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This article provides an overview of some of the most prevalent topics in post-Yugoslav memory politics as well as on some of the scholars working on these issues, focusing on the commemorative practices of the Second World War and the wars of the 1990s. Thirty years after the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's disintegration, the discourse of post-war memory politics continues to dominate nearly all of the successor states, even though two of them have seemingly left the past behind to join the European Union. While the wars of the 1990s created an entirely new memoryscape in the region, they also radically transformed the way in which each country commemorated the Second World War. Although the article examines in-depth the collective remembrance of sites of memory, such as Jasenovac, Bleiburg, and Knin, trends across the broader region are also addressed. The work of young scholars, as well as experienced researchers, who have introduced innovative approaches in memory studies in the former Yugoslavia, is highlighted to show how new studies focus on the cultural reproduction of dominant narratives in addition to top-down political discourse.

The term anti-politics refers to a whole catalog of phenomena such as the decline in citizens' interest in politics and participation in formal political institutions the process of depoliticization and technocratization of democracy and the rise inpopularity of right-wing populist parties and nationalism. The purpose of this article isto explore what anti-politics really is. This requires not only going beyond an analysis of current politicsbut also a pure descriptivism that simply registers changes in the attitudes of participants in public life. It is necessary to look at this complex phenomenon not only in the long termbut in different interpretive contexts

The purpose of the article is to analyse the role of the public prosecutor's office as an institution that is specifically embedded in between certain elements of the political system, particularly between the executive and judiciary powers. For this reason, the public prosecutor's office can be regarded, together with courts, as an institution that aims to be actively involved in administering justice and an instrument of the executive power to guarantee internal security and to execute internal functions of the state. The public prosecutor's office, given its specific operation area, is expected to prosecute crimes effectively as well as safeguard the rule of law, which may be threatened by the infringing actions of not only individuals and criminal groups but also of officials and state institutions. Hence, with respect to the accountability of the public prosecutor's office, it should be more independent of the executive power which is subject to political rules. It appears, however, that separating it officially from the executive power does not have to lead automatically to the public prosecutor's office independence of political influence when other direct (the Prime Minister's and the Minister of Justice's authority over the Attorney General) and indirect mechanisms of prosecutors' political dependency (clientelism, politicisation and political bonds of prosecutors with politicians) exist.

Stanisław Szukalski był z jednym z z najgłośniejszych i najbardziej kontrowersyjnych polskich artystów. Znany w Polsce międzywojennej, został zupełnie zapomniany po II wojnie światowej, kontynuował swoją pracę artystyczną w Stanach Zjednoczonych Ameryki, gdzie zmarł w latach 90. Szukalski zafascynowany był słowiańszczyzną, pradawną przeszłością i tradycją Słowian, szczególnie na ziemiach polskich. W tych wątkach historii znajdował inspiracje dla swojej twórczości i koncepcji politycznych. Wzbudzając tradycje inne niż katolickie i łącząc je z myślą polityczną współczesnych sobie Polaków, stał się niezwykłym nie tylko artystą ale i politykiem. Niniejszy artykuł to próba odnalezienia prawdziwych źródeł inspiracji doktryny politycznej i sztuki Stanisława Szukalskiego w oparciu o kontekst historyczny, społeczny i kulturowy epoki.

The year 1989 was both in Poland and in many other European countries, which were in the sphere of the Soviet influences, the beginning of revolutionary changes: political, economie, social and cultural ones. They also influenced the Polish language of politics which has changed radically for the last 20 years. An important reason for a variety of styles and registers is the instability of the Polish political scene, the abundance of political parties, constantly forming new parliamentary groups and government coalitions, and the disappearance of the others. In the language of the contemporary politics the lexis is particularly extensive and includes thousands of words referring to the public life of the Poles. The major point of the article is the claim that the language of contemporary politics is getting poorer, loses its elegance and becomes more and more primitive. The author sees the reasons for this pauperization in the trends of contemporary culture. He shows the main features of the phenomenon: a turn towards commonness and informality, an emotionality of expressions, a hermetic vision of the world, an impossibility of a dialogue and an increase in populist attitudes.

The authors analyze the essence of the problem of financialization of economy in the national and global perspectives, at the same time pointing out that this process also refers to the sphere of politics. The example of the 2007+ financial and banking crisis indicates the negative features of this process in reference to economy but also to the financial security of the states and their citizens. In the sphere of politics financialization in the external aspect is reflected in transferring public funds to private economic entities, mainly financial corporations, by virtue of political decisions. In the internal aspects financialization means an increasing role of financial instruments and resources in establishing public authorities, including parliaments and presidential offices. This tendency is considered by the authors to be an immanent feature of contemporary capitalism and a threat to democracy.

The ethical analysis of The Theory of Moral Sentiments as well as 'n Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations presents A. Smith's (1723-1790) works in a completely new light than it is conventionally presented in the neoliberal interpretation. One of the most important issues appears to be the classification of moral sentiments. He divides them into social, neutral, and antisocial. The neutral sentiment - the so-called 'self love' forms the basis of acting in the best interests of oneself and as such it constitutes the foundations of the development of entrepreneurship. This can be transferred into an antisocial sentiment, i.e. selfishness. In such a case it has a devastating influence on economic activity, social life as well as public life. For this reason A. Smith shows the importance of the social emotion of sympathy understood as empathy and the acceptance of the behaviours that are acknowledged as proper. As the findings of his analysis clearly show, selfishness was the characteristic trait of the businessmen at that time, i.e. merchants and the owners of manufacturing plants. With reference to the works of A. Smith we should therefore identify and then describe all the psychological as well as economic mechanisms that in effect postpone or minimise the chances of the transformation of self love into selfishness, i.e. the activities based on rational economic grounds into the ones that are driven by mere greed. The interpretation of the issue presented in the article questions the conventional neoliberal interpretation. The latter reiterates that in the works of A. Smith the most important ones are the sentences taken out of the context that define the state as a night watchman and the market that is controlled by the invisible hand. The ethical analysis holds that in the opinion of A. Smith alone, one of the most fundamental problems of capitalism lies in the fact that self love should be realised within the boundaries set by the community. The Theory of Moral Sentiments is so vital then, in which he analysed sympathy, social sentiment, and selfishness, i.e. an antisocial emotion, along with 'n Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, in which he addressed the issue of collective selfishness.

Przedmiotem artykułu jest ‒ w pierwszej części ‒ próba odpowiedzi na pytanie, w jakim stopniu fakt powoływania sędziów Trybunału Konstytucyjnego przez organ polityczny, tj. Sejm RP, determinuje polityczny charakter samego Trybunału Konstytucyjnego. Autor wskazuje m.in. na podstawie swoich własnych doświadczeń sędziego TK, że poszukiwanie iunctim pomiędzy aktem politycznego wyboru sędziów a ich aktywnością orzeczniczą nie znajduje uzasadnienia, co wyraźnie potwierdzają przykłady konkretnych rozstrzygnięć sądu konstytucyjnego w tzw. hard cases. Sędziowie wyposażeni w bardzo silne gwarancje niezawisłości potrafią zachować obiektywizm ocen i niezależność także od swoich własnych przekonań politycznych. Prawdziwym zagrożeniem niezależności Trybunału Konstytucyjnego jest natomiast presja polityczna wywierana przez rządzących, której przejawem jest np. bezpośrednia personalna krytyka sędziów TK lub odmowa wykonywania orzeczeń sądu konstytucyjnego. Szczególnie niebezpiecznym instrumentem jest próba ingerowania ustawodawcy w sprawy wewnętrznej autonomii proceduralnej TK, zmierzająca m.in. do narzucenia kolejności rozpatrywanych spraw, wprowadzenia większości kwalifikowanej 2/3 przy podejmowaniu orzeczeń w pełnym składzie czy określenia quorum na takim poziomie, który może paraliżować funkcjonowanie sądu konstytucyjnego. W drugiej części artykułu podjęto próbę odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy Trybunał może zbadać konstytucyjność procedur wprowadzonych nową ustawą o TK, zanim przystąpi do stosowania tych procedur. Autor udziela odpowiedzi twierdzącej na to pytanie, przytaczając argumenty na rzecz bezpośredniego stosowania Konstytucji, która w takich wypadkach staje się jedynym punktem odniesienia oceny nowych regulacji proceduralnych. ; In the first part of this paper an attempt is made to answer the question to what extent the fact that judges of the Constitutional Tribunal are appointed by a political organ (the Seym of the Republic of Poland) determines the political character of the Tribunal itself. Based, among otherthings, on his own experience, the author, a retired judge of the Constitutional Tribunal, states that the search for a iunctim between the political appointment of constitutional judges and their adjudicating activity is unjustified, as can be seen from the example of particular judgments delivered by the Constitutional Tribunal in what might be termed hard cases. Judges endowed with very strong guarantees of independence are capable of remaining impartial in their judgments and making decisions independently of their personal beliefs. The real threat to the independenceof the Constitutional Tribunal is political pressure exercised by government, which manifests itself in, for example, direct and personal criticism of Constitutional Tribunal judges or a refusal to implement judicial decisions issued by the Constitutional Tribunal. A particularly dangerous situation arises when a legislator attempts to intervene in the internal procedural autonomy of the Constitutional Tribunal with a view to determining the order in which the matters before the Tribunal should be dealt with, setting a 2/3 qualified majority for decisions 'when sitting as a full court' or determining the required quorum at a level which may paralyse the work of the Constitutional Tribunal altogether. In the second part of the paper the question is asked whether the Constitutional Tribunal may examine the constitutionality of the procedures being introduced by a new law on the Constitutional Tribunal before it proceeds to apply them. The answer to this question is in the affirmative, followed by arguments calling for the direct application of the Constitution which in such cases becomes the only point of reference when new procedural regulations are to be evaluated.

The Conference on "Recovering Forgotten History" is one of the oldest attempts undertaken in the III Republic to defend Poland's (and East- Central Europe's) image abroad, especially in the US. From 2006, the Conference has organized its seminars, originally bi-annually and now annually, to provide a forum for discussions between the authors of English-language history textbooks and monographs, and Polish historians who review those publications. Arguments are scholarly, grounded in evidence of primary sources and historiography, therefore, they are convincing in combatting Western prejudices and clichés about Poland and East-Central Europe. Additionally, the Conference provides opportunities for sightseeing of Poland's historical places. As a result, the work of the Conference leads not only to the removal of countless mistakes and misinterpretations in the reviewed books but also to a change of guests' attitudes toward this part of Europe. For the most part, they are academic teachers, who can also influence students through their classes. The Conference achieves all of this while having very modest means at its disposal.

The article explores the concept of civil society in connection with Web 2.0 and its transformative impact on society and politics, contrasting it with the earlier era of Web 1.0. Web 2.0, characterized by enhanced user interaction and content production, has given rise to a new media ecosystem that has reshaped the way people communicate, obtain information, and participate in the polity. The article highlights the emergence of popular social media platforms and how they have become integral to the platform society. These platforms have not only revolutionized online interactions but have also intersected with offline realms, including politics, commerce, and social relations. The article further explores the implications of Web 2.0 for civil society, contentious politics, and citizen engagement, examining the rise of protests, transnational movements, and the impact of digital resources on democracy and (digital) citizenship. Finally, the work discusses the potential of digital counter-democracy in the platform society and the need for democratic control in the digital age.

The aim of the paper is to scrutinize activities related to the commemoration of Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky. There were three main goals of the research. The first one was to identify the most important actors of the commemorative activities. The second goal was to reconstruct the strategies applied by these agents. Thirdly, this research aimed to consider current processes in the Ukrainian political system. In particular, the question was what we can know about the evolution of these commemorative activities after the Euromaidan based on relations between different agents in the mnemonic field. Special emphasis was placed on Sheptytsky's attitude during the Holocaust and on the impact of this topic on the commemorative activities. As a theoretical framework of the research, Jan Kubik and Michael Bernhard's theory of the politics of memory was applied. The research enabled verification of some elements of Kubik and Bernhard's concept. Inter alia it was an issue of a set of presumptions regarding interrelations between strategies applied by mnemonic actors, the structure of mnemonic regime, and prospects for democratization of a political system.

The victory of the National Front Party led by Ms. Marine le Pen within the European Parliamentary Election in France by May 2014 raised the question whether or not it signals the end of the French left-right bipolarized party system. This option remains uncertain. The far-right party of the 45-year-old daughter of National Front founder, Jean-Marie Le Pen, gained new voters, deepening the national audience of the extremist party geographically and in the different categories of the population. But the still remaining French "presidentialist" constitutional political regime continues to operate under a strong constraint in favor of bipolarization. Meanwhile, the possible presence of Ms. Le Pen as the two-qualified opponent for the second round of the presidential election is currently determining, and will continue to determine for the next two years, the political strategies of the 2017 future running candidates and parties.

The victory of the National Front Party led by Ms. Marine le Pen within the European Parliamentary Election in France by May 2014 raised the question whether or not it signals the end of the French left-right bipolarized party system. This option remains uncertain. The far-right party of the 45-year-old daughter of National Front founder, Jean-Marie Le Pen, gained new voters, deepening the national audience of the extremist party geographically and in the different categories of the population. But the still remaining French "presidentialist" constitutional political regime continues to operate under a strong constraint in favor of bipolarization. Meanwhile, the possible presence of Ms. Le Pen as the two-qualified opponent for the second round of the presidential election is currently determining, and will continue to determine for the next two years, the political strategies of the 2017 future running candidates and parties.

The aim of the article is to present the proposal by France as the initiator of the development of the strategic autonomy of the European Union and the politics of France before and after Russian aggression in Ukraine. The idea of the European Union's involvement in the defence sphere has been with us for years; however, the concept of strategic autonomy is differently understood in the Member States of the European Union. For this reason, the following research questions were formulated: How is the strategic autonomy of the European Union understood in the politics of France? What is the position of France in reference to developing a "Europe of defence" for the European Union's security and defence policy? How does Russia's aggression in Ukraine affect the development of the European Union's strategic autonomy in France's policy? How does Russia's aggression in Ukraine affect France's position on the spread of the EU's strategic autonomy? It would seem that the outbreak of the war in Ukraine constitutes an existential test for strategic autonomy.

The Treaty of Trianon (hereinafter Trianon), the enormous losses of territory and co-ethnics, and the shaking of Hungary's status as a dominant power in the Carpathian Basin imputed a tragic understanding of contemporary Hungarian history on the Hungarian society, invoking the idea of a trauma lasting even today. Trianon's understanding became a divisive issue for political parties after 1989, highlighting the ever-deeper divisions between right and left-liberals, since 2010. Its "overcoming" is a flagship project of the government's politics of identity, with modest success so far. Thus, the 100th anniversary was a crucial moment as a test case for a self-professed nationalist, traditionalist, conservative political force for manifesting a comprehensive politics of memory. In the light of the newly built monument at the heart of Budapest, with the Hungarian names of all localities on the territory of pre-1918 Hungary inscribed on its wall, a cautious shifting back to territorial revisionism was expected. In this article, I will argue that even with such tendencies being, obviously, present, the official commemorations were crafted with a surprising message, that attempts to turn the canonical understanding of Trianon upside down and reframe it into a common catastrophe of Central Europe. Doing so places the consequences in the context of the decolonization of history, the present decline of empires, and the emergence of nation-states while combining it with important tropes of the traditional, anti-liberal and revisionist Trianon discourse. Nevertheless, the result is a transparently political message that is not only driven by easily visible actual political goals (V4 and Central European), but one that detaches the politics of memory from historical references and legacies and creates a set of shallow symbols for utter instrumentalization, to recombine at will, in a vulgarised sense of post-modernism.