Populizam kao suvremeni izazov liberalnoj demokraciji može predstavljati prijetnju, ali i potencijalan korektiv demokraciji. Ovaj rad bavi se tipovima desnog populizma u Europi. Pretpostavlja se postojanje razlika unutar kategorije desno populističkih stranka u starim i novim demokracijama u Europi. Počinje se od određenja desnog populizma te njegovih ključnih elemenata: populizam, autoritarizam i nativizam. Program desno populističkih stranaka uključuje negativan stav prema manjinama, antiimigrantsku politiku i euroskepticizam. Cilj rada je uočiti ključne elemente koje su jednake u tim strankama, ali i uočiti potencijalne razlike među njima. Shodno tome kompariraju se četiri desno populističke stranke: poljska stranka Pravo i pravednost (PiS), francuska stranka Nacionalno okupljanje (RN), češka stranka Sloboda i izravna demokracija (SPD) i norveška Napredna stranka (FrP). U prikaz stranaka ulazi pregled postojeće znanstvene literature o navedenim strankama te usporedba stranačkih programa koja uključuje bazu podataka Manifesto Project Database (MPD). MPD sadržava kvalitativne podatke o tome kojoj temi, javnoj politici i političkoj poziciji političke stranke posvećuju pažnju u svojim izbornim i stranačkim programima. Desno populističke stranke pokazuju razlike prema svojim socioekonomskim pozicijama, poziciji prema Europskoj uniji, Rusiji i drugim međunarodnim organizacijama te koga uključuju u "opasne druge, to jest u njihovom odnosu prema etničkim i seksualnim manjima. Uočene su razlike na ekonomskoj dimenziji pa su tako neke stranke za tržišnu ekonomiju i privatizaciju, dok su druge za državni intervencionizam i povećanje socijalnih naknada. Na kulturnoj dimenziji zauzimaju sličnu radikalno desnu poziciju, no razlikuju se prema tome koju skupinu uključuju u svoje poimanje "opasnih drugih". Desni populisti pokazuju pozitivno lice populizma kada kritiziraju tehnokraciju, to jest demokratski elitizam i u svoj koncept naroda uključuju seksualne manjine. S druge strane, negativno lice pokazuju kada u "opasne ...
Glavni je cilj rada utvrditi u kojoj je mjeri novu političku opciju u Hrvatskoj, Most, opravdano nazivati populističkom. Na to pitanje autori nastoje odgovoriti korištenjem recentnih teorijskih, metodoloških i empirijskih uvida politološke literature o populizmu. Analizu temelje na inkluzivnom pristupu populizmu i iz njega izvedenoj istraživačkoj matrici na temelju koje je provedena analiza sadržaja. Analiza samo djelomice potvrđuje teze o Mostu kao populističkoj opciji. Autori smatraju kako je tu opciju najprikladnije kategorizirati kao kombinaciju centrističkog populizma i antiestablišmentske reformske stranke. Tvrde da bi istraživanja populizma trebala razlikovati antielitizam od antiestablišmentske pozicije stranaka i političara. Zanimljivost Mosta vide i u njegovu čudnom i paradoksalnom odnosu prema hrvatskoj političkoj eliti: mostovci kritiziraju političku elitu kao nekompetentnu i korumpiranu, a istodobno zagovaraju politički savez s tom istom elitom kako bi se provele reforme i donio prosperitet hrvatskom društvu. ; The main goal of the paper is to establish to which extent it is justified to label a newly established Croatian party The Bridge (Most) a populist party. In order to answer this question, the paper relies on theoretical, methodological and empirical insights from contemporary literature on populism. The study is based on inclusive approach to populism and accordingly developed categories for content analysis. The analysis only partially confirms the assumption that Most is a populist option. The authors suggest that Most is best described as a combination of centrist populism and an anti-establishment reform party. They suggest that populism research would benefit from distinguishing between anti-elitist and anti-establishment position of parties and politicians. Finally, they argue that the 'curiosity' of Most stems primarily from their awkward and paradoxical relationship towards Croatian political elite: Most's politicians criticise political elite for being incompetent and corrupt, while at the same time advocating alliance with this same elite in order to implement reforms and bring prosperity to Croatian society.
Tema rada je desni populizam, vrlo jak i raširen na cijeloj sjevernoj polutki; ovdje nas zanima naša zemlja i njoj najbliže. Najprije općenito karakteriziramo populizam, a onda razmatramo njegov odnos s najbližim mu pojavama, nacionalizmom i patriotizmom. Zanimljiv je fenomen u Hrvatskoj odsutnost snažnih jasno populističkih stranki usprkos snažnoj nacionalističkoj orijentaciji u izbornoj bazi; najjednostavnije je objašnjenje da je HDZ uspio preuzeti važne teme desnog populizma, a ipak sačuvati formu i ideologiju parlamentarne demokracije. Koliko je to rješenje stabilno vidjet će se u budućnosti. Uspon populizma promijenio je okvir političkih dilema kod nas i u svijetu; zastupnici suprotnih stajališta sada moraju ponovno promisliti pretpostavke na kojima djeluju i ponuditi nova rješenja. ; The topic of the paper is right-wing populism, strong and widespread throughout the Northern Hemisphere; although the focus is on Croatia and its closest neighborhood. First, the author defines populism and then considers its relationship with its closest phenomena, nationalism, and patriotism. An interesting puzzle about Croatia is the absence of strong, clearly populist parties, despite a strong nationalist orientation in the electoral base; the simplest explanation is that the strongest party, HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) has managed to take on important topics of right-wing populism while still preserving the form and ideology of parliamentary democracy. How stable this solution is will be seen in the future. The rise of populism has changed the frame of political contestation in our country and in the world; proponents of opposing political standpoints must now rethink the assumptions of their political action and offer new solutions.
Populizam je aktualan politički fenomen o kojem se mnogo raspravlja u posljednjih nekoliko desetljeća. Postavlja se pitanje kako se i zašto pojavljuje u nekim zemljama, dok u drugima ne. U radu nastojim putem višestruke studije slučaja objasniti kako se ključni politički lideri u Francuskoj, Turskoj i Kanadi koriste populističkim diskursom. Ono što im omogućuje artikuliranje populizma u govorima su različito pojmljene krize i politička kultura. U Francuskoj i Turskoj Marine Le Pen i Recep Tayyip Erdoğan u svojim kampanjskim videspotovima koriste se populističkom retorikom kako bi mobilizirali narod. Riječ je o populističkom konceptu naroda, a ne o cijelom narodu unutar njihovih zemalja. U Francuskoj Marine Le Pen zastupa protuimigracijsku politiku i nastoji stvoriti egzistencijalni strah, kriveći političke elite koje naziva oligarhijom za migrantsku krizu i podređivanje nacionalnih interesima onima Europske Unije. U Turskoj Erdoğan kritizira sekularizam, opoziciju, Zapad i Europsku Uniju, čime udara u temelje stupova demokracije republike Turske, stvarajući tako u zemlji krizu demokracije. U Kanadi se populizam veže za premijera Justina Trudeaua, no u ovom slučaju je riječ o "krnjem" populizmu u kojem nedostaje nužan koncept političkih elita i "opasnih drugih". U Kanadi do populizma kakav se pojavljuje u Francuskoj i Kanadi ne može doći zbog multikulturalizma koji je na snazi u ovoj federalnoj državi. ; Populism is an actual political phenomenon, about which there has been a lot of discussion during last few decades. The question is why does it appear in some states, and in some not. In my paper I am trying to explain, by using multiple case-study, how do key political leaders in France, Turkey and Canada use populist discourse. They are in possibility to use populism in their speeches because of different types of crisis in their states and also different political culture. In France and Turkey, Marine Le Pen and Recep Tayyip Erdogan are usinbg populist rhetoric in their campaign videospots to mobilize the ...
Demokracije su u opasnosti da će ih zadaviti populistički demagozi, koji se postavljaju kao jedini i istinski vođe "naroda", i koji zanemarujući ustavnu "strukturu slobode", parlamentarnu supremaciju, kontrolu sudova i, nadasve, ustavna ograničenja dovode u izravnu vezu s odlučivanjem biračkog tijela. Referendumi se sve više koriste za donošenje određenih odluka koje ne mogu proći u parlamentu. Tvrdi se da ne smije postojati nikakva prepreka vlasti naroda. Ovaj je fenomen najpoznatiji liberalni časopis The Economist obilježio novom riječju referendumanijom u kojoj se referendum izravno povezuje s manijom. U okolnostima kada televizija i Internet pokazuje svu bijedu brojnih skupština i to ne samo u novim već i u zrelim demokracijama taj je fenomen dobio punu simpatiju šire javnosti. Nakon što je u Velikoj Britaniji toj matici svih parlamenata referendum o Brexitu iskorišten kao instrument političke borbe što je dovelo do tekućeg "pretapanja" visoko cijenjenog britanskog političkog sistema izgleda da se ispunilo najgore moguće proročanstvo o napredovanju populističkih snaga u velikom broju europskih država. Republika Hrvatska je već dugo izložena takvim ugrozama od strane političkih grupa koje se ekstremno protive politici Vlade, počam od katoličkih konzervativaca a odnedavno i sindikalista. Zahvaljujući neadekvatnoj regulaciji refrerenduma o građanskim inicijativama gdje se ne govori o nikakvom kvorumu već se odluka donosi većinom onih koji glasuju mogućnosti manipulacije su ogromne. U postojećim okolnostima trajne konfuzije, brojni političari koji su već izjavili svoju namjeru da će ukoliko budu izabrani za Predsjednika Republike takav referendum koristiti radi uklanjanja svih kontrola i provjera koje postoje između šefa države i "naroda". Imajući u vidu krizu demokracije i smatrajući takve prijetnje sasvim ozbiljnim autor naglašava potrebu da se jednim međustranačkim dogovorom stvore uvjeti kojima bi se referendum uz odgovarajuću regulaciju uklopio u deemokreatski sistem ustavne demokracije. ; Democracies are at risk to be strangled by the populist demagogues, posturing as the only and true leaders of 'the people', while disregarding constitutional "structure of liberty", meaning that, the parliamentary supremacy, judicial review and, above all, the constitutional limits to the very direct decision making by the voters' constituencies. Referenda are being used ever more, often to push certain decision, which could not pass the parliament. The claim is that there must not be any limits to the power of the people. That phenomenon the most esteemed liberal magazine "The Economist" nicknamed coining the word "referendumania", apparently combining 'a mania' with 'referenda'. It has been received with a lot of sympathy by the general public, in circumstances when the television and the Internet shows all the misery of the numerous assemblies, not only in a new but also in the mature democracies. After the referendum on the Brexit has been used as an instrument of the political struggle in the mother of parliaments, Great Britain, which lead to the ongoing "melting down" of the highly valued British political system, it seems that the worst of prophecies are realized by advancing populist forces in a number of Euroepan states. Republic of Croatia has been for a long time exposed to such treats, by the political groups extremely opposed to governmental policies, first by the Catholic conservatives and most recently by the trade unionists. Due to the very inadequate regulation of the referenda on civil initiatives, whereas the decision is to be made by a majority of those who vote, without any quorum being provided, the posibilites of manipulation are enormous. In the lasting confusion, a number of politicians has already proclaimed their intention, if elected the president of the Republic, to use such a referendum in order to remove all the checks and balances between the chief of state and "the people". Taking such treats very seriously in the existing crisis of democracy, the author emphasizes hi plead for an interparty agreement which would enable the referendum to be properly regulated and thus incorporated into the system of a democratic constitutional democracy.
Svrha je rada upotpuniti spoznaje o populizmu u kontekstu hrvatskoga društva, s naglaskom na prihvaćanju populizma među mladima kao nositeljima budućega društvenog razvoja. Budući da su za istraživanje sklonosti populizmu mediji, kao oblikovatelji javnoga mišljenja, među najvažnijim izvorima relevantnih spoznaja, posebna se pozornost posvećuje odnosu upotrebe dnevnoinformativnih portala i prihvaćanju populizma. Istraživanje je provedeno na dvoetapno izabranom neprobabilističkom uzorku od 1189 studenata Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, kako bi se utvrdili odnosi između sklonosti studenata općem, lijevom i desnom populizmu te njihovih navika upotrebe dnevnoinformativnih portala i nekih individualnih obilježja. Rezultati pokazuju kako kod studenata postoje trendovi niske, ali značajne povezanosti između upotrebe većine portala i sklonosti općem, lijevom i desnom populizmu. Utvrđena je povezanost obrazovanja roditelja sa studentskom sklonosti lijevom i desnom populizmu te razlike u tim sklonostima u odnosu na sociodemografska obilježja, razinu studija, studijsko usmjerenje, političku orijentaciju, religioznost i povjerenje u institucije. ; The purpose of the paper is to fulfil the findings on populism in the context of Croatian society, with an emphasis on the acceptance of populism among young people as bearers of the future social development. Media, as a form of public opinion, are among the most important sources of relevant insights for the study of the rise of populism. The paper pays special attention to the relationship between the use of daily news portals, and the acceptance of populism. The study was conducted on a two-stage non-probabilistic sample of 1189 students of the University of Zagreb, in order to determine the relationships between students' preferences in general, left-wing and right-wing populism, their habits of using daily news portals, and some individual characteristics. The results show that there is a low but significant correlation between the use of most portals, and the preference for general, left- -wing and right-wing populism among students. The correlation between the education of parents with student preferences of left-wing and right-wing populism was found, as well as differences in these preferences with respect to some sociodemographic characteristics, level of study, study orientation, political orientation, religiosity and trust in institutions.
Manjak povjerenja u demokratske procese, frustriranost vladajućom elitom i opadanje interesa za politiku trendovi su vidljivi diljem svijeta. Takav politički okoliš pogoduje javljanju populističkih stranaka, točnije onih koje uviđaju da elite više ne zagovaraju želje svojih sugrađana i koje vjeruju da je jedino rješenje problema vraćanje moći u ruke naroda. Danas gotovo svaka država ima svoju populističku opciju, a čini se da i Hrvatska ne odstupa od pravila. Na parlamentarnim izborima 2020. godine javile su se dvije nove stranke koje su uspjele prodrmati Sabor i osvojiti 7 mjesta za stranku Možemo! te 16 mjesta za Domovinski pokret. Mediji su obje stranke brzo okarakterizirali populističkim. Budući da se toliki dio života odvija u virtualnoj sferi, cilj ovog rada je istražiti koriste li političke stranke Možemo! i Domovinski pokret populizam u svojim Facebook objavama. Facebook je najraširenija društvena platforma u Hrvatskoj koja se iznova pokazuje pogodnom za političku komunikaciju. Metodom analize sadržaja analizirano je ukupno 60 Facebook objava, 30 od svake stranke, kroz dva razdoblja – prije i poslije izbora. Objava se smatrala populističkom ako je sadržavala dva konstitutivna elementa: pozitivno spominjanje naroda i negativno spominjanje elita. Rezultati ukazuju kako obje stranke slabo koriste populizam u svojoj političkoj komunikaciji, a glavni razlog tomu je što rijetko spominju narod, a ako ga spominju, spominju ga u neutralnom kontekstu. Jedno moguće objašnjenje ovakvih rezultata je način korištenja Facebooka kojeg stranke ne koriste kao sredstvo za učvršćivanje komunikacije sa svojim biračima, nego kao kolekciju svojih nastupa u medijima ili govora iz Sabora. Još jedno moguće objašnjenje je da stranke koriste populistički stil u određenim trenucima kako bi pridobile simpatije šireg segmenta naroda, a da su ih mediji okarakterizirali populističkim bez stvarnog uporišta. ; A lack of trust in democratic processes, growing frustration with the ruling elite and a declining interest in politics are trends visible around the world. Such a political environment favors the emergence of populist parties -those who see that elites no longer advocate the wishes of their fellow citizens and who believe that the only solution to the problem is to return power to the people. Today, almost every country has its own populist option, and it seems that Croatia does not deviate from the rules. In the parliamentary elections in 2020, two new parties appeared that managed to shake up the Parliament and win 7 seats for the We Can Party! (Možemo!) and 16 seats for the Homeland Movement (Domovinski pokret). The media quickly characterized both parties as populist. Since such a big part of life takes place in the virtual sphere, the aim of this paper is to investigate whether political parties We can! and the Homeland Movement use populism in their Facebook posts. Facebook is the most widespread social platform in Croatia, which is continuously proving to be suitable for political communication. Using content analysis, a total of 60 Facebook posts were analyzed, 30 from each party, over two periods - before and after the election. The post was considered populist if it contained two constitutive elements - a positive mention of the people and a negative mention of the elites. The results indicate that both parties make little use of populism in their political communication and the main reason for this is that they rarely mention the people, and if they do, they mention them in a neutral context. One possible explanation for these results is the way Facebook is used, as parties do not use it as a means of strengthening communication with their constituents, but as a collection of their media appearances or speeches from Parliament. Another possible explanation is that the parties use a populist style at certain times in order to gain the sympathy of a wider segment of the people, and that the media characterized them as populist without a real foothold.
Od široj javnosti nepoznate političke opcije, MOST nezavisnih lista je u manje od godinu dana prije parlamentarnih izbora uspio privući ogromno biračko tijelo i osvojiti čak 19 mandata u Hrvatskom Saboru. Prije toga su u samo pola godina od osnutka do lokalnih izbora u Metkoviću, srušili Stipu Gabrića Jamba koji je tim gradom vladao punih 16 godina. Što je to što je MOST približilo hrvatskim građanima koji su dotad svoje glasove redovito dijelili između HDZ-a i SDP-a? Jesu li to dotad ostvareni uspjesi u Metkoviću ili je MOST svojom političkom komunikacijom uspio uvjeriti građane u svoju politiku, odnosno predstaviti se kao drugačiji, "outsideri" koji se bore protiv snažnih političkih elita? Ovaj diplomski rad kreće od pretpostavke da je MOST nezavisnih lista u svojoj predizbornoj kampanji za parlamentarne izbore 2015. godine veoma uspješno koristio populističke metode kao što su isticanje podjele društva na pošten narod i korumpiranu političku elitu, izjednačavanje s građanima te snažno naglašenu ulogu vođe. ; From unknown political option to the wider public, MOST nezavisnih lista (The Bridge of Independent lists) has in less than a year before Croatian parliamentary election gathered a respectable following winning 19 seats in the Croatian Parliament. Even earlier, the party won local elections in Metković in just 6 months after the establishment conquering Stipe Gabrić Jambo that had ruled the city for 16 years. What is it about MOST that appealed to Croatian citizens that would regularly choose between the Croatian Democratic Union and Social Democratic Party? Is it about their success in Metković or has MOST managed to use its political communication to convince the citizens that their policy is the best, that is, to present itself as a different party, outsiders fighting against strong political elites? This thesis starts from the premise that MOST successfully used populist methods as highlighting the problems of the division of Croatian society into honest people and corrupt political elites, ...
Autor u članku razmatra suvremene oblike predstavničke demokracije u svjetlu triju teorijskih i ideoloških sukoba. Prvi se odnosi na one koji se bore za konsolidiranu predstavničku demokraciju, te razvijaju teorije "manjkave demokracije". Predstavnici tog pravca razmatraju elemente koji nedostaju njihovim režimima da bi normalno funkcionirali kao sustavi predstavničke demokracije, te sustave više ne klasificiraju samo prema formalnim kriterijima (parlamentarna ili predsjednička predstavnička demokracija), nego razmatraju i integraciju drugih podsustava u sustav konzekventnih demokratskih pravila igre u "ukotvljenoj demokraciji". Drugi pravac odnosi se na pojavu populizma kao izazova predstavničkoj demokraciji. Zemlje u kojima je predstavnička demokracija konsolidirana sve su manje zadovoljne formaliziranim rutinama sustava i razvijaju nove populističke vizije bolje i reprezentativnije demokracije nasuprot puke proceduralne demokracije u kojoj postoji konkurencija elita. I na kraju, treći pravac odnosi se na nove modele demokracije koji se razvijaju u normativnim teorijama koje razmatraju nedostatke predstavničkih demokracija. Unutar tog pravca razvijaju se vizije "boljih demokracija" u duhu republikanizma, deliberativne demokracije, refleksivne demokracije i drugih koncepcija "demokratizacije demokracije".* ; In this paper, the author examines contemporary forms of representative democracy in the light of three theoretical and ideological conflicts. The first conflict concerns those who strive for a consolidated representative democracy, and develop theories of "defective democracies". Advocates of this thrust examine the elements which their regimes lack to operate normally as systems of representative democracy, and no longer classify systems only against formal criteria (parliamentary or presidential representative democracy), but also consider the integration of other subsystems into the system of consistent democratic rules of the game in an "embedded democracy". The second thrust concerns the rise of populism as a challenge to representative democracy. Countries in which representative democracy has been consolidated are increasingly dissatisfied with the formalised system routines and develop new populist visions of a better and more representative democracy in contrast to the mere procedural democracy in which there is a competition of elites. Finally, the third theoretical thrust concerns new models of democracy developed in normative theories which deal with the deficiencies of representative democracies. In this view, visions of "better democracies" have been developed in the spirit of republicanism, deliberative democracy, reflexive democracy and other concepts of "democratisation of democracy.
Autor u radu obrađuje desne političke stranke. Riječ je o najbrže rastućoj stranačkoj obitelji u Europi. U tom smislu analizira i prikazuje ideologiju, pojmove i vrste desnih političkih stranaka. Posebna pozornost posvećena je ideologiji stranaka radikalne desnice kroz teorijski okvir nizozemskoga politologa Casa Muddea. ; The author deals with right-wing political parties. It is the fastest growing party family in Europe. In this sense, he analyses and displays the ideology, concepts, and types of right-wing political parties. Special attention is paid to the ideology of the parties of the radical right through the theoretical framework of the Dutch political scientist Cas Mudde.
Sveučilišni profesor upravnog prava, političar, šekspirolog i esejist Vinko Krišković (Senj, 1861. – Zürich, 1952.) u više svojih djela s temama iz filozofije politike zagovara liberalizam na fonu engleskih autora i engleske političke prakse. Krišković je razmjerno slabo prisutan u hrvatskoj političkoj i intelektualnoj povijesti, među ostalim i zbog toga što nije pristajao niti uz jednu političku opciju djelatnu u Hrvatskoj dvadesetih, tridesetih, četrdesetih i pedesetih godina prošlog stoljeća (integralno jugoslavenstvo, haesesovski populizam, totalitarno ustaštvo, jugoslavenski komunizam). Autor sugerira mogući odgovor na pitanje - u kolikoj mjeri on argumente za otpor ovim opcijama i nepristajanje uz njih nalazi u filozofiji, i je li Kriškovićev slučaj u nekoj mjeri relevantan i za aktualne probleme i prijepore. ; Professor of administrative law at the University of Zagreb, politician, essayist and first Croatian member of the Royal Shakespeare Society Vinko Krišković (Senj 1861 - Zurich 1952) dealt in some of his works with the topic of political philosophy. He was an advocate of liberal positions inspired by English authors and English political practice. Krišković is relatively unknown in the Croatian political and intellectual history, i.a. because he opposed all the political options present in Yugoslavia and Croatia in the first half of the 19th century (integral Yugoslavism, Peasant Party populism, totalitarian Ustasha movement, Yugoslav Communism). The author offers possible answers to the questions to what extent did Krišković find the arguments needed to resist these political options in philosophy and whether his case is in any measure relevant for the current issues and controversies.
U svom djelu Zatvorena trgovačka država iz 1800. godine, njemački filozof Johann Gottlieb Fichte zagovara ekonomsku autarkiju kao radikalan oblik protekcionizma, dok 1840. njemačko-američki ekonomist Friedrich List izdaje »bibliju protekcionizma«, djelo Nacionalni sustav političke ekonomije u kojem se suprotstavlja učenju Adama Smitha o važnosti slobodne trgovine i međunarodne razmjene. Pitanje otvorene ili zatvorene privrede iznimno je aktualno s obzirom na to da su globalizacijski procesi rezultirali rastućim nejednakostima i drugim anomalijama te se, kao reakcija, ponovno javljaju, ako su ikad i nestale, snažne protekcionističke prakse. U radu će se pokušati odgovoriti na pitanje je li globalni kapitalizam nužno suprotstavljen ekonomskom nacionalizmu te koju poziciju u toj opreci danas zauzimaju lijeve i desne političke opcije. Naime, umjesto lijeva ili desna, sve češće može se čuti da je neka stranka sistemska ili prosvjedna, pri čemu se tzv. sistemskima predbacuje da žele zadržati status quo u provođenju neoliberalne agende, dok prosvjedne često klize u populizme i nacionalizme. ; Johann Gottlieb Fichte in his work The Closed Commercial State (1800) argued for economic autarky as the next reform of protectionism. German-American economist Friedrich List published The National System of Political Economy (1840) which is considered to be the "Bible of protectionism". List was the opponent of Adam Smith's theses on the importance of free trade and international market. The advocate in a shift from open to closed economy is actual in the globalized world, which is determined by growing inequality and other social and political anomalies. Protectionism is imposed as a possible response to the discontents of globalization. The paper attempts to answer if there is a link between global capitalism and economic nationalism, and how are left and right political parties related to that possible link. Recently, in the days of political dissatisfaction, the alternative between left and right positions is replaced by the opposition between system and anti-system or protest parties. While system parties are criticized for keeping a status quo of neoliberal agenda, protest parties slide into nationalism and populism.
Glavni cilj disertacije je analizirati ideologiju glavnih predstavnika radikalne desnice u Poljskoj. Ova doktorska disertacija dizajnirana je kao studija slučaja unutar okvira kulturalnog pristupa u političkim znanostima. Kao metoda istraživanja odabrana je kombinacija kvalitativne analize sadržaja i konceptualne analize ideologije Michaela Freedena. Iako je najveći fokus istraživanja na dvjema političkim strankama (Zakon i pravda i Liga poljskih obitelji) kao glavnim predstavnicima radikalno desne političke scene u Poljskoj, istraživanje se bavi i drugim akterima, prije svega organizacijama civilnog društva, društvenim pokretima i medijima, koji sudjeluju u konstruiranju i promoviranju ideologije radikalne desnice. Pritom istraživanje nije ograničeno na sadržaj ideologije i aktere koji tu ideologiju promoviraju, već ono uključuje i analizu procesa putem kojih se ideologija radikalne desnice eksplicira i formulira, kao i analizu dinamičnih odnosa među akterima procesa proizvodnje ideologije doprinoseći istraživanju ideologije radikalne desnice kao i istraživanju procesa konstruiranja političkih ideologija općenito. Kao polazište za navedenu analizu u disertaciji se koristi ponešto modificirana definicija radikalne desnice poznatog politologa Casa Muddea prema kojoj su konstitutivna obilježja radikalne desnice integralni nacionalizam, autoritarnost i populizam. Analizom je utvrđeno kako su sve tri ideološke karakteristike tipične za radikalnu desnicu prisutne kod glavnih aktera istraživanih u ovoj disertaciji. Na tragu konceptualne analize, ova disertacija je pokazala kako središnji konstitutivni koncept radikalno desne ideologije u Poljskoj predstavlja nacija, i kako svi ostali okolni koncepti detektirani analizom, poput solidarnosti, jednakosti šansi, pravde, demokracije, slobode, zadobivaju svoje značenje na temelju svog odnosa prema središnjem konstitutivnom obilježju ideologije. ; In the last thirty years or so, the influence of the radical right has been constantly growing throughout Europe. This political success has been accompanied by an increasingly intensive scientific research on the phenomenon of the radical right, which has resulted in several studies that address various aspects of the radical right phenomenon in Europe. Paradoxically, despite such an abundance of research papers, their review suggests that there are relatively few papers that have a systematic and in-depth approach to the political ideology of the radical right. This doctoral dissertation fills this research gap and focuses on the political ideology of the radical right, taking into account the thesis of the well-known researcher of political ideologies Michael Freeden, that political ideologies are the center of political analysis because the study of ideologies can provide relevant insights necessary for understanding politics and political processes. In the context of the debate on the wave of radicalism in Europe, Poland is a particularly interesting case. Firstly, it is the largest and most populous post-communist country that became a member of the EU and a country in which the radical right won three parliamentary and three presidential elections between 2005 and 2020. Secondly, in academic papers and media Poland is often portrayed as an example of a country that has successfully gone through the process of transformation to liberal democracy and as an example of the most successful transition economy in Europe. The Polish case is also interesting because it is a a country with more than 90% of declared Catholics and where, primarily due to historical development, Catholicism plays a significant role in political, social, and cultural life; it has become a key component of the Polish national identity. In contrast to Western European countries, in Poland Political Catholicism, did not spark the development of strong Christian- Democratic parties, it rather gave rise to radical right-wing parties instead. In addition to cultural factors, historical heritage is often considered a fertile ground for the emergence of this type of parties, especially its influence on political processes and on the processes of building a national identity. Namely, the Polish historical heritage, specifically the one related to the 20th century, was marked by a short period of democratic rule (1918-1925), and two long periods of authoritarian rule, that of Jozef Pilsudski (1925 to 1939), and that of the communist authoritarians (1945 to 1989). Thus, the main goal of the dissertation is to analyze the ideology of the main representatives of the radical right in Poland by exploring its discursive manifestations, as well as the way in which the radical right ideology is produced. This doctoral dissertation is designed as a case study within the framework of a cultural approach in political sciences. The cultural approach is characterized by the insistence on the importance of context, which, on the other hand, makes it difficult to define clear independent, dependent, and intervening variables. Therefore, in the cultural approach, a case is most often taken as the analytical unit taking into consideration all the complexity of its historical and socio-political distinctiveness. Qualitative content analysis was chosen as the research method, and conceptual analysis of Michael Freeden's ideology was added to it, since this approach allows us to better understand the morphology of ideologies and their operationalization in politics. The first chapter is about the theoretical and methodological framework. Since the concept of the radical right is one of the deeply contested concepts which there is no consensus about in political science, and since the aim of this doctoral dissertation is to explain this concept, the first part of the chapter consists of a review and analysis of recent literature. The notion of the radical right was analyzed through comparison with related terms such as the extreme right, right-wing populism, and the far right. As a starting point for analysis in the dissertation, a somewhat modified definition of the radical right by the well-known political scientist Cas Mudde is used. According to him, the constitutive features of the radical right are integral nationalism, authoritarianism, and populism. Like the concept of the radical right, the concept of ideology is also ambivalent and can be understood in different ways which result in multiple uses of the term ideology which are often contradictory. This doctoral dissertation is largely based on the morphological approach to the study of ideology developed by Michael Freeden. The second chapter deals with the history of Poland before 1989. The first part of the chapter explains the early context of the emergence of Polish nationalism, which has its roots in the 'noble democracy' of the 17th century, as well as in the national struggles for independence of the 19th century. However, the chapter focuses on two periods that significantly influenced the emergence and growth of Polish political nationalism in the early 2000s. The first is the interwar period (1918-1939) in which two traditions of Polish political thought, Sanacja and Endeca, crystallized, and from which two visions of the Polish nation, national identity, and the nation-state, emerged. The second period is after the Second World War, i.e., the period of the People's Republic of Poland in which the legitimization and institutionalization of the nationalist discourse take place. Equally, in this period there emerged and formed social groups with different visions of the Polish state after the fall of communism. The third chapter deals with the transformation of the People's Republic of Poland into the The third Republic and with an account of political and social events in the first decade after the fall of communism. This chapter sheds light on the political and social context within which the dominant social divisions in Polish society emerged, which in large part resulted in the evolution of radical right-wing parties in the early 2000s. In particular, the very nature of the transformation process emerged as the main subject of dispute. Namely, the Polish right believes that due to the contractual transformation of the system, the 'revolution' is not over and that the left-liberal groups have made an agreement with the former communist establishment. They believe that the Third Republic is a product of this agreement and that it serves the left-liberal and former communist elites to maintain positions of power and rule the The third Republic to the detriment of the oppressed people. This conspiratorial narrative represents the foundation around which the politics and ideology of the radical right have been built in Poland since 2000. The fourth chapter deals with the emergence and profiling of two radical right-wing parties, Law and Justice (Polish: Prawo I Sprawiedliwość – PiS) and the League of Polish Families (Polish: Liga Polskich Rodzin – LPR) . The chapter is structured in such a way as to first present the history of the formation of these parties, with an emphasis on the main actors who participated as the originators and implementers of these projects. In both cases, these are largely the 'family projects' of the Kaczynski brothers (Law and Justice) and father and son Giertych (League of Polish Families). From the Kaczynskis' biographies, it is obvious that they come from an environment dominated by the legacy of Sanacja, while father and son Giertych openly presents themselves as the heirs of the interwar Endecja. After presenting their political activities and the first successes in the elections, the ideology of these two parties is reconstructed, primarily from their programs and other party publications. The research showed that until 2005 both parties contained all the constitutive elements of the radical right according to Mudde's conceptualization. While these constitutive elements have been present in the League of Polish Families since its founding, the party Law and Justice gradually became radicalized. This period, at least from the perspectives of PiS and LPR, is dominated by the conflict between the post-communist elites (former communists and left-liberal intellectuals) gathered around the left Democratic Left Alliance (Polish: Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, SLD) and the so-called "patriotic' camp that emerged from Solidarity. This chapter also covers the period between 2005 and 2007 when these two parties, together with the Self-Defense party, formed a government that lasted less than two years. This first, shorter coming to power of the radical right in Poland is not important because of the public policies they pursued during that period, but because of the experience and lessons gained by PiS during its rule in the liberal democratic system. Namely, after 2007, the LPR disappeared from the Polish political scene, leaving the PiS as the only relevant political actor of the radical right. The fifth chapter covers the period between 2007 and 2015. It is the period of rule by the Civic Platform (Polish: Platforma Obywatelska, PO), a center-right party with strong pro-EU views and liberal economic and social policies. Due to the disappearance of the left from the Polish political scene, the main social and political conflict underwent a radical change. PiS formulated a new conflict – the struggle between solidarity and liberal or corporate Poland – and built its ideology around this conflict. This period in Polish political and social life was marked by the immigration crisis that hit Europe and the debate on the acceptance of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women, the so-called Istanbul Convention. Both topics as well as the pro-European orientation of the PO government led to the mobilization of radical right-wing social groups and media that skillfully occupied public space by successfully imposing their topics on the public agenda. As this dissertation will show, PiS has adapted its discourse to that of radical right-wing organizations and has successfully presented itself as their political representative. On the one hand, this 'alliance' helped the PiS succeed in the 2015 presidential and parliamentary elections, while on the other it marked the further radicalization of the PiS, especially when it comes to issues of morals and values. The sixth chapter deals with the period between 2015 and 2020. During that period, the PiS won both the presidential and the parliamentary elections twice. This chapter emphasizes how PiS translates its ideology into public policies. Namely, during this period PiS focused its efforts on two projects: 'repairing the state' and rebuilding the community (nation). The first project was marked by the judicial reform and the crisis related to the Constitutional Court; it aimed to strengthen the executive branch to the detriment of other branches of government. The PiS community reconstruction project was conceived as a change in the material and spiritual dimension of the community. The first is mostly related to social policies, the emphasis being on family policies. Changes in the spiritual dimension imply changes in cultural policy, within which there has been a reform of public media and the announcement of the "recolonization" of private media. In changing the spiritual dimension, PiS placed special emphasis on the defense of the traditional way of life on the one hand, and on the politics of history on the other, in which the Institute of National Remembrance played an exceptional role. The seventh chapter takes the form of a final discussion in which the basic theses of the radical right ideology in Poland are reconstructed. The aim of this discussion is to position the topic of this dissertation within the framework of a broader theoretical discussion between liberals and their critics. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the main research results in this doctoral dissertation and points to the possible direction of future research, especially research of countries with a strong radical right and with a similar historical and cultural heritage. Equally, the conclusion points to the fact that this dissertation has not fully answered the research question related to finding out how ideology is constructed, and the actors involved in the process. Namely, the problem was the research design and selection of the analysis method. The conclusion is that a more complete answer to this research question would require some field research, preferably using the method of interview or survey. Finally, we believe that some future research on ideology should move in that direction.
RIJEČ UREDNIŠTVA Nova promjena u vezi s plaćanjima naknade za općekorisne funkcije šuma, tretirane kao parafiskalni namet, potiče nas da opetovano progovorimo o tom problemu. Na Poduzetničkom portalu čitamo: Premda se službeno zovu "neporezna davanja" u javnosti se već uvriježio termin "parafiskalni nameti", a popisan je 161 parafiskalni namet, koji kažu naciji oduzima oko 2,5 % BDP-a. Detaljnije pak pojašnjenje prema definiciji Ministarstva financija kaže: "parafiskalni nameti su sva propisana obvezna neporezna davanja koja plaćaju poduzeća središnjim tijelima državne uprave, jedinicama lokalne i područne (regionalne) samouprave ili drugim tijelima s javnim ovlastima, ako pri tome: platitelj ne dobiva za uzvrat neku uslugu, dobro ili pravo .". Ako je tome tako zbog čega se onda naknada za općekorisne funkcije šuma tretira kao parafiskalni namet? Naime, u ovome slučaju nesporno je da platitelj dobiva za uzvrat uslugu, dobro ili pravo. To bi trebalo biti svima jasno ako samo pogledaju Zakon o šumama, gdje su navedene općekorisne funkcije šuma kako slijedi: 1. zaštita tla, prometnica i drugih objekata od erozije, bujica i poplava; 2. utjecaj na vodni režim i kvalitetu voda; 3. utjecaj na plodnost tla i poljodjelsku proizvodnju; 4. utjecaj na klimu i ublažavanje posljedica klimatskih promjena; 5. zaštita i unapređenje čovjekova okoliša; 6. stvaranje kisika, ponor ugljika i pročišćavanje atmosfere; 7. rekreativna, turistička i zdravstvena funkcija; 8. stvaranje povoljnih uvjeta za divljač i ostalu faunu te 9. povećan utjecaj zaštitnih šuma i šuma posebne namjene na bioraznolikost. U pojedinim funkcijama imaju korist samo neki, a u nekima svi. Naknada za općekorisne funkcije šuma prvotno je iznosila 0,07 % od ukupnoga godišnjeg prihoda, 2010. godine pada na 0,0525 %, a potom 2012. godine na 0,0265 % da bi 2018. godine bili oslobođeni plaćanja oni koji ostvaruju ukupni prihod manji od 3 milijuna kn godišnje. Sada se oslobađaju plaćanja oni s ukupnim godišnjim prihodom manjim od 7,5 milijuna kn, a postotak pada na 0,024. Da bi nam bilo jasnije, izračunajmo koliko je to novaca godišnje – na 3 milijuna kn to je bilo 795,00 kn/god., a na 7,5 milijuna kn to je 1.800,00 kn/god. (velik novac !?). Sagledavajući kronologiju smanjenja naknade za općekorisne funkcije šume i histeriju koja vlada oko parafiskalnih nameta, ne bi nas iznenadilo da obnašatelji vlasti nakon parlamentarnih izbora potpuno ukinu ovaj po nama potreban ekološki progresivni porez. Nažalost, ne bi bilo prvi puta da se radi populizma povlače potezi koji nisu dobri ni za državu ni za društvo. Od glavnih gospodarskih djelatnosti: 1. proizvodnje drvnih šumskih proizvoda, 2. proizvodnje šumskog reprodukcijskog materijala i 3. proizvodnje nedrvnih šumskih proizvoda, očekuje se i dobit koja se uplaćuje u državni proračun. Sve to unatoč netržišnom poslovanju u prometu tim proizvodima i nužnim potrebama pravodobnog i sveobuhvatnog rada na uzgojnim i zaštitarskim radovima u šumskom ekosustavu koji se često "preskače", kako bi dobit bila čim veća. Više puta ukazivali smo da u šumarstvu nema dobiti, ako vratimo šumi ono što smo joj uzeli, a da bi ona bila u optimumu, ili slikovito rečeno "vječna". O svakoj od devet navedenih općekorisnih funkcija često smo govorili, potkrijepivši naše riječi istraživačkim rezultatima. Brojke su impresivne i najbolje se pamte. Govoreći, zbog manjka prostora u rubrici, primjerice samo o njenoj hidrološkoj funkciji, rečeno je kako niti jedan vegetacijski oblik ne utječe tako djelotvorno na vodu kao šuma - ona uravnotežuje raspored vode u prostoru, ravnomjerno opskrbljuje vodotoke i ublažava pojavu visokih vodnih valova, utječe na čistoću vode i broj izvorišta. Procjeđivanjem vode kroz živo i rahlo šumsko tlo, ona u podzemne tokove ulazi pitka. Ako uzmemo u obračun prosječnu godišnju količinu oborina u Hrvatskoj od 1200 mm i površinu šuma od samo 2 milijuna ha (ona je veća) računa se da iz šume istječe oko 13 milijardi tona pitke vode. Tko dobiva tu uslugu – svi uključivši i platitelja! Ovako bi mogli i o ostalim općekorisnim funkcijama. E sada, neki kažu pisano je već o svemu tome i rečeno na mnogim šumarskim skupovima, ali mi šumari govorimo sami sebi – a mi pitamo kolegice i kolege: servirani su vam podaci u ovoj rubrici i drugim tekstovima – zašto to ne širite među poznanike, a oni politički angažirani šumarski stručnjaci među kolege političare na lokalnoj, regionalnoj pa i državnoj razini? Pitamo se, da li je pristojno reći da ste se "zavukli u mišju rupu"? Vi odgovorite! Uredništvo ; EDITORIAL A new change referring to the payment of non-market forest function fees, regarded as a parafiscal tax, urges us to again discuss this problem. We read on the Entrepreneurial Portal: Although officially called "non-tax benefits", the term "parafiscal levies" has already become commonplace in the public, and 161 parafiscal levies have been listed, which is believed to take away about 2.5 % of the GDP from the nation. A more detailed explanation according to the definition of the Ministry of Finance states: "parafiscal levies are all prescribed mandatory non-tax benefits paid by companies to central state administrative bodies, local and regional self-government units or other bodies with public authority, if the payer does not receive a service, goods or right in return .". If so, then why is the non-market forest function fee treated as a parafiscal levy? In this case it is indisputable that the payer receives a service, goods or right in return. It should be clear to everyone who reads the Forest Act and where the non-market forest functions are listed as follows: 1. protection of soil, roads and other facilities from erosion, torrents and floods; 2. impact on water regime and water quality; 3. impact on soil fertility and agricultural production; 4. impact on climate and mitigation of climate change; 5. protection and improvement of the human environment; 6. oxygen generation, carbon sink and atmospheric purification; 7. recreation, tourist and health function; 8. creation of favourable conditions for wildlife and other fauna, and 9: increased impact of protective forests and special purpose forests on biodiversity. Some of the functions provide benefits only for some individuals, while other functions provide benefits for all. The non-market forest function fee initially amounted to 0.07 % of the total annual income, in 2010 it dropped to 0,0525 %, and then in 2012 to 0.0265 %, whereas in 2018 all those who generated total income less than 3 million kuna annually were exempt from payment. Now all these with a total annual income of less than 7.5 million kuna are exempt from payment, and the percentage has dropped to 0.024. To make it clearer, let us calculate how much money it is per year - at 3 million kuna it was 795.00 kuna/year, and at 7.5 million kuna it was 1,800.00 kuna / year (what an amount!). In view of the chronology of the reduction of the non-market forest function fee and the hysteria surrounding parafiscal levies, it would not at all surprise us if, after the parliamentary elections, the government completely abolishes this, in our view, necessary and environmentally progressive tax. Regrettably, it would not be the first time that populism takes steps that are not good either for the state or for the society. The main economic activities, including 1. production of wood forest products, 2. production of forest reproductive material and 3. production of non-wood forest products, are expected to generate income which is paid into the state budget. All this despite non-market business moves in the trade of these products and the necessary need for timely and comprehensive work on silvicultural and protection operations in the forest ecosystem, which are often "skipped" in order to maximize profit. We have repeatedly pointed out that there is no profit in forestry if we return to the forest what we have taken from it so as to leave it in the optimal state, or figuratively speaking, so as to make it "eternal". We have often discussed every one of the nine non-market functions listed above, corroborating our words with research results. The numbers are impressive and are easy to remember. Due to limited space in the column, let us only take the hydrological function; no vegetation form affects water as effectively as a forest - it balances the distribution of water in space, evenly supplies watercourses and mitigates high water waves, and affects water purity and the number of water springs. Water filtered through live and friable forest soil reaches ground courses as potable water. If we take into account the average annual rainfall in Croatia of 1200 mm and the forest area of only 2 million ha (it is larger), it is calculated that about 13 billion tons of drinking water flows from the forest. Who receives this service? Everyone, including the payer! We could continue in the same way with other non-market forest functions. Some would say, these issues have been treated at a number of forestry conferences, but we foresters speak for ourselves - and we ask our colleagues: you have been served information in this column and in other articles - why do not you spread it among your acquaintances, and why those politically active forestry experts do not raise these issues among their fellow politicians at the local, regional and even state level? We wonder, is it polite to say that you have "crawled into a mouse hole"? You answer it! Editorial Board
