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Searches for a useful & accurate definition of Islamic movements in the Middle East. The often-used term "theocratic populism" is incorrect, as it incorporates concepts used to the explain events in other parts of the world. Similarly rejected are the ideas of Michel Foucault, who observed the 1979 Iranian Revolution first hand. He argued that it was neither antimodern nor populist, but rather, the injection of the spiritual into political life. In his romanticizing of the revolution, however, he downplayed repressive aspects of it & failed to understand the authoritarian cult of the personality. The ideas of Jurgen Habermas can also be used to understand the defense of the life world in the Middle East against further enroachments by the world system. It is argued here, however, that a historical understanding of the development of the Iranian state, Islam, foreign intervention, & nationalism must be pursued. The analysis emphasizes the need to retrieve the strain of participatory democracy in Iran from the demagogic populism of the power elite in order to check the rise of religious fascism, which threatens a more liberal path for the Middle East. J. Cowie

International audience ; This chapter examines the supply and demand sides of populism in France. It looks at the two main populist actors i.e. the Front National (FN) and La France Insoumise (LFI). The FN exemplifies the typical radical right populist organization, primarily mobilizing grievances over immigration, while LFI shows a left-wing egalitarian and socially inclusive profile. Electoral support for populism in France is fuelled by economic instability and voter distrust of mainstream politics and of the EU. Both LFI and the FN increasingly converge on a common protectionist platform, opposing the EU and globalization. Populist voting in 2017 is found predominantly amongst the youngest cohorts and it is strongly correlated with populist attitudes. FN voters are primarily found amongst the so-called 'losers' of globalization in the lower social classes, who are typically more anti-immigrant and more authoritarian. LFI attracts on the other hand a broader coalition of secularized voters in the middle and lower social classes, who are primarily motivated by economic concerns. Both FN and LFI voters are more Eurosceptic than the mainstream, and they share similar concerns about globalization.

International audience ; This chapter examines the supply and demand sides of populism in France. It looks at the two main populist actors i.e. the Front National (FN) and La France Insoumise (LFI). The FN exemplifies the typical radical right populist organization, primarily mobilizing grievances over immigration, while LFI shows a left-wing egalitarian and socially inclusive profile. Electoral support for populism in France is fuelled by economic instability and voter distrust of mainstream politics and of the EU. Both LFI and the FN increasingly converge on a common protectionist platform, opposing the EU and globalization. Populist voting in 2017 is found predominantly amongst the youngest cohorts and it is strongly correlated with populist attitudes. FN voters are primarily found amongst the so-called 'losers' of globalization in the lower social classes, who are typically more anti-immigrant and more authoritarian. LFI attracts on the other hand a broader coalition of secularized voters in the middle and lower social classes, who are primarily motivated by economic concerns. Both FN and LFI voters are more Eurosceptic than the mainstream, and they share similar concerns about globalization.

International audience ; This chapter examines the supply and demand sides of populism in France. It looks at the two main populist actors i.e. the Front National (FN) and La France Insoumise (LFI). The FN exemplifies the typical radical right populist organization, primarily mobilizing grievances over immigration, while LFI shows a left-wing egalitarian and socially inclusive profile. Electoral support for populism in France is fuelled by economic instability and voter distrust of mainstream politics and of the EU. Both LFI and the FN increasingly converge on a common protectionist platform, opposing the EU and globalization. Populist voting in 2017 is found predominantly amongst the youngest cohorts and it is strongly correlated with populist attitudes. FN voters are primarily found amongst the so-called 'losers' of globalization in the lower social classes, who are typically more anti-immigrant and more authoritarian. LFI attracts on the other hand a broader coalition of secularized voters in the middle and lower social classes, who are primarily motivated by economic concerns. Both FN and LFI voters are more Eurosceptic than the mainstream, and they share similar concerns about globalization.

This essay offers an explanation for the rise of contemporary "mediatized populisms." Disaggregating the idea of a singular media logic of populist politics, we examine the institutional and political-economic dynamics of mediatization and the variegated structures of mediated political fields in which contemporary populist political formations are embedded. Moving away from broad "global populism" approaches as well as case studies from Europe and the Americas that have thus far dominated discussions of populism, we make the case for empirically grounded comparative studies of populism from the particular standpoint of regional contexts across Asia that offer theoretical insights often missed in prevailing "technology-first" and election-focused approaches. We then outline three distinctive features of media-politics relations (and their transformations) that have enabled the contemporary rise of mediatized populism across the Inter-Asian region.

"Populism, Eco-populism, and the Future of Environmentalism analyzes the history and language of populism in order to fully comprehend the threat of eco-fascism - paradoxically revealing that it is possible for there to be both progressive eco-populist and right-wing sham eco-populist discourses. The book highlights the harrowing prospect that the crises of democracy now confronting countries such as the United States may culminate in forms of eco-fascism in a world increasingly divided over issues of economic and social inequality, immigration, and competition for dwindling resources. The author reveals that there is a language of eco-populism that accompanies populist and sham populist discourse of the left and right as ecological crises have assumed a more prominent role in national and global politics. These crises are exacerbated by the willingness of the fossil fuel industry to destabilize democracy in order to forestall government-imposed limits on carbon emissions and elimination of fossil fuel subsidies that threaten their profits. The book, primarily a work of political and ecological theory, draws on the history of populism as well as the history of conservation and modern environmental movements to make an innovative argument - that a radical form of right-wing sham eco-populism that emerged out of the crucible of the energy crisis and recession of the 1970s has substantially contributed to the crises we now face. The author maintains that the only plausible solution to current political and ecological crises is a progressive eco-populism that combines environmental justice and sustainability with economic and social justice, and offers resources that can help construct a democratic and inclusive movement and culture. A progressive eco-populist vision has led to proposals for a Green New Deal and the development of the Build Back Better Act currently being considered by the U.S. Congress, but the stalemate between progressive and conservative Democrats over the bill reveals both the compromised state of U.S. representative democracy and the need for a stronger movement to hold politicians and government accountable. This book will be of great interest to students, scholars, and researchers of environmental politics, environmental history, and environmental philosophy, as well as sociology, political science, and history"--

In this paper, I want to introduce a(n digital) ethnographic approach to populism that understands populism as a (digitally) mediatized chronotopic communicative and discursive relation. Populism, I argue, is not only constructed in a (mediatized) communicative relation between journalists, politicians and academics, but also in the relation to citizens, activists and computational agency. Attention to all these actors, and the media they use, is of crucial importance if we want to understand populism. Digital media are not just new media that populists use, their algorithms and affordances reshape their populism. In times of digitalization, we cannot understand populism by only looking at 'the input', the frame that actors prepare for uptake, it is about the uptake as well. More concretely, I will argue that digital media have given birth to a new form of populism: algorithmic populism. Understanding and focusing on populism as a 'communicative relation' between all these human and non-human actors allows use to analyze 'populism' more precisely.

Examines populism as a political style involving rapport with "the people", focusing on the Mexican experience and the phenomenon of neo-populism embodied by President Salinas of Mexico, President Menem of Argentina, and President Fujimori of Peru, among others.

"Populism, Eco-populism, and the Future of Environmentalism analyzes the history and language of populism in order to fully comprehend the threat of eco-fascism - paradoxically revealing that it is possible for there to be both progressive eco-populist and right-wing sham eco-populist discourses. The book highlights the harrowing prospect that the crises of democracy now confronting countries such as the United States may culminate in forms of eco-fascism in a world increasingly divided over issues of economic and social inequality, immigration, and competition for dwindling resources. The author reveals that there is a language of eco-populism that accompanies populist and sham populist discourse of the left and right as ecological crises have assumed a more prominent role in national and global politics. These crises are exacerbated by the willingness of the fossil fuel industry to destabilize democracy in order to forestall government-imposed limits on carbon emissions and elimination of fossil fuel subsidies that threaten their profits. The book, primarily a work of political and ecological theory, draws on the history of populism as well as the history of conservation and modern environmental movements to make an innovative argument - that a radical form of right-wing sham eco-populism that emerged out of the crucible of the energy crisis and recession of the 1970s has substantially contributed to the crises we now face. The author maintains that the only plausible solution to current political and ecological crises is a progressive eco-populism that combines environmental justice and sustainability with economic and social justice, and offers resources that can help construct a democratic and inclusive movement and culture. A progressive eco-populist vision has led to proposals for a Green New Deal and the development of the Build Back Better Act currently being considered by the U.S. Congress, but the stalemate between progressive and conservative Democrats over the bill reveals both the compromised state of U.S. representative democracy and the need for a stronger movement to hold politicians and government accountable. This book will be of great interest to students, scholars, and researchers of environmental politics, environmental history, and environmental philosophy, as well as sociology, political science, and history"--

The diversity of features attributed to populism - and, as a result, the variety of critiques leveled at it - are remarkable. It sometimes seems as though people are using the same terms to address very different phenomena. Is there any distinctive meaning to populism? Is populism inherently anti-democratic or, on the contrary, is it the epitome of democratic practice? What should an engagement with populist movements mean for the theory and practice of democracy? This paper seeks to map the discursive ecosystem that populism determines. It canvasses the phenomena often associated with populism, proposes an interrelated set of concerns that is distinctive to populism, suggests how populism intersects with propensities and affinities with which it is often associated, emphasises the role of growing economic inequality, and suggests responses to populist movements that are grounded in a truly democratic constitutionalism.

Abstract
Authoritarian populism poses major challenges to democracy. Yet relatively little systematic political-theoretical or philosophical analysis has focused on how best to oppose or resist it. The present essay focuses on three possible approaches now being tentatively discussed. Some writers emphasize the possible virtues of civil disobedience, others are advocating a related yet broader strategy of civil resistance, and yet others abandon both "civil" approaches in favor of uncivil disobedience. Despite their many strengths, each approach suffers from weaknesses, in part because each responds incompletely to the challenges of authoritarian populism and its use of increasingly commonplace modes of "smart" repression. With ominous implications for those worried about democracy's fate, populists are embracing coercive techniques designed to squelch dissent without generating public sympathy or a popular backlash.

Un populisme techno-culturel se propage en Europe, par la voie de médias sociaux numériques qui court-circuitent toutes les médiations institutionnelles. Mais ce nouveau populisme, social et identitaire, se nourrit d'une défiance générale : la « démocratie illibérale » répond à un libéralisme dogmatique de plus en plus fermé à l'expression démocratique.