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Y. Kleistra, Hollen of stilstaan. Beleidsverandering bij het Nederlandse ministerie van buitenlandse zaken P.R. Baehr, M.C. Castermans-Holleman, F. Grünfeld, Human rights in the foreign policy of the Netherlands E.M. van den Berg, The influence of domestic NGOs on Dutch human rights policy. Case studies on South Africa, Namibia, Indonesia and East Timor. The role of human rights in post-1945 Dutch foreign policy: Politicological and historical literature, Maarten KuitenbrouwerThe second Dutch government under Prime Minister Kok fell in 2002 following the publication of a critical report by the Dutch Institute for Wartime Documentation (NIOD) on the Srebenica issue. This event forms the starting point for a review of the recent literature on the role of human rights in Dutch foreign policy during the last few decades in both political science and history. Both disciplines share the 'decisionmaking analysis' in international relations theory as a common background. In addition, political scientists and historians have often found themselves researching the same human rights issues that affect Dutch relations with a series of non-Western countries. An explanation of Dutch policy is usually sought based on a combination of internaland external factors. In general, comparative analyses and research into its effectiveness are still conspicuous by their absence. All in all, there are more similarities than differences between recent political and historical studies on the role of human rights in Dutch foreign policy.

This study deals with the rise and decline of the system of unelected representative bodies that accompanied post-war democracy in the Netherlands. After World War II, the number of these unelected representative bodies grew spectacularly, but from the seventies onwards, it started to decrease. How can we account for this remarkable political change? In traditional historiography, this change is associated with the pillarisation of Dutch society, the institutionalisation of corporatist arrangements, the emergence of new social movements or the deep-rooted practice of consensus building. As these accounts turn out to be problematic, this study focuses on the democratic character of unelected representative bodies. Chapter 1 introduces a framework for analysing the democratic character of these bodies, based on the criteria of a democratic political order as identified by R.A. Dahl. The framework encompasses the constitution of the domains represented by unelected bodies; the recruitment of their members; the tasks they fulfilled; and their internal decision-making process. Chapter 2 presents the cases used to analyse how the democratic character of the system of unelected representative bodies developed. These cases are the Sociaal-Economische Raad (1950), the Landbouwschap (1954 - 1995), the Nationale Raad voor Maatschappelijk Werk (1946 - 1989) and the Raad voor de Kunst (1955 - 1995). Chapter 3 shows that the represented domains were either constituted from above by the state or from below by interest groups. The involvement of interest groups led to the exclusion of rivals and, later on, to petrifaction, with the composition of unelected bodies remaining the same despite fundamental social changes. Chapter 4 highlights a similar pattern as the members delegated by interest groups managed to exclude a large number of newcomers. This resulted in a fierce critique of the involvement of interest groups in member recruitment and led to a new generation of unelected councils composed of independent experts. Chapter ...

Dutch-American relations in the post-war period have been inexorably intertwined with the Cold War. In the course of the 1960s the East-West struggle entered a new phase with the beginning of a period of détente, which had important consequences for the Dutch-American relationship. In this dissertation, which focuses on the governmental level, the following issues are dealt with: firstly, to what extent was the relationship affected by the complicating developments that took place in the years 1969-1976? Secondly, how did Dutch and American policy makers view the relationship? Finally, what did the asymmetry in the relationship mean and were the Dutch able to exert any influence? When taking into account both international and domestic factors, the picture that emerges is one of both change and continuity. What makes the period concerned stand out is the fact that the Atlantic Alliance was at a point where a redefinition of the common goals seemed unavoidable. Security concerns and preserving the American dominant position in the international arena were the foremost concerns of President Nixon and NSC-advisor Kissinger. These ideas clashed with those of Dutch politicians of for instance the Labour Party who wanted détente, an active human rights policy and development cooperation to be part of the Atlantic foreign policy agenda. The American embassy in The Hague was aware of these changes: it noticed a turn to the left in Dutch society and the political landscape. The Dutch cabinets in the period concerned faced domestic pressure to take a more critical stance towards the United States, where the Nixon administration faced problems concerning its image and credibility because of the Vietnam war and the Watergate scandal. On the other hand, unmistakable signs of continuity in the Dutch-American relationship were present. The Dutch governments in the years concerned did not turn away from Atlantic cooperation, as the Netherlands remained dependent on the American military commitment to Western Europe. Détente was ...

Hans Schippers assesses the position of the Islamic AK Party led by Prime Minister Erdogan in the light of the relationship between religion and the state in Turkey. Although the AK Party won the general elections in 2002, Erdogan has the Damocletian sword of a military coup hanging above his head ever since. The military consider themselves to be the guardians of Kemal Atatürk's legacy of Turkey as a secular state. In the past decades they intervened four times in politics, the most recent one the 1998 'post modern' coup to oust the Islamic Prime Minister Erbakan, whose approach to Iran, critical opinions on the EU and NATO and favourisation of religious education had gone too far in the eyes of the military. Erdogan cleverly avoided the mistakes of his predecessor. He declared the AKP to be a conservative, pro-EU and pro-NATO party that would seek adherence to the mostly christian-democratic European Peoples Party. His government would be liberal and respect people with different opinions on religion. Erdogan did well in regional elections of 2004. However, he met with growing criticism in the following two years. The organisational structure of the AKP is undemocratic and the number of women active in the party is far too limited, his critics remarked. The party is accused of conducting a campaign of 'creeping islamisation' of Turkish society. The military closely monitor every decision of the government near two-thirds majority in parliament and he could They have the support of the secular president have a party member elected. This would increase Sezer who has amended or rejected a large number the chances of military intervention. Erdogan will of Erdogans proposals. A crucial moment for the probably opt for a compromise candidate. However, AKP-government will be the election by parliament until the arliamentary elections of November, the of a new president, coming May. Erdogan has a political.

The subject of this study is the strategic cooperation of the permanent members in the Security Council in the period 1946 2000. Because of their right of veto the cooperation of the permanent members has a significant influence on the functioning of the Council. The most important aspects of the cooperation that were investigated are the intensity of the cooperation and the ef-fectiveness of this cooperation in preventing and ending wars. To investigate these aspects, for both the intensity and the effectiveness measuring instruments were constructed. These measuring instruments were based on comprehensive sets of so-called 'leading indicators' and statistical methods and techniques. The intensity of the cooperation increased gradually from 1946 until 1990 (the end of the Cold War). Then it started to increase rapidly until 1996. From 1996 a slight decrease can be discer-ned. The strong increase in the strategic cooperation of the permanent members in the security Council can be established in all the majors forms of cooperation in the Council: the numbers of adopted strategic resolutions and presidential statements, the numbers of employed means (like peacekeeping missions and enforcement actions) and the amounts of money that were spent on peacekeeping activities. Further it was established that the response times of the Council regarding potential and waged wars dropped significantly since the end of the Cold War. The effectiveness of the cooperation of the permanent members in the Council was, insofar this was measurable with the applied method, not good for many years, but after the Cold War a clear improvement can be discerned. This goes for the prevention of wars, as well as for post war peacebuilding and the ending of wars. Also the numbers of potential and waged wars in which the Council not intervened dropped significantly since the end of the Cold War, as well as the use of vetoes. The large number of potential and waged wars in which the Council did not intervene during the Cold War was nearly exclusively caused by 'non decisions' (the non placing of wars on the agenda), and not by the use of vetoes by permanent members, as is often assumed in literature. Further, a comparison of two phase classifications of the Cold War showed that the great powers, even when there are great tensions among them, are prepared to cooperate in the Security Council to resolve strategic matters, if they consider this in their interest. Analyses of the adopted strategic resolutions during the Cold War revealed that cooperation here was nearly exclusively limited to issues that were not core issues of the Cold War. From this it can be concluded that cooperation against third party states was a basis of cooperation of the great powers in the Security Council. Finally, the results of this study show clearly that the Security Council was regarded and used to a large extent by the permanent members in the period 1946 2000 as an instrument of foreign policy to pursue their national interests, and not as an instrument of the world community to prevent and end wars.