Suchergebnisse

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Tables and Figures -- Preface -- Introduction -- 1. Studying Postconflict Violence: Approaches and Methods -- 2. Explaining Postconflict Violence: Evidence, Theories, and Arguments -- 3. Violence and Indonesia's Democratic Transition -- 4. Large Episodic Violence in Postconflict Maluku -- 5. North Maluku's Peace -- 6. Small Episodic Violence in Postconflict Aceh -- 7. Why Has Extended Violent Conflict Not Recurred? -- Conclusions -- Glossary -- Appendix. The National Violence Monitoring System Dataset -- Notes -- References -- Index

A short history of the Cambodian conflict and peace process -- The social structure of the insurgency -- Leadership -- Mid-ranking operators -- Rank-and-file soldiers -- Blank pages, symbolic reconstruction -- Note on female combatants of the Khmer Rouge -- The diaspora

Why do some postconflict states return to violence, while others remain at peace? Analysts increasingly credit postconflict justice institutions—such as truth commissions, amnesties, reparations, and trials—with contributing to the prevention of conflict recurrence following civil wars. But scholars remain divided about the overall effectiveness of these varied institutions. In this article, we directly engage this debate. We seek to overcome theoretical and data limitations that make it difficult to address the relationship between justice institutions and the likelihood that conflict will recur. We find that only postconflict justice processes that lessen conflict-induced grievances, and thus address individual motivations to rebel, are successful at keeping the peace. In a series of statistical tests using new data on postconflict justice from 1946 to 2006, we find strong support for the role of motivation-addressing processes in reducing conflict recurrence.

AbstractWhy are civil society organizations so often unable to make a difference during the transition to peace? I argue that the contributions of local civil society organizations and women's organizations to postconflict peacebuilding should be understood in terms of the networks that emerge during the peacebuilding process. Horizontal network conditions are essential for successful postconflict reconstruction. Yet external actors often implement policies that strengthen hierarchical links at the expense of such horizontal networks. To explore the types of networks that emerge in postconflict reconstruction, I use semistructured interviews conducted in Liberia. The evidence suggests that emerging horizontal networks are more robust in areas where local communities and women have a tradition of organizing. However, these networks remain fairly unstable. The assistance is mostly channeled centrally, strengthening hierarchical ties and leading to distortions in the distribution of resources.

This article explores the processes that lead to different types of civil war outbreak in postconflict societies, combining quantitative analysis with case studies of Myanmar and Sierra Leone to disaggregate situations in which former rebels resume fighting from those when new rebels emerge in the postconflict environment. The analysis, based in principal–agent theory, illuminates how relations between the government and ex‐rebel elites, group cohesion among rebels, and the relationship between the government and the ex‐combatants all can lead to resumed civil war. Its findings suggest that victories and settled conflicts are the most important outcome for preventing conflict recurrence by former rebels, but do not prevent the rise of new insurgencies. Moreover, the absence of government repression emerges as the factor most likely to reduce the risk of new rebellion.

Building a capable public service is fundamental to postconflict state building. Yet in postconflict settings, short-term pressures often conflict with this longer-term objective. To ensure peace and stabilize fragile coalitions, the imperative for political elites to hand out public jobs and better pay to constituents dominates merit. Donor-financed projects that rely on technical assistants and parallel structures, rather than on government systems, are often the primary vehicle for meeting pressing service delivery needs. What, then, is a workable approach to rebuilding public services postconflict? Paths between Peace and Public Service seeks to answer this question by comparing public service reform trajectories in five countries—Afghanistan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, and Timor-Leste—in the aftermath of conflict. The study seeks to explain these countries' different trajectories through process tracing and structured, focused methods of comparative analysis. To reconstruct reform trajectories, the report draws on more than 200 interviews conducted with government officials and other stakeholders, as well as administrative data. The study analyzes how reform trajectories are influenced by elite bargains and highlights their path dependency, shaped by preconflict legacies and the specifics of the conflict period. As the first systematic study on postconflict public service reforms, it identifies lessons for the future engagement of development partners in building public services.

Public opinion in postconflict societies toward international missions is widely believed to be important. We offer a theory that local satisfaction critically depends on an individual's perception of whether the mission is furthering the wartime political agenda of his or her social group. To test this theory and competing hypotheses, we examine Kosovo Albanian satisfaction with the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). We use data from seventeen different representative surveys conducted in Kosovo from 2002 to 2007 as well as focus group and other primary and secondary sources. Consistent with our theory, we find that aggregate satisfaction over time reflected UNMIK's growing acceptance of Kosovo's independence and individuals with more radical views tended to be less satisfied with UNMIK. Our analysis implies that missions can achieve greater local satisfaction by doing what is possible to be responsive to, or at a minimum recognize, the wartime political agendas of the key social groups.

The Guatemalan peace process helped to shape both the form of state that emerged following armed conflict and the constraints and opportunities faced by contemporary social movements. Despite the reconfiguration of power by Guatemalan elites through peace negotiation and accord-based reforms, social movements have harnessed neoliberal projects to strengthen grassroots resistance and alternative-building. An overview of the campesino movement and the case of the Comité Campesino del Altiplano indicates that campesinos have engaged strategically with neoliberal resources in order to construct counterhegemonic projects.El proceso de paz en Guatemala ayudó a definir tanto al Estado que surgió después del conflicto armado como las limitaciones y oportunidades que caracterizan a los movimientos sociales contemporáneos. A pesar de la reconfiguración del poder llevada a cabo por las élites guatemaltecas a través de las negociaciones de paz y las reformas basadas en los acuerdos, los movimientos sociales han utilizado proyectos neoliberales para fortalecer la resistencia popular y la construcción de alternativas. Un vistazo al movimiento campesino y el caso del Comité Campesino del Altiplano da muestra de como los campesinos se han relacionado estratégicamente con recursos neoliberales para construir proyectos contrahegemónicos.