Suchergebnisse

Je montre dans cet article à quel point les idées transhumanistes sont contestées et débattues. Je ne reviens pas ici sur les objections de ceux qui s'opposent absolument à l'enhancement, pour des raisons théologiques, métaphysiques, irrationnelles ou fausses. Je m'intéresse aux difficultés soulevées par ceux qui adhèrent foncièrement à l'esprit transhumaniste. Il s'agit des problèmes et objections de nature éthique, sociale et politique. Le paradigme évolutionniste du transhumanisme est matérialiste. Ce matérialisme est technoscientifique, il évolue avec les technosciences, leurs instruments et leurs concepts opératoires. Le paradigme évolutionniste est un paradigme "dangereux": il peut être interprété et appliqué de façon simpliste, brutale, aveugle, insensible et conduire dans un monde posthumain de fait inhumain, barbare. Cependant, par contre, des Rapports américains tels que Converging technologies for improving human performance (2002) et Beyond therapy (2003) sont figés dans leur unilatéralisme respectif et antagoniste, le transhumanisme bien compris c'est l'humanisme progressiste capable d'intégrer les révolutions technoscientifiques théoriquement et pratiquement.

What does it mean to think beyond humanism? Is it possible to craft a mode of philosophy, ethics, and interpretation that rejects the classic humanist divisions of self and other, mind and body, society and nature, human and animal, organic and technological? Can a new kind of humanities—posthumanities—respond to the redefinition of humanity's place in the world by both the technological and the biological or "green" continuum in which the "human" is but one life form among many?Exploring how both critical thought along with cultural practice have reacted to this radical repositioning, Cary Wolfe—one of the founding figures in the field of animal studies and posthumanist theory—ranges across bioethics, cognitive science, animal ethics, gender, and disability to develop a theoretical and philosophical approach responsive to our changing understanding of ourselves and our world. Then, in performing posthumanist readings of such diverse works as Temple Grandin's writings, Wallace Stevens's poetry, Lars von Trier's Dancer in the Dark, the architecture of Diller+Scofidio, and David Byrne and Brian Eno's My Life in the Bush of Ghosts, he shows how this philosophical sensibility can transform art and culture. For Wolfe, a vibrant, rigorous posthumanism is vital for addressing questions of ethics and justice, language and trans-species communication, social systems and their inclusions and exclusions, and the intellectual aspirations of interdisciplinarity. In What Is Posthumanism? he carefully distinguishes posthumanism from transhumanism (the biotechnological enhancement of human beings) and narrow definitions of the posthuman as the hoped-for transcendence of materiality. In doing so, Wolfe reveals that it is humanism, not the human in all its embodied and prosthetic complexity, that is left behind in posthumanist thought

In this paper I defend the importance of Daniel Dennett's "intentional stance" for Philosophical Posthumanism vis-à-vis humanism. After first establishing the role of intentionality in humanism, I move to a critique of that role from the perspective of both ontology and the history of scientific explanation. Rendering intentionality deeply problematic for humanism, thereby acting in support of Philosophical Posthumanism, I argue that this critique may ultimately be too strong for Philosophical Posthumanism itself. This is because it leads to eliminativism and reductionism. I conclude by arguing that Philosophical Posthumanism needs the more inclusive approach to intentionality found in Dennett's intentional stance. It does so, but only on a pragmatic interpretation. Without that interpretation, Dennett's work, and thus its application to Philosophical Posthumanism, falls victim to the very same critique levelled against intentionality in relation to humanism.

This paper maps and builds relations between posthumanism and the field of archaeology, arguing for vital and promising connections between the two. Posthuman insights on post-anthropocentrism, non-human multiplicities, and the minoritarian in the now intersect powerfully with archaeology's multi-temporal and long-term interests in heterogenous and vibrant assemblages of people, places, and things, particularly the last few decades of 'decolonial' re-imaginings of the field. For these reasons, we frame archaeology as the historical science of posthumanism. We demonstrate the discipline's breadth through three vignettes concerning archaeology's unique engagements with multiplicities of objects, multiplicities of scales, and multiplicities of people. These examples, we argue, speak to the benefits of becoming posthuman archaeologists and archaeological posthumanists.

Le posthumanisme désigne ce courant de pensée qui prône l'amélioration de l'humain par les technologies, sur la base notamment de la convergence nouvelles entre nanotechnologies, biotechnologies, sciences informatiques et sciences cognitives. L'article étudie la congruence de nos modes de vie avec ce mouvement de pensée.

Le posthumanisme désigne ce courant de pensée qui prône l'amélioration de l'humain par les technologies, sur la base notamment de la convergence nouvelles entre nanotechnologies, biotechnologies, sciences informatiques et sciences cognitives. L'article étudie la congruence de nos modes de vie avec ce mouvement de pensée.

"Where does the posthuman dwell? At what address? And in what type of house?" These questions, borrowed from the opening of Deborah Amberson and Elena Past's essay on "Gadda's Pasticciaccio and the Knotted Posthuman Household," tickle our eco-accustomed ears – ears that more often than not like to take ideas back to their earthly dwelling, something that the Greek all-too famously called oikos. In our case, however, to provide the right answer to these questions is definitely challenging and might require a little "veering." The reason is simple: situated by definition in a mobile space of matter and meanings, the posthuman does not seem so prone to dwell. In fact, it moves, relentlessly shifting the boundaries of being and things, of ontology, epistemology, and even politics. And these boundaries, especially those between human and nonhuman, are not only shifting but also porous: based on the – biological, cultural, structural – combination of agencies flowing from, through, and alongside the human, the posthuman discloses a dimension in which "we" and "they" are caught together in an ontological dance whose choreography follows patterns of irredeemable hybridization and stubborn entanglement. In this mobile and uncertain dwelling, furthermore, the posthuman might not have a stable "address," but it does address important issues: it addresses, for example, the alleged self-sufficiency of the human, the purported subsidiarity of the nonhuman, and the consistency of categorical essences and forms that hover over our visions and practices as if they had been demarcated ab aeterno by the hand of an inflexible taxonomist. Taking a closer look, finally, we can see that the posthuman's house is not only mobile and a bit shambolic, but also operationally open: open to transformations and revolutions, ready to welcome the natures, matters, and cultural agents that determine the existence of the human and accompany it in its biological and historical adventures. It is a collectivehouse for "nomadic" comings and goings, and most of all for belonging-together and multiple becomings: its inhabitant and "name-bearer," the posthuman subject is, in fact, "a relational subject constituted in and by multiplicity" – a subject "based on a strong sense of collectivity, relationality and hence community building," as Rosi Braidotti says in her beautiful interview with Cosetta Veronese. In other words, as its house is itinerant and accessible to numerous guests, including the elements, the posthuman subject is a restless and sociable agent, allergic to limitations and boundaries, and ontologically full of stories. A biocultural Picaro, one might say.

A mimetic turn is emerging in posthuman studies. Taking as a starting point a recent re-turn to an immanent, embodied, and relational conception of mimesis constitutive of the ERC-funded project, Homo Mimeticus, this paper proposes three related conceptual foundations to further a "mimetic turn" already at play in sf simulations and now operative in embodied imitations as well. Building on pioneering work on the centrality of an "embodied" and "cognitive nonconscious" (Hayles 1999, 2017) on the one hand, and a "relational" conception of "posthuman subjectivity" (Braidotti 2019) on the other, I argue that mimesis, understood as an unconscious tendency to mimic others (be they human or nonhuman) provides a decisive and still missing link to account for the capacity of (post)humans to become other in the first place. The concepts of "mimetic pathos," the "mimetic unconscious," and "hypermimesis" provide three related conceptual steps toward a mimetic turn in posthuman studies, which as this special issue shows, is already underway.

Towards a critical posthumanism -- Genealogy of posthumanism -- Our posthuman humanity and the multiplicity of its forms -- Posthumanism and science fiction -- Interdisciplinarity and the posthumanities -- Posthumanism, digitalization, and new media -- Posthumanity, subject, and system -- Other side of life.