The article is about the characteristics of power as the subject of socialization. The author reveals the specifics of its functioning, indicating the methods, means and mechanisms applied. Particular attention is paid to the basic mechanisms and attributes of power - law, which affects the mass consciousness and behavior.
The degree of asymmetry of power is one of the key factors affecting the relationship between the franchisor and the franchisee. The development of strategies for building relations should correspond to the legitimacy of the measures taken, as well as the costs of harmonization that arise in connection with a decrease in the adequacy of power relations between the subjects of relations. This article reveals the main factors that determine the legitimacy of power asymmetry, the consequences of not legitimate requirements described, as well as the costs of choosing different strategies on the part of the franchisor. The purpose of this article is to prove the inevitability of the emergence of power asymmetry in the relationship between the franchisor and the franchisee, as well as a theoretical description of the influence of asymmetry on their relationships. The results of the article can be used by franchisors in formulating strategies for building relationships with franchisees.
The populism phenomenon has become a mainstraim political research topic at the beginning of the 21st century. Scholars have focused on different aspects of this phenomenon. In the peer-reviewed monograph "Populism in power. Strategies and Consequences of a Populist Stay" (Wiesbaden, 2021) the author analyzes the results of a populist government in a geographical area. It is argued that populism in power has the following characteristics: charismatic leadership, public political opposition, networking and shutdown of patronage institutions that stand between populist status and the so-called "true people", paving the way for the autocratization of assemblies. The author shows the peculiar position of populist governments: how they come to power and what they do as a political elite to create their own legitimacy. Most of them act as the leaders of a permanent election campaign. The first step towards their new legitimacy is always the delegitimization of any opposition and this naturally opens the way to anti-pluralism.
In information society, the information delivered by mass media and becoming the most effective weapon in "information wars" plays a huge role in the formation of public consciousness, the dominating ideological principles and motives of social actions. In the last decades, the strategy of "soft power", which different states treat in different ways, has become more relevant. Russia implements the policy of "soft power" as using the opportunities of civil society, informational and communicational, humanitarian and other methods and techniques, in addition to traditional diplomatic methods, which is defined by the Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. There is another practical application of the policy of "soft power" that includes informational "brainwashing" and manipulation of consciousness and is directed at destabilization of political regimes. It acts as a technological resource of the USA, which has developed and field-tested the strategy of nonviolent change of political regimes. The author critically comprehends the techniques of "soft power" and "nonviolent resistance", analyzes ways of protection against destructive informational and psychological influence, define the backbone spheres in the course of any state counteracting a similar strategy. ; В информационном обществе огромную роль в формировании общественного сознания, доминирующих идеологических принципов, мотивов социальных действий играет информация, представляемая массмедиа и становящаяся наиболее эффективным оружием в «информационных войнах». В последние десятилетия более актуальной стала стратегия «мягкой силы», которая различными государствами трактуется различным образом. Россия реализует политику «мягкой силы» как использующую возможности гражданского общества, информационно-коммуникационных, гуманитарных и других методов и технологий, в дополнение к традиционным дипломатическим методам, что определяет Концепция внешней политики России. Есть и другое практическое применение политики «мягкой силы», которое включает информационную «обработку» и манипулирование сознанием, направлено на дестабилизацию политических режимов и выступает технологическим ресурсом США. Штаты выработали и апробировали таким образом стратегию ненасильственной смены политических режимов. Автор критически осмысливает технологии «мягкой силы» и «ненасильственного сопротивления», анализирует способы защиты от деструктивного информационного и психологического воздействия, определяет те сферы, которые являются системообразующими в процессе противодействия любого государства подобным стратегиям.
Twenty years have passed since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Up until the point of dissolution, the Soviet authorities and intellectual elite had attempted to build a community in order to unite all Soviet citizens in the spirit of socialist modernisation. Although it is difficult to demonstrate that 'a Soviet nation' was successfully created [1], the attempt to build such a nation can serve as a case study through which to examine nation-building processes for constructivists as well as modernists . In addition to socialist modernisation, the Soviet nation aimed to be identified as a state, which would make it similar to the political nations dominant in western countries. Contrary to western tradition, however, it was not a nation state that provided full rights for all its citizens, but rather a socialist state that was 'ruled by workers and peasantry'. Nevertheless, the authorities aimed to give the Soviet nation the characteristics of a specific nation state. "It was a nation that in historical terms strived, or more accurately part of which strived, to form or proclaim a particular state" [2]. While at the time of proclaiming the USSR there was no such thing as the Soviet nation, it can be assumed that it was intended to become a constructed titular nation. The majority of national communities, even created ones, have an ethnic core. However academics cannot agree on the kind of state the USSR was, to what extent it took into account the ethnicity of its multinational population, how much it reflected the values, culture, and interests of its largest population group (i.e., the Russians) or even whether it was a Russian national state despite the strong influence of Russian ideology and politics. Some Russian academics, especially those in nationalistic circles (e.g., Valerij Solovej) as well as western scholars such as Terry Martin and Geoffrey Hosking stressed that Russians dominated demographically and politically. However, the USSR did not aim to nurture traditional Russian values. It rather fostered the deethnicisation of Russians and the ethnicisation of non-Russian. Another group of scientists, including those from post-Soviet states (e.g., Žambyl Artykbaev, Otar Džanelidze, and Georgij Siamašvili) as well as western scholars (e.g., Rogers Brubaker) concede that positive processes such as the allotment of territory to republics and other territorial units, the constitution of authority and administrative apparatus, and the formation of the elites once characterised the ethnic history of the USSR. All these processes, however, were dominated by a lack of sovereignty, a loss of national identity, and damage to the living environment. Georgia rather than the USSR has always been regarded by the Georgian people as their mother country. The Soviet Union, which was considered to be a voluntary union of equal republics, was in fact an artificial creation that non-Russian nations were forced to join. The majority of Georgians did not therefore claim the USSR as their homeland: 'The USSR was for its nations a socio-political state not a homeland' [3]. Non-Russian citizens in the Soviet Union perceived the Russians to be a state-building 'nation' and the USSR a Russian state. The Soviet authorities, who predicated internationalism on the Russian language and new Russian culture, actively combated ethnic nationalism (including Russian nationalism, which was associated with chauvinism and a tsarist legacy). Although Russkost was considered to be a remnant of a disgraceful past, it was nonetheless used as a tool to sovietise society. Indeed, Russian language and culture were both conducive to the assimilation of non-Russians. 'The Great Russian nation' was to be 'the first among equals' and thus Russia provided. Soviet state with certain features of ethnicity. However, Russian characteristics were never treated as instrumental to the USSR, because the aim was to form a new socialist, national community, that was beyond ethnicity, rather than to convert the citizens of the former USSR into Russians. Soviet ideology and science thus set the direction for nationality policy in the USSR, especially in terms of forming a Soviet nation. Based on the foregoing, the present paper identifies how the ethnic character of both the Soviet nation and the state. ; Twenty years have passed since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Up until the point of dissolution, the Soviet authorities and intellectual elite had attempted to build a community in order to unite all Soviet citizens in the spirit of socialist modernisation. Although it is difficult to demonstrate that 'a Soviet nation' was successfully created [1], the attempt to build such a nation can serve as a case study through which to examine nation-building processes for constructivists as well as modernists . In addition to socialist modernisation, the Soviet nation aimed to be identified as a state, which would make it similar to the political nations dominant in western countries. Contrary to western tradition, however, it was not a nation state that provided full rights for all its citizens, but rather a socialist state that was 'ruled by workers and peasantry'. Nevertheless, the authorities aimed to give the Soviet nation the characteristics of a specific nation state. "It was a nation that in historical terms strived, or more accurately part of which strived, to form or proclaim a particular state" [2]. While at the time of proclaiming the USSR there was no such thing as the Soviet nation, it can be assumed that it was intended to become a constructed titular nation. The majority of national communities, even created ones, have an ethnic core. However academics cannot agree on the kind of state the USSR was, to what extent it took into account the ethnicity of its multinational population, how much it reflected the values, culture, and interests of its largest population group (i.e., the Russians) or even whether it was a Russian national state despite the strong influence of Russian ideology and politics. Some Russian academics, especially those in nationalistic circles (e.g., Valerij Solovej) as well as western scholars such as Terry Martin and Geoffrey Hosking stressed that Russians dominated demographically and politically. However, the USSR did not aim to nurture traditional Russian values. It rather fostered the deethnicisation of Russians and the ethnicisation of non-Russian. Another group of scientists, including those from post-Soviet states (e.g., Žambyl Artykbaev, Otar Džanelidze, and Georgij Siamašvili) as well as western scholars (e.g., Rogers Brubaker) concede that positive processes such as the allotment of territory to republics and other territorial units, the constitution of authority and administrative apparatus, and the formation of the elites once characterised the ethnic history of the USSR. All these processes, however, were dominated by a lack of sovereignty, a loss of national identity, and damage to the living environment. Georgia rather than the USSR has always been regarded by the Georgian people as their mother country. The Soviet Union, which was considered to be a voluntary union of equal republics, was in fact an artificial creation that non-Russian nations were forced to join. The majority of Georgians did not therefore claim the USSR as their homeland: 'The USSR was for its nations a socio-political state not a homeland' [3]. Non-Russian citizens in the Soviet Union perceived the Russians to be a state-building 'nation' and the USSR a Russian state. The Soviet authorities, who predicated internationalism on the Russian language and new Russian culture, actively combated ethnic nationalism (including Russian nationalism, which was associated with chauvinism and a tsarist legacy). Although Russkost was considered to be a remnant of a disgraceful past, it was nonetheless used as a tool to sovietise society. Indeed, Russian language and culture were both conducive to the assimilation of non-Russians. 'The Great Russian nation' was to be 'the first among equals' and thus Russia provided. Soviet state with certain features of ethnicity. However, Russian characteristics were never treated as instrumental to the USSR, because the aim was to form a new socialist, national community, that was beyond ethnicity, rather than to convert the citizens of the former USSR into Russians. Soviet ideology and science thus set the direction for nationality policy in the USSR, especially in terms of forming a Soviet nation. Based on the foregoing, the present paper identifies how the ethnic character of both the Soviet nation and the state.
Regardless of the popular wisdom to make predictions in negotiations as if they always reflect the right according to the Bible– that "to every one who has will more be given" – this article starts with observation that weaker parties can and do sometimes successfully negotiate with stronger parties. Naturally this provokes questions: "Why can weak parties successfully negotiate with the stronger parties in asymmetric negotiations? How to explain this structural paradox?". The article argues that these questions would be old and answered if not for the long lasting tendency in the international relations discipline to analyze international negotiations from the point of view of the traditional power understanding, as well as systemic international relations theories. On another hand, difficulties objectively arise due to the fact that analysis of the structural paradox is connected to the problem of power – one of the most complex and difficult to define categories of the social science. And although much has been done recently in the social science to improve our understanding of the concept of power, it is still unclear what is the best way to conceptualise it.
Regardless of the popular wisdom to make predictions in negotiations as if they always reflect the right according to the Bible– that "to every one who has will more be given" – this article starts with observation that weaker parties can and do sometimes successfully negotiate with stronger parties. Naturally this provokes questions: "Why can weak parties successfully negotiate with the stronger parties in asymmetric negotiations? How to explain this structural paradox?". The article argues that these questions would be old and answered if not for the long lasting tendency in the international relations discipline to analyze international negotiations from the point of view of the traditional power understanding, as well as systemic international relations theories. On another hand, difficulties objectively arise due to the fact that analysis of the structural paradox is connected to the problem of power – one of the most complex and difficult to define categories of the social science. And although much has been done recently in the social science to improve our understanding of the concept of power, it is still unclear what is the best way to conceptualise it.
Regardless of the popular wisdom to make predictions in negotiations as if they always reflect the right according to the Bible– that "to every one who has will more be given" – this article starts with observation that weaker parties can and do sometimes successfully negotiate with stronger parties. Naturally this provokes questions: "Why can weak parties successfully negotiate with the stronger parties in asymmetric negotiations? How to explain this structural paradox?". The article argues that these questions would be old and answered if not for the long lasting tendency in the international relations discipline to analyze international negotiations from the point of view of the traditional power understanding, as well as systemic international relations theories. On another hand, difficulties objectively arise due to the fact that analysis of the structural paradox is connected to the problem of power – one of the most complex and difficult to define categories of the social science. And although much has been done recently in the social science to improve our understanding of the concept of power, it is still unclear what is the best way to conceptualise it.
The article analyzes the phenomenon of ownership in its legal, economic, political and philosophical perspectives. Ownership is considered as an opportunity and as a guarantee of sustainable development. Comparative context is used to identify the specificity of the bourgeois model of owners' power (social state) and the domestic concept of power-ownership (including socialist state). The author draws conclusions about ways to overcome the competition between the state and the market for the human resource and proposes to explore the ideological provision of power-ownership in order to appreciate its progressive potential and predilection in relation to the liberal model of social development
International audience ; The article analyzes the phenomenon of ownership in its legal, economic, political and philosophical perspectives. Ownership is considered as an opportunity and as a guarantee of sustainable development. Comparative context is used to identify the specificity of the bourgeois model of owners' power (social state) and the domestic concept of power-ownership (including socialist state). The author draws conclusions about ways to overcome the competition between the state and the market for the human resource and proposes to explore the ideological provision of power-ownership in order to appreciate its progressive potential and predilection in relation to the liberal model of social development. ; В статье анализируется феномен собственности в его юридическом, экономическом, политическом и философском ракурсах. Собственность рассматривается как возможность и как гарантия поступательного развития. Сравнительный контекст используется для выявления специфики буржуазной модели власти собственников (государство социальное) и отечественной концепции власти-собственности (в т.ч. государство социалистическое). Автором делаются выводы о способах преодоления конкуренции государства и рынка за человеческий ресурс и предлагается исследовать идеологическое обеспечение власти-собственности, дабы по достоинству оценить её прогрессивный потенциал и предпочтительность по отношению к либеральной модели общественного развития