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After the First World War, the German colonial empire was put under the mandate of the League of Nations. Day-to-day administrative affairs in former German Togoland were handed, under the stewardship of the League of Nations, to the United Kingdom and France. The shift from German to French administration in the eastern part led to the implementation of numerous changes including the renaming of places in the capital city Lomé: each and every name relating to Germany being banned and replaced by others relating to France or French colonial history. Another limited round of place renaming took place from 1960, in celebration of the country's independence from French colonial rule. The 1967 military coup meant political and military empowerment of people from the North over the political elite from the South showing in many ways where the new power came from. Place renaming occurred again, even in rural areas. In the 1970s, a name cleansing – topononymic as well as patronymic – took place under the new political ideology of "African authenticity". Nevertheless, by law, each and every Togolese citizen had to change his/her name to an "authentic" one, with no means of escape since new identity documents were no longer issued with former Christian names. Allowing individuals to keep their former Christian names was a strong demand in the national sovereign conferences that took place in the 1990s. Nowadays, and despite other social priorities having to be achieved quickly, place renaming still occurs according to two principles dealing with power, although in very different ways. In the Litimé, a remote rural area which is a former frontier where land issue is at stake after the saturation of settled land, competition over land ownership is set between local people and foreign settlers. Traditional leaders, in cooperation with the ruling party, tried to take over the local toponymy in an attempt to remove the names of settlements and neighbourhoods with foreign origins. In the capital city, at the time of the so-called "political opening", symbolic places (landmarks) continue to celebrate the memory of the former dictator through brand new names, even if symbolic concessions are made in an attempt to bring balance and honour the memory of the leaders of the independence movement. A century after the first colonial toponymic struggle in Togo, political place name issues are still on the agenda of both central power and local stakeholders.

Since the 1970s, even before the Maastricht Treaty comes into force, the status of the EU in international relations and therefore its power is a source of conceptual debates. Although European integration is often seen as a process of renunciation of power, the idea of a European power which replaces the powerlessness of member states after the Second World War is always present among the representatives of various approaches to international relations: civilian power, normative power, soft power, military power, etc. It should be noted that the search for new concepts to describe better the enigmatic nature of European power is in progress.The aim of this work is to contribute to this debate by using the concept of smart power, effective combination of hard power and soft power, in order to describe the nature of the power of the EU. The concept of smart power seems relevant to explain the model of the EU's power, although, in practice, the EU has difficulties in exercising smart power because of the lack of will among the member countries. ; Depuis les années 1970, bien avant l'entrée en vigueur du traité de Maastricht, le statut de l'UE dans les relations internationales et donc sa puissance est une source des débats conceptuels. Bien que la construction européenne soit souvent vue comme un processus de renoncement à la puissance, l'idée d'une Europe puissance qui se substitute à l'impuissance des Etats membres après la Seconde Guerre mondiale est toujours présente parmi les représentants de divers approches des relations internationales: puissance civile, puissance normative, puissance militaire, puissance douce, etc. Il faut remarquer que la recherche pour les nouveaux concepts supposés décrire toujours mieux la nature énigmatique de la puissance européenne continue. L'objectif de ce travail est de contribuer à ce débat en utilisant le concept de smart power, combinaison raisonné de hard et de soft power, pour décrire le rapport de l'UE à la puissance. Le concept de smart power parait pertinent pour ...

The people's power relies on a new strategy of emancipating social transformation which appeared in Latin America but with a universal aim. It consists in building up a plebeian power able to enlarge the democratic authority to form autonomous individuals and to create new ways of living in society. Such is the power of popular organizations when they are able to set up places where the capitalistic power can't prevail so that new social interactions are developed. Thanks to these organizations, the people's power first aims at creating a tension with the larger system not only in order to protect itself, but also to increase its influence on society and be able to make it evolve. It conveys a utopian vision of social transformation and intends to overrule all domination and to build a new social and local unity that would respect the people's diversity, as individuals or groups of individuals. Its political strategy relies on social hegemony and aims at controlling the capitalist state system in a democratic way and at transforming it, and, in the end, put it to an end. The people's power understands that its necessarily democratic political stance needs a long term transition period, as well as a transition type of society. This society, the condition to an emancipated one, is to be composed of both capitalistic and non-capitalistic forms of lives. ; Le pouvoir populaire est une nouvelle stratégie de transformation sociale émancipatrice, apparue en Amérique latine, mais avec vocation universelle. Elle est centrée sur la construction d'un pouvoir plébéien capable d'élargir l'exercice démocratique de l'autorité, de développer des sujets autonomes et de créer de nouvelles formes de sociabilité. Ce pouvoir est celui des organisations populaires, quand elles sont capables de construire des espaces où le pouvoir capitaliste ne peut pas s'exercer pour y développer de nouveaux rapports sociaux. À partir de ces organisations, le pouvoir populaire, cherche d'abord à établir un rapport de forces avec le pouvoir du ...

The people's power relies on a new strategy of emancipating social transformation which appeared in Latin America but with a universal aim. It consists in building up a plebeian power able to enlarge the democratic authority to form autonomous individuals and to create new ways of living in society. Such is the power of popular organizations when they are able to set up places where the capitalistic power can't prevail so that new social interactions are developed. Thanks to these organizations, the people's power first aims at creating a tension with the larger system not only in order to protect itself, but also to increase its influence on society and be able to make it evolve. It conveys a utopian vision of social transformation and intends to overrule all domination and to build a new social and local unity that would respect the people's diversity, as individuals or groups of individuals. Its political strategy relies on social hegemony and aims at controlling the capitalist state system in a democratic way and at transforming it, and, in the end, put it to an end. The people's power understands that its necessarily democratic political stance needs a long term transition period, as well as a transition type of society. This society, the condition to an emancipated one, is to be composed of both capitalistic and non-capitalistic forms of lives. ; Le pouvoir populaire est une nouvelle stratégie de transformation sociale émancipatrice, apparue en Amérique latine, mais avec vocation universelle. Elle est centrée sur la construction d'un pouvoir plébéien capable d'élargir l'exercice démocratique de l'autorité, de développer des sujets autonomes et de créer de nouvelles formes de sociabilité. Ce pouvoir est celui des organisations populaires, quand elles sont capables de construire des espaces où le pouvoir capitaliste ne peut pas s'exercer pour y développer de nouveaux rapports sociaux. À partir de ces organisations, le pouvoir populaire, cherche d'abord à établir un rapport de forces avec le pouvoir du système lui permettant de se préserver, mais avec vocation de devenir hégémonique au sein de la société pour pouvoir la remodeler. Porteur d'une vision utopique de la transformation sociale, son objectif final est le dépassement de toute domination et la construction une nouvelle totalité sociale, communautaire, mais respectueuse de la diversité populaire, individuelle et collective. Sa stratégie politique part de l'hégémonie sociale et vise à contrôler, démocratiquement, l'appareil d'État capitaliste, à le transformer, et à terme, à le faire disparaître. Le pouvoir populaire assume que son engagement politique, du fait de sa méthode démocratique, nécessite une période et une société de transition prolongées dans le temps. Cette société, préalable à la société émancipée, admets la coexistence en son sein de formes de vie capitalistes et non capitalistes.

Regardless of the popular wisdom to make predictions in negotiations as if they always reflect the right according to the Bible– that "to every one who has will more be given" – this article starts with observation that weaker parties can and do sometimes successfully negotiate with stronger parties. Naturally this provokes questions: "Why can weak parties successfully negotiate with the stronger parties in asymmetric negotiations? How to explain this structural paradox?". The article argues that these questions would be old and answered if not for the long lasting tendency in the international relations discipline to analyze international negotiations from the point of view of the traditional power understanding, as well as systemic international relations theories. On another hand, difficulties objectively arise due to the fact that analysis of the structural paradox is connected to the problem of power – one of the most complex and difficult to define categories of the social science. And although much has been done recently in the social science to improve our understanding of the concept of power, it is still unclear what is the best way to conceptualise it.

Regardless of the popular wisdom to make predictions in negotiations as if they always reflect the right according to the Bible– that "to every one who has will more be given" – this article starts with observation that weaker parties can and do sometimes successfully negotiate with stronger parties. Naturally this provokes questions: "Why can weak parties successfully negotiate with the stronger parties in asymmetric negotiations? How to explain this structural paradox?". The article argues that these questions would be old and answered if not for the long lasting tendency in the international relations discipline to analyze international negotiations from the point of view of the traditional power understanding, as well as systemic international relations theories. On another hand, difficulties objectively arise due to the fact that analysis of the structural paradox is connected to the problem of power – one of the most complex and difficult to define categories of the social science. And although much has been done recently in the social science to improve our understanding of the concept of power, it is still unclear what is the best way to conceptualise it.

Regardless of the popular wisdom to make predictions in negotiations as if they always reflect the right according to the Bible– that "to every one who has will more be given" – this article starts with observation that weaker parties can and do sometimes successfully negotiate with stronger parties. Naturally this provokes questions: "Why can weak parties successfully negotiate with the stronger parties in asymmetric negotiations? How to explain this structural paradox?". The article argues that these questions would be old and answered if not for the long lasting tendency in the international relations discipline to analyze international negotiations from the point of view of the traditional power understanding, as well as systemic international relations theories. On another hand, difficulties objectively arise due to the fact that analysis of the structural paradox is connected to the problem of power – one of the most complex and difficult to define categories of the social science. And although much has been done recently in the social science to improve our understanding of the concept of power, it is still unclear what is the best way to conceptualise it.

Ouverte à des questions que seulement quelques décennies auparavant elle peinait à envisager, l'histoire politique ou l'histoire du/des pouvoir(s) n'est plus uniquement aujourd'hui une étude des structures administratives et judiciaires, ou encore des événements dits "politiques". Elle fait, tout au contraire, la part belle à des dynamiques de recherche interdisciplinaire. L'étude croisée du fait militaire et des idées est l'une d'entre elles. Le présent recueil d'articles, "Le pouvoir par les armes. Le pouvoir par les idées", se positionne dans la continuité des recherches récentes en la matière. Il entend, en particulier, se concentrer sur les liens que les hommes et les femmes de la fin du Moyen Âge établirent entre l'action armée et les discours sur le pouvoir. C'est en effet à travers les interconnexions de ces deux champs que l'on peut mieux comprendre le succès ou l'insuccès d'une politique - militaire ou non - ou l'émergence d'une propagande justifiant un pouvoir et, parfois, le recours aux armes. Ce volume entend ainsi contribuer à éclairer la manière dont émerge, se construit et s'affirme les différents pouvoirs au Moyen Âge tardif et au cours de la première Renaissance.

Il est assez communément admis que les BRICS, en tant que groupe, pâtissent de leur diversité. L'organisation en elle-même est en effet assez unique puisqu'elle rassemble des nations très éloignées les unes des autres géographiquement et ô combien dissemblables en termes sociaux, politiques et culturels. Des volatiles d'espèces différentes peuvent-ils voler ensemble et véritablement constituer une nuée ? Cet article veut démontrer que tel est le cas, et que le sens commun fait fausse route. Plus encore, cet article montre que loin d'empêcher les BRICS de fonctionner effectivement comme un tout, l'extrême diversité de ses parties ne fait en réalité que renforcer, pour les nations qui la compose, l'efficience des BRICS en tant que vecteur de diplomatie d'influence dans le système international. Plus généralement, cela permet d'expliquer les modalités à travers lesquelles des organisations internationales peuvent gagner en influence grâce à une plus grande diversité de leurs membres. ; It is the general view that the BRICS countries, as a group, are disadvantaged by their diversity. The BRICS organisation itself is somewhat unique since it covers countries that are not only very distant geographically but also very different socially, politically and culturally. Can birds of a different feather really flock together ? This article tries to show that they can, and that received wisdom is wrong. Going further still, we show that rather than preventing the BRICS from functioning efficiently as a group, the very diversity of its component parts in fact strengthens, in the BRICS countries themselves, the group's effectiveness as a vehicle for soft power diplomacy within the international system. More generally, this can also explain how the influence of international organisations can grow with greater diversity among their members.

Selon Joseph Nye, pour pouvoir exercer son " soft power " - concept qu'il a inventé -, un pays doit avoir une idée claire de ses buts et de ses fondements : attractivité de sa culture et de ses valeurs sociales et politiques, substance de sa diplomatie. C'était le cas de la Chine de Mao, ça l'est beaucoup moins de celle de Hu Jintao, trente ans après. Depuis la fin des années 1990, l'impressionnant développement économique de la République populaire de Chine génère une inquiétude latente à la mesure du bouleversement qu'il induit dans les relations internationales. Le régime communiste en a conscience mais, englué dans une profonde crise idéologique et dans ses contradictions, il peine à développer son soft power et à améliorer son image, que ce soit avec la mise en valeur de ses ressources culturelles ou l'utilisation des Jeux olympiques de Pékin. Au point de privilégier ces derniers temps l'accroissement de son " hard power ".

Selon Joseph Nye, pour pouvoir exercer son " soft power " - concept qu'il a inventé -, un pays doit avoir une idée claire de ses buts et de ses fondements : attractivité de sa culture et de ses valeurs sociales et politiques, substance de sa diplomatie. C'était le cas de la Chine de Mao, ça l'est beaucoup moins de celle de Hu Jintao, trente ans après. Depuis la fin des années 1990, l'impressionnant développement économique de la République populaire de Chine génère une inquiétude latente à la mesure du bouleversement qu'il induit dans les relations internationales. Le régime communiste en a conscience mais, englué dans une profonde crise idéologique et dans ses contradictions, il peine à développer son soft power et à améliorer son image, que ce soit avec la mise en valeur de ses ressources culturelles ou l'utilisation des Jeux olympiques de Pékin. Au point de privilégier ces derniers temps l'accroissement de son " hard power ".

International audience ; This article analyses the birth and the role of the NGO's Coalition for the civil society and Democracy in Kyrgyzstan. This NGO, funded by the American foundation of the Democratic Party (NDI) played a key role during the events of march 2005. The birth of this kind of new institution should be analysed in order to understand the relationships which occur beetween local NGO with this national NGO and a foreign foundation. The notion of «coaltion» suggests that this new form of political group is just a network of equal actors. The analyse show that this kind of coalition that exist also in other post-soviet countries are new form of power structures which can compit with State institutions. If local NGO are independent from the Kyrgyz governement, the analyse reveal new forms of dependances which place this kind of institutions in new types of power relations. ; Cet article analyse l'émergence et le rôle de Koalitsia, une coalition d'ONG luttant pour la société civile et la démocratisation au Kirghizstan. Elle a joué un rôle déterminant au moment des élections de mars 2005 qui ont entraîné la Révolution des tulipes. La naissance de ce nouveau type d'institution amène à s'interroger sur les relations qu'elle entretient avec les ONG locales qu'elle est censée représenter d'une part et la fondation du Parti démocrate américain qui la finance d'autre part. Cette coalition, qui se présente comme un réseau réunissant des acteurs égaux, cache de nouvelles structures de pouvoir qui viennent contester l'État. Si les ONG locales s'émancipent de la tutelle gouvernementales, l'analyse révèle de nouvelles formes de dépendance. Le nouveau président a utilisé cette ressource tout en s'en détournant aujourd'hui au profit d'une collaboration étroite avec la Russie et la Chine. Les acteurs politiques sont ainsi dans des nouveaux rapports de pouvoir qui caractérisent l'évolution politique de cette société post-socialiste qui fait face à des contraintes extérieures très fortes remettant en cause la ...

Wittgenstein notes: "Writing in the style you need is putting a car exactly on track. "What does it mean, if not that every thought has a style, and must have one? That is to say, form matters in substance, that it is an issue, including in the production of theories and analyses. There would be a power of shape, which would guide the creation of ideas. In order to present that argument, I propose a detour by Corneille. It works almost exclusively for Alexandrin throughout his life, both in his comedies (too little known) and in his tragedies or tragedies. This undoubtedly explains this, even Cassirer, an analyst who is particularly penetrating his work, finds it cold: "In Corneille, everything is in a cold and clear light and all in this light has a glacial effect. "It cannot therefore be avoided that the form and substance, Alexandrin and the affres of pumping power and outdated morals are linked. Corneille's approach to handling Alexandrin, which is very specific, carried out by balancements and repetitions, seems to have produced only a mathematical one. The shape would be powerful, but binding, and its rigid effects. ; International audience ; Wittgenstein notes: "Writing in the style you need is putting a car exactly on track. "What does it mean, if not that every thought has a style, and must have one? That is to say, form matters in substance, that it is an issue, including in the production of theories and analyses. There would be a power of shape, which would guide the creation of ideas. In order to present that argument, I propose a detour by Corneille. It works almost exclusively for Alexandrin throughout his life, both in his comedies (too little known) and in his tragedies or tragedies. This undoubtedly explains this, even Cassirer, an analyst who is particularly penetrating his work, finds it cold: "In Corneille, everything is in a cold and clear light and all in this light has a glacial effect. "It cannot therefore be avoided that the form and substance, Alexandrin and the affres of pumping power ...

While the Spanish Constitution of 1978 affirms the unity of the Nation, it places great emphasis on the autonomy of nationalities and regions. This is reflected in the dispersion of political power. At the economic level, the trend is towards the formation of larger groups, going beyond regional or nationals.The analysis of trends over the last 20 years tends to show that political power in Spain is shaken, with the region often taking precedence over the nation. At the same time, economic relations with Portugal have considerably strengthened, implying a high degree of dependence on its Spanish neighbour. An economic area coinciding with the Iberian peninsula largely dominated by Spain. In the long run, the question will arise as to whether this new economic area will create a new Iberian identity. ; International audience The Spanish Constitution of 1978 asserts both "the indissoluble unity of the Nation" and the "right of self-government for nationalities and regions", a constitutional contradiction which, in fact, disperses political power. In the economic sphere, however, the trend is to concentrate power in wider groups, going beyond the political notions of "regions" and "nation". In the Iberian Peninsula, which is a clear geographical unit, the economic trend, for the last twenty years, has seen the growth of Spain's leadership. The question can thus be raised: has a new economic identity emerged within this geographical unit? ; While the Spanish Constitution of 1978 affirms the unity of the Nation, it places great emphasis on the autonomy of nationalities and regions. This is reflected in the dispersion of political power. At the economic level, the trend is towards the formation of larger groups, going beyond regional or nationals.The analysis of trends over the last 20 years tends to show that political power in Spain is shaken, with the region often taking precedence over the nation. At the same time, economic relations with Portugal have considerably strengthened, implying a high degree of ...

Communitarianism emerged as a critique to liberalism. Communitarians are aiming to show that communitarianism is an alternative political theory which could successfully compete with other political theories. However, it is maintained that liberalism and communitarianism are not separate theories and they only disagree over the proper role of power. Thesis claims that the communitarian concept of power is liberal and, therefore, communitarianism is not a distinct political theory, but a liberal one. Communitarianism denies a liberal claim that it is possible to agree about the principles of justice. Moreover, communitarians maintain that a liberal concept of free individual is a false view. They emphasize the significance of the community in the life of an individual, because it helps one to become a real human being. On the other hand, if there are only communal values and we cannot commensurate them, because there are no universal principles then everything is possible. Thus it is impossible to criticize or condemn other communal practices. That is why communitarians claim that there are some non-communal principles, like "parity of participation" and "everyone has an equal rights". They emphasize that no community can be more superior than other, so power has to be neutral. Communitarian critique of liberalism is not irresistible. Firstly, it simplifies the liberal concept of an individual. Secondly, liberals agree with some of the communitarians proposals, like the role of community in the life of an individual. Furthermore, the communitarian theory rest on liberal assumptions – equality and freedom, neutrality of the state. The role which is attributed to the state is the same for communitarians and for liberals. Both liberals and communitarians claim that state has to secure conditions that would enable the right for all to participate in the governance. It also has to reform communities and other associations and should not try to implement any concept of good. Thus communitarian concept of power does not add anything to liberalism.