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Session 3: Military & Constitutional Politics in Sea - Slot 4 ; The Conference program & abstracts' website is located at http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=4&ved=0CEoQFjAD&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.euroseas.org%2Fplatform%2Ffiles%2Ffile%2FProceedings.pdf&ei=2xfOUuOCJ9GXiAeRl4DYCQ&usg=AFQjCNFMK7mKfnD7lGQTpv2ob5LHLik2rw&bvm=bv.59026428,d.aGc ; This paper explores the evolving political role of the Myanmar armed forces since the adoption of the 2008 Constitution and the subsequent military/civil transition engaged in 2011. It moves beyond transition and democratization studies and rediscovers theories of the "praetorian state" to apply them to the post-junta constitutional politics in Myanmar. Armed forces in transitional polities, the literature on praetorianism informs us, still aim to keep an eye on policymaking – mostly thanks to military-sanctioned Constitutions or through more subtle ways of political, social and corporate intervention. This paper therefore demonstrates how the Myanmar army still enjoys in a post-SPDC context the legal instruments, networks and political leverage to intrude as a "praetorian ruler" into state affairs, notably through the provisions of the 2008 Constitution. It argues that, instead of a direct military rule (as observed until 2011), "praetorian" practices will be rediscovered in the 2010s thanks to the constitutional prerogatives the Myanmar military institution has secured after a decade-long Constitution-drafting process. Indeed, whilst keeping vested interests in the newly formed post-junta and civilian-led executive and legislative powers, the Myanmar army seems however willing to now stay away from day-to-day politics. Gradually tolerating a greater policy role for civilians, it will nonetheless continue to shape, through various types of praetorian interventions, Myanmar's foreign and domestic policies, as well as influence future reforms. ; postprint

The successive constitutional crises that confronted the Pakistani courts were not of their own making. But the doctrinally inconsistent, judicially inappropriate, and politically timid responses fashioned by these courts ultimately undermined constitutional governance. When confronted with the question of the validity and scope of extra constitutional power, the courts vacillated between Hans Kelsen's theory of revolutionary validity, Hugo Grotius's theory of implied mandate, and an expansive construction of the doctrine of state necessity. A more principled and realistic response would have been to declare the validity of extra constitutional regimes a nonjusticiable political question. Besides ensuring doctrinal consistency, a refusal to furnish extra constitutional regimes with judicially pronounced validity may well have discouraged praetorian encroachment upon constitutional governance. A consistent refusal to pronounce upon nonjusticiable political questions might have promoted a democratic constitution building process by implicitly reminding the body politic of its primary responsibility to build and preserve constitutional orders. Furthermore, during the periods when these courts had the opportunity to exercise judicial review under a constitution, they failed to enunciate a consistent and coherent standard of review. By misapplying the political question doctrine, the courts implied that democratically elected legislatures possess unfettered legislative power. By refusing to fashion judicial checks against potential tyranny of the majority, the courts acquiesced in the contraction of fundamental rights and the diminution of federalism during the Fourth Republic. This facilitated the demise of the Fourth Republic following yet another military usurpation of power. A better approach would have been for the courts to invalidate any legislation which jeopardized the basic structure and essential features of the constitution.

Although the army of New Spain exhibited few if any signs of praetorianism or militarism prior to the independence wars, 1810-1821, many observers in the decades following national independence described the military as one of the negative impediments to progress in the young Mexican republic. Clearly, the decade of insurgency, guerrilla warfare, and fragmentation of the old polity caused dramatic changes in the attitudes and behavior of army officers. The present article analyzes the impact of the war on the royalist army, which in 1821 largely transformed itself to declare for independence. To develop effective counterinsurgency programs, officers assumed active political and administrative roles. After years of exercising power, they did not wish to return to their barracks.

Using Israel as a case study, this article endeavors to account for the intriguing sociopolitical phenomenon that military coups and military regimes are thwarted not because of the resilience of democratic institutions and the absence of war but because the society is militaristic and is in a protracted state of war. This argument, hypothesizing an inverse relationship between militarism and praetorianism, is based on an examination of Israel from its establishment until the present day, its depiction as a nation-in-arms, and its comparison with other nations-in-arms that have also experienced nonpraetorian militarism.

The article endeavours to account for the intriguing socio-political phenomenon, illustrated by the case of Israel, that military coups (or praetorianism) are thwarted not because of the resilience of democratic institutions and the absence of war, but because the society is culturally militaristic and is in a protracted state of war. This argument, which hypothesizes an inverse relationship between militarism and praetorianism, is based on an examination of the Israeli state from its foundation up until the present day. During that period, the depiction of the Israeli nation-in-arms has been embodied by non-praetorian militarism. ; The article endeavours to account for the intriguing socio-political phenomenon, illustrated by the case of Israel, that military coups (or praetorianism) are thwarted not because of the resilience of democratic institutions and the absence of war, but because the society is culturally militaristic and is in a protracted state of war. This argument, which hypothesizes an inverse relationship between militarism and praetorianism, is based on an examination of the Israeli state from its foundation up until the present day. During that period, the depiction of the Israeli nation-in-arms has been embodied by non-praetorian militarism.