Suchergebnisse

Of all new states in Asia, Latin America, and Africa, Nigeria qualifies as one that has suffered recurring praetorianism. Nigeria was under firm military autocracy and absolutism for a longer period than civil rule. It is against this background that transitions from the military to civil rule in 1999 made the polity heave a sigh of relieve. However, the performance of the civil government is now a serious concern because of the system's inability to nurture and sustain democracy. Thus, this article reviews all previous coups and attempts an in-depth analysis of salient factors that may be a harbinger of democratic reversal. This paper infers that the performance of the state makes the military an alternative that is only waiting for another auspicious period to terminate the fledging democracy. The article calls for an increase in social spending if the so-called dividend of democracy will make Nigerians a catalyst for democracy.

The past decade marks a watershed in Argentine civil-military relations. The country, an almost classic case of twentieth-century praetorianism, now has an historic opportunity to assert civilian control over the armed forces. This improvement in the prospects for civilian control of the armed forces may not be evident at first since the accession of the current president, Carlos Menem (1989-) was marked by an apparently dramatic retreat in the government's relations with the armed forces. While Menem's predecessor, Raul Alfonsin (1983-1989), pursued a policy which included prosecution of military human rights violators, Menem made an abrupt about-face. He granted a general pardon to those same military officers. However, this trade-off has given the government the freedom to assert a degree of civilian control over the armed forces hitherto lacking in range of important military policies in which the previous government had been largely stalemated by armed forces resistance. The threat of substantial political intervention by the armed forces is now on the wane.

This examination of the military's role in Polish politics and society between the two world wars attempts to fill a gap in our knowledge of civil-military relations across systems. Despite considerable literature on that subject in advanced industrial societies. (.ommunist states, and the less-developed or Third World countrics, an analytical treatment of civil-military relations in the so-called authoritarian svstems, of which prewar Poland is a prime example, has been conspicuously missing. This research was conducted with the help of two analytical frameworks that are frequently referred to as forming the developmental model. The purpose was not so much to test the use of Western social science methodology but mostly to investigate the possibility of making meaningful cross-systemic and longitudinal comparisons. The conclusion that emerged wxas that prewar Poland represents a textbook case of "oligarchical praetorianism" which suggests in turn the possibility of comparing it with other countries falling under similar and/or different systemic rubrics. Such systemic comparisons should add to our knowledge of civil-militarv relations in a global setting.

Kenya is on the short list of African states that have not experienced military rule. In a continent known for rampant praetorianism, this means only that the coup prevention strategies implemented by its civilian rulers have been successful...so far. The unscrupulous ethnic manipulation, politicization, bribery into the military's "circles of power," and the set-up of a powerful paramilitary as a counterweight to the army have done little to institutionalize civilian control. These strategies, inaugurated by President Jomo Kenyatta and taken to new heights by his successor Daniel Arap Moi, entailed neither military professionalization, military autonomy and political insulation, nor regime-legitimizing policies. The evidence of the case study suggests that the adverse effects of Kenya's civilian control strategies support Samuel Huntington's and Claude Welch Jr.'s hypothesis that only the professionalization and political insulation of the military are more likely to ensure its continued subordination to civilian control. The strategies implemented since independence epitomize the model of civil-military relations that Africa's fledgling democracies should avoid if democratic civilian control of the military is to take root on the continent.

A WIDELY KNOWN APPROACH TO THE ANALYSIS OF THE ARMED FORCES ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT IS TO BEGIN WITH AN APPRAISAL OF THE CP LEGACY OF THE AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE. THIS PARTICULAR APPROCH IS CERTAINLY CONGRUENT WITH THE NOTION OF INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFER USED BY STUDENTS OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS.1 ONE CAN EMPLOY SUCH AN APPROACH TO INVESTIGATE THE ARMED FORCES OF THE BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE, WHICH BECAME THE REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA ON 30 SEPTEMBER 1966 FOLLOWING EIGHT DECADES OF BRITISH COLONIAL RULE. HOWEVER, THE PRESENT BOTSWANA DEFENSE FORCE (BDF) HAD NO DIRECT, LONG-STANDING COLONIAL ANTECEDENT. ITS LEGACY CAN BE FOUND PRIMARILY IN THE BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE (BP) POLICE FORCE AND SECONDARILY IN THE MILITARY UNITS THAT THE PROTECTORATE CONTRIBUTED TO THE BRITISH IMPERIAL WAR EFFORT IN WORLD WARS 1 AND II. THE INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFER APPROACH TO ANALYSING THE BDF IN THE CONTEXT OF CONTEMPORARY SOUTHERN AFRICA NEEDS TO BE SUPPLEMENTED BY INQUIRIES WHICH ARE MORE SPECIFIC TO THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION ITSELF. THE STRATEGY OF INQUIRY NEEDS TO INCLUDE THE ANCILLARY TOPICS OF FORCE STRUCTURE AND MISSION, RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING, THE ECONOMIC RESOURCES CONSUMED BY THE BDF, AND THE TRANSFER OF OVERSEAS MILITARY HARDWARE AND EXPERTISE TO THE FLEDGLING ARMY. ADDITIONALLY, ONE NEEDS TO ASSESS THE PROSPECTS FOR PRAETORIANISM IN BOTSWANA. FINALLY, THE INVESTIGATION SHOULD CONSIDER THE PLACE OF THE BDF WITHIN THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGIONAL SETTING, WHERE THE MANAGEMENT AND APPLICATION OFPY: 1984

Historically the character of civil-military relations in the United States has been dominated by the concept of civilian control of the military. This has largely been a response to the fear of praetorianism. As recently as 1949, for example, the first Hoover Commission asserted that one of the major reasons for strengthening the "means of exercising civilian control" over the defense establishment was to "safeguard our democratic traditions against militarism." This same warning was raised in the report of the Rockefeller Committee on defense organization in 1953. While the overriding purpose of the committee's recommendations was to provide "the Nation with maximum security at minimum cost," the report made it clear that this had to be achieved "without danger to our free institutions, based on the fundamental principle of civilian control of the Military Establishment." Finally, during the debate on the reorganization proposals of 1958, senators and congressmen used the theme of a "Prussianized" military staff to attempt to slow down the trend towards centralization in the military establishment.Despite this imposing support, the concept of civilian control of the military has little significance for contemporary problems of national security in the United States. In the first place, military leaders are divided among themselves, although their differences cannot be reduced to a crass contrast between dichomatic doctrines. Air Force leaders who are gravely concerned over the need to maintain a decisive nuclear retaliatory force are by now acknowledging the need to develop a limited war capability.