An important objection to preference-satisfaction theories of well-being is that they cannot make sense of interpersonal comparisons. A tradition dating back to Harsanyi (J Political Econ 61(5):434, 1953) attempts to solve this problem by appeal to people's so-called extended preferences. This paper presents a new problem for the extended preferences program, related to Arrow's celebrated impossibility theorem. We consider three ways in which the extended-preference theorist might avoid this problem, and recommend that she pursue one: developing aggregation rules (for extended preferences) that violate Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives condition.
International audience Electoral systems in which voters can cast preference votes for individual candidates within a party list are increasingly popular. To the best of our knowledge, there is no research on whether and how the scale used to evaluate candidates can affect electoral behavior and results. In this paper, we analyze data from an original voting experiment leveraging real-life political preferences and embedded in a nationally representative online survey in Austria. We show that the scale used by voters to evaluate candidates makes differences. For example, the possibility to give up to two points advantages male candidates because male voters are more likely to give 'zero points' to female candidates. Yet this pattern does not exist in the system in which voters can give positive and negative points because male voters seem reluctant to actively withdraw points from female candidates. We thus encourage constitution makers to think carefully about the design of preference voting.
Incorporating weakly nonseparable preferences into the familiar time-preference model, we emphasize a role of steady-state welfare changes in determining the effect of permanent tariffs on the current account. The effect consists of: a welfare effect, due to steady-state welfare changes, which is negative (positive) when preferences toward imports are more (less) wealth-enhanced than toward exports; and a substitution effect, which occurs only with initial distortion. Even without initial distortion, a marginal tariff has a first-order welfare effect on the current-account. Its sign does not depend on whether impatience is increasing or decreasing in wealth.
While many studies have identified an association between social class andeconomic preferences, we know little about the implications of changes inclass location for these preferences. This article assesses how social class andintra-generational class mobility affect economic preferences drawing on lon-gitudinal data from the British Household Panel Survey. In doing so, the art-icle adopts a post-industrial perspective that considers horizontal and verticalclass divisions. Even when time-invariant characteristics of individuals are keptconstant (through fixed-effects estimation), it is found that both vertical andhorizontal class location explain economic preferences. Thus, these estima-tions suggest that social class moulds preferences, even when accounting forfactors that can lead to selection into classes. Moreover, people who changeclasses hold different economic preferences than their peers in the class oforigin, but do not completely assimilate into their class of destination. Thisimplies that growing intra-generational class mobility could undermine theclass basis of political conflict.
The overall aim of this thesis is to better understand how politics and preferences influence policy outcomes. The thesis consists of two papers that examine two different policy outcomes in Swedish municipalities. Paper I analyzes the effect of income and education on the environmental policy performance of Swedish local governments. In estimating the effects of income and education we will also examine how they interact with political participation. To examine this I use panel data based on an environmental ranking of Swedish municipalities made every year between 1993 and 2001. The empirical results show that there is a positive relationship between income and the environmental policy performance. This relationship is however captured by controlling for the education level, which has a positive relationship with the environmental policy performance. Controlling for municipal fixed effects and relevant control variables does not change this result. Furthermore we find that political participation has significant interaction effects with both income and education. Paper II develops a regression discontinuity (RD) design to estimate the causal effect of political party power on the placement of refugee immigrants in Swedish municipalities. That Swedish municipalities have a proportional election system puts forward specific challenges for using a RD design, which this paper will provide solutions to. The identification strategy is based on the idea that a specific party getting one more seat or not in the municipal council can be considered as good as random if the party is close to a seat change. Even though this paper only looks at Swedish data the method could be applied to other countries with proportional election systems. The results of the paper show that the political party power has a large effect on the placement of refugee immigrants in Swedish municipalities.
Political parties are key actors in electoral democracies: they organize the legislature, form governments, and citizens choose their representatives by voting for them. How citizens evaluate political parties and how well the parties that citizens evaluate positively perform thus provide useful tools to estimate the quality of representation from the individual's perspective. We propose a measure that can be used to assess party preference representation at both the individual and aggregate levels, both in government and in parliament. We calculate the measure for over 160,000 survey respondents following 111 legislative elections held in 38 countries. We find little evidence that the party preferences of different socio-economic groups are systematically over or underrepresented. However, we show that citizens on the right tend to have higher representation scores than their left-wing counterparts. We also find that whereas proportional systems do not produce higher levels of representation on average, they reduce variance in representation across citizens.
International audience ; Given a large population, it is an intensive task to gather individual preferences over a set of alternatives and arrive at an aggregate or collective preference of the population. We show that social network underlying the population can be harnessed to accomplish this task effectively, by sampling preferences of a small subset of representative nodes. We first develop a Facebook app to create a dataset consisting of preferences of nodes and the underlying social network, using which, we develop models that capture how preferences are distributed among nodes in a typical social network. We hence propose an appropriate objective function for the problem of selecting best representative nodes. We devise two algorithms, namely, Greedy-min which provides a performance guarantee for a wide class of popular voting rules, and Greedy-sum which exhibits excellent performance in practice. We compare the performance of these proposed algorithms against random-polling and popular centrality measures, and provide a detailed analysis of the obtained results. Our analysis suggests that selecting representatives using social network information is advantageous for aggregating preferences related to personal topics (e.g., lifestyle), while random polling with a reasonable sample size is good enough for aggregating preferences related to social topics (e.g., government policies)
International audience ; Given a large population, it is an intensive task to gather individual preferences over a set of alternatives and arrive at an aggregate or collective preference of the population. We show that social network underlying the population can be harnessed to accomplish this task effectively, by sampling preferences of a small subset of representative nodes. We first develop a Facebook app to create a dataset consisting of preferences of nodes and the underlying social network, using which, we develop models that capture how preferences are distributed among nodes in a typical social network. We hence propose an appropriate objective function for the problem of selecting best representative nodes. We devise two algorithms, namely, Greedy-min which provides a performance guarantee for a wide class of popular voting rules, and Greedy-sum which exhibits excellent performance in practice. We compare the performance of these proposed algorithms against random-polling and popular centrality measures, and provide a detailed analysis of the obtained results. Our analysis suggests that selecting representatives using social network information is advantageous for aggregating preferences related to personal topics (e.g., lifestyle), while random polling with a reasonable sample size is good enough for aggregating preferences related to social topics (e.g., government policies)
In: James , S , Kassim , H , Hargreaves Heap , S & Warren , T 2020 , ' Preferences, Preference Formation and Position Taking in a Eurozone Out : Lessons from the United Kingdom ' , Political studies review , vol. 18 , no. 4 , pp. 525-541 . https://doi.org/10.1177/1478929919864774
In the literature on member state position-taking in the eurozone crisis, the debate has mainly centred on whether national preferences are shaped exclusively within the domestic setting or influenced by shared EU-level norms or interaction within EU institutions. This article goes beyond this discussion. Drawing on original data collected by the authors, it uses the UK's experience to test the claims both of society-centred approaches, including liberal intergovernmentalism, and perspectives that emphasise the importance of shared EU norms or interaction. It argues that while the first overlook the role of institutions as both actors and mediating variables in preference formation, the second have so far focused on the experience of eurozone members, thereby raising the possibility of selection bias. Treating eurozone form as a series of processes rather than a single event, it contests the claim that preference formation is always driven by societal interests, highlights instances where government acts in the absence of or contrary to expressed societal interests, and reveals limitations of the shared norms critique of liberal intergovernmentalism. It shows that the UK government was driven by a scholars concern to protect the UK economy from financial contagion rather than solidarity with its European partners.
This report provides information about the Generalized System of Preferences which provides duty-free treatment for products that are imported from some designated countries. The main purpose is to promote economic growth.
A critical body politics lens to sexual desire and attraction, told from the perspective of an autoethnography. ; Nault, Curran J. ; Women's and Gender Studies
This paper uses pseudo panel techniques and a fixed effects estimator to analyse the determinants of preferences for redistribution in 34 European countries over the period 2002-2012. The data is drawn from the six available waves of the European Social Survey. The main result is that changes in income inequality positively affect changes in preferences for redistribution over time. Though this result is predicted by standard political economy models, it has found little previous empirical support. This study shows that, at least in Europe, growing income inequality leads to more individual support for redistribution. The empirical results hold after performing a variety of robustness checks regarding the construction of pseudo panels, the use of lags and different measures of income inequality.
Risk aversion is an important factor in many settings, including individual decisions about investment or occupational choice, and government choices about policies affecting environmental, industrial, or health risks. Risk preferences are measured using surveys or incentivized games with real consequences. Reviewing the different approaches to measuring individual risk aversion shows that the best approach will depend on the question being asked and the study's target population. In particular, economists' gold standard of incentivized games may not be superior to surveys in all settings.
This paper uses pseudo panel techniques and a fixed effects estimator to analyse the determinants of preferences for redistribution in 34 European countries over the period 2002–2012. The data is drawn from the six available waves of the European Social Survey. The main result is that changes in income inequality positively affect changes in preferences for redistribution over time. Though this result is predicted by standard political economy models, it has found little previous empirical support. This study shows that, at least in Europe, growing income inequality leads to more individual support for redistribution. The empirical results hold after performing a variety of robustness checks regarding the construction of pseudo panels, the use of lags and different measures of income inequality.
Do firms seek to make the market transparent,or do they confuse the consumers in their product perceptions? We show that the answer to this question depends decisively on preference heterogeneity. Contrary to the well-studied case of homogeneous goods, confusion is not necessarily an equilibrium in markets with differentiated goods. In particular, if the taste distribution is polarized, so that indifferent consumers are relatively rare, firms strive to fully educate consumers. By contrast, if the taste distribution features a concentration of indecisive consumers, confusion becomes part of the equilibrium strategies. The adverse welfare consequences of confusion can be more severe than with homogeneous goods, as consumers may not only pay higher prices, but also choose a dominated option, or inefficiently refrain from buying. Qualitatively similar insights obtain for political contests, in which candidates compete for voters with heterogeneous preferences.