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1: Binary Relations: Definitions, Representations, Basic Properties -- 1.1. Binary relations -- 1.2. Graph representation of binary relations -- 1.3. Coding the binary relations -- 1.4. Matrix representation of binary relations -- 1.5. Basic properties of binary relations -- 1.6. Particular binary relations -- 1.7. Graph interpretation of the properties -- 1.8. Algebraic interpretation of the properties -- 1.9. References -- 2: The Concept of Preference Structure -- 2.1. Preference, indifference, incomparability -- 2.2. Preference structure -- 2.3. Important agreement -- 2.4. Characteristic relation of a preference structure -- 2.5. Graph representation of a preference structure -- 2.6. Coding the preference structure -- 2.7. Example -- 2.8. References -- 3: Usual Preference Structures -- 3.1. Tournament structure -- 3.2. Total order structure -- 3.3. Weak order structure -- 3.4. Total interval order structure -- 3.5. Total semiorder structure -- 3.6. Partial order structure -- 3.7. Quasi order structure -- 3.8. References -- 4: Two New Preference Structures -- 4.1. Partial interval order structure -- 4.2. Partial semiorder structure -- 4.3. References -- 5: Complete Valued Preference Structures -- 5.1. Definition -- 5.2. Important remark -- 5.3. Particular case -- 5.4. Graph representation -- 5.5. Matridal representation -- 5.6. Particular complete valued preference structures -- 5.7. Binary relations and various properties related to a complete valued preference structure -- 5.8. Characterizations of the families defined in section 5.6.. -- 5.9. Functional representation of a valued preference structure -- 5.10. Roberts homogeneous families of semiorders -- 5.11. Families of weak orders -- 5.12. Summary -- 5.13. Examples -- 5.14. References -- 6: Complete Two-Valued Preference Structures -- 6.1. Introduction -- 6.2. Two-valued preference structures with constant thresholds -- 6.3. Example -- 6.4. References.

This review concerns political preferences—what they are and where they come from. We begin by documenting the close relationship between processes of preference formation and change. Rather than suddenly appearing, most preferences emerge from interactions between individuals and their environment. This aspect of preference formation poses a concrete challenge: to uncover the mechanics of these interactions in important social contexts. We then describe political science research that meets this challenge. We find an expansive literature that clarifies how phenomena such as parties, campaigns, and the need to act strategically affect preferences. This work provides many widely applicable insights.

This note is devoted to the question: How restrictive is the assumption that preferences be Euclidean in d dimensions. In particular it is proven that a preference profile with I individuals and A alternatives can be represented by Euclidean utilities with d dimensions if and only if d=min(I,A-1). The paper also describes the systems of A points which allow for the representation of any profile over A alternatives, and provides some results when only strict preferences are considered. ; Cette note est consacrée à la question:Quelle restriction impose-t-on en faisant l'hypothèse qu'un profil de préférences est euclidien en dimension d ? En particulier on démontre qu'un profil de préférences sur I individus et A alternatives peut être représenté par des utilités euclidiennes en dimension d si et seulement si d est supérieur ou égal à min(I,A-1). On décrit aussi les systèmes de points qui permettent de représenter tout profil sur A alternatives, et on donne quelques résultats quand seules les préférences strictes sont considérées.

A widely held & durable normative position has been that policy analysts should attempt to estimate the evaluative reaction of those who will be most directly affected by a government-sponsored or regulated technology. The premise of applied welfare economics is that citizens would divide, substitute, & additively recombine their assessments of the project's impacts in the same manner. An alternative theory is outlined by arguing that citizen preferences will often be contingent on, rather than divisible from, the substantive & procedural characteristics of the context in which a choice takes place. Moreover, it can be predicted that the manner in which these evaluations are substituted & recombined will vary with the internal structure of the individual's value & belief system. By representing that system in terms of a hierarchical model composed of four factors -- common orientation, procedural judgment, desire for personal control, & substantive evaluation -- it is argued that the evaluations of a project will be combined by way of interactive, indirect, & nonrecursive relationships as well as the common additive expectations. Some of the implications of this alternative theory for policy analysis are explored. 3 Figures, 66 References. HA