Preference Anomalies, Preference Elicitation and the Discovered Preference Hypothesis
In: Environmental and resource economics, Band 32, Heft 1, S. 55-89
ISSN: 1573-1502
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In: Environmental and resource economics, Band 32, Heft 1, S. 55-89
ISSN: 1573-1502
In: American economic review, Band 102, Heft 7, S. 3357-3376
ISSN: 1944-7981
Risk and time are intertwined. The present is known while the future is inherently risky. This is problematic when studying time preferences since uncontrolled risk can generate apparently present-biased behavior. We systematically manipulate risk in an intertemporal choice experiment. Discounted expected utility performs well with risk, but when certainty is added common ratio predictions fail sharply. The data cannot be explained by prospect theory, hyperbolic discounting, or preferences for resolution of uncertainty, but seem consistent with a direct preference for certainty. The data suggest strongly a difference between risk and time preferences. (JEL C91 D81 D91)
In: Journal of elections, public opinion and parties, Band 27, Heft 2, S. 172-191
ISSN: 1745-7297
In: Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 43-2012
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In: American economic review, Band 105, Heft 7, S. 2287-2293
ISSN: 1944-7981
Can the well-known experimental phenomenon of present-bias in intertemporal choice be confounded with the risks associated with receiving payment? Can measurements of risk preferences be used to represent desires for smoothness in intertemporal payments? In our two 2012 papers in this journal we explored these two questions and found the answer to the first to be yes and the second to be no. We feel the three papers inspired by our work and published here underscore these arguments and point to interesting new possibilities for modeling and measuring risk over time. (JEL C91, D81, D91)
Theorists of justice have to steer between two rocks. On the one hand, there is the intuition that an individual's morally permitted preferences should be respected: it is not justifiable to intervene with them. On the other hand, such preferences are the result of formation processes, which are notoriously vulnerable to manipulation. Does justice demand respect for preferences that produce or perpetuate injustices, suffered either by the individual herself or by others? In this paper, I will investigate this problem in the context of the ambiguous tenet of neutrality. The field of gender justice has extended Rawlsian theories of justice in order to account for structural factors, such as socialisation. Some theorists have argued that the justice-inhibiting character of some preferences implies that the first intuition should be rejected in favour of the second in some cases, which leads to the conclusion that some preferences are like obstacles standing in the way of justice and should thus be reformed. I will call this the 'Normative Hierarchy View' and argue that it is problematic. It presupposes a certain attitude with respect to those who hold the preferences, which forecloses a politically salient kind of respect. Furthermore, at the
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In: American economic review, Band 105, Heft 7, S. 2272-2286
ISSN: 1944-7981
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a,b) observe that utility functions are distinct for risk and time preferences, and show that their findings are consistent with a preference for certainty. We revisit this question in an enriched experimental setting in which subjects make intertemporal decisions under different risk conditions. The observed choice behavior supports a separation between risk attitude and intertemporal substitution rather than a preference for certainty. We further show that several models, including Epstein and Zin (1989); Chew and Epstein (1990); and Halevy (2008) exhibit such a separation and can account for the overall experimental findings. (JEL C91, D81, D91)
In: University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Band 160
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In: GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 22-02
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Die Dissertationsschrift nutzt eine theoriegeleitete empirische Analyse, um die divergierenden Handelspositionen der britischen und deutschen Regierung in den Verhandlungen zum EU-Korea-Freihandelsabkommen zu erklären. Durch die Anwendung des "Societal Approach" werden hierbei systematisch sowohl materielle Interessen (Wirtschaftssektoren/Gewerkschaften) als auch wertgestützte Ideen Wähler/NGOs) gegenübergestellt und herausgearbeitet, unter welchen Bedingungen eine der beiden Variablen die Regierungspositionen prägen können. Die Arbeit trägt dazu bei, die Wissenslücke über nationale Handelspolitikformulierung zu schließen und zu verstehen, wie und von wem Handelspositionen von EU-Regierungen geformt werden. Da die EU-Handelspolitik verstärkt angefochten und politisiert wird, bietet ein innerstaatlicher Fokus auf die Variation zwischen Handelspositionen von Regierungen eine aufschlussreiche Perspektive. ; This study employs a theoretically-guided, systematic empirical analysis in order to explain the diverging trade positions of the British and German governments in the EU-Korea FTA negotiations. The societal approach to governmental preference formation is applied to empirically test the independent variables domestic interests (economic sectors/trade unions) and ideas (voters/NGOs), which are employed to explain variation in these governmental trade positions. Additionally, the study focuses on the conditions for the prevalence of either of the independent variables. This study contributes to filling the salient gap in knowledge about national trade policy formulation and understanding of how, and by whom, trade positions of EU governments are formed. As EU trade policy has become increasingly contested and politicised, a domestic focus to account for variation across governmental trade positions offers a timely and relevant point of view.
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In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies
"Risk Preferences and War" published on by Oxford University Press.
In: Party politics: an international journal for the study of political parties and political organizations, Band 26, Heft 5, S. 619-627
ISSN: 1460-3683
The question how voter preferences relate to preferences of representatives under different electoral rules has attracted scholarly attention for some time. Although theoretical work suggests that proportional rule leads to more dispersion of representatives than plurality rule, empirical studies of this nexus have not yet reached a consensus. We argue that this is because they are plagued by serious problems as they rely on measures that differ for both sets of actors. We use behavioral data to estimate ideal points of voters and representatives on a common scale by taking advantage of the high frequency of referendums in Switzerland. We find that members of parliament elected in proportional representation systems are more widely dispersed around the median voter. Probing at what stage this difference in dispersion occurs, we also demonstrate this is the voters' doing, as it only applies to candidates who are elected.
In: The Preference-Driven Lead User Method for New Product Development, S. 55-81