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This review critically evaluates the largely consensual view that wars naturally and reflexively augment presidential power. After summarizing in the key arguments advanced by presidency scholars in the aftermath of World War II, this article canvasses the existing empirical basis for their claims and the theoretical microfoundations upon which they are offered. Both appear wanting. Few systematic studies yield unambiguous evidence that the adjoining branches of government reliably support elements of the president's domestic or foreign policy agendas during war that they otherwise would oppose. And no one, to date, has offered a clear theory explaining why either Congress or the courts would behave in this way. The article therefore calls for continued empirical research on the causal effects of war on presidential power, and for renewed investments in theories that might account for the way, in which war figures into congressional and judicial voting. Adapted from the source document.

Despite an increased need to measure presidential power and the increased use of such measurements in empirical studies, there has been little examination of the relative merits of alternative methods of measuring presidential power. This study reviews the measures currently in use and identifies the measure developed by Shugart and Carey (1992) as the most useful. The study also suggests improvements to the Shugart and Carey method to improve its applicability to semipresidential regimes. Scoring of Austria, Finland, France, and the six Central and East European states with popularly elected presidents demonstrates the usefulness of these revisions for establishing clearer boundaries for this regime type, which is a necessary step toward empirical testing of the relationship between semipresidentialism and democratic consolidation.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Dedication -- Table of Contents -- List of Tables, Figures, and Maps -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The Making of the Russian Presidency -- 3. The Institutional Presidency -- 4. President and Prime Minister -- 5. The Politics of the Dual Executive: Policy Making on War and Peace, Finance, and Legal Affairs -- 6. The Presidency and Parliament -- 7. The Presidency and the Provinces -- 8. Conclusion -- Notes -- Selected Bibliography -- Index -- About the Author