Der Autor analysiert die türkische Verfassungsentwicklung seit 1921 hinsichtlich ihrer horizontalen Gewaltenteilung und folgert, dass die jüngsten Verfassungsänderungen keineswegs auf ein Präsidialsystem hindeuten. Entgegen der weitverbreiteten Annahme in der Publizistik und der Wissenschaft entspricht das Regierungssystem der Definition parlamentarischer Systeme. Anhand einer Rekonzeptualisierung der Typologie von Regierungssystemen wird diese These untermauert und leistet zugleich einen Beitrag für die Vergleichende Regierungslehre, indem der Nutzen der dichotomischen Grundunterscheidung bekräftigt, eine ausdifferenzierte Subtypisierung vorgenommen und der Semipräsidentialismus als eigenständiger Typus verworfen werden.
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El trabajo realiza un estudio constitucional del Poder Ejecutivo y del sistema presidencialista. Analiza la premisa según la cual las ordenaciones estatales que se deciden por el tipo de gobierno constitucional de sesgo presidencialista suelen exhibir determinada impotencia o fracaso mismo de la separación de poderes, alteración que favorece que el órgano ejecutivo se constituya en poder predominante. Reflexiona sobre el principio de división de poderes, los mecanismos para elegir a los presidentes, sus funciones y el lugar que ocupan los ciudadanos. Concluye afirmando que experiencia histórica del presidencialismo en América del Sud hacen pensar si acaso esa supremacía del poder ejecutivo no constituye, patéticamente, la causa de las causas de la inestabilidad institucional, del sometimiento y de la vulnerabilidad social. ; The work carries out a constitutional study of the Executive Power and the presidential system. It analyzes the premise according to which the state ordinances that are decided by the type of constitutional government of presidential bias usually exhibit certain impotence or even failure of the separation of powers, alteration that favors that the executive organ is constituted in predominant power. It reflects on the principle of division of powers, the mechanisms for electing presidents, their functions and the place occupied by citizens. He concludes that the historical experience of presidentialism in South America makes wonder whether this supremacy of executive power does not constitute, pathetically, the cause of the causes of institutional instability, subjugation and social vulnerability. ; O trabalho realiza um estudo constitucional do Poder Executivo e do sistema presidencialista. Analisa a premissa de acordo com a qual as ordenações estaduais que são decididas pelo tipo de governo constitucional com inclinação presidencialista costumam exibir certa impotência ou falha da separação de poderes, alteração que favorece que o corpo executivo se constitua em poder predominante. Reflete sobre o princípio da divisão de poderes, os mecanismos para eleger presidentes, suas funções e o lugar que ocupam os cidadãos. Ele conclui afirmando que a experiência histórica do presidencialismo na América do Sul sugere para o caso se essa supremacia do poder executivo não constitui, pateticamente, as causas da instabilidade institucional, da sujeição e da vulnerabilidade social. ; Le travail fait une étude constitutionnelle du pouvoir Exécutif et du système présidentiel. On analyse la prémisse selon laquelle les ordinations d'État décidées par le type de gouvernement constitutionnel avec tendance présidentielle, tendent à présenter une certaine impuissance ou un échec dans la séparation des pouvoirs, altération qui encourage que le pouvoir exécutif devienne le pouvoir dominant. On refléchit sur le principe de la division des pouvoirs, les mécanismes d'élection des présidents, leurs fonctions et la place occupée par les citoyens. On conclut en affirmant que l'expérience historique du présidentialisme en Amérique du Sud nous faire penser si cette suprématie du pouvoir exécutif ne constitue pas, pathétiquement, la cause de l'instabilité institutionnelle, de la sujétion et de la vulnérabilité sociale. ; Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Sociales
This article analyses the contentious liaisons between the indigenous movement and the state in Ecuador during the government of Alianza PAIS under the presidency of Rafael Correa (2007-2017). The research question examines to which measure, how and why the shift from neoliberal to leftist administrations could have affected the principal strategic repertoire of the indigenous movement. Leaning on a political economy approach and social movement theorizing, and accentuating the relative power balance between the indigenous movement and the state, it focuses on indigenous oppositional strategies and the ambivalent attitude of the state regarding participatory democracy and the rights of the indigenous peoples. By contrasting this period with the neoliberal 1990s – considered the heyday of the indigenous struggle – we examine contemporary strategic responses of the movement amidst the new political setting characterized by hyper-presidentialism and a systematic effort to de-corporatize the state. A central finding is that, while retaining its powerful organizational network which could be reactivated during critical situations, the indigenous movement weakened in relation to the 1990s. This relative decline is manifested in three types of social movement relationships: between leaders and grassroots (mobilizing capacity); between the movement and its alliance partners (alliance politics); and between the movement and the legal institutional terrain of the state (institutional participation). Resumen: Economía política de las relaciones Estado-indígenas: Ecuador en tiempo de Alianza PAISEste artículo analiza las relaciones conflictivas entre el movimiento indígena y el Estado en Ecuador durante el gobierno de Alianza PAIS cuando ejercía la presidencia Rafael Correa, (2007-2017). La pregunta de investigación es la medida en la cual, cómo y por qué el desplazamiento desde el neoliberalismo hacia la izquierda pudo afectar los principales repertorios de estrategias del movimiento indígena. Desde un enfoque de economía política y de las teorías de los movimientos sociales y considerando los cambios en el balance de poder entre el movimiento indígena y el Estado, el artículo se enfoca en las estrategias de oposición de los indígenas y en la actitud ambivalente del Estado respecto a la democracia participativa y a los derechos de los pueblos indígenas. En contraste con los años neoliberales (1990s) que fueron considerados los de mayor influencia de la lucha indígena, examinamos las estrategias contemporáneas del movimiento en medio de las nuevas circunstancias políticas caracterizadas por el hiper-presidencialismo y un sistemático esfuerzo de descorporativización del Estado. Un hallazgo central del trabajo es que, aunque conserva la potencia de su poderosa red organizativa, que le permite reactivarse en coyunturas críticas, el movimiento indígena se debilitó en comparación con los años 1990. Este declive relativo se manifiesta en tres campos: la relación entre los líderes y las bases (capacidad de movilización); la relación entre el movimiento y sus aliados (la política de alianzas); y la relación entre el movimiento y el terreno institucional del Estado (participación institucional).
This article analyses the contentious liaisons between the indigenous movement and the state in Ecuador during the government of Alianza PAIS under the presidency of Rafael Correa (2007-2017). The research question examines to which measure, how and why the shift from neoliberal to leftist administrations could have affected the principal strategic repertoire of the indigenous movement. Leaning on a political economy approach and social movement theorizing, and accentuating the relative power balance between the indigenous movement and the state, it focuses on indigenous oppositional strategies and the ambivalent attitude of the state regarding participatory democracy and the rights of the indigenous peoples. By contrasting this period with the neoliberal 1990s – considered the heyday of the indigenous struggle – we examine contemporary strategic responses of the movement amidst the new political setting characterized by hyper-presidentialism and a systematic effort to de-corporatize the state. A central finding is that, while retaining its powerful organizational network which could be reactivated during critical situations, the indigenous movement weakened in relation to the 1990s. This relative decline is manifested in three types of social movement relationships: between leaders and grassroots (mobilizing capacity); between the movement and its alliance partners (alliance politics); and between the movement and the legal institutional terrain of the state (institutional participation). ; Este artículo analiza las relaciones conflictivas entre el movimiento indígena y el Estado en Ecuador durante el gobierno de Alianza PAIS cuando ejercía la presidencia Rafael Correa, (2007-2017). La pregunta de investigación es la medida en la cual, cómo y por qué el desplazamiento desde el neoliberalismo hacia la izquierda pudo afectar los principales repertorios de estrategias del movimiento indígena. Desde un enfoque de economía política y de las teorías de los movimientos sociales y considerando los cambios en el balance de poder entre el movimiento indígena y el Estado, el artículo se enfoca en las estrategias de oposición de los indígenas y en la actitud ambivalente del Estado respecto a la democracia participativa y a los derechos de los pueblos indígenas. En contraste con los años neoliberales (1990s) que fueron considerados los de mayor influencia de la lucha indígena, examinamos las estrategias contemporáneas del movimiento en medio de las nuevas circunstancias políticas caracterizadas por el hiper-presidencialismo y un sistemático esfuerzo de descorporativización del Estado. Un hallazgo central del trabajo es que, aunque conserva la potencia de su poderosa red organizativa, que le permite reactivarse en coyunturas críticas, el movimiento indígena se debilitó en comparación con los años 1990. Este declive relativo se manifiesta en tres campos: la relación entre los líderes y las bases (capacidad de movilización); la relación entre el movimiento y sus aliados (la política de alianzas); y la relación entre el movimiento y el terreno institucional del Estado (participación institucional).
The principal aim of this article is to explain the specificity of the requirement for the spatial distribution of votes in presidential elections – an institution that has existed in Nigeria since 1979 and in Indonesia since 2001. It also seeks to describe the political conditions which contributed to that institution's introduction and functioning in those two countries. The article will end with a comparison between the two cases, including a discussion of the present differences between them. The article will also contain a preliminary appraisal of whether the existence of the requirement in question is helping to reduce the level of conflictive behavior in relations between ethnic groups in the multi-ethnic societies of Nigeria and Indonesia. This article has been published in "Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia" 2017, Vol. 30, Issue 1, pp. 89-107.
In modern Political Science, researchers distinguish both typical and atypical semi-presidential systems of government. However, atypical semi-presidentialism in the Post-Soviet countries still requires a detailed analysis in Political Science. In this cut, the purpose of the article is to determine the types of governmental cabinets in atypical semi-presidential systems of government on the example of Belarus (in 1996–2018) and Kazakhstan (in 1995–2018). This purpose was solved in the situation when new institutionalism and its types/paradigms were chosen as a theoretical and methodological basis of the research. The main method of the study is the method of comparative analysis.The peculiarities of the parliamentary votes of no confidence in governmental cabinets in Belarus (1996–2018) and Kazakhstan (1995–2018) demonstrate the atypicality of semi-presidential (constitutional) systems of government in these countries. The author determined the types of governmental cabinets in atypical semi-presidential systems of government in Belarus (1996–2018) and Kazakhstan (1995–2018). Consequently, it is argued that all governmental cabinets in both countries are classified as: 1) those formed by president for the formation method; 2) technocratic for the type of composition; 3) non-partisan for the type of technocratic cabinets. It is proved that all governmental cabinets for their parliamentary support are determined: in Belarus (1996–2018) as cabinets supported by non-partisan majority supplemented by partisan deputies; in Kazakhstan (1995–1997) as cabinet supported by single-party minority supplemented by non-partisan deputies; in Kazakhstan (1997–2007) as cabinets supported by coalition majority supplemented by non-partisan deputies; in Kazakhstan (2007–2018) as cabinets supported by single-party majority supplemented by non-partisan deputies. The author determined that the presidents of the analyzed countries were the initiators of governmental cabinets' resignations in Belarus (in 1996–2018) and Kazakhstan (in 1995–2018). ; В сучасній політичній науці у рамках республіканської форми державного правління дослідники виділяють як типові, так і атипові напівпрезидентські системи правління. Атипові напівпрезидентські системи правління в пострадянських країнах потребують детального аналізу в політичній науці. У цьому зрізі метою статті є визначити типи урядових кабінетів у контексті функціонування атипових напівпрезидентських систем правління в Білорусі у 1996–2018 рр. та Казахстані у 1995–2018 рр. Теоретико-методологічною основою запропонованого наукового дослідження вибрано неоінституціоналізм і його варіативні типи й парадигми. Головний метод, котрий став іманентною складовою частиною дослідження, – це метод порівняльного аналізу.Особливості інституту вотуму недовіри урядам в Білорусі у 1996–2018 рр. та Казахстані у 1995–2018 рр. демонструють атиповість напівпрезидентських (конституційних) систем правління в цих країнах. Виділено критерії типології урядових кабінетів: спосіб формування, тип композиції/складу, парламентська підтримка. В Білорусі у 1996–2018 рр. та Казахстані у 1995–2018 рр. всі урядові кабінети за: 1) способом формування визначено як ті, що сформовані президентом; 2) типом композиції/складу – технократичні; типом технократичних урядів – непартійні. В Білорусі у 1996–2018 рр. за парламентською підтримкою всі урядові кабінети класифіковано як кабінети, що опиралися на підтримку непартійної більшості, доповненої партійними депутатами. В Казахстані у 1995–1997 рр. за парламентською підтримкою визначено кабінет, що мав підтримку однопартійної меншості, доповненої непартійними депутатами; 1997–2007 рр. – кабінети, що мали підтримку коаліційної більшості, доповненої непартійними депутатами; 2007–2018 рр. – кабінети, що мали підтримку однопартійної більшості, доповненої непартійними депутатами. Щодо відставок урядів, то в Білорусі у 1996–2018 рр. та Казахстані у 1995–2018 рр. їх ініціаторами були президенти.
In modern Political Science, researchers distinguish both typical and atypical semi-presidential systems of government. However, atypical semi-presidentialism in the Post-Soviet countries still requires a detailed analysis in Political Science. In this cut, the purpose of the article is to determine the types of governmental cabinets in atypical semi-presidential systems of government on the example of Belarus (in 1996–2018) and Kazakhstan (in 1995–2018). This purpose was solved in the situation when new institutionalism and its types/paradigms were chosen as a theoretical and methodological basis of the research. The main method of the study is the method of comparative analysis.The peculiarities of the parliamentary votes of no confidence in governmental cabinets in Belarus (1996–2018) and Kazakhstan (1995–2018) demonstrate the atypicality of semi-presidential (constitutional) systems of government in these countries. The author determined the types of governmental cabinets in atypical semi-presidential systems of government in Belarus (1996–2018) and Kazakhstan (1995–2018). Consequently, it is argued that all governmental cabinets in both countries are classified as: 1) those formed by president for the formation method; 2) technocratic for the type of composition; 3) non-partisan for the type of technocratic cabinets. It is proved that all governmental cabinets for their parliamentary support are determined: in Belarus (1996–2018) as cabinets supported by non-partisan majority supplemented by partisan deputies; in Kazakhstan (1995–1997) as cabinet supported by single-party minority supplemented by non-partisan deputies; in Kazakhstan (1997–2007) as cabinets supported by coalition majority supplemented by non-partisan deputies; in Kazakhstan (2007–2018) as cabinets supported by single-party majority supplemented by non-partisan deputies. The author determined that the presidents of the analyzed countries were the initiators of governmental cabinets' resignations in Belarus (in 1996–2018) and Kazakhstan (in 1995–2018). ; В сучасній політичній науці у рамках республіканської форми державного правління дослідники виділяють як типові, так і атипові напівпрезидентські системи правління. Атипові напівпрезидентські системи правління в пострадянських країнах потребують детального аналізу в політичній науці. У цьому зрізі метою статті є визначити типи урядових кабінетів у контексті функціонування атипових напівпрезидентських систем правління в Білорусі у 1996–2018 рр. та Казахстані у 1995–2018 рр. Теоретико-методологічною основою запропонованого наукового дослідження вибрано неоінституціоналізм і його варіативні типи й парадигми. Головний метод, котрий став іманентною складовою частиною дослідження, – це метод порівняльного аналізу.Особливості інституту вотуму недовіри урядам в Білорусі у 1996–2018 рр. та Казахстані у 1995–2018 рр. демонструють атиповість напівпрезидентських (конституційних) систем правління в цих країнах. Виділено критерії типології урядових кабінетів: спосіб формування, тип композиції/складу, парламентська підтримка. В Білорусі у 1996–2018 рр. та Казахстані у 1995–2018 рр. всі урядові кабінети за: 1) способом формування визначено як ті, що сформовані президентом; 2) типом композиції/складу – технократичні; типом технократичних урядів – непартійні. В Білорусі у 1996–2018 рр. за парламентською підтримкою всі урядові кабінети класифіковано як кабінети, що опиралися на підтримку непартійної більшості, доповненої партійними депутатами. В Казахстані у 1995–1997 рр. за парламентською підтримкою визначено кабінет, що мав підтримку однопартійної меншості, доповненої непартійними депутатами; 1997–2007 рр. – кабінети, що мали підтримку коаліційної більшості, доповненої непартійними депутатами; 2007–2018 рр. – кабінети, що мали підтримку однопартійної більшості, доповненої непартійними депутатами. Щодо відставок урядів, то в Білорусі у 1996–2018 рр. та Казахстані у 1995–2018 рр. їх ініціаторами були президенти.
Built on the theories about talent competition between rent-seeking and entrepreneurship, and the theories about constitutional environment and rent-seeking, this dissertation explores empirically the effects of a country's constitutional settings on entrepreneurship, in terms of the quantity of entrepreneurs and the quality of their performance. Both the de facto and de jure constitutional environments are studied. In particular, with respect to the de facto constitutional environment, I considered the property rights protection, decentralization, and the factors suggested by the "selectorate theory". In relation to the de jure constitutional environment, I focused on six aspects including electoral rules, form of government, federalism, property rights protection, judicial independence and antidiscrimination provisions. Three indexes were constructed to measure the de jure property rights protection, judicial independence and antidiscrimination provisions, using the data set provided by the Comparative Constitution Project.The empirical study first shows that the quantity of entrepreneurs is inversely correlated with the quality of entrepreneurship in a country. If entrepreneurship does serve as the engine of economic growth, it is perhaps the quality, rather than quantity, that matters. This study then demonstrates that the de facto property rights protection is associated negatively with the quantity of entrepreneurs, but positively with the quality of entrepreneurship. The effects of the two key factors of the selectorate theory, the size of the winning coalition and the ratio of this size to the size of the selectorate, also appear to be compatible with what the theory is to predict. On the other hand, neither fiscal nor political decentralization is found to significantly affect entrepreneurship. Among the de jure constitutional features, two have significant influence on entrepreneurship. First, the constitutional design of judicial independence has a negative effect on the quantity of entrepreneurs, but a positive one on the quality of their performance. Second, majoritarian electoral rules, compared with non-majoritarian rules, have a negative effect on the quality of entrepreneurship. In contrast, the presumed effects of the other three formal constitutional attributes, federalism, presidentialism and property rights protection, cannot be ascertained.Apart from the cross-country study, I also conducted a detailed research on China. Entrepreneurship in China is a case of entrepreneurial development in an authoritarian state lack of secure property rights and the rule of law, hence afflicted with profuse rent-seeking activities. Under these circumstances, entrepreneurship hinges on both the rent-seeking and the entrepreneurial abilities. Drawing on the private enterprise surveys, I found that, in China, the politically connected were systematically advantaged in terms of bank finance, entry to regulated industries and judicial treatment, when they plunged into the business world. The Chinese case also indicates that, when entrepreneurs cannot trust the commitment made by the state in the constitution, they will be eager to scoop profits as soon as possible and exit swiftly with accumulated wealth.Finally, this dissertation concludes by suggesting that a healthy development of entrepreneurship should be sustainable rather than aiming merely at quick money and instant success. It should allow all talented people to reach their full potentials, rather than keep the politically disconnected away from resources needed to make the best use of their potentials. Above all, it wants a constitutional environment with reliable property rights and equal access to opportunities, neither of which is seen in today's China.
В условиях глобального давления на демократию и внутрен ней турбулентности, каковы риски того, что Украина скатится к авторитаризму? Вопреки многочисленным предосте режениям автор обосновывает тезис о том, что для авторита ризма в Украине нет социальных оснований, а запрос на "силь ную руку" является свидетельством патерналистских, а не авторитарных ценностей. Вместе с тем в Украине при сутствуют как минумум три группы структурных, институцио нальных и социокультурных факторов, ко торые стоят на пути авторитарного режима. К ним относятся: низкая леги тимность руководства, низкая экономическая эффектив ность, региональные различия, низкий репрессивный потен циал государства, относительная слабость "партии влас ти", фрагментированная структура элит, усиление связей с Западом, полупрезидентская форма правления, институци ализированная гибридность режима, отсутствие хариз матичного лиде ра, сме шан ные об щес твен ные ори ен та ции и опыт трех волн ан ти ав то ри тар ных про - тес тов. Те о ре ти чес ким осно ва ни ем статьи яв ля ет ся те о рия кон гру эн тнос ти, со глас но ко то рой ре жим ста би лен при усло вии, что его спо соб осу ще ствле ния влас ти со от ве - тству ет пред став ле ни ям лю дей о ее над ле жа щем функ ци о ни ро ва нии. Дан ные по след ней вол ны Гло баль но го ис сле до ва ния цен нос тей по зво ли ли рас счи тать по ка за те ли ли бе раль - но го и ав то ри тар но го по ни ма ния де мок ра тии. Пер вый в Укра и не ока зы ва ет ся вдвое выше, чем вто рой (0,82 про тив 0,41). К тому же первый показатель усиливается умеренным ростом эмансипативных ценностей. Таким образом, представление об авторитарной склонности украинцев не имеет эмпирических оснований, а любая попытка навязать авторитарное правление сверху будет на талкиваться на ку муля тив ное сопротивление трех групп указанных факторов. (Given the global rise of illiberalism and Ukraine's own post-revolutionary turbulence, what are the risks that the war-torn society descends to authoritarianism? In contrast to numerous alerts, I argue that none of the modern forms of authoritarianism is likely in post-Euromaidan Ukraine. There are at least three groups of structural, institutional, and agency-based factors that make the emergence of the authoritarian regime in Ukraine highly improbable. These are: poor leadership legitimacy, poor economy performance, regional polarization, weak state repressive capacity, the relative weakness of the 'party of power', fragmented elite structure, the growing linkage with the West, semi-presidentialism, institutionalized hybridity (the legacy of being hybrid regime), lack of charismatic leadership, mixed public attitudes, and gravity of three (1990, 2004, 2014) waves of anti-authoritarian protest. Theoretically, this article draws on the congruence theory, which posits that the regime is stable in so far as its authority pattern meets people's authority beliefs. The empirical data from the latest wave of the World Values Survey demonstrate that Ukrainians share mixed authority beliefs, as exemplified in liberal and authoritarian notions of democracy. The score of the liberal notion of democracy for Ukraine is twice higher than that of the authoritarian notion(0.82 to 0.41) and is supported by the growing score of emancipative values. 'The authoritarian congruence', therefore is hardly achievable in the post-Euromaidan Ukraine, while any attempt to impose authoritarian rule from above would face the cumulative resistance effect produced by these three groups of factors.)
[ES]La tesis doctoral propone un marco de análisis del proceso de cambio político y constitucional experimentado en Nicaragua durante el período 1987-2011, señalando qué elementos de continuidad y ruptura pueden observarse, cuál es la dirección del cambioo constitucional dentro de la secuencia democratizadora, qué factores explican la estructura de variación examinada, así como las estrategias de acción de sus principales artífices políticos. La investigación se centra en una de las dimensiones del cambio constitucional: las atribuciones de poder entre los órganos Ejecutivo y Legislativo, reformulando los principios del debate clásico entre presidencialismo y parlamentarismo del enfoque neo-institucionalista en Ciencia Política. La interacción entre actores e instituciones en los procesos de ingeniería constitucional y política ha sido muy estudiada con el objetivo fundamental de responder de obtener democracias gobernables, que ofrezcan garantías de estabilidad y eficacia. En este sentido, se intenta dilucidar la dinámica política que subyace a cada una de las reformas a la Constitución, así como la dimensión constitucional del proceso democrático nicaragüense, esto es, los efectos de las continuas transformaciones constitucionales sobre la estabilidad del régimen pluralista. Hay una lógica intencional en las élites políticas que intervienen en el diseño de los poderes del Estado en el proceso general de institucionalización de la democracia en Nicaragua desde 1990. Por tanto, el cambio es racional y consciente, y se explica por las elecciones estratégicas que realizan los actores entre diversas soluciones institucionales, como opciones específicas de reforma. Si bien los cambios a la Constitución también representan una estructura de incentivos de tipo institucional, que incide sobre el comportamiento de estos mismos agentes. Observar como ambos grupos de variables inciden unas sobre otras para esclarecer los elementos de la antigua relación entre constitucionalismo y democracia descubre nuevos planteamientos y contradicciones. ; [EN] The dissertation proposes a framework for analyzing the process of political and constitutional change experienced in Nicaragua during the period 1987-2011, indicating which elements of continuity and discontinuity can be observed, which is the constitutional cambioo direction within the sequence of democratization, which factors explain the structure of variation examined, and action strategies of the main political architects. The research focuses on one dimension of constitutional change: the powers of power between the executive and legislative bodies, restating the principles of the classic debate between presidentialism and parliamentarism the neo-institutionalist approach in political science. The interaction between actors and institutions in the process of constitutional and political engineering has been studied with the ultimate goal of obtaining democracies respond governable provide guarantees for stability and efficiency. In this sense, it seeks to clarify the political dynamics underlying each of the amendments to the Constitution and the constitutional dimension of the Nicaraguan democratic process, that is, the effects of continuous transformations on constitutional pluralist regime stability. There is an intentional logical political elites involved in the design of the branches of government in the overall process of institutionalization of democracy in Nicaragua since 1990. Therefore, the change is rational and conscious, and is explained by the strategic choices made by actors from various institutional solutions such as specific reform options. While changes to the Constitution also represent an incentive structure institutional, impinging on the behavior of these same agents. Observe how both sets of variables influence over each other to clarify the elements of the old relationship between constitutionalism and democracy discover new approaches and contradictions.
Este trabajo de investigación, elaborado para optar el título de Maestría en Derecho Administrativo en la Universidad Libre de Colombia, acerca de la moción de censura, una de las innovaciones introducidas en la Constitución Política de 1991. Y su estudio, desde la perspectiva académica, reviste especial importancia en Colombia, cuya estructura institucional corresponde a la de un Estado Unitario con un sistema de gobierno presidencial. Es un sistema con clara preeminencia del poder ejecutivo respecto de los demás poderes públicos. Importa examinar si el presidencialismo, realidad fáctica así conocida en el argot jurídico, sobre todo en la órbita de los constitucionalistas, ha incidido en que dicho mecanismo de control político haya quedado erigido como una cláusula meramente formal o declarativa en el ordenamiento constitucional colombiano. Acaso sin posibilidad real de que prospere o se materialice a través del Congreso de la República. A diferencia de lo que ocurre en los sistemas presidencialistas, como el de Colombia, la moción de censura es en esencia una figura propia del Sistema de Gobierno Parlamentario. En este sistema es expedita su aplicación efectiva por la equivalencia funcional entre los poderes del parlamento y el ejecutivo. En él, el sistema de gobierno parlamentario, se justifica tanto el voto de censura, como el de aplauso, para ratificar o renovar la confianza de la mayoría del Parlamento en el Gobierno. Es una garantía para que este subsista. En cambio, en el sistema presidencialista el Primer Mandatario debe su investidura al pueblo, y por tanto el Gobierno no depende del Congreso sino del Presidente. Estos presupuestos básicos hacen más relevante el estudio de la moción de censura en el marco del análisis de la fisonomía misma del Estado Colombiano: Su organización, el sistema de gobierno, el funcionamiento de los partidos políticos y las instituciones democráticas. Como también las fuerzas vivas del País y otros elementos y protagonistas. Este enfoque de contexto permite una aproximación seria al estudio crítico del tema propuesto. ; This research work was carried out to obtain a Master's Degree in Administrative Law at the Free University of Colombia, about the censorship motion, one of the innovations introduced in the 1991 Political Constitution. And its study, from an academic perspective, Is of particular importance in Colombia, whose institutional structure corresponds to that of a Unitary State with a presidential system of government. It is a system with clear preeminence of the executive power with respect to the other public powers. It is necessary to examine whether presidentialism, a factual reality known in legal jargon, especially in the orbit of the constitutionalists, has meant that this mechanism of political control has been erected as a mere formal or declarative clause in the Colombian constitutional system. Perhaps without real possibility that it will prosper or materialize through the Congress of the Republic. Unlike what happens in the presidential systems, such as that of Colombia, the censure motion is essentially a figure of the Parliamentary Government System. In this system it is expedited its effective application by the functional equivalence between the powers of the parliament and the executive. In it, the parliamentary system of government, justifies both the vote of censure and the one of applause, to ratify or renew the confidence of the majority of Parliament in the Government. It is a guarantee for this to subsist. In contrast, in the presidential system the Prime Minister owes his investiture to the people, and therefore the Government does not depend on the Congress but on the President. These basic assumptions make more relevant the study of the motion of censorship within the framework of the analysis of the very physiognomy of the Colombian State: Its organization, the system of government, the functioning of political parties and democratic institutions. As well as the living forces of the Country and other elements and protagonists. This context approach allows a serious approach to the critical study of the proposed theme.
The proposition that modern western democracy is a point of intersection of modern political, economic and national interests is substantiated. In particular in the process of becoming a capitalistsociety, the political interests of the "middle class", which are realized primarily through collegial legislative bodies in opposition to the institutions of feudal absolutism and despotism, wereinextricably linked with economic interests – mass interest in the creation of ground foundations of free competition, as shown in the article, formed the political interests of the general population andbecame a necessary prerequisite for the emergence of Western political democracy that arose as a result of great European and American bourgeois social revolutions. At the same time it is shown that the antimonarchical system of separation of powers based on the mechanism of "checks and balances", the introduction of the principle of equality before the lawcontribute to the realization of the ideal of the state "night watchman" and, thus, activate the process of becoming national markets; it was thanks to these political institutions and the emergence of civilsociety that guaranteed the assertion of inalienable rights and freedoms and the filling of political interests with democratic content as one of the most important components of a modern law state thatthe advanced capitalist countries pushed. That is why the famous "Declaration of the Rights of Freedom of Man and Citizen", which refers to the powerful motives of activity in the political realm ofcitizens of the law state proclaims that the "source of sovereign power is the nation". It is also proved that the extremely negative impact on the democratization of the Ukrainian statehood and the development of a market economy, which made possible the Russian aggression against Ukraine, makes the current dismantling by the leading EU and US countries a model of a social state and a "mixed economy", which has consequently become the next financial world crisis. In turn, the steady increase in global instability and the presence of a powerful comprador fifth column in Ukraine, require the formation of political institutions and mechanisms in our country that ensure maximum consideration and realization of political interests of nationally conscious citizens through an effective model of presidentialism, which all these years is only being imitated in our country. In the light of the world experience, a number of systemic characteristics of such a form of political government and a consistent democratic social order have been analyzed. ; Обґрунтовано положення про те, що сучасна західна демократія є своєрідним місцем перетину модерних політичних, економічних і національних інтересів. Зокрема, в процесі становлення капіталістичного суспільства політичні інтереси «середнього класу», що реалізується насамперед через колегіальні законодавчі органи напротивагу інститутам феодального абсолютизму та деспотизму, були нерозривно пов'язані з інтересами економічними, – масовою зацікавленістю у створенні фундаментальних засад вільної конкуренції, як показано у статті, формувало політичні інтереси широких верств населення та стало необхідною передумовою зародження західної політичної демократії, яка виникла за наслідками великих європейських та американської буржуазних соціальних революцій. Водночас, показано, що антимонархічна система поділу влад, базована на механізмі «стримувань та противаг», запровадження принципу рівності перед законом тощо, сприяють реалізації ідеалу держави «нічного сторожа» і, тим самим, активізують процес становлення національних ринків; саме завдяки цим політичним інститутам та виникненню громадянського суспільства, що гарантувало забезпечення невід'ємних прав і свобод та наповнення політичних інтересів демократичним змістом, як одного з найважливіших компонентів сучасної правової держави, відбувся індустріальний ривок передових капіталістичних країн. Саме тому у знаменитій «Декларації прав людини і громадянина», де йдеться про потужні мотиви діяльності у політичній царині громадян правової держави, головною передумовою можливості реалізації подібних прав і прагнень проголошується те, що «джерелом суверенної влади є нація». Також доведено вкрай негативний вплив на демократизацію української державності та розвиток ринкової економіки, що зробило можливою російську агресію проти України, нинішній демонтаж провідними країнами ЄС і США моделі соціальної держави та «змішаної економіки», безпосереднім наслідком чого стала чергова світова фінансово-економічна криза; своєю чергою, неухильне наростання загальносвітової нестабільності та наявність потужної компрадорської п'ятої колони всередині України, потребують формування політичних інститутів і механізмів в нашій країні, які забезпечують максимальне врахування та реалізацію політичних інтересів національно свідомих громадян за допомогою ефективноїмоделі президенталізму, яка всі ці роки лише імітується в нашій країні. З врахуванням світового досвіду проаналізовано низку системних характеристик подібної форми політичногоправління та послідовного демократичного суспільного ладу.
The article focuses on the obstacles to legal immigration imposed by the Trump administration against those who are already in the US pursuant to their valid non-immigrant classification and those who are abroad and trying to reunite with family members in the US or seeking entry having a legitimate job offer from a US employer. Recent changes in US immigration policy have been achieved through restrictive interpretation and enforcement of existing law by the USCIS which is part of the Department of Homeland Security, and by the State Department (DOS) rather than by substantive legislative changes done in Congress. The article provides an overview of the most recent governmental restrictions affecting so called "business immigration" and family-based immigrant processing, and also restrictions on suspension of entry to the US due to Covid-19, introduced through presidential proclamations. Although the federal courts blocked several of these administrative initiatives, the anti-immigrant atmosphere is having a big negative impact on many groups of foreign nationals. Nationalistic notions of "making America great again" that should be accomplished through "buy American and hire American" principle, and legal uncertainty causing ongoing federal lawsuits will undoubtedly lead to America's further isolationism if President Trump wins the November 2020 election. ; aludwikowsk@law.gwu.edu ; Anna M. Ludwikowski – PhD in Constitutional Law, Adjunct Professor teaching Immigration Law at The George Washington University Law School, An immigration attorney at Partovi Law LLC in Vienna, Virginia. ; The George Washington University Law School, United States of America ; Alvarez, Priscilla, Judge orders Trump administration to accept new DACA applications, CNN, July 17, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/17/politics/daca-trump-judge/index.html. ; Chin, Monica, Seventeen states sue Trump administration over new students visa guidelines, "The Verge", July 13, 2020, https://www.theverge.com/2020/7/13/21322780/ice-lawsuit-states-universities-international-students-visa-pandemic-trump. ; DeChalus, Camila, Trump admin must accept new DACA applications, court rules, "Roll Call", July 17, 2020, https://www.rollcall.com/2020/07/17/trump-administration-must-accept-new-daca-applications-court-rules/. ; Dellon, Leslie, USCIS consistently denies H-1B petitions. This Lawsuit Argues it is Misinterpreting the Law, "Immigration Impact", April 17, 2020, https://immigrationimpact.com/2020/04/17/uscis-h1b-class-action-lawsuit/?emci=28c66e67–2a80-ea11-a94c-00155d03b1e8&emdi=cf21f97e-6182-ea11-a94c-00155d03b1e8&ceid=4494015#.XqCev0BFzOb. ; Gonzales, Richard, America no longer a nation of immigrants, USCIS says, NPR, February 22, 2018, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/02/22/588097749/america-no-longer-anation-of-immigrants-uscis-says. ; Johnson, Jenna, Trump calls for "total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States, "Washington Post", December 7, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/12/07/donald-trump-calls-for-total-and-complete-shutdown-of-muslims-entering-the-united-states/?noredirect=on. ; Kitson, Rebecca, Coming to America. Limited Immigration Options for Senior Parents, "ABA Experience", vol. 30, no. 3, April/May 2020, pp. 11–16. ; Klasko Immigration Law Partners, LLP,JDSUPRA, Why the Guilford College Decision is so Important? February 18, 2020, https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/why-the-guilford-college-decision-is-so-56133/. ; Krogstad, Jens Manuel, Key facts about refugees to the US, Pew Research Center, October 7, 2019, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/10/07/key-facts-about-refugees-to-the-u-s/. ; Kurzban, Ira, Immigration Law Sourcebook, 16ed. Washington DC, American Immigration Council, 2018–2019. ; Ludwikowski, Anna, M., The Role of Congress, President and the Supreme Court in Defining Immigration Policy in the United States, "Ad Americam", vol. 14, 2013, p. 99–111. ; Ludwikowski, Rett R., Ludwikowski, Anna M, Prezydencjalizm Amerykański w Pryzmacie Reformy Imigracyjnej Baraka Obamy [American Presidentialism in the Light of Barack Obama's Immigration Reform], "Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe", nr 4, 2015, pp. 129–148. ; Milligan, Susan, Biden's Shrinking lead is a Jolting Reminder for Democrats – Trump Could Win, U.S. News, September 2, 2020, https://www.usnews.com/news/elections/articles/2020–09-02/joe-bidens-shrinking-lead-is-a-reminder-for-democrats-trump-could-win. ; Moreno, K. Edward, The Supreme Court allows 'public charge' rule to take effect nationwide, "The Hill", February 2, 2020,https://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/484196-supreme-court-allowpublic-charge-rule-to-take-effect-across-country ; Owen, Quinn, Trump's threat of total immigration ban ignites outrage, confusion, abcNews April 21, 2000, https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trumps-threat-total-immigration-ban-ignites-outrage-confusion/story?id=70265156. ; Pierce Sarah, Bolter, Jessica, and Salee, Andrew. 2018. US Immigration Policy under Trump: Deep Changes and Lasting Impacts. Washington, DC. Migration Policy Institute, https://government.report/Resources/Whitepapers/c2673a0f-5adc-4b74–94e1–58b87f6e98d9_TCM-Trump-Spring-2018-FINAL.pdf ; Restuccia Andrew, Johnson, Eliana, Trump at war with himself over Dreamers, "Politico", August 30, 2017, https://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/30/trump-immigration-dreamers-242152. ; Romero, Luis Cortes, Activism Leads, The Law Follows: DACA and its Fate at the Supreme Court, American Bar Association (ABA), April 28, 2020, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/immigration/activism-leads-the-law-follows/. ; 25 ; 3 ; 69 ; 86
[ES]Desde 1999, ocho países han iniciado formalmente procesos para hacer más permisiva la reelección presidencial, lo que constituye casi la mitad de los países latinoamericanos. Dentro de algunos de estos países se ha llevado a cabo más de un proceso de reforma durante el mismo período. Con lo cual puede afirmarse que, durante los últimos años, se ha asistido a una ampliación de los períodos de mandato del presidente. La mayoría de los casos han adoptado la reelección inmediata, aunque la novedad ha sido la flexibilización absoluta mediante la "reelección indefinida o ilimitada" que Venezuela y Nicaragua acogieron en sus reglas de juego. En este sentido, la investigación se plantea la pregunta: ¿Por qué en unos casos los presidentes que intentan modificar el status quo de la reelección presidencial -con el fin de hacerla más permisiva- consiguen sacar adelante la reforma y en otros no? En la estrategia de análisis se ha seleccionado todos los casos de presidentes o expresidentes que - durante 1999 y 2011- persiguieron la reforma constitucional para prolongar su estadía en el cargo como vía para asegurar su supervivencia política. Cabe resaltar que en los presidencialismos la reforma a los límites del mandato -siempre y cuando impliquen una mayor permisividad- es considerada como una condición necesaria para la supervivencia política de los líderes en el cargo. Trece casos presentan este tipo de intento de reforma. De ellos, siete resultaron exitosos (Venezuela 1999 y 2009, Costa Rica 2003, Colombia 2005, Bolivia 2009, Ecuador 2008 y Nicaragua 2009) y seis fracasaron (Costa Rica 2000a y 2000b, Venezuela 2007, Honduras 2009, Colombia 2010 y Panamá 2011). Durante el mismo período se pueden identificar dos casos en donde se limitó la cláusula reeleccionista constitucional que fueron Perú en 2000 y República Dominicana en 2010, ambos pasaron de la reelección inmediata a una con intervalos de espera. Estos dos casos obedecen a un fenómeno diferente del que se busca analizar en esta investigación, debido a que son procesos que demuestran el declive del líder reeleccionista y el impulso modificador de la oposición para abrir el paso a la alternancia en el poder. Por esta razón este tipo de procesos exceden los límites de la investigación. Se ha definido al presidente y expresidente como el actor individual que persigue el cambio. Con ello se reconoce la centralidad que amerita como figura clave en la investigación politológica, un rol que recientemente ha ido recobrando pero que, durante años, estuvo relegado . Es preciso señalar que el impulso continuista suele venir de la mano de presidentes de notable carisma, aunque con muy variado repertorio político e ideológico, de ahí que resulta difícil hacer una lectura general de los contextos en que se desarrollaron los procesos de reforma. Sin embargo, es posible afirmar que los programas de cambio de esta norma en unos casos sirven de fuente de inspiración para otros, al hacer visible el despliegue de las estrategias institucionales de cambio -aún en escenarios políticos e institucionales muy distintos-. Al contar con un número mediano de casos se ha privilegiado el análisis cualitativo comparado. Este método privilegia una concepción dinámica de los procesos y se orienta al análisis de los casos. De forma complementaria, los casos han sido construidos siguiendo una lógica histórico- comparada y las variables han sido analizadas mediante el establecimiento de conjuntos binarios. Es decir, se clasifican de acuerdo con categorías dicotómicas de ausencia o presencia de los atributos a los que se refieren las variables o condiciones causales. Se ha considerado que el proceso deriva en el éxito o fracaso de acuerdo con los recursos de poder -que constituyen las variables explicativas en la investigación- con que cuenta el presidente para hacer frente a las trayectorias de decisión. Así la popularidad, la formación de mayorías en el parlamento, la rigidez-flexibilidad de las provisiones constitucionales de enmienda y el control que el presidente ejerce sobre su partido; se convierten en los recursos clave con los que cuenta el presidente para sacar adelante su iniciativa de modificación del status quo. En la configuración de las estrategias se le da especial atención a los escenarios institucionales dentro de los que se desarrolla la reforma al convertirse en las arenas decisorias a las que recurren los líderes con el fin de lograr su cometido. Los marcos constitucionales hoy en día permiten casi de forma generalizada que referendos y cortes constitucionales funcionen como arenas con capacidad de decisión en materia constitucional, compitiendo con los parlamentos, que parecerían ser los órganos por excelencia para cumplir con tal misión. Al profundizar en la comprobación de las hipótesis se observa que los parlamentos son instancias sumamente costosas para los presidentes que buscan reformar los límites a la reelección presidencial. En general, los legisladores son hostiles a esta iniciativa que se comporta en una lógica claramente distinta a la de un proyecto de ley ordinario. Así, los parlamentos se convierten en un lastre para alterar el status quo en la materia, hasta el punto que no resulta beneficioso para el líder contar con mayoría legislativa. De modo que una estrategia más eficiente para el líder ha sido esquivar a los legisladores acudiendo directamente a otras arenas de decisión donde sus recursos en términos de popularidad y concentración del control partidista mantienen un fuerte impacto. De esta manera al abrir el abanico de los mecanismos decisorios, se abren las oportunidades para superar la estabilidad de la cláusula. Contrariamente a lo que ocurre con otras iniciativas de reforma, en la reelección presidencial el aumento de los actores con poder de veto, puede significar una ventaja para el éxito del líder, en la medida que la influencia del presidente puede ser más efectiva en donde la oposición es menor. Presidentes que en esos escenarios gozan de alta popularidad entre los ciudadanos y controlan las estructuras de sus partidos y de los espacios institucionales a donde este control llega, son proclives al éxito. ; [EN]Since 1999, eight countries have formally initiated processes to more permissive reelection , which is almost half of Latin American countries . In some of these countries have carried out more than a reform process during the same period. With which it can be said that , in recent years , we have witnessed an expansion of the terms of office of the president. Most cases have taken immediate reelection, but the development has been the absolute flexibility by "indefinite or unlimited reelection" to Venezuela and Nicaragua welcomed in their rules. In this sense, research the question arises: Why presidents in some cases attempting to change the status quo of the presidential election in order to make it more permissive - manage to take forward the reform and not others ? In the analysis strategy is selected all cases of presidents or presidents who - in 1999 and 2011 - pursued constitutional reform to extend his stay in office as a way to ensure their political survival. It is worth noting that presidentialism reform term limits - as long as implying a greater permissiveness - is regarded as a necessary condition for the political survival of leaders in office. Thirteen cases have attempted this type of reform. Of these, seven were successful ( Venezuela 1999 and 2009 , Costa Rica 2003 , Colombia 2005 , 2009 Bolivia , Ecuador and Nicaragua 2008 2009 ) and six failed ( 2000a and 2000b Costa Rica , Venezuela 2007 , 2009 Honduras , Colombia and Panama 2010 2011) . During the same period we can identify two cases where the constitutional clause reelection in 2000 were Peru and Dominican Republic in 2010, both went from immediate reelection to a waiting interval was limited . These two cases are due to a different phenomenon that seeks to analyze in this research, because they are processes that demonstrate the decline of reelection and the leader of the opposition momentum switch to open the way to the alternation in power . For this reason this type of process beyond the limits of the investigation. Defined and former president as individual actor pursuing change. This centrality it deserves as a key figure in the political science research, a role that recently has been recovering but for years was relegated recognized. It should be noted that the continuity impulse is coming from the very remarkable charisma presidents , although political and ideological varied repertoire , hence it is difficult to make a general reading of the contexts in which the reform processes were developed. However, it can be said that programs change this rule in some cases act as a source of inspiration to others, to make visible the deployment of institutional change strategies - even in very different political and institutional settings . By having a median number of cases has been privileged qualitative comparative analysis . This method favors a dynamic conception of the processes and aims to analyze the cases. In a complementary manner , the cases have been built following a historical-comparative logic and variables were analyzed by setting binary sets . I mean, are classified according to dichotomous categories of absence or presence of attributes to variables or causal conditions apply . It was felt that the process leads to the success or failure of the resources of power, which are the explanatory variables in the research available to the President to address decision paths . So popularity, the formation of majorities in parliament, the rigidity - flexibility , constitution amendment and control the president has over his party become the key resources that the President has to take forward its initiative change the status quo. In the configuration of the strategies is given special attention to the institutional settings within which reform takes place to become the decision-making arenas resorted to by the leaders in order to achieve its mission . Constitutional frameworks today allow almost across the board referendums and constitutional courts function as arenas with decision-making in constitutional matters , competing with parliaments , which appear to be the quintessential bodies to fulfill that mission. Rediscovering the testing of hypotheses shows that parliaments are extremely costly for presidents seeking to reform the presidential term limits instances. In general, legislators are hostile to this initiative that behaves in a clearly different from a regular bill logic. So , parliaments become a drag to alter the status quo in the matter, to the point that it is not beneficial to have legislative majority leader . So a more efficient strategy for the leader has been dodging the legislators by going directly to other arenas of decision where their resources in terms of popularity and partisan control concentration maintained a strong impact. Thus opening the range of decision-making mechanisms , opportunities open to overcome the stability of the clause. Contrary to what happens with other reform initiatives in reelection rising actors with veto power , it can be an advantage for the success of the leader, to the extent that the president's influence may be more effective where opposition is lower. Presidents in those scenarios enjoy high popularity among citizens and control their party structures and institutional spaces where this control comes, are prone to success.
