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This book elaborates a theory of 'semi-parliamentary government', an often neglected form of government that instantiates the principle of the separation of powers, by demonstrating how it reconciles important benefits of both presidential and parliamentary systems.

In a democracy, a constitutional separation of powers between the executive and the assembly may be desirable, but the constitutional concentration of executive power in a single human being is not. The book defends this thesis and explores 'semi-parliamentary government' as an alternative to presidential government. Semi-parliamentarism avoids power concentration in one person by shifting the separation of powers into the democratic assembly. The executive becomes fused with only one part of the assembly, even though the other part has at least equal democratic legitimacy and robust veto power on ordinary legislation. The book identifies the Australian Commonwealth and Japan, as well as the Australian states of New South Wales, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, and Western Australia, as semi-parliamentary systems. Using data from 23 countries and 6 Australian states, it maps how parliamentary and semi-parliamentary systems balance competing visions of democracy; it analyzes patterns of electoral and party systems, cabinet formation, legislative coalition-building, and constitutional reforms; it systematically compares the semi-parliamentary and presidential separation of powers; and it develops new and innovative semi-parliamentary designs, some of which do not require two separate chambers.

In a democracy, a constitutional separation of powers between the executive and the assembly may be desirable, but the constitutional concentration of executive power in a single human being is not. The book defends this thesis and explores 'semi-parliamentary government' as an alternative to presidential government. Semi-parliamentarism avoids power concentration in one person by shifting the separation of powers into the democratic assembly. The executive becomes fused with only one part of the assembly, even though the other part has at least equal democratic legitimacy and robust veto power on ordinary legislation. The book identifies the Australian Commonwealth and Japan, as well as the Australian states of New South Wales, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, and Western Australia, as semi-parliamentary systems. Using data from 23 countries and 6 Australian states, it maps how parliamentary and semi-parliamentary systems balance competing visions of democracy; it analyzes patterns of electoral and party systems, cabinet formation, legislative coalition-building, and constitutional reforms; it systematically compares the semi-parliamentary and presidential separation of powers; and it develops new and innovative semi-parliamentary designs, some of which do not require two separate chambers.

"In What Happened to the Vital Center?, Nicholas Jacobs and Sidney Milkis tackle a foundational question within American political history: Is current partisan polarization, aggravated by populist disdain for constitutional principles and institutions, a novel development in American politics? Populism is not a new threat to the country's democratic experiment, but now insurgents intrude directly on elections and government. During previous periods of populist unrest, the US was governed by resilient parties that moderated extremist currents within the political system. This began to crumble during the 1960s, as anti-institutionalist incursions into the Democratic and Republican organizations gave rise to reforms that empowered activists at the expense of the median voter and shifted the controlling power over parties to the executive branch

This title demonstrates that American politics has become so rancorous because it has been unable to heal wounds opened up by Sixties-era protest and institutional change. While many scholars suggest that the answer to our current predicament is greater presidential power, this work shows that doubling down on the myth of transcendent presidential leadership is likely to exacerbate, not heal, our wounds. Instead, the authors recommend that a reconstituted party system may once again permit political leaders to prevent the worst excesses to democracy that now routinely roil the country.

This title demonstrates that American politics has become so rancorous because it has been unable to heal wounds opened up by Sixties-era protest and institutional change. While many scholars suggest that the answer to our current predicament is greater presidential power, this work shows that doubling down on the myth of transcendent presidential leadership is likely to exacerbate, not heal, our wounds. Instead, the authors recommend that a reconstituted party system may once again permit political leaders to prevent the worst excesses to democracy that now routinely roil the country.

What Happened to the Vital Center? demonstrates that American politics has become so rancorous because it has been unable to heal wounds opened up by Sixties-era protest and institutional change. While many scholars suggest that the answer to our current predicament is greater presidential power, this work shows that doubling down on the myth of transcendent presidential leadership is likely to exacerbate, not heal, our wounds. Instead, the authors recommend that a reconstituted party system may once again permit political leaders to prevent the worst excesses to democracy that now routinely roil the country.

Executive relations and semi-presidentialism in Europe -- The institutional flexibility of the French's Fifth Republic -- Comparative executive politics in semi-presidential regimes -- Personification of politics, clientélisme, and ethnic polarization in Ukraine -- Understanding semi-presidentialism and executive politics.

After the collapse of communism, some thirty countries scrambled to craft democratic constitutions. Surprisingly, the constitutional model they most often chose was neither the pure parliamentary model found in most of Western Europe at the time, nor the presidential model of the Americas. Rather, it was semi-presidentialism--a rare model known more generally as the "French type." This constitutional model melded elements of pure presidentialism with those of pure parliamentarism. Specifically, semi-presidentialism combined a popularly elected head of state with a head of government responsib

1. Introduction: Yuko Kasuya, S. 1 . - 2. A Framework for Analysing Presidential-Legislative Relations in Asia: Yuko Kasuya, S. 10. - 3. Presidentialism in Korea: A Strong President and a Weak Government: Yuki Asaba,S. 40 . - 4. Afghanistan's Strong President and Weak Parties: Yuko Kasuya with John Kendall, S. 59 . - 5. Trading Compromises: Interaction of Powers in the Philippine Presidential System: Takeshi Kawanaka, S. 89. - 6. Presidential Strength and Party Leadership in Taiwan: Mitsutoyo Matsumoto, S. 107 . - 7. Strong President and Vulnerable Political System in Sri Lanka: Hiroki Miwa, S. 134 . - 8. President Restrained: Effects of Parliamentary Rule and Coalition Government on Indonesia's Presidentialism: Koichi Kawamura, S. 156 . - 9. Conclusion: Lessons from the Study of Asian Presidentialism: Yuko Kasuya, S. 204

Intro -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1: Making Sense of the World -- 1.1 Making Sense of Philosophical Foundations -- 1.2 Making Sense of Scientific Realism -- 1.3 Making Sense of Pragmatism -- 1.4 Making Sense -- 1.5 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 2: Making Sense of Leadership Outcomes -- 2.1 Making Sense of Leadership -- 2.2 Making Sense of Political Leadership -- 2.3 Making Sense of Institutionalism -- 2.3.1 The Ontology of Institutionalism -- 2.3.2 The Epistemology of Institutionalism -- 2.4 Making Sense of a Pragmatic Institutionalist Account -- 2.5 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 3: The Psychological Effects of Presidential Institutions: written by David Doyle and Robert Elgie -- 3.1 The Perils of Presidentialism? -- 3.2 Why Is Presidentialism Perilous? -- 3.3 Testing the Perils of Presidentialism Under Laboratory Conditions -- 3.4 The Results -- 3.5 The Perils of a Certain Form of Presidentialism? -- 3.6 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 4: Regime Types, Presidential Power, and Clarity of Economic Responsibility -- 4.1 Institutions and Clarity of Economic Responsibility -- 4.2 Cases and Variables -- 4.3 Clarity of Institutional Responsibility and Economic Accountability -- 4.3.1 Replicating Hellwig and Samuels: One-Party Government and Economic Accountability -- 4.3.2 Parliamentarism, Semi-Presidentialism, and Economic Accountability -- 4.3.3 Presidential Power and Economic Accountability -- 4.4 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 5: Presidential Power and President/Cabinet Conflict -- 5.1 What Explains President/Cabinet Conflict? -- 5.1.1 Cases and Variables -- 5.1.2 Results -- 5.2 Under What Conditions Does Presidential Power Affect President/Cabinet Conflict? -- 5.2.1 Applying QCA to President/Cabinet Conflict -- 5.2.2 Results -- 5.3 Conclusion -- References

"Bringing constitutional frameworks back to the study of constitutional law, Borrowing Constitutional Designs questions the hasty adoption of semi-presidentialism by new democracies. Drawing on rich case studies of two of the most important countries for European politics in the twentieth century - Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic - Cindy Skach offers the first theoretically focused, and historically grounded, analysis of semi-presidentialism and democracy. She demonstrates that constitutional choice matters, because under certain conditions, semi-presidentialism structures incentives that make democratic consolidation difficult or that actually contribute to democratic collapse. She offers a new theory of constitutional design, integrating insights from law and the social sciences. In doing so, she challenges both democratic theory and democratic practice." "This book will be welcomed not only by scholars and practitioners of constitutional law but also by those in fields such as comparative politics, European politics and history, and international and public affairs."--Jacket