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Since its inception, the Internet has disseminated the most vital commodity known to man—information. But not all information is societally desirable. In fact, much of what the Internet serves to disseminate is demonstrably criminal. Nevertheless, in the effort to unbind the "vibrant and competitive free market" of ideas on the Internet, Congress enacted section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which essentially grants immunity to interactive computer service providers from liability for information provided by a third party. This Comment suggests that, in certain contexts, courts applying section 230 immunity should reexamine the preemptive effect Congress intended section 230 to have on traditional state police powers. This Comment also analyzes the several judicial and legislative solutions that could alleviate the strain that section 230 immunity puts on state and local efforts to deal with criminal activity perpetrated via the Internet.

Federal agencies are increasingly taking aim at state law, even though state law is not expressly targeted by the statutes the agencies administer. Starting in 2001, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) issued several notices saying that state laws would apply to national bank operating subsidiaries (incorporated under state law) to the same extent as those laws applied to the parent national bank. In 2003, the OCC specifically mentioned state consumer protection laws and took the position that the state laws were preempted and did not apply to mortgage lenders owned by national banks. In December 2006, the Department of Homeland Security declared its own authority to preempt state law on high-risk chemical plant security, announcing a procedure by which interested parties could apply to see if state law would be preempted. In both cases, states responded angrily. In the OCC case, the attorneys general of every state filed Supreme Court briefs opposing the agency's position in Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. A joint brief filed by the National Conference on State Legislatures and the National Governors Association, also opposing the agency's position, argued that federal counterparts to state consumer protection laws were not adequate. In response to the Department of Homeland Security, the state of New Jersey asserted its right to address risks presented by the seven high-risk chemical facilities located within its borders, more facilities than in any other state. Recent events have overtaken both agency actions. In the OCC case, the Supreme Court ruled that the relevant banking statutes were preemptive, mooting the impact of the agency action. The Department of Homeland Security backed off its preemptive position to some degree in response to congressional pressure, especially from the New Jersey delegation, and ultimately Congress legislated a limited savings clause for state chemical facility security laws. The examples nonetheless remain significant because the agencies attempted to preempt ...

How far does U.S. law reach beyond U.S. borders? In principle, Congress could extend its laws as far as it likes, but Congress often fails to make its intentions clear. Many statutes do not specify their geographic scope, instead using general terms that have no inherent limit. Federal courts have long employed interpretive rules, or canons, to guide their construction of such statutes. The canon most commonly cited is the presumption against extraterritoriality, which states that "legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." The simplicity of this language masks difficult questions. Does the "territorial jurisdiction of the United States" include only territory within the national boundaries, or does it extend to territory outside those boundaries but within U.S. control? How should the presumption apply to actions taken abroad that cause effects within U.S. territory, however defined? What implications does the presumption have for situations within U.S. territory but also within the jurisdiction of another country, such as foreign ships in a U.S. port? When the presumption does apply, what evidence of "contrary intent" is necessary to overcome it?

One of the most contested arguments in contemporary just war thinking has been the question of the right starting point of analysis. On one side of the argument, one finds Catholic Church officials who argue for a 'presumption against war' as jumping-off point. On the other, one encounters critics of that position, led by James Turner Johnson, who defend a 'presumption against injustice' as the correct point of entry. Interestingly, both sides refer to St Thomas Aquinas, the key figure in the systematisation of the classical just war, as giving support to their respective position. While Johnson was vindicated as far as Aquinas's historical starting point is concerned, debate about the contemporary purchase of the presumption against war has continued until the present day. Historical just war thinkers like Johnson have criticised the Church not only for turning the logic of the just war tradition on its head by reversing the inherited hierarchy between the so-called deontological and prudential criteria, but have also questioned the empirical evidence that has put the Church on this trajectory. In this article, I explain how the debate about the presumption against war continues to be relevant by engaging with the general direction the Catholic Church has taken up until Pope Francis and by investigating the particular example of its position on drone warfare. I point out that while the presumption against war runs counter to what Aquinas wrote during his days, Thomistic virtue ethics is generally open to development. The Church may thus claim a Thomistic patrimony in advocating for a presumption against war, but, as I demonstrate, the just war thinking that results, often referred to as modern-war pacifism, struggles to address important moral issues raised by contemporary warfare.

One of the most contested arguments in contemporary just war thinking has been the question of the right starting point of analysis. On one side of the argument, one finds Catholic Church officials who argue for a 'presumption against war' as jumping-off point. On the other, one encounters critics of that position, led by James Turner Johnson, who defend a 'presumption against injustice' as the correct point of entry. Interestingly, both sides refer to St Thomas Aquinas, the key figure in the systematisation of the classical just war, as giving support to their respective position. While Johnson was vindicated as far as Aquinas's historical starting point is concerned, debate about the contemporary purchase of the presumption against war has continued until the present day. Historical just war thinkers like Johnson have criticised the Church not only for turning the logic of the just war tradition on its head by reversing the inherited hierarchy between the so-called deontological and prudential criteria, but have also questioned the empirical evidence that has put the Church on this trajectory. In this article, I explain how the debate about the presumption against war continues to be relevant by engaging with the general direction the Catholic Church has taken up until Pope Francis and by investigating the particular example of its position on drone warfare. I point out that while the presumption against war runs counter to what Aquinas wrote during his days, Thomistic virtue ethics is generally open to development. The Church may thus claim a Thomistic patrimony in advocating for a presumption against war, but, as I demonstrate, the just war thinking that results, often referred to as modern-war pacifism, struggles to address important moral issues raised by contemporary warfare.