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THOMAS NAGEL has argued that 'true liberalism' excludes appeals to conceptions of the good in political argument. According to Nagel, liberalism's impartiality is grounded not in skepticism but, rather, in its commitment to 'epistemological restraint.' As he puts it, 'We accept a kind of epistemological division between the private and the public domains: in certain contexts I am constrained to consider my beliefs merely as beliefs rather than as truths, however convinced I may be that they are true, and that I know it.' Nagel's notion of epistemological restraint has been roundly criticized by perfectionist liberals and advocates of liberal neutrality alike. In fact, even Nagel has come to reject the epistemological argument—in part, because of the epistemological asymmetry that it presupposes. In this paper, I offer an answer to Nagel's critics, one that makes the notion of epistemological asymmetry coherent. In so doing, I show how to defend liberal neutrality without embracing skepticism. I structure the paper in the following way: Section II lays out the critique of epistemological restraint; Section III defends the coherence of this notion; and Section IV considers an objection to the analysis developed in Section III.

Thomas Nagel's (1987) assertion that liberalism's neutrality is contingent on the notion of "epistemological restraint" is defended. Joseph Raz's (1994) & Brian Barry's (1995) respective critiques of Nagel's notion of epistemological restraint are reviewed & subsequently challenged. A nonskeptical strategy that renders epistemological restrain viable is then presented. Although it is claimed that the problem of transferring positions should be attributed to the presence of background beliefs, it is contended that individuals draw on these background beliefs to maintain their positions when attempting to account for nonbelievers' rejections of these positions. A potential objection to the defense of epistemological asymmetry is addressed; specifically, it is argued that religious arguments against epistemological asymmetry can be handled by appealing to differences in background beliefs. J. W. Parker

"This paper investigates how concern for the environment translates into predictable patterns of consumer behavior. Two types of behavior are considered. First, individuals who care about environmental quality may voluntarily restrain their consumption of goods and services that generate a negative externality. Second, individuals may choose to pay a price premium for goods and services that are more environmentally benign. A theoretical model identifies a symmetry between such voluntary restraint and a voluntary price premium that mirrors the symmetry between environmental policies based on either quantities (quotas) or prices (taxes). We test predictions of the model in an empirical study of household electricity consumption with introduction of a price-premium, green-electricity program. We find evidence of voluntary restraint and its relation to a voluntary price premium. The empirical results are consistent with the theoretical model of voluntary conservation"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site

Untersucht werden die Auswirkungen der U.S.-amerikanischen - japanischen Handelsbeschränkungen in bezug auf japanische Automobilexporte in die USA für Kraftfahrzeugpreise und Qualitätssteigerungen amerikanischer Kleinwagen. + Die japanische "voluntary export restraint" ist ein Beispiel des "Neuen Protektionismus" bei Handelsbeziehungen. (DÜI-Xyl)