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The article describes policy analysis as regards complex policy making processes in multi-level governance systems & how the principal-agent model typifies governance problems between federal & canton levels. The limit on federal intrusion on the cantons is known as principal-agent problem, & it assumes that every agent tries to use information from the principal to their own advantage. However, the cantons do not only carry out policy recommendations from the federal level but also play a role in governance by initiating public policy. Even though the question of how the existence of different principals impacts the behavior of the executive branch on cantonal level is relevant, it is not an essential factor in the policy formulations of the cantons. In addition, empirical analysis has shown that federal policy initiatives occasionally have unintended results, as described concerning health policy. Thus, the lacking analysis of such unintended consequences, as well as the emphasis on problems of control in the principal-agent model, does not result in such an analytical advantage as to justify neglecting alternative theoretical approaches in multi-level governance, the author contends. 11 References. A. Kallioinen

Abstract
We propose an agency model based on competitive markets in order to analyse an economy with several homogeneous principals and heterogeneous agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterise the set of stable outcomes (equilibria) of this market. In this regard we generalise the assignment game of Shapley and Shubik (1972). Unlike in the standard principal-agent theory, equilibrium payoffs of all the individuals are endogenous, equilibrium contracts are Pareto optimal, and the incremental surplus generated in a principal-agent relationship accrues to the tenant. We design a simple non-cooperative game which implements the set of stable outcomes in subgame perfect equilibrium. We also suggest policy measures in relation to efficiency and income distribution.

This article argues that human rights could be improved by motivating politicians and bureaucrats to put more effort into protecting human rights. It conceptualizes the production of human rights practices as the outcome of two principal-agent relationships that constrain politicians and bureaucrats. Reliance on taxes is a non-electoral, fiscal factor that makes politicians more willing to protect human rights. Increased government revenue, no matter the source, raises bureaucratic compensation and helps create a more accountable bureaucracy. Thus both a higher reliance on taxes and larger state revenues lead to the better protection of human rights. Each fiscal factor promotes a different type of accountability, both of which independently contribute to good human rights practices. Adapted from the source document.

This article argues that human rights could be improved by motivating politicians and bureaucrats to put more effort into protecting human rights. It conceptualizes the production of human rights practices as the outcome of two principal-agent relationships that constrain politicians and bureaucrats. Reliance on taxes is a non-electoral, fiscal factor that makes politicians more willing to protect human rights. Increased government revenue, no matter the source, raises bureaucratic compensation and helps create a more accountable bureaucracy. Thus both a higher reliance on taxes and larger state revenues lead to the better protection of human rights. Each fiscal factor promotes a different type of accountability, both of which independently contribute to good human rights practices.