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AbstractThis is a contribution to the idea that some proofs in first-order logic are synthetic. Syntheticity is understood here in its classical geometrical sense. Starting from Jaakko Hintikka's original idea and Allen Hazen's insights, this paper develops a method to define the 'graphical form' of formulae in monadic and dyadic fraction of first-order logic. Then a synthetic inferential step in Natural Deduction is defined. A proof is defined as synthetic if it includes at least one synthetic inferential step. Finally, it will be shown that the proposed definition is not sensitive to different ways of driving the same conclusion from the same assumptions.

"Shell proof dugout showing massive logs used to protect our boys from German gun fire." ; https://digital.kenyon.edu/arthistorystudycollection/1460/thumbnail.jpg

We study strategy-proof decision rules in the variant of the canonical public good model proposed by Borgers and Postl (2009). In this setup, we fully characterize the set of budget-balanced strategy-proof deterministic mechanisms, which are simple threshold rules. For smooth probabilistic mechanisms, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for dominant strategy implementation. When allowing for discontinuities in the mechanism, our necessary condition remains valid, but additional conditions must hold for sufficiency. We also show that, among ex post efficient decision rules, only dictatorial ones are strategy-proof. While familiar in spirit, this result is not the consequence of any known result in the literature.

Main description: The book Ontological Proofs Today, apart from the introduction, consists of six parts. Part II comprises papers each of which pertains either to historical ontological arguments, or to some other, rather new, ontological arguments, but what makes them stand out from the other papers in this volume, is the fact that they all treat of the omniscience or the omnipotence of God. Part III includes papers which introduce new ontological arguments for the existence of God, without referring to omniscience and omnipotence as the transparent attributes of God. The issue of the type of necessity with which ontological proofs work or may work is raised in the articles of Part IV. In Part V the semantics for some ontological proofs are defined. Part VI consists of papers which, although quite different from each other in terms of content, all explore some ontological issues, and formal ontology may be considered the link between them. Part VII comprises two articles, by R. E. Maydole and G. Oppy, mutually controversial and different in their assessment of some ontological proofs.

Topicality of a subject-matter "Burden of proof in major court proceedings" is based on ambiguous understanding of the standard of proof in legal practice, that is, of the moment when a fact is considered to be proven or unproven. Goal of an article is to research legal regulation of burden of proof in civil procedure, administrative procedure, administrative offence procedure and criminal procedure law and to determine standard of burdens of proof within each of these procedures. Burden of proof, or duty to prove a claimed fact, is an essential element of any evidentiary proceedings. Determination of standard of proof is ambiguously understood issue in legal theory and especially in legal practice. Ambiguous understanding of standard of proof in legal practice may cause determination of unproven facts as proven or vice versa, or even lead to finding innocent persons as guilty. Author, by researching burden of proof in so-called major court proceedings, provides an explanation on legal aspects of its standards.

In jurisdictions that subscribe to adversarial mode of litigation, burdens and standards of proof have significant roles in the adjudication and determination of criminal cases. The operation of the principle of presumption of innocence in such jurisdictions determines issues of who bears what burden and the extent thereof. The Ethiopian criminal procedure system predominantly exhibits adversarial features, and there is the need for the comprehension and enforcement of the respective burdens and standards of proof borne by litigants. The constraints in clarity are more pronounced in those criminal law provisions that embrace some form of presumptions such as provisions on corruption offences. This note highlights how issues of burden and standard of proof are allocated as between prosecuting authorities and accused persons. Apart from explaining the nexus between the principle of presumption of innocence, burdens of proof and standards of proof, it indicates the implications of the operation of the principle of presumption of innocence upon the allocation of evidential and persuasive burdens of proof as between the state and the accused. It further outlines the effects of the various forms of presumptions upon the different kinds of burdens of proof.