Δεν παρατίθεται περίληψη στα ελληνικά. ; The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of cultural propaganda in formulating and conducting foreign policy aiming at political supremacy and cultural penetration within the overall context of the ideological conflict between East and West during the Cold War era. Educational and cultural exchanges and other events of a nominali}'' nonpolitical nature are examined within their political context. In particular, the paper observes Anglo-Soviet relations over Greece. These relations turned increasingly hostile in mid-February 1945. Around that time a marked intensification of Soviet propaganda occurred. In July 1945, the Greek-Soviet League was established. It is interesting that, in response, the British Foreign Office concidered that the British Council in Athens should be reinforced and acquire a permanent representative. It was also decided to reopen the question of the Anglo-Greek Cultural Convention that was signed in 1940 but never ratified. This presentation seeks to examine the purpose of establishing these two cultural agencies, their staffing, the funding of their activities, the content of their cultural programmes, and the profile of their Greek supporters, both state officials and private individuals. How successful was the effort by the British Council and the Greek-Soviet League to promote their cultural programmes and what was the impact of these programmes on Greek public opinion? How did their cultural initiatives continue during the Greek Civil War? On the basis of the sources available, did each agency, and if so to what degree, enjoy the support of the country it represented? The comparative study of British and Soviet cultural propaganda in Greece will contribute to understanding the differences and similarities in the means used by each country to achieve its political ends in Greece.
Konstantinos Katsoudas, "A Dictatorship that is not a Dictatorship". Spanish Nationalists and the 4th of August The Spanish Civil War convulsed the international public opinion and prompted most foreign governments to take measures or even intervene in the conflict. Greek entanglement either in the form of smuggling war materiel or the participation of Greek volunteers in the International Brigades has already been investigated. However, little is known about a second dimension of this internationalization of the war: the peculiar forms that the antagonism between the two belligerent camps in foreign countries took. This paper, based mainly on Spanish archival sources, discusses some aspects of the activity developed in Greece by Franco's nationalists and the way Francoist diplomats and emissaries perceived the nature of an apparently similar regime, such as the dictatorship led by general Metaxas. The main objectives of the Francoist foreign policy were to avoid any escalation of the Spanish civil war into a world conflict, to secure international assistance for the right-wing forces and to undermine the legitimacy of the legal Republican government. In Greece, an informal diplomatic civil war broke out since Francoists occupied the Spanish Legation in Athens and Republicans took over the Consulate in Thessaloniki. The Francoists combined public and undercover activity: they worked hard to achieve an official recognition of their Estado Nuevo, while at the same time created rings of espionage and channels of anticommunist propaganda. The reason of their partial breakthroughs was that, contrary to their Republican enemies, the Nationalists enjoyed support by a significant part of the Greek political world, which was ideologically identified with their struggle. Francoist anti-communism had some interesting implications for Greek politics. An important issue was the Francoist effort to reveal a supposed Moscow-based conspiracy against Spain and Greece, both considered as hotbeds of revolution in the Mediterranean, in order to justify both Franco's extermination campaign and Metaxas' coup. Although this effort was based on fraudulent documents, forged by an anti-Bolshevik international organization, it became the cornerstone of Francoist and Metaxist propaganda. General Metaxas was the only European dictator to invoke the Spanish Civil War as a raison d'etre of his regime and often warned against the repetition of Spanish-like drama on Greek soil. Nevertheless he did not approve of Franco's methods and preferred Dr. Salazar's Portugal as an institutional model closer to his vision. For Spanish nationalist observers this was a sign of weakness. They interpreted events in Greece through the disfiguring mirror of their own historic experience: thus, although they never called in question Metaxas' authoritarian motives, the 4th of August regime was considered too mild and soft compared to Francoism (whose combativeness and fanaticism, as they suggested, the Greek General should have imitated); it reminded them the dictatorship founded in Spain by General Primo de Rivera in 1920s, whose inadequacy paved the way for the advent of the Republic and the emergence of sociopolitical radicalism. Incidents of the following years, as Greece moved towards a civil confrontation, seemed to strengthen their views. ; Konstantinos Katsoudas, "A Dictatorship that is not a Dictatorship". Spanish Nationalists and the 4th of AugustThe Spanish Civil War convulsed the international public opinion and prompted most foreign governments to take measures or even intervene in the conflict. Greek entanglement either in the form of smuggling war materiel or the participation of Greek volunteers in the International Brigades has already been investigated. However, little is known about a second dimension of this internationalization of the war: the peculiar forms that the antagonism between the two belligerent camps in foreign countries took. This paper, based mainly on Spanish archival sources, discusses some aspects of the activity developed in Greece by Franco's nationalists and the way Francoist diplomats and emissaries perceived the nature of an apparently similar regime, such as the dictatorship led by general Metaxas. The main objectives of the Francoist foreign policy were to avoid any escalation of the Spanish civil war into a world conflict, to secure international assistance for the right-wing forces and to undermine the legitimacy of the legal Republican government. In Greece, an informal diplomatic civil war broke out since Francoists occupied the Spanish Legation in Athens and Republicans took over the Consulate in Thessaloniki. The Francoists combined public and undercover activity: they worked hard to achieve an official recognition of their Estado Nuevo, while at the same time created rings of espionage and channels of anticommunist propaganda. The reason of their partial breakthroughs was that, contrary to their Republican enemies, the Nationalists enjoyed support by a significant part of the Greek political world, which was ideologically identified with their struggle. Francoist anti-communism had some interesting implications for Greek politics. An important issue was the Francoist effort to reveal a supposed Moscow-based conspiracy against Spain and Greece, both considered as hotbeds of revolution in the Mediterranean, in order to justify both Franco's extermination campaign and Metaxas' coup. Although this effort was based on fraudulent documents, forged by an anti-Bolshevik international organization, it became the cornerstone of Francoist and Metaxist propaganda. General Metaxas was the only European dictator to invoke the Spanish Civil War as a raison d'etre of his regime and often warned against the repetition of Spanish-like drama on Greek soil. Nevertheless he did not approve of Franco's methods and preferred Dr. Salazar's Portugal as an institutional model closer to his vision. For Spanish nationalist observers this was a sign of weakness. They interpreted events in Greece through the disfiguring mirror of their own historic experience: thus, although they never called in question Metaxas' authoritarian motives, the 4th of August regime was considered too mild and soft compared to Francoism (whose combativeness and fanaticism, as they suggested, the Greek General should have imitated); it reminded them the dictatorship founded in Spain by General Primo de Rivera in 1920s, whose inadequacy paved the way for the advent of the Republic and the emergence of sociopolitical radicalism. Incidents of the following years, as Greece moved towards a civil confrontation, seemed to strengthen their views.
Δεν παρατίθεται περίληψη στα ελληνικά. ; The aim of the current study is an attempt to address the problem which emerged in the Hellenic Society during the years of the inter war as well as the first post civil war period, due to the change of the calendar. The introduction, from the Hellenic Church, of the new (Gregorian) calendar in 1924 created a strong reaction among the believers wich resulted to the creation of a new movement, named Greek Religions Community of Genuine Orthodox Christians (C.O.Ch.). This conservative minority, having had a great influence, insisted in the reinstatement of the old calendar and caused important conflict in the Hellenic society. The issue is examined from a political viewpoint, since the G.O.Ch. functioned as a pressure group towards the governments, demanding the free exercise of their religious duties. The governments appeared rather uncourageous in facing the problem, as they relied on G.O.Ch's vote. However, there had been systematic chasing persecutions against their clergymen, with them arrested or sent to the exile, facts which aggravated the problem. In this article, we also attempt to analyse the ideological stigma of the G.O.Ch. movement as their moved against all innovations of West-European origin and they declared their dedication to the traditional customs. Another aspect of the issue, concerns the so-called Macedonian issue and since the Church as well as many politicians considered the G.O.Ch. as being Serving the Yugoslav propaganda between the Slavonic-speaking minority of Macedonia, given that the Serbian Church maintained the old calendar. The C.O.Ch. Church attempted to defend itself against those accusations claiming that the change of the calendar served the political plans on the northern neighbours.
Michalis P. Liberatos, The Greek Communist Party and the SlavophonesMinority in West Macedonia during the German Occupation (1941-194The existence of a Christian Slavic-speaking population in West Macedoniaafter the exchanges of populations in 1923-1924 and its confrontationwith Greek residents affected not only the relations between Greeceand the neighbouring Balkan countries but also determined the attitudeof KKE towards the Greek political stage and its relations with the otherpolitical parties. Especially during the German Occupation in Greece thecontroversies were enforced because of the existence of Bulgarian occupationalauthorities in the region and the attempt of Germans to treatethnic differences as an instrument of oppression. On the contrary, theGreek resistance forces that acted in Macedonia attempted to avert theaccession of Slavophones to Bulgarian nationalism and tried to compromisethe contradictions between the minority and the Greek population.The main resistance movement in the region, EAM, an organisationthat included KKE as the stronger part of it, had the advantage thatit was acceptable to the minority. On the other hand, other Greek organisations,like PAO, caused a feeling of fear, insecurity and mistrust tothe minority as representatives of Greek nationalism. KKE, because of itspolitical attitude towards the defence of the social rights of the minorityin the Inter-War period, had gained the confidence of that population,something extremely useful for the purposes of the liberation struggle.Nevertheless, the other political forces in Greece suspected that KKEhad returned to its attitude about the «Autonomy» of Macedonia fromthe Greek State, which KKE had declared in the decade 1925-1935. Thatwas a great obstacle for a political party that for a long period exerteditself to prove that it had abandoned that policy and especially in relation with EAM, which was based primary on its patriotic character. In orderto avoid the charges that it favoured the Slavophones separatists andthe possibility of an internal crisis that might have dissolved the politicalalliance of EAM, KKE pursued to incorporate the Slavophones into theGreek liberation movement on purpose to create a state of mutual confidencebetween the two populations. At the same time, it tried to isolatethe minority from the propaganda of Bulgarian separatists and destroythe corresponding armed groups.The problems regarding the relations between the minority and theGreek resistance movement became more complicated because of theinvolvement of Tito's regime in Yugoslavia. Tito and his partisans attemptedto use their ideological connection with EAM as a means to persuadeGreeks to accept the existence of minority as a cause of a new arrangementof the borders between Greece and Yugoslavia in the post Warperiod. On the other hand, the leaders of EAM tried to avoid Tito's accusationsthat Greeks impeded the development of a Balkan resistanceco-operation against Axis and strove to confine the massive accession ofSlavophones to the Yugoslavian resistance army by incorporating membersof the minority in organisations of EAM. It was a very difficulttask and often caused more problems than it resolved. ; Michalis P. Liberatos, The Greek Communist Party and the SlavophonesMinority in West Macedonia during the German Occupation (1941-194The existence of a Christian Slavic-speaking population in West Macedoniaafter the exchanges of populations in 1923-1924 and its confrontationwith Greek residents affected not only the relations between Greeceand the neighbouring Balkan countries but also determined the attitudeof KKE towards the Greek political stage and its relations with the otherpolitical parties. Especially during the German Occupation in Greece thecontroversies were enforced because of the existence of Bulgarian occupationalauthorities in the region and the attempt of Germans to treatethnic differences as an instrument of oppression. On the contrary, theGreek resistance forces that acted in Macedonia attempted to avert theaccession of Slavophones to Bulgarian nationalism and tried to compromisethe contradictions between the minority and the Greek population.The main resistance movement in the region, EAM, an organisationthat included KKE as the stronger part of it, had the advantage thatit was acceptable to the minority. On the other hand, other Greek organisations,like PAO, caused a feeling of fear, insecurity and mistrust tothe minority as representatives of Greek nationalism. KKE, because of itspolitical attitude towards the defence of the social rights of the minorityin the Inter-War period, had gained the confidence of that population,something extremely useful for the purposes of the liberation struggle.Nevertheless, the other political forces in Greece suspected that KKEhad returned to its attitude about the «Autonomy» of Macedonia fromthe Greek State, which KKE had declared in the decade 1925-1935. Thatwas a great obstacle for a political party that for a long period exerteditself to prove that it had abandoned that policy and especially in relation with EAM, which was based primary on its patriotic character. In orderto avoid the charges that it favoured the Slavophones separatists andthe possibility of an internal crisis that might have dissolved the politicalalliance of EAM, KKE pursued to incorporate the Slavophones into theGreek liberation movement on purpose to create a state of mutual confidencebetween the two populations. At the same time, it tried to isolatethe minority from the propaganda of Bulgarian separatists and destroythe corresponding armed groups.The problems regarding the relations between the minority and theGreek resistance movement became more complicated because of theinvolvement of Tito's regime in Yugoslavia. Tito and his partisans attemptedto use their ideological connection with EAM as a means to persuadeGreeks to accept the existence of minority as a cause of a new arrangementof the borders between Greece and Yugoslavia in the post Warperiod. On the other hand, the leaders of EAM tried to avoid Tito's accusationsthat Greeks impeded the development of a Balkan resistanceco-operation against Axis and strove to confine the massive accession ofSlavophones to the Yugoslavian resistance army by incorporating membersof the minority in organisations of EAM. It was a very difficulttask and often caused more problems than it resolved.