Suchergebnisse

Some prophecy interpreters refrained from presenting their readings to the public out of fear that negative comments on Hong Kong may cause trouble.

By MIKE MAGEE The Politico headline in 2019 declared dramatically, "The Most Powerful Activist in America is Dying." This week, 4 1/2 years later, their prophecy came true, as activist Ady BarkanContinue reading...

The prominent science fiction author Arthur C. Clarke developed “Clarke’s laws” over time. The ideas originally appeared in his 1962 essay, “Hazards of Prophecy: The Failure of Imagination” (in the collection Profiles of the Future: An Enquiry into the Limits of the Possible. They were reformulated as “laws” in the decades that follow. The best-known of … Continue reading Andrew Gelman: “Any Sufficiently Crappy Research is Indistinguishable from Fraud”
The post Andrew Gelman: "Any Sufficiently Crappy Research is Indistinguishable from Fraud" first appeared on Conversable Economist.

Maybe not genocide, almostcertainly a war crime. I have been reluctant to call what Israel is doing in Gaza genocide.  I am not an international lawyer so my hesitance is less about the fine points of international law and more about how fraught the word is--that it is a very inflammatory accusation, that it turns people's minds off, that it ends conversations.  It is pretty much the worst thing you can accuse someone of doing, especially an Israeli given the history of the Jews.  It also raises in some people's minds a false equivalency between this event or that event and the Holocaust.  For the legal beagles, the question is of intent--is the aim to kill in part (the in part thing is important) or entirely a group of people because of their race, religion, language, or some other ethnic marker.*  For an excellent discussion of much of this, see Page Fortna's op-ed.And then I got into a conversation with a family member about ethnic cleansing versus genocide.  I am far more confident that what is happening in Gaza is ethnic cleansing.  We have had a variety of statements from Israeli officials referring to this as a/the nabka--a repeat of something that had long been denied--that the new Israelis expelled the Palestinians from contested territories in 1948.  Reports that Netanyahu has been looking for other places to settle the Palestinians are very disturbing. The level of violence and its targeting, as this WP analysis illustrates only too clearly, is suggestive.  Israel has more done more damage to civilians and civilian infrastructure in a couple of months than other contemporary campaigns and it is not close. Remember, the 21k civilian casualties in Gaza is almost certainly an undercount that will get worse as the destruction of the health care system and the shortages of food and water kick in.Israel and its fans will claim that they need to eradicate Hamas because it has genocidal intent.  I sympathize with that, but genocide is partly about power.  One cannot engage in mass killing unless one has the powers of a state or something close to it.  So, in the genocide conversation, one can argue that one side might have intent, but it is the other side that has the ability to engage in large scale destruction and is doing so.  Hamas may present a threat to engage in genocide, but it is Israel that is actually killing large numbers of people, mostly civilians including many, many children.I need to mention one dynamic here: conflating all Palestinians with Hamas and arguing Hamas needs to be eradicated leads to the conclusion, intentionally or not, implicit or explicit, that to destroy Hamas, one needs to eliminate the Palestinians.  Which leads to the biq question:Is the intent of Israeli leaders to eliminate all Palestinians?  Just those living in Gaza? Not so clear, so one could argue it is not genocide.  But that is really a quibble.  Israel is forcing Gazans to move south, and so-called safe zones are not so safe (which reminds me of Bosnia).  Israels and its supporters can argue about genocide/not genocide, and maybe that is a conversation that could be more comfortable than addressing the contemporary situation--Israel is killing large numbers of innocents out of revenge, rage, and/or a misconception that hitting much, much harder will ultimately lead to deterrence.  I included the bluesky post because it illustrates something very, very powerful--that Israel is engaged in a variety of horrific tactics and no strategy (if Israel had one) could justify it.  Attacking hospitals and refugee camps is simply wrong--it is immoral and it is also bad strategy.  Netanyahu recently said he was seeking to destroy Hamas,** demilitarize
Gaza, and deradicalize the Palestinians.  This campaign may be
temporarily successful at the second, but it will not destroy Hamas, and
it will do the opposite of deradicalizing the Palestinians.  I remarked that when Israel had hit the 20,000 casualty figure, was that
disproportionate enough, given that something less than 2,000 Israelis
died on or after October 7th? It is quite clear that Israel has violated
international humanitarian law repeatedly and intentionally.  I get that Israelis think international relations is gamed against them--all the UN votes by countries that have deplorable human rights records, etc.  That international law is less important than survival, but some of this is a self-fulfilling prophecy--that Israel burned whatever goodwill it received in the aftermath of October 7th by engaging in a campaign of revenge and collective punishment. One of thing that has been so disturbing is the realization that there are two meanings to Never Again--never again will Jews be victims or never again will we let mass killings take place.  It is clear now that Israeli leaders and their supporters believe that Never Again means that Jews will never be victims again, even if it means victimizing others.  The lesson I thought I had learned growing up was that Never Again meant fighting against oppression, persecution, victimization, regardless of the targeted group.  I can't help but think that all of this is a betrayal of what we were supposed to learn from the Holocaust.All of this is awful.  Hamas is awful, Netanyahu is awful, terrorism is awful, collective punishment is awful.  Whether one wants to call it genocide or not, what Israel is doing is awful--it is counterproductive and it is immoral.  So, from a strategic perspective, Israel's campaign is bad.  From a moral perspective, it is wrong.  Hamas's gross violations of human rights do not justify violating international humanitarian law, even if it were producing a successful outcome, and it is certainly not doing that.Thus, I avoid using genocide as a label for all of this because it is largely superfluous--one can condemn what Israel has been doing without it.  * The term politicide was invented to cover the attempt to kill many/all people of the same party or movement that is ethnically heterogeneous.** None of this justifies Hamas or legitimates what Hamas has done.  The recent story about the systemic gender violence committed by Hamas makes abundantly clear that Hamas is an awful, awful organization.  That they deliberately use their own people as shield not to protect the organization but to raise the hypocrisy costs for Israel--that is, they are deliberately getting Palestinians killed--makes them utterly deplorable.  They should be defeated and destroyed.  But Israel is actually empowering Hamas by walking into the traps it has set.

Since the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin on August 23, much ink has been spilled on the future of his private military company (PMC), Wagner Group, and its affiliated companies. Most attention remains on Ukraine, where the PMC has not been formally active since Prigozhin declared victory in Bakhmut on May 20. Meanwhile, Wagner continues to conduct military operations in both Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR).On November 14, the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA), backed by Wagner, took the separatist stronghold of Kidal. Despite entering a town nearly abandoned, the capture was undeniably a symbolic victory for Mali's Interim President, Colonel Assimi Goïta, and his military regime. There is a significant risk that FAMA's March on Kidal will further exacerbate humanitarian crises in the region, all at a time when the international community is stepping back from the Sahel. This is a mistake. The Sahel has become the epicenter of the West's, including the United States', two great threat narratives: jihadist terrorism and the expansion of Russian influence. Their accompanying containment narratives almost ensure counterproductive, knee-jerk reactions to future events on the ground.To avoid these pitfalls, the international community must focus today on creative solutions that account for Russia's presence in Africa.BackgroundThe past five years have seen a popular backlash against peacekeeping and humanitarian-military operations in central Africa and the Sahel. While politicized, the criticism has not been without merit. Peacekeeping missions have undoubtedly improved the lives of many. They have also often empowered the most violent and produced more, not less, armed groups. Yet it was Wagner Group's interventions in Sudan and CAR that turbocharged the criticism.
The structure of Wagner's 2017 intervention in Sudan initially followed standard practices for Africa's private security sector: training and security provision in exchange for mineral concessions. (A notable exception was the political consulting and media operations Prigozhin's team also offered.) In Sudan, the structure stayed consistent. In CAR, events on the ground shaped the nature of Wagner's intervention. In 2018, Prigozhin's men became diplomats.Wagner's diplomacy in CARIn February 2019, the CAR government and 14 major armed groups signed the Khartoum Agreement — a peace deal hailed by the United Nations. A considerable contribution to this process belonged to Prigozhin's working group, although experts from various Russian government entities also participated.
For Prigozhin, the prospect of peace would translate into increased access to mining concessions. It would also deliver a win to Moscow and increase the chances for Kremlin subsidies to fund his Africa gambit. For armed group leaders, the Agreement was a chance to obtain lucrative ministerial positions, while President Faustin-Archange Touadéra could shore up his vulnerable position vis-à-vis the armed groups.
The significance of the Agreement was immense, but unfortunately most walked away with the wrong conclusions. The international community felt it could finally distance itself from CAR's seemingly endless problems. The CAR government and Prigozhin, victims of their own success, felt they could abandon notions of an inclusive government. All seemed unable to account for the return of the largest potential spoiler of the peace, former president François Bozizé, and his decision to run in the 2020 presidential elections.
Despite rising tension between Touadéra and Bozizé, the CAR government, Wagner, and the international community pushed elections at all costs, even as a new coalition of armed groups — nominally led by Bozizé and including six of the fourteen Khartoum Agreement signatories — advanced on Bangui, the capital.
As a result of the rebellion, Wagner's mandate changed from that of a training mission to a military operation. The resulting counteroffensive brought nearly all major towns under government control.
The partial victory — armed groups are down but not out — led to overconfidence within Wagner's ranks: Military solutions were possible. The PMC came to view the Khartoum Agreement through a cynical lens as insiders reframed it as a clever way to weaken and divide the armed opposition, rather than the genuine effort at conflict resolution it was at the time.Wagner began to fashion itself as Russia's "security solution," Moscow's most successful export to Africa. Back then, Prigozhin had the ear of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Taking advantage of Moscow's light footprint on the continent, Wagner's boss could define what Moscow's interests in Africa were.Wagner's military solution in the SahelBy 2020, all actors recognized the value of the "Wagner threat" to Africa; not least African governments which leveraged narratives of "cooperating with" or "countering" Wagner to extract concessions or support from both Russia and the West.
Cold War containment narratives became a self-fulfilling prophecy in 2021 when, after a second coup, tensions between Colonel Goïta and France resulted in French military withdrawal from Mali and Wagner's arrival. Goïta's grievances with Paris were first political: He wanted France to recognize his government. Second, anti-French rhetoric helped build political legitimacy for the military regime.
The rhetoric tapped into genuine grievances with France's Operation Barkhane, especially among Mali's military class. At the top of the list was France's quiet cooperation with Tuareg separatists to oust the jihadists in northern Mali. Bamako saw that cooperation as a violation of sovereignty. Intervenors and those intervened upon could not agree on who the terrorists were.
Wagner's arrival in Mali further revealed the conflict's separate realities. Western analysts focused on human rights abuses and the territorial expansion of Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State of the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS) to prove Wagner's intervention a failure.
Goïta's circle was far less focused than western analysts on controlling territory outside the capital. The potential for another coup in Bamako was more important, and the government relied on internet influencers and political entrepreneurs to shore up its popularity. In turn, it became a prisoner of its own jingoistic claims to return Kidal to the fold.The resulting Wagner-backed operation has enjoyed more success than predicted. The Malian army has demonstrated increased combat capability and coordination between branches of the armed forces. Wagner's operations in Mali also reflect a new level of cooperation with the Russian Ministry of Defense. Russian officers are involved in planning military operations and acting as advisors. Wagner mercenaries participate in ground operations, but, unlike in CAR, they are always embedded within FAMA.A return to diplomacyFAMA does not have the ability or capacity to fight both separatists and jihadists. Indeed, FAMA and Wagner are on the path to an unwinnable counterinsurgency in the north. Interaction between Tuareg separatists and JNIM suggest the jihadi group is not quite neutral in the conflict, and its role could grow.Despite the current success of Wagner's military solution, it is evident that only peace talks, a process of reconciliation, and the equitable distribution of power and resources between Bamako and the provinces can end the conflict.The victory in Kidal puts the government in Bamako in a stronger position to negotiate with separatists. But given the prospect of an unwinnable war in the north, the continued threat of jihadist groups, and a host of economic woes, the window for "cashing in" on victory will be short.Of course, the Malian government has demonstrated little interest in serious negotiation to date. Few outside powers have leverage over its decision-making. Russia, and the Wagner Group in Mali, have more influence than most. For Russian diplomats, efforts to bring peace to Mali would reinforce Moscow's growing prominence in the Sahel. Wagner Group, too, has consistently engaged in diplomacy when it sees greater potential for profit in peace than open warfare.The international community has leveraged the presence of Wagner Group in Mali as a pretext to step away from the conflict. Yet the crisis in Mali, and the Sahel more generally, cannot be ignored. Efforts should be made to create at least conditions for a negotiating process.The West's exceptional concentration on the war in Ukraine and its support for Israeli operations in Gaza have damaged its credibility in the Global South. Competing with or trying to contain Russia (or China, for that matter) in Africa only does further damage to that credibility. Limited, compartmentalized work with all partners in the Sahel will show that the U.S. can view issues in the Global South outside these prisms.Russia is here to stay in Africa. Mali, and the Sahel more generally, should be an opportunity to engage in geopolitical deconfliction rather than competition.

I look puzzled or annoyed as the anchorgot my title wrong, suggesting I run NPSIAI have been thinking a lot lately about profs and punditry.  To start, I am just going to accept that profs who appear on TV are "pundits" as the definition of a pundit is: "an expert in a particular subject or field who is frequently called on to give opinions about it to the public."  Yep, that's us, among other folks.  Plenty of profs who aren't pundits, plenty of pundits who are not profs, but those who profess in the media are, indeed, pundits.   This came up last week at the International Studies Association as there was a panel on "How Not To Bridge The Gap" which is about as deceptive as one can get in a panel title since it was really about how to bridge the gap--how to have the academics talk to the policy people and vice versa.  After a couple of decades of Bridging the Gap [BTG], a group dedicated to fostering the exchange, and a few years of a bit of that in a Canadian accent--the CDSN which has as BTG as a founding partner--folks are now asking about whether this is a good thing, whether it is dangerous, how to do responsible engagement, and such.While all of this can be and should be quite complicated, I have a basic take on whether or not to do media stuff (and since I do a fair amount, you can guess where this is headed):We get public money to do our research, so we should give back.  Indeed, many grant applications require a dissemination plan.A fundamental part of professing is to disseminate knowledge.And if not us, then who?This last thing is my focus today and was when I piped up from the audience last week.  That if we don't speak, the media will find someone else to fill that time slot, that page, that podcast, whatever.  So, one must ask themselves if one can bring more to something than whoever else they might get or whether one might not be as fit for that topic or issue than whoever else they might get.This is where I borrow a concept from the analytics revolution in sports.  There have been all kinds of ways to measure the value of baseball players compared to each other, basketball players (one measure is called RAPTOR!), and so on.  My personal favorite happens to be from baseball.  I like it so much both because it has a good conception and has a fun acronym is VORP: Value Over Replacement Player.  This enables one not only to assess how a generic player in their position in the same season or time frame, but to compare players at different positions or in different time frames.  While technology, strategy, and medical care and the rest have changed over time, we can use this measure to figure out the relative value of players from different generations.  Babe Ruth is still #1 followed by Walter Johnson, Cy Young, and then Barry Bonds and then Bonds's godfather Willie Mays (this settles the Mantle/Mays thing).  I am happy to see Tom Seaver above Greg Maddox, that Seaver was much better than the replacement level starting pitcher of his era compared to Greg Maddox to the replacement level starting pitcher of his era.  In basketball, this puts Lebron over Jordan, which folks might disagree with just a bit. The point is not to stir up a debate about sports, but the idea of measuring someone compared the person a team could get that is easily available--off the street, from the waiver wire, from the minor leagues, whatever.  When it comes to media stuff, the producers of the various radio, television, podcast, and other programs need to fill content, so they will grab someone, anyone, to fill in a spot.  So, the point I raised at the conference and part of the reason why I do media stuff is: would we rather have a knowledgeable expert or some schlub off the street?  Of course, they don't get just any schlub, they go to the experts who are already on their rolodex (to date myself even further).  We tend to see mostly the same folks again and again depending on the issue, so the question is, for every expert, are they more expert or less (dare I say it) hacky than the person who might be called instead?  The VORP in sports is easy to calculate even if what goes in the calculations can be and is debated--how much does excellence at anyone time count compared to lifetime achievement, etc.  In punditry, how do we calculate VORP?  It will be less about what is quantified and more about what can be compared and ranked.  So, what may be in the minds of the producers and should be in our minds as we come up with a Value Over Replacement Pundit:How well they know the topic at hand?  Some folks are super sharp at one thing, others know a bit about a lot.  This measure here is about how much they know about the specific topic?What is their range?  How broadly can they speak?  Because you know the anchor is going to go off script and ask questions that are not necessarily in the strikezone.How articulate are they?  Can they speak/write clearly and dynamically?  I will mention my Lebron/Babe Ruth in Canadian circles on this measure below.How measured or responsible are they?  Folks saying that war between US and China is inevitable, for instance, have a lower VORP because they may very well be creating a self-fulfilling prophecy.  My speculating about terrorism in 1996 Lubbock should have set my VORP at a negative number.  On the other hand, I was far more responsible last March about calls for a No Fly Zone than a bunch of retired military officers in the US and Canada.  Availability: in sports, health is a gift/attribute in its own right, which means that some players rank higher because they can play most days.  Kevin Durant's VORP has been hurt by his various injuries.  In the pundit game, the question is whether one is willing to do it a bit, some, or a lot.  This can obviously tradeoff with expertise/responsibility pieces.  There are probably other ingredients/variables, but let's stick with those for now, and folks can suggest additional ones.The first item--how well they know the topic--allows us to bring in the positions from sports.  That one can have a high VORP if one is playing a position they are good at and a low one if they play one that is not their strength.  Babe Ruth has an incredible VORP because he was both a terrific hitter and an amazing pitcher.  So, some folks will have high Value Above Replacement Pundit because they know a lot about a lot, and they have the other key ingredients. In thinking about this and my experiences both in the media and watching other folks, I thought I should use a few key issues to highlight who has a high VORP.  And, yes, this was partially inspired by watching two NPSIA colleagues and one PhD student absolutely rock the Canadian intelligence beat.  So, enough with the explanations and definitions, who has a high VORP in Canada?  Note, this is illustrative, not exhaustive.I think number one on Canadian foreign policy, broadly defined, is Roland Paris.  He brings his years of academic experience on peacekeeping and international relations to bear along with his various times in government at different levels.  He is simply terrific at articulating complex stuff--his quotes today about Biden's visit to Ottawa were both accurate and delightful.  He is also very responsible--he's not going to say something that is wildly speculative.  If I were a producer, I would always go to him first on damn near anything.  When I appeared on TV with him once, I just basically said: "I agree with Roland." It did not make for good tv.  Bessma Momani has wide-ranging expertise, is compelling and clear, so she's a great go-to for Canadian relations with a variety of places.On intelligence matters, Canada has quite a few folks who are super sharp on this: Stephanie Carvin, Leah West, Jess Davis, Artur Wilcyznkski, and Craig Forcese clearly have very high VORPs (I think Amar Amarasingam does too, but I haven't seen as much of his stuff).  Stephanie, Leah, Jess, and Craig have done extensive research, Artur has far more experience than the others in government in so many spots (he is a great podcast co-host for a couple of the podcasts on the CDSN Podcast Network).  Each are quite responsible, sticking within their lanes of expertise, not speculating wildly, and not having any ideological axes to grind (that's a hint for many of the folks who have low VORPs--who tend to dominate the editorial pages).On defence stuff, Thomas Juneau has among the highest VORPs because he has academic and policy expertise, a willingness to do the media stuff, is excellent in both official languages. Stéfanie von Hlatky would have the highest defence VORP except she does not do that much media.  I wish she did more as she is super responsible, knows the Canadian defence scene, knows the US and NATO well, again strong in both languages.  I had fun watching her at a couple of NATO summits where the Canadian media grabbed us to "scrum" with them.  Of the columnists, I think Shannon Proudfoot easily has the highest VORP.  Her columns always are well reported, provide valuable perspective, making one see things from a different angle. Where do I fit in?  I think I have a decent, positive VORP score, but not as strong as those mentioned above.  I am not as articulate or as responsible.  I have a wider range than most, except perhaps Thomas and Roland (reminds me of the polls that show that men are far more confident about landing planes or battling bears), but with that greater willingness to talk about stuff at the edges of my expertise, I say stuff like Ukraine is going to lose the war.  I was wrong (many were wrong about that).  I should have been a bit more circumspect about potential predictions even while being clear as I could why a No Fly Zone was super dangerous. I did have fun saying "your guess is as good as mine" when an anchor went against the instructions asking about the pipeline sabotage.One of the things I have been emphasizing in recent years is saying no to the media where my VORP trends negative or where I know folks who have much more value.  During the Vance/McDonald/Sajjan stuff of two years ago, I kept directing the media to people who studied gender and the military.  I was far more willing to talk when the story focused on civilian control of the military, something I study.  I have declined to speak much about balloons or about election interference as I really don't have that much to say.  I really don't know much about China, for instance.  I will speak beyond my areas of expertise on the Battle Rhythm podcast because it is a smaller audience, I can edit myself afterwards, and my co-host and guests can and will correct me.  For a five minute hit on radio or TV, the anchor person is not going to push back if I say something wrong.  They may want me to do so since it might make for better tv.  Who has negative VORPs, where a replacement pundit available off the street or waiver wire would be a significant improvement?  I could name a few obvious retired senior military officers, but that would be unnecessary.  I could also name some columnists for national papers in Canada including one who used to own a bunch of them before/after? he was convicted.So some caveats here--I don't watch as much tv and I certainly don't listen to too much radio, so I am mostly influenced by the times I have appeared with other folks.  And, yes, most of the people listed above are very good friends.  I don't think I have to agree with someone to give them a high score.... but it probably doesn't hurt. Does that make me biased or do I simply hang with people with high VORPs?  ¯\_(ツ)_/¯There
is a tradeoff I forgot to mention in the first posting of this: if you
say no a lot, they won't come back.  Which can be cool if one does not
want to be bothered.  But saying yes a fair amount means that when I do
say no, I can refer them to sharp, younger people who they don't know
about, and this allows me to connect the media to diverse voices.  And
they often listen.  The media wants good people, but they also have lots
of time pressure, so they often go to the easiest get.  But if you give
them help, they will add to their rolodex. Feel free to nominate in the comments folks in the Canadian IR media space who are at either end of the VORP spectrum or in between.