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How far may we hope to go in theorizing about international affairs? That question is at the center of this article, which consists of several more or less eclectic stabs at the problem.I shall be writing as though some theory of power politics were the only possible candidate for being the theory of international relations. Let that be regarded as an act of methodological faith—certainly I can think of no scientific demonstration of it, and I would rather leave the philosophy of the matter for another occasion. There are a number of stock objections against any general theory of international relations oriented towards power politics, and these I shall try to rebut, chiefly by extending and correcting my own previous efforts in the genre. I shall then introduce objections of a rather more abstract sort, and, again from my own previous work, I shall try to show that the difficulties which these latter present are indeed formidable. But I hope it will be understood that neither kind of objection need be relevant to meories of international relations other than those built around the concepts of force, power, and security.

Globalization represents a significant paradigm shift in political science. Whereas well into the 1990s, most sub-fields of the discipline focused on the nation-state, the actions of governments, and the relationships between governments and other societal actors, globalization has forced us to revise many of our existing theories. In a truly globalizing environment, politics cannot focus solely on the state. Scholars across the discipline have moved away from studying governments to studying governance within both a national and international context. Domestically, the evolving interest in the policy network/community approach demonstrates the increasing role of the private and community sectors in governance arrangements. Internationally, regime theory has extended the frontiers of political science to study private regimes, multinational corporations and the ever-increasing importance of NGOs. Despite calls from scholars like Rosenau to speak of a post-international system following the end of the Cold war1, or from Keohane and Milner to better understand the relationship between domestic politics and international politics2, little theorizing work has actually been able to incorporate knowledge from the sub-fields of political science in order to present a truly holistic view of the emerging global order.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Introduction: Trends and Prospects -- 1: The Transformation of the Urban Community -- 2: The Form and Structure of the Future Urban Complex -- 3: The Urban Field -- 4: The Rising Demand for Urban Amenities -- 5: The Shape of the Future -- 6: Notes on Southern California -- 7: The Metropolitan Area as a Racial Problem -- 8 : The Apocalyptic Future -- The Urban Fortress -- NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE -- Inevitability Comes to New York -- For Further Reading -- Index.

All politiking is done by "interested" persons and the term "interest group" involves a truism, not a pathologi cal condition. Interest groups are essential political aggre gates whose form, functions, and power depend upon stated socio-political conditions. Interest groups have intrapersonal and interpersonal dimensions. Group leaders usually possess the intensive perspectives of their group, whereas the rank and file usually have significantly varied and split involvements in their groups. The "individual" interest can be conceived in group theory terms, so can the "national interest." A strong antigroup ideology is found in nineteenth-century democratic and socialist movements, which tended to fluctuate between semi-anarchism and executive dictatorship. Group theory pic tures the developing society more accurately in many ways than such other theories, while simultaneously interest groups are still treated as pests or threats to democracy. Political phi losophy should seek to reconcile fact and value in this situation and has a variety of theories from the past to utilize. Interest groups, broadly regarded as instruments of pluralism and lo calism, are an especially American practical alternative to the program of communist centralism in ideology and government.

In recent years various theories of "democratic administration" have been developed. These theories differ in their origins, their motivation, their sophistication. Some have been crudely forged in the heat of administration; some are finely-machined products of scholarship. Some pertain especially to private administration, others have been developed for public administration, while still others cut across this conventional division.These theories of democratic administration constitute a significant development in political thought. However crude and limited some of them may be, they open new areas to be explored in the development of democratic ideology; whatever their limitations, they are constructive efforts to adapt an ethic in which we believe to the contemporary world. If administration is indeed "the core of modern government," then a theory of democracy in the twentieth century must embrace administration. I wish to sketch the background of administrative thought and history against which theories of democratic administration are seen in perspective; to review briefly some of these theories; and to comment upon the prospects and problems of the further development of theory of democratic administration.

The paper attempts to formulate an axiomatic model of the classical balance of power system using the fundamental notion that a stable bal ance of power implies the absence of a predomin nant actor or coalition. It is shown that the basic motivation for participating in such a system is security in a world where each nation fears the prospect of being on the losing side. Under condi tions of perfect information, such a system will only be stable when exact equality of power can be maintained, if necessary by suitable alignments with previously neutral nations. Under conditions of uncertainty, the desirable goal would be stable deterrence which may imply an attempt to gain power superior to one's opponent. In both situa tions, a stable equilibrium may be attained only under fairly restricted conditions. The most suc cessful operation would be similar to the 'holder of the balance' case. A 'multipolar' system is more likely to be stable.

The problems and prospects of regional economic cooperation or
integration in Asia are today a hotly debated subject, discussed at very
different levels in different quarters. In an ECAFE paper entitled "The
. Scope for Regional Economic Cooperation in Asia and the Far East",1
the view was advanced that cooperation implying coordination of economic
policy as a whole is already on Asia's agenda of practical politics.
After the economic rationale of cooperation in varied forms had been
considered in a general way, an appeal was directed to policy-makers in
the Asian region to establish a suitable framework for cooperation
within which concrete blueprints of cooperative schemes could be worked
out. It is significant that, at the Conference of Asian Economic
Planners which discussed that paper among others, there was no
disagreement in principle about the need for increased economic
cooperation among the countries in Asia and the Far East. There was
disagreement only as to what extent of cooperation in relation to the
time perspective and what practical forms of it were most
desirable—matters concerning which the Conference was by its nature
prevented from making a decision and into which further exploration
could be made through intergovernmental consultation.

I: Economics of Decision -- Introductory Note -- 1. Rational Behavior, Uncertain Prospects, and Measurable Utility (1950) -- 2. Why 'Should' Statisticians and Businessmen Maximize 'Moral Expectation' ? (1951) -- 3. Scaling of Utilities and Probabilities (1954) -- 4. Probability in the Social Sciences (1954) -- 5. Norms and Habits of Decision Making Under Certainty (1955) -- 6. Experimental Tests of a Stochastic Decision Theory (1959) -- 7. Random Orderings and Stochastic Theories of Responses (1960) -- 8. Binary-Choice Constraints and Random Utility Indicators (1960) -- 9. Actual Versus Consistent Decision Behavior (1964) -- 10. Stochastic Models of Choice Behavior (1963) -- 11. On Adaptive Programming (1963) -- 12. An Experimental Study of Some Stochastic Models for Wagers (1963) -- 13. The Payoff-Relevant Description of States and Acts (1963) -- 14. Probabilities of Choices Among Very Similar Objects: An Experiment to Decide Between Two Models (1963) -- 15. Measuring Utility by a Single-Response Sequential Method (1964) -- 16. Decision Making: Economic Aspects (1968) -- 17. The Economic Man's Logic (1970) -- 18. Economics of Acting, Thinking, and Surviving (1974) -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.