Suchergebnisse

A widespread prudential measure limits the housing expense ratio—defined as the share of income spent on the rent or loan payment—to ensure household solvency. This policy is increasingly criticized, however, as it would induce households to settle far from the city center in search of lower housing prices, fostering urban sprawl. It would even prove counterproductive as high transport costs in distant areas would more than offset the lower housing costs. To avoid these unintended effects, several researchers advocate limiting the joint housing plus transport expense ratio instead. This paper aims to shed light on this issue by comparing the two prudential measures—limiting either the housing or the housing plus transport expense ratio—using the monocentric model. By constraining residential choices and reducing housing consumption, both policies improve household solvency and reduce urban sprawl. While this seems to contradict previous claims, the joint constraint proves more efficient in both regards. Provided the constraint is not too stringent, both policies have limited impact on household welfare and often even improve welfare. But this time, capping only the housing expense ratio always dominates the joint housing plus transport constraint. A numerical application to the Paris region illustrates our findings for a real case study. Results suggest that replacing the current limitation of the housing expense ratio with a joint housing plus transport constraint would significantly improve household solvency and curb urban sprawl, with a negligible welfare loss.

В статье анализируются основные инструменты экспансионной монетарной политики и ее влияние на инвестиционный рост. Обосновываются возможности трансформации монетарной политики в направлении активизации инвестиционных процессов, в частности путем введения макропруденциальных ограничений, развития инвестиционных альтернатив для населения и усиление роли банков с государственным капиталом. Предлагаются меры инвестиционного стимулирования со стороны Национального банка, вместе с Правительством, по распределению эмитированных средств через инструменты монетарной экспансии. ; This article is analyzed the basic tools of the expansionary monetary policy and its impact on investment growth. It is proposed transformation of monetary policy to activate the innovation processes, in particular by introducing macro-prudential limitations of investment alternatives for the population and strengthening the role of banks with state capital. In article is suggested the methods of National bank, together with the Government to stimulate investment by the use of the allocation of funds through the instruments of monetary expansion.

Bodin's Six livres de la république is a vast synthesis of comparative public law and politics, the theoretical core of which is formed by the four chapters translated in this volume. These contain his celebrated theory of sovereignty, which informed his thinking on the state and made his République a landmark in the development of European political thought. This theory, however, also included a seductive but erroneous thesis that was of great importance for the development of royalist ideology: the idea that sovereignty is indivisible, that the entire power of the state has to be vested in a single individual or group. This thesis, together with the crisis of authority in the French religious wars, led Bodin to a systematically absolutist interpretation of the French and other contemporary monarchies. His primary aim was to exclude any legal ground of forcible resistance. A king of France, he hoped, would continue to adhere to moral and prudential limitations, but a proper king, he insisted, could not be lawfully constrained. This is the first complete translation of these chapters into English since 1606. It is accompanied by a lucid introduction, a chronology, and a bibliography

The paper examines the benefits and limitations of capital control and prudential regulation in order to maintain macroeconomic and financial stability. In practice regulators often use different combinations of capital control and prudential instruments, attempted to identify and correct financial market failures and externalities across financial institutions and between the financial sector and the real economy, which are originated from foreign capital inflows. The concrete option of political instruments depends on risks essence, institutional limitations, and the depth of internal financial market. The regulators need to use different tools in foreign capital inflows management, taking into account the variety of risks and the lack of universal instruments. Their sets can vary across countries.

ABSTRACTThe new era of the Post‐Washington Consensus (PWC), promoted under the auspices of International Financial Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, centres on the need to develop sound financial regulation and strong regulatory institutions, especially in the realm of banking and finance in post‐financial crisis developing countries. This article uses an examination of the Turkish banking sector experience with the PWC in the aftermath of the 2001 financial crisis to show its considerable strengths and weaknesses. The authors argue that the emergent regulatory state in the bank‐based financial system has a narrow focus on strengthening prudential regulation, whilst ignoring the increased 'financialization' of the Turkish economy. They identify the positive features of the new era of the PWC in terms of prudential regulation, which has become much more robust in its ability to withstand external shocks. At the same time, however, the article highlights some of the limitations of the new era which resemble the limitations of the PWC. These include the distributional impact of the regulatory reforms within the banking sector, and notably the emergence of foreign banks as the major beneficiaries of this process; weaknesses in promoting productive bank intermediation that finance the real economy and economic growth, leading to poverty reduction via growth of employment whilst stimulating financialization within the economy; and finally, the exclusive focus on prudential regulation, whilst ignoring regulatory costs, consumer protection and competition regulation.

This article argues that the Supreme Court should reconsider its prudential justiciability doctrines and their underlying assumptions. As a global theory, this Article offers a judicial dynamism model. It then articulates the relevance of the political question doctrine and the need to view the doctrine as prudential rather than constitutional. First, I discuss the Supreme Court's increased use of judicial minimalism and the political question doctrine to avoid important cases and reduce its docket. Second, I describe my model, in which the court takes a dynamic approach to such issues, dependent upon the political climate, to maintain its appropriate stature and the Constitution's intended balance of powers. I use two recent cases to illustrate my prescription and how it is particularly relevant to the ongoing war on terror. Third, I examine the long-standing political question doctrine and show how dynamism would clarify that it is a prudential, not constitutional, limitation. Finally, I endorse a dynamic court, which takes up important constitutional questions when the balance of powers warrant that the federal judiciary assume its jurisdiction and speak boldly.

The 2007–8 banking crisis in the advanced economies has exposed deficiencies in risk management and prudential regulation approaches that rely too heavily on mechanical, albeit sophisticated, risk management models. These have aggravated private and economic losses. While fiscal costs were at first limited, it remains to be seen to what extent the taxpayer will be protected. Policymakers and bankers need to recognise the limitations of rules-based regulation and restore a more discretionary and holistic approach to risk management.

The global financial crisis of 2008 has given way to a proliferation of international agreements aimed at strengthening the prudential oversight and supervision of financial market participants. Yet how these rules operate is not well understood. Because international financial rules are expressed through informal, non-binding accords, scholars tend to view them as either weak treaty substitutes or by-products of national power. Rarely, if ever, are they cast as independent variables that can inform the behavior of regulators and market participants alike. This book explains how international financial law 'works' - and presents an alternative theory for understanding its purpose, operation and limitations. Drawing on a close institutional analysis of the post-crisis financial architecture, it argues that international financial law is often bolstered by a range of reputational, market and institutional mechanisms that make it more coercive than classical theories of international law predict

AbstractFirst embodied by the European Supervisory Authorities in 2010, agency governance in the financial sector has gained momentum with the creation of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) – an EU agency with considerable competencies in banking prudential policy. Within a short period, backed by the 'ESMA‐Short Selling case' judgment, agencies have progressed from supporting the European Commission with their quasi‐rule making, to a more prominent role in the decision‐making process, potentially influencing policy‐makers' agenda. By engaging in a qualitative analysis of legal documents, official texts and relevant scholarship, this research note examines the formal framework and practical aspects of SRB's governance, in order to substantiate whether its establishment presents a 'qualitative increase' in financial sector agencification. At the same time, the research note highlights problematic issues arising because of the limitations set by the Meroni doctrine arguing that the Board's wide powers 'on paper' may prove challenging to implement in practice.