Suchergebnisse

Recent critics of the Department of State have complained that "under its present leadership" the policy of the Department has been " to go slow, play cautious, and be nice." It is claimed that such a tactic is bound to be ineffectual in dealing with Moscow and Prague. Other critics have complained that the Department has failed to respond vigorously to the charges hurled at it by hostile politicians within the country; the Department seems, it is said, to have tried to avoid or evade or run away from controversy. It depends on public support for successful operations in many ways but does not try very hard to win that support. The second situation differs notably from the first, of course, being a case in domestic rather than international politics, but the choice involved is substantially the same in the art of group dynamics and constitutes an important problem, apart entirely from the substance of the questions at issue between the Department and its opponents, domestic or foreign.

Press reports on the `Summit' & `post-Summit' conferences of 1955 indicated that the open conference virtually prevented genuine diplomacy & necessitated psychol'al warfare. The free access of the world press to both Geneva conferences tended (1) to favor a `disciplined or captive press', (Pravda, as against any free press); (2) to exaggerate the basic diff's between the 2 parties in conference; (3) to enable a controlled press to exploit such diff's by relaying appropriate paraphrases of its spokesmen's remarks to other power audiences than those to which the remarks were primarily directed; (4) to give the free press of the Western powers the scope to supply the opposition press (Pravda) with arguments for the Soviet positions which are the more convincing to Western audiences because they are prestated in Western idioms - a journalistic task beyond the competence of Pravda's editors; & (5) to force each speaker at the Oct conference to formulate his remarks with reference to the outside audiences. That on balance the USSR won this psychol'al engagement is fairly indicated by the increased cordiality to Russian moves in critical areas like the Middle East & India since the conference ended on 17 Nov. AA.

Paper read at Conference held at the East African Institute of Social Research, Makerere College, January, 1954. ; On September 30th, 1888 the Imperial British East Africa Company received a Royal Charter from Lord Salisbury's Government. The Chairman was Sir William Mackinnon, already chairman of the British India Steam Navigation Company. At the end of 1886 the British and the Germans had made their first agreement partitioning East Africa. Germany had obtained the lion's share, but Great Britain gained control of Mombasa, the best harbour on the coast. By an exchange of notes in 1887 the British and German governments agreed to the so- called hinterland doctrine, whereby he who held a stretch of coastline had a pre-emptive right to the interior lying behind. By 1890 the scramble for the area of the Great Lakes was leading to a crisis, a crisis that might have created a Fashoda incident (when Peters and Jackson raced each other for Uganda) nine years before Fashoda. But diplomacy disposed of the problem, and by the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890 Germany recognised inter alia a British sphere of influence which included Buganda.