Are public goods public goods?
In: Public choice, Band 35, Heft 1, S. 45-57
ISSN: 1573-7101
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In: Public choice, Band 35, Heft 1, S. 45-57
ISSN: 1573-7101
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In: Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper No. 2020/20
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Working paper
In: Reflexive Governance for Global Public Goods, S. 37-53
In: Collective Action in the Formation of Pre-Modern States; Fundamental Issues in Archaeology, S. 133-164
In: A Theory of Fairness and Social Welfare, S. 133-165
In: Legislative studies quarterly, Band 40, Heft 2, S. 211-240
ISSN: 1939-9162
We study how policymakers play public goods games, and how their behavior compares to the typical subjects we study, by conducting parallel experiments on college undergraduates and American state legislators. We find that the legislators play public goods games more cooperatively and more consistently than the undergraduates. Legislators are also less responsive to treatments that involve social elements but are more likely to respond to additional information that they receive. Further, legislators' fixed characteristics explain much of the variation in how legislators play the game. We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding how institutions affect the provision of public goods.
In: Political and Civic Leadership: A Reference Handbook, S. 153-161
We study how policymakers play public goods games, and how their behavior compares to the typical subjects we study, by conducting parallel experiments on college undergraduates and American state legislators. We find that the legislators play public goods games more cooperatively and more consistently than the undergraduates. Legislators are also less responsive to treatments that involve social elements but are more likely to respond to additional information that they receive. Further, legislators' fixed characteristics explain much of the variation in how legislators play the game. We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding how institutions affect the provision of public goods.
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In: Princeton Monographs in Philosophy Ser v.22
Much political thinking today, particularly that influenced by liberalism, assumes a clear distinction between the public and the private, and holds that the correct understanding of this should weigh heavily in our attitude to human goods. It is, for instance, widely held that the state may address human action in the ''public'' realm but not in the ''private.'' In Public Goods, Private Goods Raymond Geuss exposes the profound flaws of such thinking and calls for a more nuanced approach. Drawing on a series of colorful examples from the ancient world, he illustrates some of the many ways in
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© 2015 The Comparative Legislative Research Center of The University of Iowa. We study how policymakers play public goods games, and how their behavior compares to the typical subjects we study, by conducting parallel experiments on college undergraduates and American state legislators. We find that the legislators play public goods games more cooperatively and more consistently than the undergraduates. Legislators are also less responsive to treatments that involve social elements but are more likely to respond to additional information that they receive. Further, legislators' fixed characteristics explain much of the variation in how legislators play the game. We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding how institutions affect the provision of public goods.
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