Suchergebnisse

The author discusses the basic structure of Mancur Olson's political economy. He highlights three concepts on which it is based - public goods, interest groups, and selective incentives. The last concept represents Olson's innovation in contemporary political science. The author's central methodical assumption is based on the insight that Olson's key theory is linked with the so-called public goods paradox. Unlike private goods, public goods are non-competitive and non-exclusive, which means that it is not possible to bar those who do not share the costs of their production from using them. On the basis of this, Olson has developed the original theory of interest groups. By looking into the costs of organizing along interest lines as a collective activity whose result is a public good, he distinguishes between large, heterogeneous, and small, homogeneous groups. Besides, he has shown that, regarding public goods, individuals tend to behave as free riders, defaulters who try to avoid the costs of securing these goods. The author shows that Olson has, notwithstanding certain flimsiness of his reductionist methodology, significantly revamped political science. (SOI : PM: S. 202)

The paper deals with the possible impact of globalization and decentralization on the future role of public spending in Croatia. In the first part, the author describes the elements of government intervention in the economic process during the 20th century and the theoretical origin of public goods as a resource that the market is incapable of efficiently providing. After that the characteristics of the process of globalization and decentralization (localization) are listed. These are the two simultaneous processes whose intensification leads to the reduction of the regulative role of the nation-state and public spending. The second part of the article first discusses the structure of public spending in Croatia, and then a possible impact of the two processes on its structure and volume. (SOI : PM: S. 193)

A few years after the collapse of communist regimes, it is evident that the confidence about the ultimate triumph of liberal democracy was premature. This waking up to the reality is not only the consequence of the hardships in the transformation of post-communist societies, but of the intellectual scepticism regarding the normative potential of liberal democracy in the developed western societies. The problem might in most general terms be formulated as the incapacity of liberal democracy to generate and reproduce the normative requirements for its own survival. The author thinks that the solution to this paradox can nevertheless be found within the institutional framework of liberal democracy: if the traditional moral concepts on which liberal democracy was founded in the past are worn out indeed, and no civil- religious substitute for that tradition has emerged as yet, then its only possibility is to create its own, modern or post-modern, morality by means of the public discourse mechanism and the political participation of citizens. The normative dimension of liberalism must not be reduced to the theory of private ownership, market and competition, but be envisaged as a constitutional theory of human rights and restricted government and the egalitarian distribution of goods and opportunities. (SOI : PM: S. 30)