Public Decisions as Public Goods
In: Journal of political economy, Band 79, Heft 4, S. 913-918
ISSN: 1537-534X
30841 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Journal of political economy, Band 79, Heft 4, S. 913-918
ISSN: 1537-534X
In: Public choice, Band 124, Heft 3-4, S. 267-282
ISSN: 1573-7101
Borders are not definite, they can change over time. Recent examples are the disintegration of the Soviet Union and of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. Within countries, borders between municipalities can change as well. Border changes can be relatively peaceful, like it was the case in Czechoslovakia, but they can also go together with violence, like it was the case with Eastern Timor. This book contains a study of the incentives individuals have to form jurisdictions, using throughout a microeconomic approach. Consecutively, the roles of public good provision, of intergovernmental transfers and of violence are discussed. The analysis argues that individuals have incentives to form jurisdictions that are smaller than optimal from a social welfare point of view, but that intergovernmental transfers can alleviate this. The discussion on violence sheds some light on the incentives for the use of violence and how this affects political outcomes.
BASE
In: The political quarterly, Band 75, Heft s1, S. 88-99
ISSN: 1467-923X
In: Evaluation and Program Planning, Band 33, Heft 2, S. 197-200
In: Proceedings of the annual meeting / American Society of International Law, Band 104, S. 147-148
ISSN: 2169-1118
In: Evaluation and program planning: an international journal, Band 33, Heft 2
ISSN: 0149-7189
In: Critical review: a journal of politics and society, Band 7, Heft 4, S. 539-557
ISSN: 1933-8007
In: Canadian journal of economics and political science: the journal of the Canadian Political Science Association = Revue canadienne d'économique et de science politique, Band 32, Heft 2, S. 230-238
In: Scottish journal of political economy: the journal of the Scottish Economic Society, Band 56, Heft 3, S. 353-370
ISSN: 1467-9485
ABSTRACTThis paper analyzes public goods whose benefits cross countries' borders and generations. Once provided, transnational intergenerational public goods (TIPGs) are assets that generate benefits for subsequent generations. For treaties involving TIPGs, a coalition of rich developed countries are apt to shoulder more of the provision burden than a coalition of poor developing countries. This burden inequality worsens if the developed countries unilaterally display altruism to future generations; nevertheless, altruistic benefits may offset reduced spillovers. When current generations strategize with respect to future generations, provision and efficiency suffer; however, the hypothesized unequal burden sharing improves somewhat. For alternative aggregator technologies of public supply, these one‐sided burdens may be partly ameliorated.
Metadata only record ; NGO's are linked to environmental objectives for good reason: non-profit NGO's provide a flexible, private-sector answer to the provision of international environmental public goods. The non-profit sector can link for profit, non-profit, and public-sector objectives in complex contracts. This article examines how, for the case of the National Biodiversity Institute (INBio) in Costa Rica, such complex contracts with both domestic and international parties provide partial solutions to public goods problems in the absence of private property rights over genetic resources. INBio's 'monopoly' position, legitimized by the local government, brings in rents from genetic resources which are reinvested in the production of public goods.
BASE
We set out and solve a static neoclassical model with a labor/leisure choice for agents and a government sector producing a Samuelsonian public good. Numerical solutions vary considerably with the elasticity of substitution for commodities in an agent's utility function. We focus on solutions with an income tax rate set by the government (second best solutions). Government revenue varies with the rate of income tax (expressed in a Laffer Curve) and we observe that such curves generally peak "internally" only for case of "high" elasticity values in the utility function of a representative agent. Inelastic substitution possibilities involve the peaking of the Laffer Curve at a corner with the rate of income tax tending to unity. We report on welfare analysis for small changes in the rate of income tax and on first best outcomes (agents charged Samuelson "prices" for the public good).
BASE
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 48, Heft 3, S. 356-378
ISSN: 1552-8766
The effect of introducing costly partner selection for the voluntary contribution to a public good is examined. Participants are in six sequences of five rounds of a two-person public good game in partner design. At the end of each sequence, they can select a new partner out of six group members. Unidirectional and bidirectional partner selection mechanisms are introduced and compared to controls with random partner rematching. Results demonstrate significantly higher cooperation in correspondence to unidirectional partner selection than to bidirectional selection and random rematching. Average monetary effort for being able to choose a partner is substantially high and remains stable.
In: Dissent: a journal devoted to radical ideas and the values of socialism and democracy, Band 51, Heft 4, S. 57-61
ISSN: 0012-3846
Contends that children must be considered a public good requiring a collective effort to address their needs. Areas where the family-centered form of childrearing falls short of meeting children's needs include child poverty & quality child care. It is argued that public investment can address shortfalls in these areas, but the national mindset regarding the value of children must change for there to be appropriate legislative action with respect to family leave, fair wages & working hours, & the child care system. J. Zendejas
In: Public administration review: PAR, Band 48, Heft v/Dec 88
ISSN: 0033-3352