Suchergebnisse

A constructivist approach to global public goods -- Accounting for tastes : the social construction of utility and preferences -- Utility, preferences, and the individual public goods decision -- Leadership and the global monetary system -- Collective security as a global public good -- The individual decision to provide collective security : Romania and the Kosovo campaign -- Human rights : consensus, norms, and public bads -- Identities, utilities, and public goods decisions

This book brings a constructivist approach to analyzing public goods by recognizing that preferences are socially constructed from the actors' identities. This synthesis of constructivism and rational choice provides a deeper understanding of the decision to provide goods such as protecting human rights and collective security.

Public goods are collectively beneficial for citizens. Peace, a free press, or a financial market that serves its function of enabling smooth, sustainable capital flows to entrepreneurs without entailing costly bailouts by Main Street-these are all public goods. Public goods are for democracy what happiness is for the individual: the center of gravity that keeps its activities-the public policies and political debate among citizens-vital and in accord with basic values and the requirements of social cohesion. Angela Kallhoff, drawing on the philosophical work of Martha Nussbaum and Jürgen Habermas, gives a convincing answer for why democracy needs public goods. Her book is a fine piece of example-driven political theory and a timely contribution to the urgent task of refurbishing the social bases of Western democracies.

This volume brings together 8 previously unpublished papers dealing with various modes of allocating jointly consumable goods (i.e. public goods). The issues covered range from voluntary contributions and price exclusion (market allocation) to positive and normative analyses of different political allocation procedures for public goods. Given this wide spectrum of allocative schemes for public goods there does not seem to be an easy and clear-cut message from modern public-goods theory to public allocation policy.

This volume brings together 8 previously unpublished papers dealing with various modes of allocating jointly consumable goods (i.e. public goods). The issues covered range from voluntary contributions and price exclusion (market allocation) to positive and normative analyses of different political allocation procedures for public goods. Given this wide spectrum of allocative schemes for public goods there does not seem to be an easy and clear-cut message from modern public-goods theory to public allocation policy.

Centralized sanctioning institutions are of utmost importance for overcoming free-riding tendencies and enforcing outcomes that maximize group welfare in social dilemma situations. However, little is known about how such institutions come into existence. In this paper we investigate, both theoretically and experimentally, the endogenous formation of institutions in a public goods game. Our theoretical analysis shows that players may form sanctioning institutions in equilibrium, including those where institutions govern only a subset of players. The experiment confirms that institutions are formed frequently as well as that institution formation has a positive impact on cooperation rates and group welfare. However, the data clearly reveal that players are unwilling to implement institutions in which some players have the opportunity to free ride. In sum, our results show that individuals are willing and able to create sanctioning institutions, but that the institution formation process is guided by behavioral principles not taken into account by standard theory.