In the XXI century in the system of globalizing social relations studying and analyzing the public opinion, its influence to the social development of society, and its role in the state administration, and working out necessary proposals and recommendations by this way is becoming very important. Besides, public opinion and its role in the state administration are continuing to be one of the important primary tasks of these days. That's why the existing problems in the state and society administration and appearing of a real, concretized solution to them by the public opinion are shown in this article.
To shed light on the political inertia around environmental legislation, I study the response of US senators to public opinion while controlling for special interest pressure. I combine data on public opinion (PO) on climate change - estimated by multilevel regression with poststratification - with campaign contributions from the extractive industries to indicate special interest (SI) influence, and use senator fixed effects, instrumental variables and the timing of senate elections for identification. PO has a strong impact on environmental legislation. The effects are different for the two parties: Republicans react to PO in election cycles, whereas Democrats are responsive through their whole term. The responsiveness of elected officials to environmental opinion is surprising: while Americans often favour environmental regulation in general, they tend to consider it as of low importance. I discuss possible explanations.
This paper outlines the larger methodological, logistical and political challenges confronting survey researchers in emerging democracies in developing country contexts, particularly in Africa. Overcoming these challenges often means that comparative social scientific surveys of public opinion are designed, executed, and received in very different ways than in the West. But rather than simply seeing these differences as blemishes that need to be gradually ameliorated, we may have much more to learn from the globalization of public opinion research than the simple accumulation of more data from exotic settings.
Renewed scholarly interest on chieftaincy hardly pays attention to the interaction between traditional leadership and modern democratic citizens. It is the state-chieftaincy relationship that has dominated much of the current research on traditional leadership in modern Africa. Even work that has been done on traditional leadership and the modern democratic state is mostly qualitative and speculative. This has led to the field being flooded by mostly qualitative and speculative assumptions on traditional rule. Botswana has not been immune to this anomaly. By employing public opinion data from the Afrobarometer surveys of 1999, 2003, 2005 and 2008, the study hopes to contribute towards the limited empirical research on traditional leaders, particularly in Botswana, which will make a valuable contribution to a more profound and grounded picture of traditional leadership in an era of heightened democratization resulting from economic development and modernization.
The second part of the book consists of summaries by A. J. and R. L. Merritt of the reports prepared by the Opinion Surveys Section, Office of Military Government of the United States for Germany. ; Continued by the authors' Public opinion in semisovereign Germany. ; Mode of access: Internet.
- As the 2010 UK General Election saw an increased use of social media by politicians, activists, journalists and citizens, a number of consultancy firms began "semantic polling" – the employment of natural language processing technology to "read" and codify vast datasets gathered online, and then the use of this data to illustrate and understand public opinion. - The semantic polling techniques employed are largely experimental and vary widely between firms. There is also very limited methodological transparency. This is problematic as academic research suggests that statements about public opinion made in media can actually drive as well as reflect popular attitudes. - Both those carrying out semantic analysis and those in the media reporting it have a responsibility to offer appropriate explanations about the meaning and limitations of the conclusions, and the methods used in data analysis. They can do this by: increasing media literacy among citizens; increasing data literacy among journalists and editors; developing structures for self-regulation; and developing institutions that ensure a greater level of methodological transparency.
The literature on state capacity is often at odds with what constitutes state capacity, how to operationalize it, and how to measure it. Nevertheless, it is important for us to attempt this endeavor given the importance of state capacity, and its effect on a number of political and social dynamics. With the proliferation of quality surveys in the Arab world in recent years, we also have an unprecedented opportunity to examine state capacity in a new light, according to citizen perceptions in addition to material measures. Thus, in this paper I will examine variations of state capacity measurements using the Arab Opinion Index data. I will provide evidence to show that many political phenomena can only be understood if the conditions surrounding state capacity are accounted for.
Two public opinion polls, in Los Angeles and Michigan, on smoking in public places contradicted findings from other major surveys. Both were commissioned by the tobacco interests during consideration of non-smoking legislation to measure opinion and influence the outcome. Analysis reveals the two polls to be remarkably similar and in violation of basic principles of survey research. Response categories lacked objective or parallel phrasing, response lists were not rotated, and the ordering of items appeared prejudicial. Both polls were effectively countered and the legislation passed.
Abstract: This article explores the extent of authoritarian durability and public opinion towards democracy in Southeast Asia drawing on findings from the Asian Barometer. While Freedom House indicators rank many countries in the region as not free or partially free, a high proportion of citizens within the same countries report that they live in a democracy. Conversely, countries ranked as electoral or liberal democracies have high proportions of citizens who report that they do not live in a democracy. These findings reveal quasi-thermostatic concerns that, when satisfied, open the way for the expression of other concerns. Views about democratic experience reveal differing expectations about democracy among the general public. In general, the results suggest that a high proportion of citizens in Southeast Asia have a rather instrumental view of democracy that is underpinned by perceptions of good governance rather than democratic ideals. Still, while economic growth is considered to be very important, when looking at what matters for a functioning democracy, other measures of good governance such as freedom and equality, trust in government, accountability and responsiveness are considered more important.
Abstract: This article explores the extent of authoritarian durability and public opinion towards democracy in Southeast Asia drawing on findings from the Asian Barometer. While Freedom House indicators rank many countries in the region as not free or partially free, a high proportion of citizens within the same countries report that they live in a democracy. Conversely, countries ranked as electoral or liberal democracies have high proportions of citizens who report that they do not live in a democracy. These findings reveal quasi-thermostatic concerns that, when satisfied, open the way for the expression of other concerns. Views about democratic experience reveal differing expectations about democracy among the general public. In general, the results suggest that a high proportion of citizens in Southeast Asia have a rather instrumental view of democracy that is underpinned by perceptions of good governance rather than democratic ideals. Still, while economic growth is considered to be very important, when looking at what matters for a functioning democracy, other measures of good governance such as freedom and equality, trust in government, accountability and responsiveness are considered more important.
In: Lawson , C & Hudson , J 2009 ' Anti-Americanism and Public Opinion in the European Union ' Bath Economics Research Working Papers , no. 19/09 , Department of Economics, University of Bath , Bath, UK .
The term "anti-Americanism" has become common coinage in public and academic debate, the more so since the election of President G. W. Bush, and especially since 9/11. Yet little is known of its causes and impact. Defining it as opposition to US policy, and using 2003 and 2005 Eurobarometer data we examine individuals` attitudes to the US in five policy dimensions for EU members. We find that over a third of EU voters either approved or disapproved of the US in all five dimensions. We also find there are differences in attitude to US policy related to age, policy preferences and nationality. And, although anti-Americanism is associated with a preference for greater European independence, perhaps surprisingly it is also linked to a desire for a less federal and hence less powerful Europe.
Research on public support for green building has, to date, been incomplete. Understanding the demographics of individuals that support green building has remained secondary to merely determining real opinions on the topic. The identity of supporters and the motivation behind their support is the focus of this research. Specifically, is support for green building dependent on the way in which the issue is framed? This research aims to focus on those that are spreading the message about green building, industry experts, and the mass public. By exposing how green building experts talk about the issue, we may begin to understand why public support for green building has yet to reach the kind of mainstream acceptance other planning and design techniques have,such as New Urbanism. I predict that green building experts perceived low levels of public awareness, with the exception of those within the Northwest region, which I believ will perceive higher levels of awareness. In addition, I assume that industry experts will be most focused on energy efficiency as a primary concept of green building. As for the public, I hypothesize that those aware of green building and individuals age 50 and older will be more likely to support green building. With the introduction of source cues, I expect that support for green building will decrease when respondents received either an environmentalism cue or a government program cue. Using survey instruments, I was able to determine that all green building experts perceive public awareness as low and do, in fact, focus their efforts on energy efficiency. With regards to the public, support was highest among those that are aware, as well as those age 50 and older. In addition, insertion of source cues decreased support for green building, with the government program source cue providing the lowest levels of support for green building. ; 2005-08-01 ; M.A. ; Arts and Sciences, Department of Political Science ; Masters ; This record was generated from author submitted information.
Child imagination is considered in developmental theories as a desirable precondition for later creative production, though in everyday use, imagination is viewed as fantasy, unreal, not practical and not important. The topic of interest in this paper is public opinion of imagination as the quality that can be encouraged to learn at home and the factors which influence this opinion. The data for the analysis were collected from the Third and Fourth Wave of World Values Survey. The findings suggest that imagination has a very low status among other child qualities which have to be supported. The increase in interest for imagination in the world and in Europe between the Third and Fourth Wave of the survey can indicate larger compliance with the actual demands of educational reform for democratization of education and encouragement of creativity of the young. Stagnation of child imagination status in the opinion of Serbian respondents is understandable in the framework of social crisis which bappened at the time when the survey was conducted. The preference of imagination is positively correlated with respondents' postmaterialist orientation and educational level, but negatively with their age. The implications of findings for nurturing creativity in formative period are discussed. It is concluded that the school is invited to offer special programs to compensate for public opinion effects.
The conservative asymmetry of elite polarization represents a significant puzzle. We argue that politicians can maintain systematic misperceptions of constituency opinion that may contribute to breakdowns in dyadic representation. We demonstrate this argument with original surveys of 3,765 politicians' perceptions of constituency opinion on nine issues. In 2012 and 2014, state legislative politicians from both parties dramatically overestimated their constituents' support for conservative policies on these issues, a pattern consistent across methods, districts, and states. Republicans drive much of this overestimation. Exploiting responses from politicians in the same district, we confirm these partisan differences within individual districts. Further evidence suggests that this overestimation may arise due to biases in who contacts politicians, as in recent years Republican citizens have been especially likely to contact legislators, especially fellow Republicans. Our findings suggest that a novel force can operate in elections and in legislatures: Politicians can systematically misperceive what their constituents want.
Political scientists have spent decades providing explanations for political support of policy proposals. On the one hand, individuals appear to concern themselves with the personal risks or benefits of a project; on the other, their appraisals appear to be more ideologically based, ultimately aligning with one's party. While many argue this is a product of an unknowing and uninterested public, simply swaying one direction and then the other, this research promotes a different stance: perceived psychological distance helps to explain variation in political attitude formation, accounting for which considerations an individual will turn to in one instance and which they will rely on in another when developing their stance of communicating the issues.This dissertation asks how perceived psychological distance relates to energy perceptions and political communication. According to the Construal Level Theory (CLT) of psychological distance, from social psychology, evaluations and behaviors differ based on the extent to which something is perceived as psychologically "proximate" or "distant" (Trope & Liberman 2010). Psychological distance has yet to be applied to political attitudes and communication and yet its utility is intuitive — 1) politicians strategically communicate to make issues more "proximate" or "distant" and 2) political perceptions and actions likely vary depending on the extent to which they are viewed as "proximate" or "distant." To investigate this question, this research maps psychological distance onto energy politics across two domains, public opinion and communication.The first study relies on a survey of residents along the proposed Keystone XL route. Half of the respondents are asked about their attitudes toward Keystone XL (the proximate issue) and half are asked about their attitudes toward offshore oil drilling (the distant issue). Each of the respondents is given objective information about the issues, with half of the sample also receiving a pro-development frame emphasizing the benefits of the project. Results indicate that distance serves to moderate attitudes, with those asked about the proximate issue exhibiting a significant framing effect compared to those asked about the distant issue who were unmoved by the frame. The second study assesses the extent to which online communications reflect the expectations of CLT. Analysis of over a million tweets related to Keystone XL finds little difference between how those living more proximate to the issue frame it compared to those living further away. In general, both appear to prefer concrete frames related to jobs, local economy, spills and environmental risk. Similarly, manual coding from the Linguistic Category Model (LCM) suggests the abstractness of the tweets also do not vary due to distance. However, the expectations from CLT do appear to apply to retweets. In this case, individuals more proximate to the pipeline were more likely to retweet concrete tweets and those further from the pipeline more likely to retweet abstract tweets. This suggests the persuasiveness of a tweet varies by distance. The final study applies CLT to political advocacy groups, arguing they should recognize differences in persuasiveness due to the location of the target audience and adjust their strategies accordingly. I identified local and national advocacy groups in favor of or opposed to the pipeline and analyzed their Twitter communications as well as the effectiveness of these communications. According to the results, local and national groups rely on a mix of frames in order to appeal to a broad section of the U.S. public (those living closer or further from the pipeline). However, this is less so the case for the pro-Keystone XL groups, likely due to the fact that they have fewer resource constraints and are therefore not as reliant on broad public support. The study also finds that in general these frames tend to be more concrete than abstract, contrary to the expectations of CLT. At the same time, the public appears to prefer concrete frames, retweeting these more often than abstract frames. This work examines the relationship between physical proximity and public opinion in order to better understand some of the previously unexplained variation in environmental public opinion. Together, the studies suggest that distance matters to public opinion and political communication, but the relationship is highly context dependent. In the media effects setting, distance moderates framing effects. Similarly, when exposed to online communications from elites, members of the public are more or less persuaded by these based on their geographic proximity to the policy issue. However, this is not similarly reflected other communication settings, such as political advocacy group activities and within network online communications. Thus, other facets of the political environment appear to influence the role of distance in public opinion and political communication. The messiness of politics requires additional investigation into when distance helps us account for political variability.