Suchergebnisse

Aliments; Riscos emergents; Seguretat alimentària ; Food; Food safety; Food risk assessment ; Alimentos; Riesgos emergentes; Seguridad alimentaria ; Avaluació i autorització d'additius. Actualització ; Evaluación y autorización de aditivos. Actualización

Aliments; Riscos emergents; Seguretat alimentària; Food safety; Food risk assessment; Alimentos; Riesgos emergentes; Seguridad alimentaria ; Microorganismes indicadors de la higiene dels processos ; Microorganismos indicadores de la higiene de los procesos

Aliments; Riscos emergents; Seguretat alimentària; Food safety; Food risk assessment; Alimentos; Riesgos emergentes; Seguridad alimentaria ; Els antimicrobians ; Los antimicrobianos

Aliments; Riscos emergents; Seguretat alimentària; Food safety; Food risk assessment; Alimentos; Riesgos emergentes; Seguridad alimentaria ; Avaluació dels riscos acumulatius ; Evaluación de los riesgos acumulativos

Aliments; Riscos emergents; Seguretat alimentària; Food safety; Food risk assessment; Alimentos; Riesgos emergentes; Seguridad alimentaria ; Cronobacter spp. ; Cronobacter spp.

In a series of experiments conducted in Belgium (Wallonia and Flanders), France and the Netherlands, we compare behavior regarding tax evasion and welfare dodging, with and without information about others' behavior. Subjects have to decide between a "registered" income, the realization of which will be known to the tax authority for sure, and an "unregistered" income that will only be known with some probability. This unregistered income comes from self-employment in the Tax treatment and from black labor supplementing some unemployment compensation in the Welfare treatment. Subjects have then to decide on wether reporting their income or not, knowing the risk od detection. The results show that (i) individuals evade more in the Welfare treatment than in the Tax treatment ; (ii) many subjects choose and option that allows for tax evasion or welfare fraud but report their income honestly anyway ; (iii) examples of low compliance tend to increase tax evasion while examples of high compliance exert no influence ; (iv) tax evasion is more frequent in France and the Netherlands ; Wallons evade taxes less than Flemish. There is no cross-country difference in welfare dodging.

In a series of experiments conducted in Belgium (Wallonia and Flanders), France and the Netherlands, we compare behavior regarding tax evasion and welfare dodging, with and without information about others' behavior. Subjects have to decide between a "registered" income, the realization of which will be known to the tax authority for sure, and an "unregistered" income that will only be known with some probability. This unregistered income comes from self-employment in the Tax treatment and from black labor supplementing some unemployment compensation in the Welfare treatment. Subjects have then to decide on wether reporting their income or not, knowing the risk od detection. The results show that (i) individuals evade more in the Welfare treatment than in the Tax treatment ; (ii) many subjects choose and option that allows for tax evasion or welfare fraud but report their income honestly anyway ; (iii) examples of low compliance tend to increase tax evasion while examples of high compliance exert no influence ; (iv) tax evasion is more frequent in France and the Netherlands ; Wallons evade taxes less than Flemish. There is no cross-country difference in welfare dodging.

In a series of experiments conducted in Belgium (Wallonia and Flanders), France and the Netherlands, we compare behavior regarding tax evasion and welfare dodging, with and without information about others' behavior. Subjects have to decide between a "registered" income, the realization of which will be known to the tax authority for sure, and an "unregistered" income that will only be known with some probability. This unregistered income comes from self-employment in the Tax treatment and from black labor supplementing some unemployment compensation in the Welfare treatment. Subjects have then to decide on wether reporting their income or not, knowing the risk od detection. The results show that (i) individuals evade more in the Welfare treatment than in the Tax treatment ; (ii) many subjects choose and option that allows for tax evasion or welfare fraud but report their income honestly anyway ; (iii) examples of low compliance tend to increase tax evasion while examples of high compliance exert no influence ; (iv) tax evasion is more frequent in France and the Netherlands ; Wallons evade taxes less than Flemish. There is no cross-country difference in welfare dodging.

In a series of experiments conducted in Belgium (Wallonia and Flanders), France and the Netherlands, we compare behavior regarding tax evasion and welfare dodging, with and without information about others' behavior. Subjects have to decide between a "registered" income, the realization of which will be known to the tax authority for sure, and an "unregistered" income that will only be known with some probability. This unregistered income comes from self-employment in the Tax treatment and from black labor supplementing some unemployment compensation in the Welfare treatment. Subjects have then to decide on wether reporting their income or not, knowing the risk od detection. The results show that (i) individuals evade more in the Welfare treatment than in the Tax treatment ; (ii) many subjects choose and option that allows for tax evasion or welfare fraud but report their income honestly anyway ; (iii) examples of low compliance tend to increase tax evasion while examples of high compliance exert no influence ; (iv) tax evasion is more frequent in France and the Netherlands ; Wallons evade taxes less than Flemish. There is no cross-country difference in welfare dodging.

In a series of experiments conducted in Belgium (Wallonia and Flanders), France and the Netherlands, we compare behavior regarding tax evasion and welfare dodging, with and without information about others' behavior. Subjects have to decide between a "registered" income, the realization of which will be known to the tax authority for sure, and an "unregistered" income that will only be known with some probability. This unregistered income comes from self-employment in the Tax treatment and from black labor supplementing some unemployment compensation in the Welfare treatment. Subjects have then to decide on wether reporting their income or not, knowing the risk od detection. The results show that (i) individuals evade more in the Welfare treatment than in the Tax treatment ; (ii) many subjects choose and option that allows for tax evasion or welfare fraud but report their income honestly anyway ; (iii) examples of low compliance tend to increase tax evasion while examples of high compliance exert no influence ; (iv) tax evasion is more frequent in France and the Netherlands ; Wallons evade taxes less than Flemish. There is no cross-country difference in welfare dodging.

In a series of experiments conducted in Belgium (Wallonia and Flanders), France and the Netherlands, we compare behavior regarding tax evasion and welfare dodging, with and without information about others' behavior. Subjects have to decide between a "registered" income, the realization of which will be known to the tax authority for sure, and an "unregistered" income that will only be known with some probability. This unregistered income comes from self-employment in the Tax treatment and from black labor supplementing some unemployment compensation in the Welfare treatment. Subjects have then to decide on wether reporting their income or not, knowing the risk od detection. The results show that (i) individuals evade more in the Welfare treatment than in the Tax treatment ; (ii) many subjects choose and option that allows for tax evasion or welfare fraud but report their income honestly anyway ; (iii) examples of low compliance tend to increase tax evasion while examples of high compliance exert no influence ; (iv) tax evasion is more frequent in France and the Netherlands ; Wallons evade taxes less than Flemish. There is no cross-country difference in welfare dodging.

In a series of experiments conducted in Belgium (Wallonia and Flanders), France and the Netherlands, we compare behavior regarding tax evasion and welfare dodging, with and without information about others' behavior. Subjects have to decide between a "registered" income, the realization of which will be known to the tax authority for sure, and an "unregistered" income that will only be known with some probability. This unregistered income comes from self-employment in the Tax treatment and from black labor supplementing some unemployment compensation in the Welfare treatment. Subjects have then to decide on wether reporting their income or not, knowing the risk od detection. The results show that (i) individuals evade more in the Welfare treatment than in the Tax treatment ; (ii) many subjects choose and option that allows for tax evasion or welfare fraud but report their income honestly anyway ; (iii) examples of low compliance tend to increase tax evasion while examples of high compliance exert no influence ; (iv) tax evasion is more frequent in France and the Netherlands ; Wallons evade taxes less than Flemish. There is no cross-country difference in welfare dodging.

"Prostitution ist ein aktuell öffentlich vielfach aufgegriffenes Phänomen des Sozialen, bei dem die Körperlichkeit des Menschen in besonderer Weise im Zentrum steht, und das bis in die heutige Zeit ein ausgesprochen strittiges Thema geblieben ist. Trotz grundsätzlicher Legalität und zunehmend thematisierter 'Selbstverständlichkeit' stellt das prostitutive Geschehen bis heute gleichzeitig eine umstrittene, als 'anormal' bzw. 'amoralisch' geltende und weitgehend tabuisierte 'Grauzone' urbanen Lebens dar, die stets einer besonderen sozialen Kontrolle unterliegt. Feld-spezifische Kontrollmaßnahmen, die nicht nur von Ordnungsbehörden, sondern auch von einer breiten Öffentlichkeit und sogar von Teilen des Feldes selbst für sinnvoll bis zwingend notwendig erachtet werden, zielen dabei insbesondere auf eine Ausgrenzung des prostitutiven Geschehens aus dem sonstigen städtischen Lebensalltag. Über die räumliche Trennung der Prostitution vor allem von familiären und kirchlichen Lebensbereichen soll ein 'Schutz der Jugend und des öffentlichen Anstandes' gewährleistet werden. Aufbauend u.a. auf eine Feldstudie in Frankfurt/ M. kann verdeutlicht werden, dass soziale Kontrollformen der Prostitution, die von städtischer Seite als Reaktion auf ein soziales Problem eingesetzt werden, gleichzeitig einen aktiven Faktor der spezifischen 'Herstellung' des Phänomens darstellen und dabei eng verwoben sind mit der (Re)Produktion Körperorientierter sozialer Ordnungsmuster und insbesondere der Geschlechterordnung." (Autorenreferat)