Suchergebnisse

This paper investigates if multinationals in.uence the political process through lobbying more effectively than national firms. First, I introduce a model which contrasts a multinational's incentives for lobbying with those of a national firm. Then the effect of lobbying on the political decision is analyzed. I conclude that multinationals have smaller incentives to lobby because they have smaller stakes in national markets. But the effectiveness of lobbying by multinationals might be higher if the government cares much about production in the home country. The resulting regulation depends on the relative strength of these effects.

AbstractThis paper explores how urban bias in the host country affects the movement of multinational capital owned by multinational firms in the source country and the production in the invested sector. If the degree of urban bias in one of the urban sectors in the host country increases, then the amount of multinational capital flowing into the host country will increase, but the production in the invested sector will have different changes in different situations.