Openness as Platform Strategy - Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Crowdfunding
In: Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 18-05
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In: Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 18-05
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Working paper
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 14916
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In: CESifo Working Paper No. 8632
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Working paper
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Previous analyses of the formation and composition of community-based organizations (CBOs) have used cross section data. So, causal inference has been compromised. We obviate this problem by using data from a quasi-experiment in which villages were formed by government officials selecting and clustering households. Our findings are as follows: CBO co-memberships are more likely between geographically proximate households and less likely between early and late settlers, members of female-headed households are not excluded, in poorer villages CBO co-membership networks are denser and, while wealthier households may have been instrumental in setting up CBOs, poorer households engage shortly afterward.
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In: China Accounting & Finance Review, Band 25, Heft 1
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This paper exploits the collective pardon granted to individuals incarcerated in French prisons on the 14th of July, 1996 (Bastille Day) to identify the effect of collective sentence reductions on recidivism. The collective pardon generated a very significant discontinuity in the relationship between the number of weeks of sentence reduction granted to inmates and their prospective date of release. We show that the same discontinuity exists in the relationship between recidivism probability five years after the release and prospective date of release. Overall, the Bastille Day quasi experiment suggests that collective sentence reductions increase recidivism and do not represent a cost-effective way to reduce incarceration rates or prisons' overcrowding.
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Working paper
Not only in Switzerland, the trend in social welfare toward raising numbers of cases per social worker due to the growing need for public assistance and the coincident lack of political will to enhance the capacities of social welfare has led to a contra‑productive situation. The overload of cases and the limited resources of social services often result in to low levels of contact between social workers and their service users. To break this vicious circle in welfare services provision, the conditions to conduct a quasi‑experiment over two years have been established: the employment of three additional social workers over this period reduces the number of cases per social worker considerably and an evaluation examines this new setting by scientific means. A simple random sampling was done by lottery to assign three former social workers to the experimental group which has a maximal limit of 75 assigned cases per social worker. The rest of the social workers (N=18) form the control group. They work with among 130 cases per worker for a full time equivalent (FTE). The main question of the evaluation is about the impact of the caseload on the costs of social assistance. The evaluation is ongoing and the focus of this article is on the collaboration of researchers, social service and practitioners as well as decision‑makers.
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Using the unanticipated creation of a new agency in the French region of Lyon as a quasi-natural experiment, we question whether distance to local public employment agencies (LPEAs) is a new channel for spatial mismatch. Contrary to past evidence based on aggregated data and consistently with the spatial mismatch literature, we find no evidence of a worker/agency spatial mismatch, which pleads for a resizing of the French LPEA network. However, echoing with the literature on the institutional determinants of the local public employment agencies' efficiency, we do find detrimental institutional transitory effects.
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Using the unanticipated creation of a new agency in the French region of Lyon as a quasi-natural experiment, we question whether distance to local public employment agencies (LPEAs) is a new channel for spatial mismatch. Contrary to past evidence based on aggregated data and consistently with the spatial mismatch literature, we find no evidence of a worker/agency spatial mismatch, which pleads for a resizing of the French LPEA network. However, echoing with the literature on the institutional determinants of the local public employment agencies' efficiency, we do find detrimental institutional transitory effects.
BASE
Using the unanticipated creation of a new agency in the French region of Lyon as a quasi-natural experiment, we question whether distance to local public employment agencies (LPEAs) is a new channel for spatial mismatch. Contrary to past evidence based on aggregated data and consistently with the spatial mismatch literature, we find no evidence of a worker/agency spatial mismatch, which pleads for a resizing of the French LPEA network. However, echoing with the literature on the institutional determinants of the local public employment agencies' efficiency, we do find detrimental institutional transitory effects.
BASE
Using the unanticipated creation of a new agency in the French region of Lyon as a quasi-natural experiment, we question whether distance to local public employment agencies (LPEAs) is a new channel for spatial mismatch. Contrary to past evidence based on aggregated data and consistently with the spatial mismatch literature, we find no evidence of a worker/agency spatial mismatch, which pleads for a resizing of the French LPEA network. However, echoing with the literature on the institutional determinants of the local public employment agencies' efficiency, we do find detrimental institutional transitory effects.
BASE
Using the unanticipated creation of a new agency in the French region of Lyon as a quasi-natural experiment, we question whether distance to local public employment agencies (LPEAs) is a new channel for spatial mismatch. Contrary to past evidence based on aggregated data and consistently with the spatial mismatch literature, we find no evidence of a worker/agency spatial mismatch, which pleads for a resizing of the French LPEA network. However, echoing with the literature on the institutional determinants of the local public employment agencies' efficiency, we do find detrimental institutional transitory effects.
BASE