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The Kurdish-Iraqi conflict lies in the fact that Kurdistan is a nation-without-a-state and Iraq is a non-nation state, each possessing a nationhood project differing from and opposing the other. Iraqi-Kurdistan is an outward looking entity seeking external patronage. Though external patronage has played a pivotal role in the evolution of the Kurdish quasi-state, a lack of positive patronage has prevented it from achieving independence. This book looks at how the Kurdish and Iraqi quests for nationhood have led to the transformation of Iraqi Kurdistan into an unrecognised quasi-state, and the devolution of the Iraqi state into a recognised quasi-state. This is done by examining the protracted Iraqi-Kurdish conflict and by analysing the contradictions and incompatibilities between the two different nationalisms: Iraqi and Kurdish. The author explains that Kurds as a nation without a state have their own nationhood project which is in opposition to the Iraqi nationhood project. Each has its own identity, loyalty and sovereignty. The book answers the question as to how the Kurdish quest for nationhood has been treated by successive Iraqi regimes. Furthermore, it fills in the literary gaps which exist in relation to the Iraqi-Kurdish conflict by specifying and categorising the cardinal conditions that drive ethnic and nationalist conflicts which lead to the creation of separatist entities. Drawing upon a vast amount of untapped Kurdish and Arabic primary sources, the book draws on prominent theories on nation-states and quasi-states. It will particularly appeal to students and scholars of international relations, political theory and Middle Eastern Studies.

The study of quasi-states has been marred by an unfortunate terminological confusion. Sometimes, this term is taken to mean recognized states that fail to develop the necessary state structures to function as fully fledged, 'real' states. At other times, 'quasi-states' is a designation given to regions that secede from another state, gain de facto control over the territory they lay claim to, but fail to achieve international recognition. The author proposes that, in order to clear up this confusion, recognized but ineffectual states ought to be referred as 'failed states', while the term 'quasi-states' ought to be reserved for unrecognized, de facto states. Since quasi-states are not supported by international recognition, they must be sustained by something else. In contrast to researchers who maintain that the majority of these quasi-states are quite strong, this article argues that their modal tendency is weak economy and weak state structures. The main reasons why these states nevertheless have not collapsed seem to be that they have managed to build up internal support from the local population through propaganda and identity-building; channel a disproportionately large part of their meager resources into military defense; enjoy the support of a strong patron; and, in most cases, have seceded from a state that is itself very weak.

The study of quasi-states has been marred by an unfortunate terminological confusion. Sometimes, this term is taken to mean recognized states that fail to develop the necessary state structures to function as fully fledged, 'real' states. At other times, 'quasi-states' is a designation given to regions that secede from another state, gain de facto control over the territory they lay claim to, but fail to achieve international recognition. The author proposes that, in order to clear up this confusion, recognized but ineffectual states ought to be referred as 'failed states', while the term 'quasi-states' ought to be reserved for unrecognized, de facto states. Since quasi-states are not supported by international recognition, they must be sustained by something else. In contrast to researchers who maintain that the majority of these quasi-states are quite strong, this article argues that their modal tendency is weak economy & weak state structures. The main reasons why these states nevertheless have not collapsed seem to be that they have managed to build up internal support from the local population through propaganda & identity-building; channel a disproportionately large part of their meager resources into military defense; enjoy the support of a strong patron; &, in most cases, have seceded from a state that is itself very weak. References. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2006.]

The paths taken by historians and political scientists intersect less frequently than
their subject matter might indicate. Both sets of scholars, for example, have a mutual
interest in the formation and evolution of the modern state. However, while this
interest has made the 'Westphalian system' the common currency of exchanges
among political scientists, few historians refer to the concept, and some would not
recognize it—even at close range and in full sunlight. Practitioners of the two disciplines
often pass like ships in the night because they are unaware of another large
presence on a parallel course. In an age of intense specialization we readily become
separated, like Alfred Marshall's noncompeting wage groups, from a common body
of information. A more formally acceptable justification for discrete enquiries into
similar problems lies in the claim that the disciplines have different purposes. The
distinction is not, as is still so often said, that historians are interested in the unique
and social scientists in the general; it is rather that the analytical issues forming the
generalizations that necessarily accompany statements about large issues are of a
different order. Political scientists assign significance to the Westphalian system
mainly because they wish to generalize about the principles governing the international
regime of sovereign states after 1648. Historians, on the other hand, are less
interested in testing the merits of realism and its rivals than in charting changing
relativities in international relations. Accordingly, they are more likely to set the
Westphalian settlement in the context of already evolving state systems and of subsequent
changes of equal or greater moment, such as the upheavals caused by the
French and American revolutions.

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