Suchergebnisse

An eye-witness and researched account of the ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment (1977) by the Indiana General Assembly. It includes a foreword that updates action through 2018 on the Equal Rights Amendment; written in 1998. ; Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis Indiana

On 10 December 1976, the Swiss Government received an instrument of ratification of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 from the Republic of Bolivia and accordingly notified the Governments of the States parties to these conventions.

Officially known as the Federal Law on Ratification of the Treaty Between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Unofficial translation provided by the PIR Center, an NGO, in Moscow, Russia.

The September-October 1978 edition of the International Review of the Red Cross announced the coming into force, on 7 December 1978, of the Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, following the ratification by the Republic of Ghana and the accession of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

Over the past decade, William Riker has written a series of articles that reinterpret the founding of American politics in light of insights gleaned from theories of rational choice. In the course of these efforts, he has invented a new subject, "heresthetics," having "to do with the manipulation of the structure of tastes and alternatives within which decisions are made." With Evelyn C. Fink, for example, he has shown more systematically than previous analyses how the federalists structured the the ratification process by attaching an informal promise of future amendment to a formally unconditional ratification. In the present essay, Riker moves from heresthetics to rhetoric: "Rhetoric and heresthetic are both techniques of winning. But they are different kinds of techniques. Rhetoric is persuasion.… With heresthetic, on the other hand, conviction is at best secondary or not involved at all." Riker describes federalist and antifederalist ratification rhetoric in an effort to display the persuasiveness of "negative" campaign appeals for those who wish to attract the support of marginal voters.

Résumé Nous étudions une négociation à offres alternées visant à la ratification d'un accord international sur le changement climatique. Trois coalitions aux intérêts divergents sont considérées : la coalition des pays développés pro-régime menée par l'Union européenne, la coalition des pays développés anti-régime menée par les États-Unis et la coalition des pays en développement non inclus dans l'effort climatique, dite du Sud. Nous supposons que la coalition pro-régime est l'unique coalition qui souhaite la mise en application d'un accord international. Nous étudions alors les propositions (sous forme de concessions) qu'elle doit faire pour que l'accord soit unanimement ratifié. Dans notre modèle, chacune des coalitions peut ou non supporter une contrainte de ratification, ce qui nous permet de montrer que les concessions de la coalition pro-régime sont d'autant plus faibles qu'elle est la seule à supporter une forte contrainte de ratification. Nous montrons également que ces concessions sont d'autant plus importantes que l'une ou l'autre des coalitions adverses, voire les deux, supportent elles aussi de fortes contraintes de ratification ; la coalition pro-régime n'ayant en effet pas d'autre choix que de répondre aux exigences de ses partenaires.

On 16 September 2014, Indonesian lawmakers unanimously agreed to ratify the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (AATHP), becoming the last ASEAN member state to ratify. Eight of the 10 member states had ratified by 2006, and nine had ratified by 2010. Although the ratification bill reached the Indonesian Parliament during the 2000s, it was always disapproved. This article seeks to re-examine Indonesia's lengthy delay and address its long-awaited ratification. Accordingly, we build on Robert Putnam's theory of ratification from two-level game theory and develop a framework for analysing delayed ratifications. Although the negotiated AATHP was 'soft' and thus low-cost for domestic stakeholders, key domestic stakeholders had little appetite for ratification and limited substantive pressure came from neighbouring governments during the 2000s. However, in the context of heightened public concern and calls for government action and positive palm oil industry responses to international pressures, persistent international pressure and measures during the 2010s, particularly from Singapore, provided parliamentarians with enough incentive to symbolically ratify the agreement. Addressing Indonesia's delayed ratification is important in understanding ASEAN's ongoing struggle to combat transboundary haze pollution and offers a useful case study in the still-developing area of ratifications in the environmental regime formation literature. (Pac Rev/GIGA)

On June 13, 1952, with two senators on the floor, the Senate of the United States gave its advice and consent to the ratification of three treaties which thereby became a part of the supreme law of the land. One of the senators did not vote. The other voiced his "aye" while serving as presiding officer.The conventions approved by the voice vote of one senator were the Consular Convention with Ireland; a Protocol Supplementary to the said Convention; and the Consular Convention with the United Kingdom.Article II, Section 2 of the United States Constitution provides that the President shall have power "to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur…." Even though, under Article I, Section 5, Clause 2, "Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, …" how, as a matter of law, was it possible for the Senate, with but two senators on the floor, one of whom did not vote and the other of whom was in the chair, to give its advice and consent to a treaty? And as a matter of policy was the Senate in this case properly discharging its responsibilities?

Three sets of assumptions about elite and constituent relations prevail in approaches to conflict termination. The `Interest-based', `Identity-based', and `Timing' approaches offer important insights into conflict termination processes but differ in how they conceive of the locus and direction of domestic political power during conflict termination. Despite such important differences, these contending approaches have not been tested comparatively. In this paper, I introduce the Dynamic Group approach and test it against these current approaches. The Dynamic Group approach differs from these others in that it is grounded in the two-level perspective on negotiation. The Dynamic Group approach treats the domestic locus and direction of power as variable (1) across cases and (2) across conflict stages within a given case. Accommodating such variation introduces the concept of domestic ratification as an important determinant of the success or failure of conflict settlement attempts. The Dynamic Group approach offers greater generalizability than the current approaches. Specifically, I demonstrate (1) that whereas these three contending approaches apply only to cases in which elite's and constituent's interests are consonant, the Dynamic Group approach covers cases of elite and constituent interest dissonance, and (2) that whereas the three approaches apply to no more than two stages of conflict termination, the Dynamic Group approach comprehends differential effects of four distinct stages. I demonstrate that the Dynamic Group approach best accounts for conflict-stage effects in the 1973 and 1985 attempts to settle the Northern Ireland conflict.

This article deals with the intricate ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty, while focusing on the thorny issues of Euroscepticism and democratic deficit within the European Union in the current institutional context. The study is based on a wide research endeavour, whose purpose has been to encompass multiple points of view on the future of the European Union, seen from the perspective of the Treaty of Lisbon and its reception in all member states. These viewpoints include the ones found in the speciality literature, as well as in the press that published representative articles during the debates on the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. Useful attempts are made in order to classify the member states of the EU according to various relevant criteria in their attitude germane to the ratification of the Treaty, so as to outline new waves of Euroscepticism, opt-outs and criticism. Apart from an institutional and a legal perspective, this study presents a large number of political, national and even cultural aspects encountered in attitudes and courses of action pertaining to the future of European Construction, seen through the eyes of the reform process carried out by the latest EU major legal document.