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The particular pattern the bureaucratic development in Turkey has evinced suggests that legal rationality is a prerequisite for the successful institutionalization of rational productivity. Whereas there is a zero-sum type of relationship between patrimonialism on one hand and legal rationality and rational productivity on the other, there is a positive-sum type of relationship between legal rationality and rational productivity.

"Weberian Bureaucracy" published on by Oxford University Press.

"Rational Choice Perspectives on Bureaucracy" published on by Oxford University Press.

Max Weber's and Franz Kafka's respective understandings of bureaucracy are as different as night and day. Yet, Kafka's novel The Castle is best read with Max Weber at hand. In fact, Kafka relates systematically to all the dimensions in Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy and give us a much-contemplated parody, almost a counter-punctual ideal type, based on four key observations: bureaucratic excesses unfold in time and space; a "no error" ideology generates inescapable dilemmas; inscrutability is a life condition in bureaucracy; civil servants end up walking on the spot, just like the figures in Escher's painting: Ascending and Descending. Nevertheless, Weber and Kafka can both be right. While Kafka looks at the bureaucratic phenomenon through persons who are marginalized, Weber's perspective is historic-comparative and top-down. Are the observations of the one more correct than the other? The question is meaningless. As two opposite poles, Weber and Kafka "magnetize" each other. Adapted from the source document.

The essence and contents of the concepts «bureaucracy» and «bureaucratism» in do-mestic and foreign science are researched. Generalized definitions of these concepts from a position of public administration are proposed. It is proved that the bureaucracy is a necessary condition for the existence of public administration, without that it cannot perform its functions. As for the bureaucratism, it is negative and even destructive phe-nomenon, that destroys laws and social rules, limits public participation in making public and administrative decisions, slows reforms in the country. The reasons of the bureau-cratism's appearance in the system of public administration are analyzed, namely: the low professional and moral level of civil servants, the excessive politicization of public and administrative apparatus, the insufficient development of civil society institutions, including independent media, and the general low level of public consciousness and activ-ity. It was demonstrated that the objective gap between the Max Weber's bureaucracy ideal model and real public administration system is always a place for the signs of bu-reaucratism, such as formalism, individualism, automatism, that reduce the public ad-ministration effectiveness. Therefore the de-bureaucratization ways finding should not behave to full eradication of bureaucratism's phenomenon that is a priori impossible, and to creating the conditions that makes it impossible the bureaucratism's most threatening for the society forms - careerism, protectionism, bribery. The ways to bureaucratism's overcoming, in particular through the institutionalization of civil society, the system au-diting of public activities and the implementation of market processes in public adminis-tration, are suggested. The complex of these measures will contribute to rationalization and de-bureaucratization of public administration activity. ; Исследована сущность и содержание понятий «бюрократия» и «бюрократизм» в отечественной и зарубежной науке. Предложены обобщенные ...

This book describes how rationality undermines bureaucracy's ability to solve problems or to gain the confidence of the general public. The author suggests ways to change the bureaucratic environment into one that appreciates the creative abilities of all its members, without the false premise of operating government like a business

William Niskanen's theory of Bureaucracy and Representative Government predicts that the interaction of rational vote‐maximizing politicians and rational budget‐maximizing bureaucrats will lead to an oversupply of bureaucratic goods and services. The demand, supply and motivational components of this model are all shown to be flawed; and the oversupply conclusion therefore fails to follow. A revised model constructed from the elements that can be salvaged from this critique suggests that rational mission‐committed politicians and bureaucrats join in a policy‐making oligopoly, run internally on the basis of trust and externally on the manipulation of information. This leads to a skewing (rather than a simple oversupply) of bureaucratic goods and services. Some evidence suggests that this model fits British as well as American policy‐making.

A review essay on a book by James Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard U Press, 1990 [see IRPS No. 63/92c01569; also see listing in IRPS No. 88]). Coleman attempts to reconcile rational choice theory with classical sociological concerns: the relationship between the individual & society, & the historical & normative status of rationality. He identifies limits to the rational choice model & suggests some promising but ultimately unconvincing ways around them. His project does, however, offer an important critique of Max Weber's theory of bureaucracy, which is of value in analyzing relationships between corporate actors & particular persons. 28 References. Adapted from the source document.