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AbstractHobbes conception of reason as computation or reckoning is significantly different in Part I of De Corpore (entitled Computatio sive Logica) from what I take to be the later treatment in Leviathan. In the late actual computation with words starts with making an affirmation, framing a proposition. Reckoning then has to do with the consequences of propositions, or how they connect the facts, states of affairs or actions which they refer tor account. Starting from this it can be made clear how Hobbes understood the crucial application of this conception to natural law, identified as 'right reason'.

Liberal regimes in the West are not homogeneous in their application of secular principles. What kind of “secular” state a particular government promotes depends in large part on the strength and influence of the majority religion in that region. This article acknowledges the heuristic value of a recent threefold taxonomy of secularism: passive, assertive, and benevolent forms of secularism. I take issue with and challenge certain institutional privileges granted to the majority religion in one benevolently secular regime, the Republic of Ireland. I consider how benevolent secularism, while remaining benevolent toward religion, can align its application of secularism in the arena of publicly-funded education (primary and secondary education). A politically liberal regime, defined by the idea of public reason, invokes the principle of publicity, namely, that discourse and public policy be intelligible (and acceptable to a large degree) not only to an individual’s religious or moral community but also to the broader collection of members who constitute a liberal state. Drawing on John Rawls’ conception of public reason, and using Ireland as a case study, I show how this particular state-religion interrelation can be recalibrated in order to increase the prospects of reconciliation with a secular space of public reason.

Reason has co-opted our conception of autonomy. My purpose is to set
autonomy free. Here is the problem: some philosophers, Kant most notably,
have said that governing your life by reason or by being responsive
to reason is the source of autonomy. But there is a paradox concealed
in these plausible claims. On the one hand, a person can be enslaved
to reason and lack autonomy because of this kind of bondage. On the
other hand, if reason has no influence, then it appears that one would
be the slave of one's passions, and, however eloquently Hume might
have written about reason being the slave of the passions, there is
something odd about the idea that a person who is enslaved by his passions
is autonomous. The paradox, which I shall call the paradox of
reason, is that if we are governed by reason in what we choose,
then we are in bondage to reason in what we choose, and we are not
autonomous. Yet, if we are not governed by reason, then we do not govern
ourselves in what we choose, and again we are not autonomous.

Our actions are informed by the consideration of reasons; reasons which constructivism suggests are not simply discovered, but made by us. This book examines this view, elaborating its basic idea into a fully-fledged account of practical reasons, making its theoretical commitments explicit, and defending it against well-known objections.

Modern philosophy has been vexed by the question "Why should I be moral?" and by doubts about the rational authority of moral virtue. In Reasons without Rationalism, Kieran Setiya shows that these doubts rest on a mistake. The "should" of practical reason cannot be understood apart from the virtues of character, including such moral virtues as justice and benevolence, and the considerations to which the virtues make one sensitive thereby count as reasons to act. Proposing a new framework for debates about practical reason, Setiya argues that the only alternative to this "virtue theory" is a

What is the nature of the a priori? Can we really rely on our own cognitive architecture in distilling the nature of moral-practical motivation? What role does cognitive science play in adding to the solutions of traditional philosophical problems, about which debate has raged for centuries? In Reason and Counterpoint, Marc Lamparello tackles these and scores of other exciting questions in contemporary Analytic philosophy in a sharp, incisive, and engaging manner. Presented in the form of aphorisms and paragraph-length insights, Reason and Counterpoint offers ambitious and highly creative answers to some of the most vexing philosophical questions, while also using skepticism to question some of the most basic assumptions at the heart of philosophical method and inquiry. Suitable for both the professional philosopher and layperson alike, Reason and Counterpoint will take the reader on a journey surveying major areas of philosophical discourse, leading to a richer and deeper understanding of some of the central questions of any thinking person

Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Preface -- 1 The paradox of trust -- Truth, virtue and happiness -- The problem of trust -- The Enlightenment Trail -- Promises, promises: nature's paradoxicaltask -- 2 The perils of prudence -- Plan of the book -- Fear -- Sympathy -- 3 The centipede's sting -- Three views about moral psychology -- Centipedes and backward induction -- Conclusion: prudence in peril -- 4 A remedy in the judgement and understanding? -- Perils of strategic choice -- Impartiality and fairness -- 5 Fairness and morality -- Playing fair with Kant -- Contractarians -- Morality in trust -- 6 All in the game -- Prelude: Enlightenment football -- The games of sociallife -- Reason and obligation -- 7 The bond of society -- Problems of coordination -- Trust in miniature: teamwork -- 8 Trust in the light of reason -- Reciprocity -- 'A remarkable change in man' -- The moral andpolitical sciences -- Citizens of the world? -- Bibliography -- Index

This book shows how public reason is both central and useful for thinking about legitimacy in constitutional law and theory. It helps academics to understand many important doctrines in constitutional adjudication of some leading constitutional courts around the world and in the supranational sphere.

Our responsibilities for democracy are sharper, more demanding than at any time since my childhood. If we are to renew democracy and secure knowledge, policy schools, as Helmut Anheier insists, must advance democratic policy reason with clarity, dedication, and purpose.