Suchergebnisse

Geistesgeschichtlich ist die große Vergangenheit des lateinischen Aristotelismus immer noch unbewältigt. Die vorliegende Teiledition eines Cursus philosophicus von 1653/55 [Ms. BU Salamanca 1351-52] dokumentiert den regen Schulbetrieb zu Lockes Zeit. Etwas 'metaphysische' zu betrachten, das hieß im Suarezismus, es gerade unter Bezug auf unser Denken zu betrachten: quoad nostros conceptus (Arriaga). In diesem erkenntnistheoretischen Sinn 'metaphysische' Abhandlungen sind hier zusammengestellt. Hauptfrage: Hat das Urteil schon diesseits des Wahrheitsbezugs einen eigenen Gegenstandsbezug? Die Psychologie des Urteils erscheint systematisch verknüpft mit der Ontologie des Irrealen (ens rationis ratiocinantis). Der Autor González de Santalla, sonst immer nur der Märtyrer der Gesinnungsethik, wird als Scholastiker vorgestellt. Die intellektuelle Biographie dieses Jesuiten konzentriert sich auf seine philosophiepolitische Aktivität: Ab 1687 war er der Chef jenes globalen Bildungskonzerns, der damals über sechshundert Schulen und Hochschulen unterhielt. Hundert Jahre später war diese Institution, die Societas Jesu, vom Erdboden verschwunden.Interessenten: Philosophen, Mediävisten, Romanisten, Theologen, Kulturhistoriker In order to trace Psychologism, particularly the 18th-century' perception theory of judgment' (G. Nuchelmans), a case is made for a fair appreciation of the Aristotelian school philosophy during Locke's life time. From a hitherto unknown Jesuit Cursus Philosophicus of 1653/55, a substantial portion of its disputations on Logic, Psychology and Metaphysics is edited. A remarkable refutation of Suárez's classical account of the beings of reason reveals the systematic connection between any theory of judgment and the ideas on how to make sense of the chimaeras. This time, González de Santalla, otherwise famous for his firm stand against ethical Probabilism, is presented as an epistemologist. His intellectual biography focuses on the schoolman and on a future Jesuit General's (1687-1703) educational policy, who tried to keep the standards of school philosophy.Readers: Scholars interested in mediaeval and modern philosophy, in the history of higher education, and hispanists.

Konstantinos Katsoudas, "A Dictatorship that is not a Dictatorship". Spanish Nationalists and the 4th of August The Spanish Civil War convulsed the international public opinion and prompted most foreign governments to take measures or even intervene in the conflict. Greek entanglement either in the form of smuggling war materiel or the participation of Greek volunteers in the International Brigades has already been investigated. However, little is known about a second dimension of this internationalization of the war: the peculiar forms that the antagonism between the two belligerent camps in foreign countries took. This paper, based mainly on Spanish archival sources, discusses some aspects of the activity developed in Greece by Franco's nationalists and the way Francoist diplomats and emissaries perceived the nature of an apparently similar regime, such as the dictatorship led by general Metaxas. The main objectives of the Francoist foreign policy were to avoid any escalation of the Spanish civil war into a world conflict, to secure international assistance for the right-wing forces and to undermine the legitimacy of the legal Republican government. In Greece, an informal diplomatic civil war broke out since Francoists occupied the Spanish Legation in Athens and Republicans took over the Consulate in Thessaloniki. The Francoists combined public and undercover activity: they worked hard to achieve an official recognition of their Estado Nuevo, while at the same time created rings of espionage and channels of anticommunist propaganda. The reason of their partial breakthroughs was that, contrary to their Republican enemies, the Nationalists enjoyed support by a significant part of the Greek political world, which was ideologically identified with their struggle. Francoist anti-communism had some interesting implications for Greek politics. An important issue was the Francoist effort to reveal a supposed Moscow-based conspiracy against Spain and Greece, both considered as hotbeds of revolution in the Mediterranean, in order to justify both Franco's extermination campaign and Metaxas' coup. Although this effort was based on fraudulent documents, forged by an anti-Bolshevik international organization, it became the cornerstone of Francoist and Metaxist propaganda. General Metaxas was the only European dictator to invoke the Spanish Civil War as a raison d'etre of his regime and often warned against the repetition of Spanish-like drama on Greek soil. Nevertheless he did not approve of Franco's methods and preferred Dr. Salazar's Portugal as an institutional model closer to his vision. For Spanish nationalist observers this was a sign of weakness. They interpreted events in Greece through the disfiguring mirror of their own historic experience: thus, although they never called in question Metaxas' authoritarian motives, the 4th of August regime was considered too mild and soft compared to Francoism (whose combativeness and fanaticism, as they suggested, the Greek General should have imitated); it reminded them the dictatorship founded in Spain by General Primo de Rivera in 1920s, whose inadequacy paved the way for the advent of the Republic and the emergence of sociopolitical radicalism. Incidents of the following years, as Greece moved towards a civil confrontation, seemed to strengthen their views. ; Konstantinos Katsoudas, "A Dictatorship that is not a Dictatorship". Spanish Nationalists and the 4th of AugustThe Spanish Civil War convulsed the international public opinion and prompted most foreign governments to take measures or even intervene in the conflict. Greek entanglement either in the form of smuggling war materiel or the participation of Greek volunteers in the International Brigades has already been investigated. However, little is known about a second dimension of this internationalization of the war: the peculiar forms that the antagonism between the two belligerent camps in foreign countries took. This paper, based mainly on Spanish archival sources, discusses some aspects of the activity developed in Greece by Franco's nationalists and the way Francoist diplomats and emissaries perceived the nature of an apparently similar regime, such as the dictatorship led by general Metaxas. The main objectives of the Francoist foreign policy were to avoid any escalation of the Spanish civil war into a world conflict, to secure international assistance for the right-wing forces and to undermine the legitimacy of the legal Republican government. In Greece, an informal diplomatic civil war broke out since Francoists occupied the Spanish Legation in Athens and Republicans took over the Consulate in Thessaloniki. The Francoists combined public and undercover activity: they worked hard to achieve an official recognition of their Estado Nuevo, while at the same time created rings of espionage and channels of anticommunist propaganda. The reason of their partial breakthroughs was that, contrary to their Republican enemies, the Nationalists enjoyed support by a significant part of the Greek political world, which was ideologically identified with their struggle. Francoist anti-communism had some interesting implications for Greek politics. An important issue was the Francoist effort to reveal a supposed Moscow-based conspiracy against Spain and Greece, both considered as hotbeds of revolution in the Mediterranean, in order to justify both Franco's extermination campaign and Metaxas' coup. Although this effort was based on fraudulent documents, forged by an anti-Bolshevik international organization, it became the cornerstone of Francoist and Metaxist propaganda. General Metaxas was the only European dictator to invoke the Spanish Civil War as a raison d'etre of his regime and often warned against the repetition of Spanish-like drama on Greek soil. Nevertheless he did not approve of Franco's methods and preferred Dr. Salazar's Portugal as an institutional model closer to his vision. For Spanish nationalist observers this was a sign of weakness. They interpreted events in Greece through the disfiguring mirror of their own historic experience: thus, although they never called in question Metaxas' authoritarian motives, the 4th of August regime was considered too mild and soft compared to Francoism (whose combativeness and fanaticism, as they suggested, the Greek General should have imitated); it reminded them the dictatorship founded in Spain by General Primo de Rivera in 1920s, whose inadequacy paved the way for the advent of the Republic and the emergence of sociopolitical radicalism. Incidents of the following years, as Greece moved towards a civil confrontation, seemed to strengthen their views.