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This thesis has two aims. The first one is to discuss the nature of normative reasons and to investigate which account of them would be compatible with a broadly naturalistic world view. The second aim is to show how a naturalistically constrained account of normative reasons and rationality can be fruitfully applied to some practical contexts that involve interfacing normative constraints and empirical data. The structure of the thesis is the following: in the first chapter, I introduce the concept of a normative reason. Following the literature, I distinguish between object-based and subject-based theories of normative reasons and discuss their attractions and disadvantages. In the second chapter, I defend one type of subject-based theory, the response-dependentist view of normative reasons. In the third chapter, I argue that subject-based theories of reasons receive support from evolutionary and naturalistic considerations. Moreover, I argue, on the basis of evolutionary considerations, that the object-based theories of reasons face serious difficulties, and therefore that we should adopt an attitude-dependent conception of normative reasons. In the fourth chapter, I further develop a positive account of one type of subject-based theory of normative reasons. I develop a naturalistically based account of reasons that is able to account for an important distinction between hypothetical and categorical reasons. Finally, in the fifth chapter I apply the developed framework to the case of psychopathy in order to discuss the question whether some recent neuropsychological studies show that psychopaths are irrational in their decision-making processes and behavior. I argue that current neuropsychological data do not warrant the conclusion that psychopaths are on average more irrational than other non-psychopathic individuals. ; Normativnost se pojavljuje kao neophodan uvjet u našim promišljanjima i djelovanju. Normativni pojmovi ne obilježavaju samo našu svakodnevicu, oni su isto tako sveprisutni u filozofiji, humanističkim te društvenim znanostima općenito. Kako bi govor o normativnosti imao smisla obično se pretpostavlja postojanje nekih standarda, normi ili općenitije činjenica o trebanju pomoću kojih mjerimo i ocjenjujemo ispravnost vjerovanja, ponašanja i emocionalnih reakcija ili čak druge normativne standarde. Neki autori tvrde da je relevantan smisao rečenice da nešto treba biti slučaj ili da se nešto treba vjerovati onaj u kojem tvrdnje o trebanju povlače iskaz da postoji odlučujući razlog (eng. decisive reason) da se to nešto učini ili vjeruje. Drugi autori tvrde da se bazični etički pojmovi mogu objasniti u terminima principa koje bi razložne osobe imale razloga prihvatiti ili odbaciti. Nadalje, neki autori tvrde da, pozivajući se na razloge, možemo objasniti na koji način naša volja može biti slobodna te pružiti plauzibilno objašnjenje pojma moralne odgovornosti. Dakle, jasno je da normativni razlozi zauzimaju vrlo značajno mjesto u suvremenim raspravama u etici, metaetici, političkoj filozofiji te filozofiji društvenih znanosti. S obzirom na posebnu ulogu koju bi pojam razloga trebao igrati u našim filozofskim i svakodnevnim razmišljanjima, naš je filozofski zadatak pružiti zadovoljavajuće objašnjenje tog pojma. U slučaju normativnih razloga, problem je još istaknutiji s obzirom na to koju fundamentalnu ulogu bi trebali imati normativni razlozi. Nadalje, neki utjecajni normativisti tvrde da kako bi nešto bio razlog, mora postojati neka činjenica koja ima svojstvo ići u prilog (eng. count in favor of) te stvari za koju postoji afirmativni razlog. Isto tako se tvrdi da se svojstvo ići u prilog nečemu ne može svesti na nijednu drugu činjenicu (barem ne na ne-normativne činjenice) ili objasniti u naturalističkim terminima, tj. u terminima koji se koriste u znanostima, poput biologije, psihologije ili u kognitivnim znanostima općenito. Međutim, ako su razlozi fundamentalni za naše normativno promišljanje tada bi bila poželjna ona teorija razloga koja bi mogla objasniti na koji se način normativni razlozi uklapaju u svijet koji spoznajemo putem različitih prirodnih i društvenih znanosti. Pisanje ove disertacije ima dva cilja. Prvi i osnovni cilj je raspraviti na koji način bi se mogla razviti teorija normativnih razloga koja će biti kompatibilna s naturalističkom slikom svijeta. Pod naturalističkom slikom svijeta mislim na objašnjenja prirodnog svijeta koje možemo pronaći u trenutno prihvaćenim znanstvenim teorijama. Drugi cilj ove disertacije je pokazati kako se određena, naturalistički omeđena teorija normativnih razloga može na zanimljiv način primijeniti u praktičnim kontekstima. Struktura disertacije je sljedeća. U prvom poglavlju uvodim pojam normativnog razloga te ga definiram u kontrastu s pojmom motivacijskog razloga. Razlikujem dvije teorije razloga; teorije normativnih razloga koje su usmjerene na predmet i one koje su usmjerene na djelatnika (eng. object and subject based theories of normative reasons). U tom kontekstu, raspravljam o tome koje su pozitivne i negativne strane tih teorija. U drugom poglavlju branim jednu vrstu teorije razloga koja je usmjerena na djelatnike. Posebice se usmjeravam na davanje odgovora na prigovor da ova vrsta teorija nema utemeljenje u svakodnevnome razmišljanju o normativnim razlozima. U trećem poglavlju, oslanjajući se na evolucijska i naturalistička razmatranja, branim tvrdnju da teorije usmjerene na djelatnike pružaju plauzibilnije objašnjenje razloga nego teorije usmjerene na predmet. Argumentiram da se teorije razloga koje su usmjerene na predmet suočavaju s ozbiljnim poteškoćama te stoga trebamo prihvatiti neku koncepciju normativnih razloga prema kojoj su razlozi ontološki ovisni o umu ili stavovima racionalnih djelatnika. U četvrtom poglavlju razvijam jednu vrstu teorije normativnih razloga koja je usmjerena na racionalne djelatnike. U tom pogledu razvijam teoriju normativnih razloga koja je kompatibilna s naturalističkom perspektivom te je u mogućnosti objasniti važnu razliku između hipotetičkih i kategoričkih razloga. Konačno, u petom poglavlju primjenjujem teoriju razloga i racionalnosti koju sam razvio u prijašnjim poglavljima na slučaj psihopatije kako bih razmotrio pokazuju li trenutno dostupna neuropsihološka istraživanja da je proces odlučivanja kod psihopata iracionalan. U tom pogledu, argumentiram kako trenutačno dostupni neuropsihološki podaci ne opravdavaju zaključak da su psihopati iracionalniji od ostalih ljudi.

In this thesis I elaborate on three reasons why religious exemptions from generally applicable laws are not publicly justifiable in a liberal democratic society. First, mere claims of the form "God says so and my conscience requires that I obey" do not explicate the rationale behind the legal provisions that they are expected to support. Therefore, such claims cannot be regarded even as pro tanto justificatory reasons for any legal provisions, be it laws or exemptions. Second, no matter how elaborate they are, reasons based on religious faith cannot be allowed in public justification of exemptions because such reasons involve non-negotiable claims about final values, which is incompatible with respect for fellow citizens as equal co-legislators. Third, even if religious arguments are allowed in public justification, carving out religious exemptions from generally applicable laws is still impermissible because it arbitrarily bends the sovereign will of the people to the dictate of religious doctrines. ; En esta tesis explico tres razones por las cuales las exenciones religiosas de las leyes de aplicación general no son públicamente justificables en una sociedad democrática liberal. Primero, las meras afirmaciones de la forma "Dios lo dice y mi conciencia requiere que obedezco" no explican las razones detrás de las disposiciones legales que se espera que respalden. Por lo tanto, tales reclamos no pueden considerarse incluso como razones justificativas pro tanto de ninguna disposición legal, ya sean leyes o exenciones. En segundo lugar, no importa cuán elaborados sean, las razones basadas en la fe religiosa no pueden admitirse en la justificación pública de las exenciones porque tales motivos implican reclamos no negociables sobre los valores finales, lo que es incompatible con el respeto de los conciudadanos como colegisladores iguales. En tercer lugar, incluso si los argumentos religiosos son permitidos en la justificación pública, dar las exenciones religiosas de las leyes de aplicación general sigue siendo ...

Part 1: IT Policy ; International audience ; In 1959 Datacentralen was created by the State and local governments to provide IT services to the government and to regional authorities. Similar centralized IT service centers were created in other parts of society, where Danish Agriculture created LEC, Landbrugets Edb-Central. The municipal governments created one big IT center, Kommunedata, by merging many small local IT centers. For several years Datacentralen was the only supplier of IT to central government and administration. But through the 1980s the development of minicomputers and powerful PCs led to new kinds of decentralized IT systems and IT services. Economic conditions also forced the government to reconsider the role of Datacentralen and of the whole use of IT in Denmark. Gradually this led to the privatization of Datacentralen and other IT services. Quite similar developments took place in other Nordic countries.

45 [i.e. 55] p. ; Caption title. ; Place and date of publication from Wing. ; Errata: p. 45 [i.e. 55]. ; Reproduction of original in Union Theological Seminary Library, New York. ; Marginal notes.

This paper considers the micro- and macro-economic benefits and costs of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) and some implications of implementing new international accounting standards IFRIC 12. If public sector financial costs are forced to move 'on balance sheet' then there are likely to be impacts on the use in PPPs by governments and other public bodies. This may move the basis of PPP choice towards a more 'level playing field' with other financing sources, potentially give a more realistic measure of future public commitments and liabilities and reduce incentives to use PPPs for budget enlargement. There may be a refocusing upon the potential efficiency gains of PPPs and potentially a reduction in their use, depending upon the exact interpretations of the standards and other factors

The aim article is to develop a non-identarian critique of reason. The point of departure of the argument is a view that uniqueness of the Cartesian project lies not in privileging the principle of reason, but in privileging the subjective reason. The argument is developed by arguing that the preconditions of possibility of subjective reason are expressed in the logic of identity. Yet because of this the idea of reason becomes an ideology of reason: the philosophical principles of rationality turn into preconditions of ethical and political action. The author claims that because of interrelation between the philosophical idea reason and the institutions and structures of power, a critique of the idea of reason is necessary. Such a critique is developed in two directions: first, reason encompasses an irrational moment in its definition; second, irrationality itself is a notion of reason. ; Racionalumo diskurso recepcija ir kritika yra sietina su Descartes'o filosofija. Būtent Descartes'as savo "Metafiziniuose apmąstymuose" suformuluoja pamatinius racionalumo filosofijos principus: abejonę, kaip mąstymo metodą; racionalaus ir sau tapataus ego egzistavimą; mąstymo aiškumą ir ryškumą grindžiantį tapatybės dėsnį. Karteziškojo projekto unikalumą sudaro ne tai, jog privilegijuojamas proto principas, bet tai, jog privilegijuojamas subjektyvus protas. Viena esminių subjektyvaus proto ypatybių yra ta, jog jis gali apsibrėžti ir sėkmingai funkcionuoti tik tuo atveju, jei yra vienintelis, t.y. jei iš mąstomybės srities yra iš anksto pašalinamas kitybės momentas. Subjektyvaus proto funkcionavimas remiasi tapatybės logika: kiekvienu mąstymo aktu protas vis iš naujo susitapatina su savimi ir taip save prezentuoja, o tai, kas protui yra netapatu, atmetama kaip neracionalus likutis. Tokiu būdu proto idėja virsta proto ideologija: racionalumo maksimos grindžia ne tik teorinį diskursą, bet tampa praktinio - etinio ir politinio - veiksmo sąlyga bei galimybe. Racionalumo filosofija nėra neutrali: ji apima ne tik žinojimo, bet ir galios sritį, ji veikia per racionalumo principui atstovaujantčias institucijas bei struktūras. Būtent šis galios momentas, glūdintis racionalumo diskurso šerdyje, įgalioja mus nuodugniau apsvarstyti racionalumo filosofijos prielaidas, t.y. pritaikyti abejonės judesį tam dalykui, kurio legitimacija laikoma neabejotina. Rodosi įdomu, kodėl Descartes'as, suabejojęs viskuo, niekuomet nebandė kvestionuoti paties proto. Remiantis tapatybės logika iš esmės tai neįmanoma padaryti, nes tapatybės logika pašalina kito požiūrio, kitos pozicijos galimybę. Todėl savo tekstu sieksime "susilpninti" tapatybės logiką ir parodyti, jog, viena vertus, pačiame proto apibrėžime glūdi iracionalumo momentas, kita vertus, tai, kas laikoma iracionalumu, yra sukonstruota ir apibrėžta paties proto.

The paper focuses on Cornelius Castoriadis and Henri Lefebvre's approaches and sheds light on "the imaginary" in the politics of self-governance. It shows how tactics of self-governance and the imagi-nary accompanying them revive all the contradictions between the State reason, on the one hand, and human reason and freedom, on the other hand. Castoriadis, in The Imaginary Institution of Soci-ety, emphasizes the internal relation between what is intended (the development of autonomy) and that through which it is intended (the exercise of this autonomy). He notes that these are two mo-ments of a single process and defines as revolutionary politics "a praxis which takes as its object the organization and orientation of society as they foster the autonomy of all its members and which rec-ognizes that this presupposes a radical transformation of society, which will be possible, in its turn, only through the autonomous activity of individuals." My paper treats the following questions: How might a politics like this exist? On what could it be based and what would its implications be for the tactics of formation of urban design tools? Henri Lefebvre, in "Theoretical Problems of Autogestion", underscores the fact that autogestion intro-duces and stimulates a contradiction with the State. Autogestion, according to Lefebvre, calls into question the State's functioning as a constraining force erected above society as a whole, capturing and demanding the rationality that is inherent to social relations and practice. Lefebvre also considers that autogestion tends to resolve contradictions by subletting them into a new totality. In parallel, he wonders whether the principle of autogestion is an ideal whose rational core and content is ultimately derived from the democratic ideal. My paper will revisit this question, juxtaposing it to the following question raised by Castoriadis, in The Imaginary Institution of Society: does the critique of rationalism not exclude the possibility of establishing a destructive and constructive 'revolutionary dynamics'? Despite Lefebvre's claim that autogestion cannot be a utopia, he refers to Henri Desroche's notion of "occupia", which is used to define a genre of socializing related to practical utopia. He claims that au-togestion "shows the practical way to change life". My aim is to present how this "practical way to change life" in Lefebvre's thought relates to Castoriadis' understanding of praxis. Juxtaposing Cas-toriadis' conception of autonomy and Lefebvre's understanding of autogestion, I examine what strat-egies of bottom-up urban politics are implied by each of these conceptions. Taking as a starting point the fact that Castoriadis' praxis is based on a kind of knowledge that is always fragmentary and provi-sional, I examine what would be entailed by an integration of such a conception of knowledge into the procedures of formation of urban design tools. Special attention is paid to how Lefebvre and Cas-toriadis' conceptions and autogestion respectively aimed to reinvent the relationship between public space and the collective ideal.

The purpose of this study is to identify the main reasons public adoption seekers do not complete the adoption process. I conduct interviews with public adoption seekers from two California counties who dropped out of the process. I find that the most common reasons given for dropping out of the process are -changes in personal circumstance (for reasons such as losing a job or becoming ill); -dissatisfaction with agencies (for reasons such as poor customer service, the process being too lengthy, or perceived discrimination); -being too busy; and -having an insufficient income or being unable to meet the housing requirements. In examining the relationship between the socioeconomic characteristics of prospective adoptive parents and attrition, I find that lower-income adoption seekers most often drop out because they experience instability in their personal circumstances, have insufficient income, or do not meet agency housing requirements. I find that middle- and upper-income adoption seekers most often drop out due to insufficient time to complete the steps in the process or dissatisfaction with foster care adoption agencies. Although many reasons for dropping out may seem to be beyond the influence of agencies, I argue that if the foster care adoption process were more efficient, prospective parents would be less likely to drop out due to life-changing events or due to being too busy to complete the process. Agencies appear to have room for improvement in terms of providing better customer service, making the process more clear and efficient, and complying with federal legislation.

Self-censorship is a phenomenon that in different ways accompanies the professional life of every journalist. According to its effects, self- censorship appears as something "good" and "bad". It is seen as ''good'' when it influences in restricting the passions of individuals who are against moral and social norms of society, but it is quite different when it turns into a cloned individual who follows him, and warn him that he should not make any ideological mistake. This paper will shed light on the main reasons that lead journalists to self-censorship and those reasons are raised in the form of research questions: How does censorship and self-censorship act among journalists ?; What are the factors that influence and support them?; What are the consequences of self-censorship among journalists and media employees? For this study, there will be analysed different authors, supported by concrete facts occurring in media enterprises. At the end of the study it will be given a concrete approach over the main reasons that lead to self-censorship.

Proponents of public reason views hold that the exercise of political power ought to be acceptable to all reasonable citizens. This paper elucidates the common structure shared by all public reason views, first by identifying a set of question that all such views must answer and, second, by showing that the answers to these questions stand in a particular relationship to each other. In particular, we show that what we call the 'rationale question' is fundamental. This fact, and the common structure more generally, is often overlooked or distorted within the literature. As a result, we argue, several prominent argumentative moves made by both critics and defenders of public reason are unsuccessful. Our overall conclusion is that discussions of public reason views would be more fruitful if they made consistent use of the common structure we identify.

In this paper I will focus on education as the core function of reason in Kant and Fichte. The notion of reason carries an intrinsic tendency to universality, which is difficult to be reconciled with its local (cultural, historical, anthropological) background and actualisation. I believe that the stress on the importance of learning, which can be seen in the works of both Kant and Fichte, might provide useful clues to approaching the relation between universality and particularity. I will start by focusing on Kant's narration on the genealogy of human reason in the Conjectural Beginning of Human History, and then move on to the critical writings and selected lectures in order to focus on the role of human dignity and ethical education for the moral appraisal and the practice of virtue. Later, I will consider Fichte's lectures on the Vocation of the Scholar, the Vocation of Man and The Characteristics of the Present Age, which are crucial to understanding the social, ethical and political role of the scholar. For Fichte, education is the best instrument to eradicate selfishness, regarded as a historical phenomenon which can lead a nation to ruin. I will then provide some conclusions concerning the two accounts and their implications.

In this paper I will focus on education as the core function of reason in Kant and Fichte. The notion of reason carries an intrinsic tendency to universality, which is difficult to be reconciled with its local (cultural, historical, anthropological) background and actualisation. I believe that the stress on the importance of learning, which can be seen in the works of both Kant and Fichte, might provide useful clues to approaching the relation between universality and particularity. I will start by focusing on Kant's narration on the genealogy of human reason in the Conjectural Beginning of Human History, and then move on to the critical writings and selected lectures in order to focus on the role of human dignity and ethical education for the moral appraisal and the practice of virtue. Later, I will consider Fichte's lectures on the Vocation of the Scholar, the Vocation of Man and The Characteristics of the Present Age, which are crucial to understanding the social, ethical and political role of the scholar. For Fichte, education is the best instrument to eradicate selfishness, regarded as a historical phenomenon which can lead a nation to ruin. I will then provide some conclusions concerning the two accounts and their implications.

Includes bibliographical references. ; Share repurchases have long been permitted in the United States of America, but it is only relatively recently that they have become a frequently-used means of returning funds to shareholders in that country. In other countries, it was also only relatively recently that share repurchases were even permitted, and in South Africa, repurchases have been permitted only since 1999, when the Companies Act was amended to allow for them. Repurchases in South Africa are fairly closely regulated, not only by statute, but also, in the case of listed shares, by regulations contained in the Listing Requirements of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. In essence, the regulations, read with the legislation, allow for three types of repurchase, namely, a specific repurchase incorporating a pro-rata offer; a specific purchase incorporating a specific offer, and a general repurchase. Specific repurchases have more demanding requirements than general repurchases as far analysis in the context of the "signalling hypothesis," and for that reason, the focus of this study is on specific repurchases. Studies in the USA and elsewhere have shown that repurchases may be carried out for any of a number of reasons. Most studies in the USA have also shown that repurchases are associated with significant positive abnormal returns on the share prices; the increase in prices is usually attributed to the signalling hypothesis, which holds that managers use repurchases as a means of signalling to the market that they believe that the shares are underpriced. The objectives of the present study are twofold: - To identify the reasons for South African companies carrying out repurchases; and - To determine whether such repurchases create shareholder value.

This discussion paper was presented during an internal seminar of the GUARDINT Project. GUARDINT is a research project focused on the democratic oversight of intelligence agencies, and in particular of their surveillance activities. At the heart of our work is a tension between democratic values of publicity and transparency, and the rationalities of the reason of state and attached practices like secrecy. The goal of this discussion paper is to bring to light this tension and mobilize political theories on which to ground our joint work and our conceptualization of oversight and democracy.

This discussion paper was presented during an internal seminar of the GUARDINT Project. GUARDINT is a research project focused on the democratic oversight of intelligence agencies, and in particular of their surveillance activities. At the heart of our work is a tension between democratic values of publicity and transparency, and the rationalities of the reason of state and attached practices like secrecy. The goal of this discussion paper is to bring to light this tension and mobilize political theories on which to ground our joint work and our conceptualization of oversight and democracy.