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Redistributive Taxation in the Modern World
In: (2016) 34 Sing L Rev 173-218
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REDISTRIBUTIVE TAXATION WITHOUT EXCESS BURDEN
In: Economics & politics, Band 5, Heft 1, S. 53-60
ISSN: 0954-1985
REDISTRIBUTIVE TAXATION--WHETHER IT COMES IN THE FORM OF A TAX ON CAPITAL INCOME, A TAX ON SKILLED LABOR, OR A TAX ON A PARTICULAR INDUSTRY--WILL NORMALLY LEAD TO A DEAD-WEIGHT LOSS. NEVERTHELESS, A GOVERNMENT THAT MUST USE DISTORTIONARY TAXES CAN AVOID THE EXCESS BURDEN PROVIDED TWO CONDITIONS HOLD: (1) MEMBERS OF THE TAXED GROUP COORDINATE THEIR BEHAVIOR, TAKING FULL ACCOUNT OF THE RESPONSE OF THE GOVERNMENT TO THEIR ACTIONS AND (2) THE GOVERNMENT IS IN AN INTERIOR OPTIMUM WITH RESPECT TO ITS OBJECTIVE FUNCTION.
REDISTRIBUTIVE TAXATION WITHOUT EXCESS BURDEN*
In: Economics & politics, Band 5, Heft 1, S. 53-60
ISSN: 1468-0343
Redistributive taxation imposes no excess burden when: (a) the taxed group behaves collusively and takes into account government behavior, and (b) the redistribution outcome is an interior solution (i.e., after redistribution the government values a marginal dollar of income to each class equally). There is no dynamic inconsistency in capital taxation under the same conditions.
Education, Redistributive Taxation and Confidence
We consider redistributional taxation between people with and without human capital if education is endogenous and if individuals differ in their perceptions about own ability. Those who see their ability as low like redistributive taxation because of the transfers it generates. Those who see their ability as high may also like redistributive taxation because it stops other people receiving education and increases the quasi rents on their own human capital. It is surprising that this rather indirect effect can overcompensate them for the income loss from taxation and make the overconfident want higher taxes than the less confident do. The results, however, turn out to be in line with empirical evidence on the desired amount of redistribution among young individuals.
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Education, redistributive taxation and confidence
In: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Märkte und Politik, Abteilung Marktprozesse und Steuerung, Band 2005-05
"We consider redistributional taxation between people with and without human capital if education is endogenous and if individuals differ in their perceptions about own ability. Those who see their ability as low like redistributive taxation because of the transfers it generates. Those who see their ability as high may also like redistributive taxation because it stops other people receiving education and increases the quasi rents on their own human capital. It is surprising that this rather indirect effect can overcompensate them for the income loss from taxation and make the overconfident want higher taxes than the less confident do. The results, however, turn out to be in line with empirical evidence on the desired amount of redistribution among young individuals." (author's abstract)
Social Mobility and Redistributive Taxation
We investigate redistributive taxation in a political economy experiment and determine how different patterns of social mobility affect the choices of redistributional taxes. In the absence of social mobility, voters choose tax rates that are very well in line with the prediction derived in the standard framework by Meltzer and Richard (1981). However, past or future changes in the income hierarchy affect the choice of the tax rate in the current period. The same is true for social mobility within the period to which the tax rate choice applies and for the case where the choice of the tax rate takes place behind the veil of ignorance. Due to our design of the experiment, these strong effects of own social mobility cannot be attributed to social or other-regarding preferences.
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Social mobility and redistributive taxation
In: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Schwerpunkt Märkte und Politik, Forschungsprofessur und Projekt The Future of Fiscal Federalism, Band 2010-15
"We investigate redistributive taxation in a political economy experiment and determine how different patterns of social mobility affect the choices of redistributional taxes. In the absence of social mobility, voters choose tax rates that are very well in line with the prediction derived in the standard framework by Meltzer and Richard (1981). However, past or future changes in the income hierarchy affect the choice of the tax rate in the current period. The same is true for social mobility within the period to which the tax rate choice applies and for the case where the choice of the tax rate takes place behind the veil of ignorance. Due to our design of the experiment, these strong effects of own social mobility cannot be attributed to social or other-regarding preferences." (author's abstract)
Social mobility and redistributive taxation
We investigate redistributive taxation in a political economy experiment and determine how different patterns of social mobility affect the choices of redistributional taxes. In the absence of social mobility, voters choose tax rates that are very well in line with the prediction derived in the standard framework by Meltzer and Richard (1981). However, past or future changes in the income hierarchy affect the choice of the tax rate in the current period. The same is true for social mobility within the period to which the tax rate choice applies and for the case where the choice of the tax rate takes place behind the veil of ignorance. Due to our design of the experiment, these strong effects of own social mobility cannot be attributed to social or other-regarding preferences. ; Dieser Artikel untersucht Besteuerung mit dem Ziel der Einkommensumverteilung in einem polit-ökonomischen Experiment. Wir ananlysieren, wie unterschiedliche Muster sozialer Mobilität die Wahl von Steuern bestimmt, die zur Umverteilung dienen. Ohne die Möglichkeit eines sozialen Auf- oder Abstiegs entscheiden sich die Wähler für Steuersätze, die der theoretischen Vorhersage des Standardmodells von Meltzer und Richard (1981) entsprechen. Mobilität in der Einkommenshierarchie - sowohl in der Vergangenheit als auch in der Zukunft - hat jedoch einen signifikanten Einfluss auf die Wahl des Steuersatzes in der gegenwärtigen Periode. Dies gilt auch, wenn die Möglichkeit sozialer Mobilität in derjenigen Periode besteht, in der der Steuersatz zur Anwendung kommt. Ebenso verändert sich die Wahl des Steuersatzes, wenn die Entscheidung hinter dem Schleier der Unwissenheit vorgenommen wird. Aufgrund des Aufbaus des Experiments können diese starken Effekte eigener sozialer Mobilität nicht durch soziale Präferenzen begründet sein.
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Redistributive taxation and public expenditures
In: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:d1caeae7-4036-4f85-b03c-3cef1a11cdf9
We introduce a model of redistributive income taxation and public expenditure. Besides redistributing personal income by means of taxes and transfers, the government supplies goods and services. The government chooses the tax schedule that is found acceptable by the largest share possible of the population. We show that there is a unique income tax schedule that is universally acceptable. The progressivity of the income tax is shown to depend on the composition of the public expenditure and on the substitutability between the goods and services supplied by the government and the consumption goods privately obtained through the market. We test the empirical implications of the model. Specifically, we use OECD data to observe the relationship between marginal tax rates and the distribution over the taxpayers of the benefits produced by the specific composition of the government expenditure in the provision of goods and services. We confirm that for lower elasticities of substitution between public and private goods, there is a negative relationship between marginal tax rates and pro-taxpayer-bias, and for higher elasticities, there is a positive relationship.
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Redistributive taxation and social insurance
In: CORE discussion paper 9554
Social mobility and redistributive taxation
In: Discussion papers 2010-15
Redistributive Taxation in the Roy Model
In: NBER Working Paper No. w18228
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