Suchergebnisse

This study takes its starting -point in the Swedish referendum about a membership in the European monetary union. The purpose of the study is to explain the differences that became visible during the EMU-referendum, by thoroughly explore macro-factors & their importance to the voting against a membership at a municipal level. In earlier pursued research concerning voting behaviour & public opinion differences general explanations appear which work as an initial position for this study, the creation of three alternative explanation models & the macro factors to be tested. This study has a statistical design & its intention is to study macro-factors in the 290 municipals of Sweden through collecting material from several sources. The material has been compiled to analytical aggregate data & will be analysed through bivariate- & multivariate regressions. The result shows that the differences that became visible concerning the EMU-referendum can be explained from economic factors & economic structural differences between the municipals. Tables, Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.

Herbert Tingsten (1896-1973) was one of the leading political science scholars in Sweden during the 20th century. In 1935-1946 he was a professor at Stockholm University. In 1946-1959 he was the editor-in-chief of the leading liberal newspaper in Sweden, the Dagens Nyheter. Tingsten's extensive scholarly production can be summed up in four groups. The first group describes the political institutions and rules, e.g. his doctoral thesis about referendum in the United States (1923). The second group contains analyses of political ideas. The third group combines institutional descriptions and analyses of ideas, primarily democratic and totalitarian ones. The fourth group, lastly, consists primarily of Political Behavior (1937). This book, a classic in the study of electoral statistics, gave Tingsten a lasting international acknowledgement. Adapted from the source document.

The starting point for this analysis is that there is no 'business as usual' when considering the consequences of the Brexit referendum: there is either the question 'if Brexit?' or the question 'if-not Brexit?' because there is no turning around or comfortable retreat to established positions. Starting with an analysis of the British debate this 'policy-brief paper' looks at the consequences of the Brexit referendum for transatlantic security relations and in particular the consequences for Sweden. The most important arguments are, in brief: (1) That the value conflict inherent in the British debate, essentially between Eurosceptic nationalism and pro-EU integrationism, is mirrored in several European nations and remains a challenge to the EU; (2) that while Britain remains a European power regardless of the outcome of the referendum, the British geo-political outlook is differs from that of other European nations and will have to be taken into account when considering transatlantic security relations; (3) that NATO is likely to be even more important if Britain leaves the EU but that a strengthening of NATO's European pillar is likely regardless of the outcome of the referendum, among other things because of US demands on European nations to improve their military capacity; (4) that Sweden in the case of Brexit is likely to lose influence over the development of European security cooperation in general but might nevertheless be able to gain in influence mainly as a result of Sweden's geo-strategic position. ; Rapport inom ramen för "Transatlantisk säkerhet" som ingår i Forskning för regeringens behov (FORBE)

The formation of a green party in Sweden, "Miljopartiet De Grona", in 1981, can be explained as a result of the established party system's failure to handle a change of zeitgeist in an ecological direction, & most of all the political trauma arising from the focal point of Swedish environmental protest, the popular referendum on Nuclear Power 1980. Initially, Miljopartiet De Grona originally was organized as an alternative, non-hierarchical party, without a distinct party leadership & an with an ultrademocratic ideal. The party failed to achieve the 4 percent necessary to enter parliament in the elections of 1982 & 1985, but in 1988 it finally established itself in the Swedish Riksdag. Since then, Miljopartiet has step by step changed in the direction of a more "normal" political party. In 2002 they were allowed as a semi-coalition partner of the Social Democrats & the formerly communist Left Party. Still eager to be an alternative party, Miljopartiet will, perhaps, enter a red-green government after the election in autumn 2010. If so, they have in 30 years managed to move from "alternative exclusion" to what may be labeled "included alternativism.". Adapted from the source document.

Stratagems adopted by democratic leaders to try to insinuate, or anchor, a preferred course of action into the larger collective will have a variety of repercussions. Beyond the apparent success of the venture itself, the long-term integrity of the democratic fabric may be at stake if simmering rancour and discontent is left unheeded. These questions would seem particularly pertinent when studying the national side of the evolution of the European Union. The periodic shunting of competencies to European institutions is highly complex, so much so that popular legitimacy for the momentous changes is in effect something of an ephemeral commodity. The referendum, with its unique potential to determine the prevailing vox populi, has from time to time been employed to offset these problems, and lend continued credence to the relinquishment of sovereign power. The political entities that will be the powerhouses in this contest for the hearts and minds of the public are, inevitably, national political parties. They, too, are likely to pay whatever political price will be exacted as a consequence of this unusual form of battle – including the exposition and potential widening of internal rifts. Noticing a dearth of investigative tools that can help us unravel these processes, the author develops a structured framework of analysis specifically designed to "parse" strategic or tactical action, with the aim to gauge likely party-democratic fallout. She makes a first-level distinction between "convincing" strategies (basically conceptualised as compatible with deli¬berative-democratic tenets), and "persuading" strategies (closely associated with a subset of negotiation theory principles focusing on strategic action). While both strategies may lead to the desired short-term outcome – where leadership preferences are duly propagated – a convince/persuade analysis is shown to yield improved understanding of the concomitant, longer-term effects. The author studies the Swedish Social Democratic Party's internal handling of the debates leading up to two pivotal referenda – the EU membership referendum of 1994, and the EMU referendum of 2003. Reviewing a wealth of secondary sources and conducting more than 40 interviews with high-level party officials and other centrally positioned actors (representing both sides of the two issue divides), she is provided with a unique material, which is parsed through the framework (which at this point also proves to be a sound analytical instrument). The study is primarily qualitative in nature, but an entire chapter is devoted to a complementing quantitative analysis where an existing Discourse Quality Index (DQI) is used to determine the level of deliberation prevalent in four party congresses (two preceding the EU referendum; two preceding the EMU referendum). One "convince" sub-dimension, respect, proved to be the one most easily affected by external events, not to mention deadline imposed by the referendum. The qualitative analysis revealed a generally higher level of justification (another "convince" sub-dimension) in the EMU case than in the EU case, and the reverse was true for the respect dimension. In both instances, the party leadership acted to pacify [persuade] the debate, notably by prohibiting government ministers from being active in the respective no-campaigns. A preliminary hypothesis that "deliberative space" shrinks as the final deadline looms was in part corroborated, as turned out to be valid for the respect dimension.

In Norway, 2005 was a year of celebrations, linkel, first & foremost, to the fact that 100 years had passed since the peaceful dissolution of the personal union between Norway & Sweden. Despite the absence of broad popular support for the idea that this should merit any celebrations, government & media spent considerable resources on high-profile promotion of the 1905 story, including the side-events leading up to or following the famous 7 June Declaration of the Norwegian Storting (Parliament). In the context of nation-building, historical milestones tend to take on a flavor of history-building, -- the stuff that national myths are made of. In the saga of Norwegian nation-building, 1905 had come to play a perhaps surprisingly inflated role. Thus -- less surprisingly -- in the interpretation handed over to a contemporary audience, the various events of 1905 have been suffused with a series of myths, some of which have assumed the character of national dogmas. In particular, the author explores the myths surrounding the referendum of 12-13 November 1905, & demonstrates how vested interests have been instrumental in consolidating the popular (but false) interpretation that the real issue of the referendum was Norway's constitution (monarchy vs. republic) & not the conditions set forth by Prince Carl of Denmark for accepting the offer made by the Norwegian Government & its parliament to assume the Norwegian throne. In fact, employing devious tactics, prime Minister Michelsen succeeded not only in winning a comfortable victory for prince Carl's candidacy (whereby the prince became King Haakon VII of Norway), but he also managed to entrench the notion that the referendum above all was a resounding confirmation of a (continued) monarchical constitutional order. The long-term effect (which is still very much a defining feature of Norway's political self-image) was to give the country's republicans (who, at the onset of 1905 were a dominant force in the Norwegian political discourse) a permanently marginalized position as a fringe movement of eccentrics & certified losers. References. Adapted from the source document.

The constitutional development & the parliamentarianism in Sweden since 1970 can schematically be divided into two periods. The first period was 1970-1990. The second was initiated in 1990. 1970-1990 stands out as a 'classical' period to the new constitution with its unicameral system & exact proportional representation above a 4 per cent threshold. The formation of government was mainly based on blocs with sharp opposition, although in combination with negotiating parliamentarianism in the Riksdag. In their years of parliamentary majority, 1976-1982 & 1991-1994, the right-wing patties introduced considerable constitutional changes which the social democrats in opposing position accepted. From 1990 & onwards, it is above all the disrupting EU dimension which generates new constitutional changes concerning the politico-economic institutions. The European influence in legal matters is regulated, as are the EU-processes between government & parliament. Moreover, the electoral period is extended by one year & an element of personalized voting is introduced. Both the vote of censure & the instrument of consultative referendum attain a partially new constitutional character through the development of praxis. One can also identify a series of minority governments (right-wing 1991-1994 & social democratic since 1994) with prolonged partial coalitions grounded on different issues, & with all the parties of the Parliament involved in different areas. The EU dimension is central in this respect too. The constitutional changes, the new form of parliamentarianism & the EU processes strengthen the government. In this period too, questions can be raised regarding the role of the opposition in Swedish parliamentarianism. References. Adapted from the source document.

At the centre of this study lies one of the critical questions faced by (late-)modern society, namely that of taking care of the long-lived radioactive waste from nuclear power production. The problems of nuclear waste management are pictured as embracing a complex web of essential issues for society today, in terms of both its capacities and its shortcomings – so called core issues. The principal aim of the thesis is to examine the nuclear waste discourse in Malå, Västerbotten, from a critical discourse analytical perspective, through applying the approach developed by Michel Foucault in The Order of Discourse. During the 1990s, the municipality of Malå played a prominent role as a candidate site for the geological disposal of Sweden's spent nuclear fuel. A five-year process culminated in a local referendum on whether detailed site investigations should be permitted within the community. Following the result no further investigations have been undertaken. The discourse analysis is carried out through a study of opinion formation in the municipality during the period October 1992 to October 1997. Two main types of empirical material have been collected: interviews with opinion leaders (politicians, activists, journalists, information professionals, etc.) and contemporaneous mass media content (the local newspaper and regional television news). In the empirical analysis, a review is made of the workings of the external and internal control mechanisms within the discourse; that is to say, how they serve to set limits on the content and form of the sense-making process concerning nuclear waste management. Important themes in the opinion forming process in Malå include information and expertise, opposition and legitimacy, the centre/periphery relationship and the themes of mistrust, partitioning and rejection. Among other themes identified as being marginalised or absent, one example is the Samish citizens' views on the nuclear question. Four actors play a prominent role as authors of the discourse, namely the nuclear industry, the experts, Greenpeace and the mass media. The voices of resistance groups are also significant. Representatives from authorities and civil servants were most likely to take the commentary role in the discourse, along with journalists. In the concluding analysis of the nuclear waste discourse in Malå, two main types of desire for truth, which form the discourse's main order, are identified. The stronger concerns the will to know, which places the expert with a scientific background as the principal truth-teller. The other is 'ordinary' people's desire, which influences the content and form of the opinion formation. It is also concluded that the mass media institutions play a significant role in this context, not least as mediators. Reflections on contemporary 'core issues' to which the analysis bears witness, such as the crisis of democracy, are also included. In addition, the implications of applying the Foucaultian research programme to a study of the nuclear question have been considered.