Suchergebnisse

The present report provides an overview of the main debates and developments in relation to migration and asylum in Luxembourg in 2016. The issue of migration remained on the forefront of public and political debate, a debate axed on both planned legislative changes as well as the concrete migratory situation in Luxembourg. Four topics dominated public and policy discussions over the course of the year: the reform on Luxembourgish nationality, economic migration, the organisation of reception, as well as support and integration measures, linked to the continued inflow of applicants for international protection (AIPs) in 2016 and steps taken to adapt formal and informal education to the increasing heterogeneity of Luxembourg's population. The debate on international protection that arose in 2015 was carried onward in 2016, the focus shifting towards reception, support and integration measures. As the inflow of AIPs remained relatively high in 2016 with 2.043 applications, Luxembourg's Reception and Integration Agency (OLAI) warned throughout the year that the country's structures would soon reach the limits of their capacity. Linked to the high recognition rate, the legal challenges that local residents put to the plans for the construction of new reception facilities and the difficulty of beneficiaries of international protection (BIPs) in finding appropriate accommodation, the perceived dearth of housing was discussed broadly by the public, the media, as well as civil society and political actors. The continued inflow of AIPs also put a strain on the concerned administrations, both in terms of financial and human resources, leading to discussions regarding the duration of procedures and the variations of this duration. Moreover, the question of integration or support measures for beneficiaries and applicants stepped to the forefront: the changed profile of people arriving in Luxembourg posed new challenges to language learning and education for the newly arrived, and overall, emphasised the need to adapt existing and create new integration and support measures for beneficiaries and applicants. At the same time, the role of non-governmental organisations in supporting the government in the reception of applicants and in establishing new projects facilitating their integration also grew over the course of 2016, not least due to over 80 projects being granted funding by the Oeuvre Nationale de Secours Grande Duchesse Charlotte (henceforth Oeuvre). The Luxembourgish Centre for Integration and Social Cohesion (LISKO), part of the Red Cross and supported by convention to the Ministry for Family and Integration opened its doors in April 2016. The newly created centre will take care of the integration of BIPs into Luxembourg's society, putting its emphasis on facilitating access to housing. The planned extension of the maximum period of detention for families with children and unaccompanied minors (UAMs) from 72 hours to 7 days precipitated strong reactions from civil society and the public. Luxembourg furthermore followed through on its resettlement and relocation commitments made in 2015, with 167 persons being relocated from Greece and Italy to Luxembourg and with 52 being resettled in the context of the EU-Turkey agreement over the course of 2016. The adaptation of Luxembourg's legislation in the domain of legal migration also took shape over in 2016 and was broadly debated during the law-making process, while warranting less public attention. With the introduction of one bill, the legislator started the process of transposing Directive 2014/36/EU on seasonal workers and Directive 2014/66/EU on intra-corporate transfers into national law. The same bill furthermore introduced an authorisation of stay for investors, the aspect most commented on by civil society; a mechanism for continuation of activity; detailed the conditions under which a TCN (third country national) corporate officer (mandataire social) can apply for an authorisation of stay, extended the period of validity of the "European Blue Card" residence permit from two to four years, modified dispositions regarding the change of status of students and facilitated family reunification. These developments are to be framed within a wider context of economic diversification, encouragement of entrepreneurship and the repositioning of the financial centre. The reform of the Luxembourgish nationality, another major subject of discussion, was recognised as the best way to counteract Luxembourg's increasing democratic deficit after the electorate's refusal to extend legislative voting rights to foreign residents, decided in the referendum of 2015. This reform further proceeded over the course of 2016, reintroduced the perennial language debate in Luxembourg, a larger debate on the role and status of the Luxembourgish language as well as its relation to integration of migrants into Luxembourgish society. In order to increase foreign residents' participation in the upcoming municipal elections of October 2017, the government launched an awareness campaign encouraging foreign residents to register on the electoral roll, and provided support for organisations wishing to organise complementary actions. The Ministry of National Education and Youth made efforts to find responses to the growing heterogeneity of Luxembourg's population, aiming to diversify and broaden the post-primary school offer, to develop plurilingual education in nurseries and to develop non-formal education by reforming in-kind benefits, this with the aim of promoting integration and equal opportunity. The transposition of Directive 2013/55/EU on the recognition of professional qualifications was also completed in 2016. The law further amended several national provisions, recast the legislation in the field of recognition of diplomas, combined all applicable provisions in a single legislative text and simplified the procedure for recognition. The debate regarding the return of irregular migrants circled around a number of issues in 2016: the exclusion of Kosovar nationals from the AVRRL programme, the Schengen evaluation and the aforementioned resulting changes to provisions on detention, the debate on the enforcement of the EU-Afghanistan 'Joint way forward on migration issues' agreement, as well as the continuation of the elaboration of readmission agreements. Luxembourg's government took further steps in the fight against trafficking in human beings (THB) over the course of 2016. The Council of Government adopted the National Action Plan on trafficking in human beings, which focuses on the detection and protection of victims, the prosecution and punishment of perpetrators and a policy to combat trafficking. Luxembourg's strategy on prostitution was presented, consisting of a National Action Plan on prostitution and a bill strengthening the fight against the exploitation of prostitution, procuring and THB. Additionally, the Consultative Commission on Human Rights (Commission Consultative des Droits de l'Homme – C2DH) published its first report on THB, which reviewed the years 2014-2016. In reference to migration and development, Luxembourg continued putting emphasis on vocational training and integration programmes in its indicative cooperation programmes with partner countries. Additionally, the Council of Government approved the bill on the agreement between the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the Republic of Cape Verde on the concerted management of migratory flows and solidarity-based development, facilitating the movement of persons and to encourage temporary circular professional migration between Luxembourg and Cape Verde.

Luxembourg has been a country of immigration for more than 50 years. Located in the heart of Europe, it holds a strong attraction for EU citizens and nationals from countries all around the world, who play a central role in the national economy, making an important contribution to the population growth and the labour market. Over the course of 2015, Luxembourg's population has continued its steady growth of approximately 13.000 people per year, increasing by 2,36%, from 562.958 on 1st January 2015 to 576.249 on 1st January 2016. Foreign citizens have continued to play an essential role in Luxembourg's population growth, both in terms of net migration and births. The total net migration amounted to +11.159 individuals in 2015, which signifies a surplus of arrivals over departures. Foreign EU citizens accounted for 76,1%; third-country nationals represented 32,9%, while Luxembourgish nationals' contribution was negative, at -9%. The number of births in 2015 was the highest on record, equal to that in 2013, with 6.115 births in total. Foreigners contributed a birth surplus of 2.150 to Luxembourg's natural increase, while a birth deficit of -18 was recorded for Luxembourgish nationals. 2015 also marked a record year regarding naturalisations, with Belgians remaining the citizens that obtain citizenship most frequently, followed by the French and the Portuguese. On 1st January 2016, 46,7% of Luxembourg's residents were foreigners. Representing 34,6% of the total foreign population, Portuguese remained the most represented nationality, followed by France (15,5%) and Italy (7,5%), while the most numerous third-country nationals were Montenegrins. Due to the war in Syria and the influx of applicants for international protection that followed, the Syrian population living in Luxembourg showed the highest proportional increase during 2015, growing by 461,5% from January 2015 to January 2016. A look at Luxembourg's labour market also reveals the central role that foreigners play in the national economy. In the first quarter of 2016, residents of Luxembourg represented 55% of the country's salaried workforce. Of these, 27,5% were Luxembourgish nationals, while EU nationals represented 24,2% and third-country nationals 3,3%. Cross-border workers from France, Belgium and Germany represented 45% of all salaried workers in Luxembourg. They mainly work in the manufacturing industries, construction and commerce. A majority of recruitments in the HORECA sector are of foreign residents. Third-country nationals who do not benefit from free movement must be issued with a residence permit in order to enter Luxembourg. An increase in first issues of residence permits was recorded for most categories compared to the preceding year, which had experienced a decrease in almost all categories. In 2015, residence permits were most frequently issued in the "family member", "salaried worker" and "European Blue Card" categories. 2015 was marked by a significant increase in the number of applications for international protection, which has more than doubled when compared to 2014 (2.447 applications in 2015). While there was a strong increase at the end of 2015, the trend slowed down in 2016. Nonetheless, the number of applications for international protection remains higher than levels in 2013/2014. Most applications were from Syrians and Iraqis (27,3% and 22% respectively), who accounted for only 9% and 1% respectively in 2014. Moreover, both the rate of status recognition (refugee and subsidiary protection status) and of return decision increased. In 2015, Luxembourg pledged to relocate 557 individuals to Luxembourg in the framework of the EU Council decision to relocate 160.000 international protection applicants from Greece and Italy. Within this framework, 114 refugees have been relocated from Greece and 20 from Italy up until mid-August 2016. Furthermore, 46 refugees were resettled from Turkey in 2015, followed by 52 further refugees as a result of Luxembourg's pledge to resettle 194 refugees from Turkey in the context of the EU-Turkey agreement of March 2016. Additionally, 44 Syrians were welcomed in 2015 following a request for assistance by German authorities. Faced with the increased inflow of applicants for international protection, an emergency reception plan was developed in 2015. The plan included the establishment of first-instance reception centres and the strengthening of the capacity in human resources of both the Luxembourg Reception and Integration Agency (OLAI) and the Directorate of Immigration, which is under the authority of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The OLAI also strengthened the collaboration with stakeholders at inter-ministerial and local levels. A strong focus has also been put on integration, where major developments include the setting up of integration projects by the municipalities in the context of the 'Communal Integration Plan' project and the creation of Luxembourg's Centre for Integration and Cohesion (LISKO), a service supporting the beneficiaries of international protection in their process of integration in Luxembourgish society. Over the course of 2015 and 2016, Luxembourg continued to transpose and implement several EU directives. The law of 18th December 2015 on the reception of applicants for international protection and temporary protection transposes Directive 2013/33/EU (re-cast reception conditions) into national law. The law of 18th December 2015 on international protection and temporary protection transposed Directive 2013/32/EU (re-cast procedure), establishing the procedures for granting and withdrawing international and subsidiary protection and the standardisation of the content of this protection. The bill implementing Directive 2013/55/EU on the recognition of professional qualifications was introduced into parliament in 2015 and the bill implementing Directive 2014/36/EU on seasonal workers and Directive 2014/66/EU on intra-corporate transferees and investors' residence permits was introduced in 2016. Regarding the transposition of the Blue Card Directive, a Government Decree was issued on 22nd May 2015 establishing the professions to which the lower salary threshold for hiring highly qualified workers applies. On the national level, a number of legislative changes address some of the challenges set by Luxembourg's heterogeneity. The bill no. 6410 on youth, introduced into parliament on 6th February 2015, gives cross-border workers access to the care service voucher system which was previously only available to Luxembourgish residents. Bill no. 6893 on the recognition of qualifications was introduced in parliament in October 2015. At the referendum of 7th June 2015, the proposal to extend the right to vote of non-Luxembourgish residents was rejected by a large majority, who argued in favour of the acquisition of nationality as the more appropriate way to acquire the right to vote. Consequently, the government took steps towards reforming the law on nationality in order to soften the requirements for acquisition of nationality, and in this way enable the broadening of participation in elections. Bill no. 6977 on nationality was introduced in parliament on 24th March 2016. It includes the reduction of the required duration of residency from seven to five years and the reintroduction of procedure of option in cases of close links with Luxembourg. The level of fluency in Luxembourgish required has become a central focus of the debate on the bill on nationality, some fearing that linguistic requirements would become an obstacle to foreigners' acquisition of nationality, others underlining the command of the language as a central factor in integration and thus also in the acquisition of nationality.

Il 10 marzo 2015 la Camera dei Deputati ha approvato, in prima deliberazione, il disegno di legge costituzionale che reca: «Disposizioni per il superamento del bicameralismo paritario, la riduzione del numero dei parlamentari, il contenimento dei costi di funzionamento delle istituzioni, la soppressione del CNEL e la revisione del titolo V della parte II della Costituzione». Una così ampia e incisiva revisione dell'architettura istituzionale della nostra Repubblica, secondo quanto emerge, seppur sommariamente, dalla rubrica del citato disegno di legge costituzionale, non può non richiamare alla memoria le analoghe riforme già recate dalle ll.cost. 1/1999 e 3/2001, che da meno di tre lustri hanno già revisionato interamente il titolo V della parte II della Costituzione, nonché l'ancor più recente e fallito tentativo del 2005 di riformare ulteriormente il rapporto fra lo stato e le regioni, accentuando maggiormente il ruolo di queste ultime. Una così serrata sequela di riforme costituzionali, aventi ad oggetto il medesimo tema del rapporto fra stato, regioni e autonomie territoriali, dipanatesi in un arco temporale relativamente breve di quindici anni, sono indice evidente dell'esistenza di una crisi che affligge il nostro stato regionale. Il presente lavoro si propone quindi, nella prima parte, di comprendere l'origine di questa crisi, compiendo un'analisi storica del dibattito giuridico, politico e istituzionale, che portò alla nascita delle regioni, dalle tesi confederali e federaliste preunitarie al processo costituente del 1946, tracciandone quindi l'evoluzione storica successiva, così come emerge dalla legislazione attuativa del titolo V della parte II della Costituzione, nonché dalle riforme costituzionali del 1999 e del 2001, tuttora in vigore, per giungere poi ad un'analisi critica della fallita riforma costituzionale del 2005, bocciata con referendum nel 2006 dal corpo elettorale. Vengono quindi illustrati criticamente gli ulteriori progetti di riforma, presentati nel corso delle legislature XV e XVI, che tuttavia non sono mai giunti in porto, per mutamenti successivi delle maggioranze politiche, che li avevano inizialmente condivisi. Si giunge infine a valutare se il disegno di legge costituzionale, attualmente proposto dal governo Renzi, nel testo modificato e approvato dalla Camera dei Deputati il 10 marzo 2015, possa o meno rappresentare una valida soluzione al problema del regionalismo italiano, rimasto fino ad oggi sostanzialmente incompiuto. Mai come ora, infatti, si rende opportuna una radicale riforma del Senato, che non si limiti semplicemente a dare un taglio, senz'altro necessario, ai costi della politica, attraverso la riduzione del numero dei senatori o del loro trattamento economico, ma che consenta soprattutto alle nostre autonomie territoriali di ottenere, finalmente, una voce in capitolo nelle scelte importanti del nostro Paese, che le riguardano più da vicino. L'accresciuta espansione delle competenze legislative esclusive dello stato negli ambiti materiali cosiddetti trasversali, che incidono profondamente nelle competenze legislative delle regioni – come la determinazione dei livelli essenziali delle prestazioni concernenti i diritti civili e sociali, che devono essere garanti su tutto il territorio nazionale, ai sensi della lettera m) del secondo comma dell'art. 117 cost. – ha reso fortemente invasiva l'ingerenza dello stato centrale nell'autonomia politica e finanziaria delle regioni e degli altri enti territoriali, in settori nei quali essi svolgono un insieme di attività molto importanti per la piena riuscita del nostro moderno stato sociale – si pensi ad esempio all'assistenza sociale o a all'assistenza sanitaria. Ciò ha fatto sì che nel nostro stato composto, la rappresentanza delle regioni e delle altre autonomie territoriali in seno al cosiddetto sistema delle Conferenze – Conferenza Stato-Regioni, Conferenza Stato-Città e autonomie locali, Conferenza unificata – non sia più sufficiente a garantire un adeguato livello di dialogo politico fra il centro e la periferia e di concorso comune nell'assunzione delle decisioni più importanti, che devono tradursi in provvedimenti legislativi. Non può sfuggire, infatti, la considerazione che il sistema delle Conferenze risulta incardinato in seno al Governo, ovvero in seno all'organo che detiene il potere esecutivo, mentre sempre più spesso le nostre autonomie territoriali si trovano a dover dare attuazione ad importanti provvedimenti legislativi, che tuttavia vengono "calati dall'alto", poiché sono assunti in seno al Parlamento, supremo organo legislativo, all'interno del quale, ad oggi, non esiste una loro rappresentanza. Il presente studio, pertanto, vuole mettere in evidenza quanto mai come ora si rende non più procrastinabile in Italia una seria riforma della seconda Camera del Parlamento e dei procedimenti legislativi che hanno ad oggetto materie di rilevante importanza per il nostro ordinamento regionale. L'inarrestabile processo di globalizzazione, che caratterizza il mondo contemporaneo, se da un lato frantuma i vecchi stati nazione, schiacciandoli dall'alto con fenomeni economici e sociali, che trascendono i loro confini statali e non sono più controllabili da parte dei singoli governi, attraverso l'impiego delle vecchie politiche nazionali, dall'altro lato disgrega dal basso i vecchi stati nazione, rafforzando l'identità delle comunità locali e il loro bisogno di autogoverno. Come se ciò non bastasse, nell'attuale contesto politico e sociale, reso di per sé già complesso da governare, si è aggiunta anche una crisi economica senza precedenti, che imperversa ormai da decenni e che costringe i governi nazionali e locali a far quadrare i propri conti, con una spesa storica difficile da contenere e con entrate fiscali via via sempre più esigue. Tutto ciò non può non influire sul tentativo di realizzare in Italia quel "federalismo" fiscale, così vagheggiato dalla l. 42/2009, emanata in attuazione del art. 119 cost., come novellato nel 2001. I decreti legislativi attuativi della citata legge di delega si sono purtroppo scontrati con l'attuale crisi economica e finanziaria che, richiedendo provvedimenti continui di risanamento della finanza pubblica, ha causato uno snaturamento tale degli obiettivi di partenza, da suscitare in dottrina seri dubbi sulla possibilità di assicurare concretamente l'auspicata autonomia di entrata e di spesa di comuni, province, città metropolitane e regioni, nell'ottica del superamento del dualismo economico del Paese. Prendendo, dunque, le mosse dalle suddette considerazioni, nella seconda parte del presente lavoro si effettua una comparazione diacronica fra il modello di stato regionale e il modello di stato federale e in particolar modo fra lo stato regionale italiano e lo stato federale tedesco, al fine di evidenziare le analogie e le differenze nell'evoluzione storica dei due ordinamenti, sotto i due diversi profili della distribuzione delle competenze fra il centro e la periferia e della ripartizione delle risorse fra il livello di governo centrale e i livelli di governo territoriali substatuali. L'analisi comparata mette quindi in luce che l'Italia – e, con essa, gli ordinamenti di tipo composto – corre oggi il rischio che la grave crisi economica, che imperversa a livello globale, possa portare il governo centrale a fare dell'equilibrio di bilancio e del contenimento della spesa pubblica i suoi principali obiettivi, da raggiungere eventualmente anche a discapito della diversità delle politiche e delle soluzioni normative, che possono essere messe brillantemente in campo dai livelli di governo territoriali periferici, nella tutela dei principali diritti civili e sociali dei cittadini. Il pericolo che corriamo oggi, in ultima analisi, è quello che le politiche dei governi, rivolte al solo contenimento della spesa pubblica, senza considerare il rilancio dell'economia e soprattutto senza valorizzare quegli istituti che incentivino una gestione responsabile della finanza pubblica da parte degli amministratori, portino dietro con sé il rischio che si regredisca nella tutela di quei diritti civili e sociali, che sono stati le grandi conquiste del Novecento.

The origins of East Timor Defence Force (ETDF) can be traced to a number of sources. Firstly, the ETDF is a product of East Timor's war of resistance against Indonesian invasion. After the Indonesians withdrew from East Timor in 1999 and the UN arrived to build the state of East Timor, resistance leaders demanded that a defence force be created, and that their resistance fighters be incorporated into it. Secondly, the ETDF is a product of the atrocities committed by pro-Jakarta militias, after the 1999 referendum in East Timor demonstrated an overwhelming level of support for independence. The violence unleashed by the militias convinced even those East Timorese leaders who had originally been opposed to the idea, that an East Timorese defence force should be raised to ensure that such atrocities would never happen again. finally, the ETDF is also a product of a study, commissioned by the UN and undertaken by the King's College of London, which was tasked with, firstly, addressing the future of the former resistance fighters in East Timor, and secondly, with formulating a workable structure for a future East Timorese defence force - the ETDF was formed based on the recommendations of that study. The 2000 King's college study did not, however, question whether the country actually needed a defence force to protect it from external threats - that was simply assumed. External threats to East Timor' s security are divided into conventional and nonconventional threats for clarity of analysis. The conventional threats to East Timor' s security are assessed as low to negligible, with East Timor' s status as a sovereign state and as a product of UN state-building, acting as a deterrent to foreign aggression. Given the geostrategic significance that Australia and Indonesia have historically placed on East Timor - during the Pacific war in Australia's case and during the Cold War in Indonesia's - it is also likely that Australia and/or Indonesia would defend East Timor if a conventional threat were to emerge from the broader region or beyond. In the unlikely event that a conventional threat did emerge, the ETDF could do little to counter it. East Timor has only two neighbours, Indonesia and Australia, and both are far larger than East Timor in economic, geographic and demographic terms. East Timor simply lacks the resources as a society to build a defence force capable of defeating, or even significantly delaying, either of those neighbours through conventional warfare. While a guerrilla strategy may appear an attractive option for the ETDF, a guerrilla campaign would do little to counter any conventional threat to East Timorese statehood - the East Timorese waged a guerrilla campaign against their Indonesian occupiers for 24 years without prompting a withdrawal. The Indonesian withdrawal was only secured with formidable international backing. The only means available to East Timor to defend itself from external threats are its diplomatic efforts - an area of the East Timorese budget which is, at present, receives little funding. · Non-conventional threats are far more likely to affect East Timor's security. Smuggling, illegal fishing, piracy and, to a far lesser extent, maritime terrorism, all present credible threats to East Timor's economic interests. However, securing East Timor from these threats is not a role for the ETDF. Aside from being more expensive to employ in a border security capacity than police, there is also a question of whether the ETDF is the appropriate organisation for protecting East Timor's borders. As a conventional military trained in the use of lethal force in accordance with the laws of armed conflict, the ETDF is not the appropriate organisation to conduct border policing tasks - something that is essentially a policing role which requires the use of minimum force consistent with the rule of law. There is also a possibility that replacing border police with ETDF troops may incite tensions in the border region - firstly between the ETDF and the Indonesian military, who control the Indonesian side of the border, and secondly, between the ETDF and local East Timorese who, given the regionally based conflicts which have taken place in East Timor in recent years, may feel a sense of animosity toward the troops. Evidence suggests that the ETDF does little to protect East Timor from external threats. Thus, the East Timor Defence Ministry's proposed response to the (unlikely) conventional and non-conventional threat - an exponential increase in the size, budget and capabilities of the ETDF and the militarisation of East Timor' s borders - would be an unnecessary expense which would do little to improve East Timor' s security and may in fact incite tensions in some parts of East Timor. The second major argument for an East Timorese defence force - namely, the need to deal with the demands of the veterans of East Timor' s war of resistance - is equally flawed. When the ETDF was formed, only around one-third of the country's resistance fighters were incorporated into it. The remainder, around 1,300 fighters, were left without work in a country of soaring unemployment where they received little assistance from the UN or the government of East Timor. Nonetheless, East Timor's greatest security problems in the years since independence have not been caused by those unemployed resistance fighters. They have been caused by deserting and serving members of the ETDF. The first incident occurred in the 2006 when a protest, held by a group of ETDF troops who had deserted their barracks, instigated violence in the streets of Dili, a political crisis and a second international peacekeeping intervention into East Timor. The second incident occurred in 2008 when a group of former ETDF personnel, who had deserted, attempted to assassinate the president and prime minister of East Timor. Thus, neither the justification that East Timor requires a defence force to defend it from external threats, nor the explanation that the ETDF is essential in appeasing and placating the country's former resistance fighters, provides sufficient grounds for an East Timorese defence force. Nonetheless, any plans to reduce or demobilise the ETDF would need to be well considered - disgruntled former ETDF personnel have already caused sufficient turmoil in East Timor; adding their numbers could prove disastrous for East Timor's security. Recommendations to the government of East Timor 1. Halt any plans to implement Defence Ministry recommendations that the ETDF be upsized, its equipment upgraded and its role expanded. 2. Freeze ETDF recruitment and consider consolidating the ETDF into a single battalion. 4, Ease the. minimum criteria for the veterans' pension (and lower the rate of payment if necessary) and formulate a comprehensive long-term reintegration program to assist veterans of the resistance, and other ETDF members, in finding civilian employment. 5. Recognise East Timor's diplomatic efforts as its most powerful means of defending itself from conventional threats and, in future budgets, allocate funding accordingly.

[Resumen] Los recientes episodios vividos por la Monarquía han llevado a algunos analistas a referirse a la crisis coyuntural de la institución; pero el calado de los problemas que la acucian refleja una crisis estructural que la institución no consigue superar. Todas las contradicciones y cuestiones apenas tratadas o conjuradas durante la "Transición" han emergido al tiempo, afectando a diversas instituciones y situaciones de facto del Estado. Son los jóvenes, menores de 40 años, quienes reclaman ejercer los derechos hurtados o mermados a sus padres y que hacen que el futuro de la Corona siga siendo una cuestión pendiente. El presente trabajo se vertebra sobre la serie de medidas jurídicas que se tomaron en su momento para evitar que se pudiera planear, ni siquiera intelectualmente, el debate República-Monarquía, entre las que destaca la reforma de la Ley de Prensa de 1966, que mantenía el secuestro administrativo de aquellas publicaciones que abordaran desde perspectivas críticas o meramente disociadas de la postura del Gobierno, aspectos tales como la unidad de España, la Monarquía o el papel del Ejército. A partir de una densa aproximación a los fundamentos teóricos de la institución a lo largo de la historia, se sigue la evolución de la "reinstauración de la Monarquía" electiva en España y la forma en que régimen de Franco se fue adaptando a la desaparición del Caudillo. Desde la perspectiva de las fuerzas opositoras, se reconstruyen los intentos de alternativa, cuyo elemento esencial debería de haber sido un referéndum previo al proceso de reforma, que decidiera la forma del Estado y su jefatura. Se estudian la serie de instrumentos esenciales de los que el Franquismo se dotó para el control de la libertad de pensamiento. Tras señalar la complicidad de los medios en el proceso de la Reforma, se repasa la más reciente jurisprudencia sobre el tratamiento público de la figura del Rey y su familia, destacando las diversas interpretaciones de las leyes vigentes y sus efectos en los casos más significativos. Dentro de este capítulo analiza el futuro de la Monarquía y del Príncipe de Asturias. Concluye esta parte advirtiendo que a la reforma constitucional tendrá que abordar cuestiones esenciales de la construcción del Estado, tal y como demandan de manera abrumadoramente mayoritaria los españoles más jóvenes. El epílogo está dedicado a los avatares del Conde de Barcelona y el extraño proceso por el que ahora es reconocido como Juan III. Las conclusiones enlazan con la hipótesis de que la Monarquía en España se enfrenta a una crisis institucional, estructural y que va a condiciona, antes o después, sin remedio, su futuro. ; [Resumo] Os recentes episodios vividos pola Monarquía levaron a algúns analistas a se referir á crise da institución como un feito episódico, mais, a gravidade dos problemas que ten de diante amosa unha crise estructural que a institución non é capaz de superar. Tóladas contradicións e cuestións que non se trataron entón ou que foron conxuradas durante a "Transición" agroman ao tempo, afectando a diversas institucións e situacións de facto do Estado. Son os mozos, menores de 40 anos, os que reclaman exerce-los dereitos dos que foros privados os seus pais e que fan que o futuro da Coroa siga sendo unha cuestión pendente. O presente traballo vertébrase sobre a serie de medidas xurídicas que se tomaron no seu momento para evitar que se puidese plantexar, nin siquera intelectualmente, o debate República-Monarquía, entre as que salienta a reforma da Lei de Prensa de 1966, que mantiña o secuestro administrativo daquelas publicacións que abordasen desde perspectivas críticas ou meramente disociadas da postura do Goberno, aspectos tales como a unidade de España, a Monarquía ou o papel do Exército. A partir dun denso achegamento aos fundamentos teóricos da institución ao longo da historia, séguese a evolución da reinstauración da Monarquía electiva en España e a forma en que o réxime de Franco foise adaptando á desaparición do Caudillo. Desde a perspectiva das forzas opositoras, reconstrúense os intentos de alternativa, cuxo elemento esencial debería de ser un referendo previo ao proceso de reforma, que decidise a forma do Estado e a súa xefatura. Estúdanse a serie de instrumentos esenciais dos que o Franquismo dotouse para o control da liberdade de pensamento. Tras sinalar a complicidade dos medios no proceso da Reforma, repásase a máis recente xurisprudencia sobre o tratamento público da figura do Rei e a súa familia, salientando as diversas interpretacións das leis vigentes e os seus efectos nos casos máis significativos. Dentro deste capítulo se analiza o futuro da Monarquía e do Príncipe de Asturias. Conclúe esta parte advertindo que a reforma constitucional terá que abordar cuestións esenciais da construción do Estado, tal e como demandan de xeito abrumadoramente maioritario os españois máis novos. O epílogo está adicado aos avatares do Conde de Barcelona e o estrano proceso polo que agora é recoñecido como Juan III. As conclusións enlazan coa hipótese de que a Monarquía en España enfróntase a unha crise institucional, estructural, e que vai a condicionar, antes ou despois, sen remedio, o seu porvir. ; [Abstract] Recent episodes of the Spanish Monarchy to some analysts are a temporary crisis of the institution. But the depth of the problems is that of an institutional crisis that the institution can not exceed. All topics of "Transition" appear in the future of several institutions. Young people under 40 require the right to decide the form of the state that their parents were not allowed This work is based on the number of legal actions that are used to reject any known alternative to the Monarchy. In particular, the reform of the press law of 1966, to prevent a critical perspective or just different from the position of the government, the Monarchy and the role of the armed forces. The theoretical foundations of the Monarchy are studied along the historical approach, and follow the evolution of the "restoration of the Monarchy" in Spain after Franco's death. From the perspective of the opposition forces explore alternative should have been a referendum before the reform process, to decide the form of government and who should lead it. We have studied the number of basic tools that the Franco regime established to control freedom of thought. Noting the complicity of the media in the process of reform, most recently in the public treatment of the figure of the king, the different interpretations of the legislation and its impact on the most significant cases. Within this chapter the future of the Monarchy and the Prince of Asturias is discussed. We believe that constitutional reform must address the key issues of state-building, and who demand the most young citizens. The epilogue is devoted to the vicissitudes of the Count of Barcelona and the strange process that is now recognized as Juan III. We conclude that the Monarchy in Spain is facing a constitutional crisis and that, sooner or later inevitably affects their future.

ABSTRACT Recognition of minority groups, their general and educational ideals: Is there another way out? The history of most countries, including those regarded as relatively culturally homogeneous, has demonstrated that practically all of them are composed of minority groups and that many of these groups struggle for survival. "Cultural" groups, such as age, interest, socio-economic and gender groups, provide their own quota of problems for educational planners, but are not as politically encumbered as others, such as ethnic and religious groups. In a social democracy as in South Africa where the rule of law reigns supreme, the interest and future existence of minority groups are often overlooked by the majority. In some cases, their cultural and linguistic needs and interests are symbolically entrenched in the Constitution, but these measures are often nullified, for instance through Constitutional Court decisions. Such actions on the part of the powers that be explain why minority groups in South Africa and elsewhere are displeased with the ways in which they are being hampered in their efforts to develop their unique identities. Tensions of this nature are clearly observable in South Africa and elsewhere. The recent referendum in Scotland, the tensions in Catalonia and the treatment of the Dalai Lama, the spiritual leader of Tibet, at the hands of South African authorities attest to the topicality of the problem. On the one hand, we have the various minority groups with a number of legitimate claims, among others for a measure of independence and self-assertion, grounded in a unique interpretation of social justice and in an appeal to the Constitution of the country. On the other hand, they form part of a larger community structure in which equality and non-discrimination reign as supreme national values. The national government, as representative of the larger community, also appeals to social justice, as embodied in the Constitution. The end result is a conflict of opinions and ideals, each based on an interpretation of social justice. The onus to find a solution for the resolution of the tension lies with the various minority groups, and not with the government as representative of the majority. In fact, many governments find the constant complaints of minority groups rather irritating. The irritation is intensified where a minority group is able to provide in its own needs, and hence can refuse to align itself with the general value system of the majority community. The question therefore arises: What can minority communities do in these circumstances? How can they take charge of their own interests, needs and future existence? The fact that minority rights have been entrenched in international treatises such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) of the United Nations, and the European Union's Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990) does not really help because their stipulations are regularly flouted by majorities. A minority group is described in these documents as a numerical minority which aims at preserving and developing its unique characteristics in its country. The rights of minorities can be summarised as "respect for human dignity as individuals and communities" which leads to "treating equals equally and unequals unequally". The educational rights of minorities are likewise entrenched in two documents, namely the Convention against Discrimination in Education (1960) of Unesco, and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1990). These documents stipulate that minorities are entitled to education equivalent to that of majority groups, that the erection of separate educational institutions may not be regarded as discriminatory, and that parents / guardians have the right to determine what is best for their children. The same rights are entrenched in the South African Constitution. As stated above, minorities have to assume responsibility for protecting their own rights. The central claim of this article is that a recent epistemological development, namely post-post foundationalism, can assist them in this regard. After a brief discussion of foundationalism in the form of Rationalism and of the post-foundationalism that has risen in response to foundationalism, it is concluded that neither of these orientations provides a suitable vantage point for the protection of minority rights. A foundationalist orientation seems to be too imperialistic and deterministic to be of any value to a minority group and also to the entire community of which a minority group forms part. Such a group tends to control and dominate because it supposes itself to be the voice of reason. The post-foundationalistic orientation, on the other hand, is shot through with indeterministic views and is relativistic as far as its view of values is concerned. It is also inconsistent in that it avoids any universalistic statements, except its own claim that all values are relative. Because neither of these orientations can successfully serve as a basis for a minority group to work towards the recognition and actualisation of its values and aspirations, a third way had to be found. Such a third way has surfaced since the 1990s in the form of post-postfoundationalism, i.e. an orientation that follows after post-foundationalism. The key feature of post-post-foundationalism is that it attempts to steer through between the extremes of foundationalism and post-foundationalism. The latter tends to overlook the need for a minority group to occasionally make justifiable and firm universally legitimate claims (which may be refuted, of course). Post-post-foundationalism does not regard a foundation as absolutely, reasonably, finally and universally true. While it rejects the notion of working with grand narratives, it is prepared to recognise the need to resort to firm values, which it assumes can also change with time, as life-concepts tend to do. Put differently, foundations are not so much in the foreground as playing a role in the back of the minds of individuals and groups. Since post-post-foundationalism is a common sense approach, it enables minority group strategic planners to find a way for a minority group to remain true to its value foundation while remaining flexible and adaptable in order to find a niche for itself in the broader community of which the group is a part. In doing so, a minority group can remain true to its own ideals and aspirations and also become and remain a valuable part of the larger community. OPSOMMING 'n Oorsig oor die stand van sake met betrekking tot die onderwysideale en -voorsiening van minderheidsgroepe lei tot die gevolgtrekking dat daar 'n onvermydelike spanning bestaan tussen die ideale en sieninge van minderheidsgroepe en dié van die meerderheidsgroep in die samelewing, en dus dat die verantwoordelikheid op 'n minderheidsgroep lê om 'n weg uit die impasse te vind.Drie sulke weë word ondersoek, naamlik fundamentisme, postfundamentisme en postpostfundamentisme. Omdat die eersgenoemde te imperialisties, rasionalisties en deterministies, en die tweede te relativisties bevind is, word aandag aan die derde bestee. Hierdie oriëntering word gekenmerk deur sy strewe om tussen die uiterstes van die eerste twee benaderings deur te stuur, en verder ook deur sy gesonde verstand-benadering. Weens die epistemologiese ewewigtigheid daarvan kan die post-postfundamentistiese benadering vir minderheidsgroepstrategiese beplanners 'n waardevolle oriënteringspunt wees. ; http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_serial&pid=0041-4751&lng=en&nrm=iso

The first chapter summarises and anticipates most of the research topics. Paragraphs 1 and 2 show the surprise and perplexity of some pre-eminent liberal-democratic intellectuals facing Berlusconi's victory in 1994, which, along with the transformation of the electoral law in the previous years, mark out the passage to the "second republic" according to the current opinion. My research suggests that 1994 instead marked the return to an anti-political culture which was repressed for a long time and Berlusconi was able to interpret and represent, both in his television channels and in the direct political propaganda. I believe that the defeat of the referendum in 1995 for the repeal of television duopoly and the limitation of advertising (§.3) are, on the other hand, a much clearer clue of his hegemony as public figure and "commanager" ("communication manager" – P. Musso), but traditional politicians are highly responsible for the origin of the duopoly and his achievement of "neotelevision" (Casetti-Odin) hegemony (§.4). In §.5, 6 and 8, I expound the two keys to understand the history of "neotelevision" (Casetti-Odin) which will guide my research especially in chapters 5, 6 and 7: the "Meyrowitz effect" and the "Chomsky effect" (quotation marks are necessary because I do not expect them to be theories which can be formalised and universalised, but they can only be clues for the organization and interpretation of historical data). The first theory suggests the possibility that "neotelevision" in Italy caused the progressive loss of aura, prestige and authority of parents, politicians and adults in general. Meyrowitz theory, inspired by Goffman's dramaturgical sociology, aimed to explain the rise of protest movements in America with the widespread of television sets among American families (almost half of them had a television set in 1954). Nevertheless "paleotelevision" in Italy cannot significantly explain these same movements: it was less widespread, it had a smaller amount of hours of transmission, it had only one channel at first, then two…; in addition to this many other stimuli (starting from the "contagion" of the movement from abroad) appeared at that time. On the contrary "neotelevision" was a sudden change which concerned all the variables (hours of transmission, channels, etc…), therefore a further loss of adults' prestige could be expected from it, but in a form different from protest. The "Chomsky effect" can integrate the "Meyrowitz effect". According to Chomsky, media that lives off advertisement have to "produce" (I would say: attract, select, shape) the public, which then they will have to "sell to advertisers". Program schedules of "neotelevision" will be, therefore, at complete disposal of the advertisers' demands. It is certainly not a new idea, nor an idea had only by Chomsky, who uses it in an apodictic way against media mainstream: among others Antonio Pilati shares this idea, but with an apologetic intent (cf. §.8). Of course this "effect" is even less scientifically definable, because the educational process itself requires a long period of time, it is the result of too many crossed factors and its consequences are considered to be hardly predictable, or even unpredictable. Nevertheless, from those years, Italians' attitude towards advertising and brands has gone through changes so drastic (as evidenced by Eurisko researches) that we cannot avoid relating them to the contemporary development of "neotelevision". Moreover advertising targeting children and youngsters aims to make them consumers that are independent from their parents and to some extent it reinforces the "Meyrovitz effect". Both the "effects" aim to develop television as independent educational curriculum. ; Le premier chapitre résume et anticipe une grande partie des thèmes de la recherche. Le §.1 et le 2 montrent la surprise et l'égarement de certains autorisés intellectuels libéraux démocratiques face à la victoire de Berlusconi en 1994, qui, avec les transformations de la loi électorale en 1993, marquerait, selon l'opinion courante, le passage à la « deuxième République ». Ma recherche suggère plutôt que 1994 a été le retour à une culture antipolitique longtemps refoulée, que Berlusconi a bien su interpréter et représenter, tant dans ses télévisions que dans sa propagande politique directe. En revanche à mon avis c'est la défaite des référendums de 1995 pour l'abrogation du duopole télévisuel et pour la limitation de la publicité (§.3) qui montre des indices bien plus forts de son hégémonie en tant que personnage public et « commanager » (« communication manager » - P. Musso), mais les politiciens traditionnels ont de graves responsabilités en ce qui concerne les origines du duopole et le développement de son hégémonie télévisuelle (§.4). Dans le §.5,6 et 8 j'expose les deux clefs d'interprétation de l'histoire de la néo-télévision qui guideront ma recherche surtout dans les ch. 5, 6 et 7 : l' « effet Meyrowitz » et l' « l'effet Chomsky » (les guillemets sont nécessaires car je ne prétends pas qu'il s'agisse de théories pouvant être universalisées et formalisées, mais seulement de critères pour l'organisation et l'interprétation des données historiques). La première suggère la possibilité que la néo-télévision en Italie ait stimulé la perte progressive de l'aura, du prestige et de l'autorité des parents, des politiciens et en général des adultes. La théorie de Meyrowitz, inspirée à la sociologie dramaturgique de Goffman, visait à expliquer l'époque des mouvements de la contestation en Amérique par le biais de la diffusion de la télévision parmi les familles américaines (50% environ d'entre elles avaient un poste en 1954). Mais le recours à la paléotélévision ne peut pas donner de contributions importantes à la compréhension de ces mêmes mouvements en Italie : elle y était moins répandue, avait beaucoup moins d'heures d'émission, avait une seule chaîne au début et au maximum deux, etc ; et de toute façon beaucoup d'autres stimulations (la contagion étrangère, p.ex) se sont manifestées. La néotélévision en revanche a constitué un changement rapide qui a concerné tous les aspects (heures d'émission, nombre de chaînes,etc), donc ont peut s'attendre à une ultérieure perte de prestige des adultes, mais dans une forme différente par rapport à la contestation. L' « effet Chomsky » peut intégrer l' « effet Meyrowitz ». Selon Chomsky, les médias qui vivent de publicité doivent « produire » (je dirais : attirer, sélectionner, former) leur public, qu'ils devront « vendre aux annonceurs ». Les grilles de la néo-télévision seront donc au service des exigences des ces derniers. Il ne s'agit certes pas d'une idée nouvelle, ni d'une idée de Chomsky seulement, qui l'emploie de façon apodictique dans sa polémique contre les media mainstream : elle est partagée entre autres par A. Pilati avec une intention décidemment apologétique (cf. §.8). Naturellement cet « effet » est encore moins déterminable de manière scientifique, car la formation concerne notamment en tant que telle la longue période, est le résultat de trop de facteurs croisés et ses conséquences sont difficilement prévisibles, sinon carrément imprévisibles. Néanmoins les attitudes des italiens envers la publicité et les marques ont changé depuis de façon si radicale (cf sondages Eurisko) que l'on ne peut que les mettre en relation avec le développement contemporain de la néotélévision. En outre la publicité adressée aux enfants vise à en faire des consommateurs autonomes par rapport à leurs parents.

Since pension schemes-along with health care and education-absorb the largest amount of social expenditure in all countries, their reform has a potentially major impact both on the fiscal situation of the state and on the life chances of citizens who stand to win or lose from new arrangements. This makes pension reform a highly controversial issue; and, except for the addition of new programmes and benefits, major restructuring of existing pension systems has been extremely rare in advanced industrial democracies. It was also rare in Latin America before the 1980s and 1990s. But there has been a great deal of experimentation within the region during the past decade. This paper examines the larger economic, social and political context of Latin American pension reform and compares experiences in different countries of the region with options available in Western European societies during the same period. The authors argue that the type of pension reform undertaken in Latin America has been an integral part of the structural adjustment programmes pursued by Latin American governments, under the guidance of international financial institutions (IFIs). Although there was a range of possible remedies to the problems of pension systems in different Latin American countries, neo-liberal reformers and the international financial institutions preferred privatization over all others. They claimed that privatization would be superior to other kinds of reform in ensuring the financial viability of pension systems, making them more efficient, establishing a closer link between contributions and benefits and promoting the development of capital markets-thus increasing savings and investment. And they were able to push through some of their suggestions for reform in spite of considerable opposition from pensioners, trade unions and opposition political parties. Interestingly enough, their pressure proved least effective in the more democratic countries of the region. In Costa Rica, for example, citizens preferred to reform the public system-eliminating the last pockets of privilege for public sector workers and ensuring that new levels of contribution would be adequate to provide minimum benefits for the aged and infirm. In Uruguay, citizens forced a public referendum, through which they rejected a proposal for privatization. At a later stage, they did permit the introduction of private investment accounts, but not at the cost of eliminating the public programme. In Argentina and Peru, after the legislature refused to authorize partial privatization, this was eventually pushed through by presidential decree. Only in Chile and Mexico has there been a complete shift to private pension funds-but, in both cases, influential sectors of the elite, including the military, have been allowed to keep their previous, publicly managed group funds. Looking at the only privatized pension system in existence long enough to allow for some assessment of its consequences-that of Chile-the authors find that many of the claims made by supporters of privatization are not substantiated by the evidence. The first discrepancy between neo-liberal predictions and the reality of Chilean pension reform has to do with efficiency. All previous claims to the contrary, private individual accounts have proven more expensive to manage than collective claims. In fact, according to the Inter-American Development Bank, by the mid-1990s administration of the Chilean system was the most expensive in Latin America. The second disproved claim involves yield. When administrative costs are discounted, privately held and administered pension funds in Chile show an average annual real return of 5.1 per cent between 1982 and 1998. Furthermore high fees and commissions-charged at a flat rate on all accounts-have proven highly regressive. When levied against a relatively modest retirement account, for example, these standard fees reduced the amount available to the account holder by approximately 18 per cent. When applied to the deposit of an individual investing 10 times more, the reduction was slightly less than 1 per cent. The third discrepancy involves competition. Although it was assumed that efficiency within the private pension fund industry would be associated with renewed competitiveness-while the public pension system represented monopoly-the private sector has in fact become highly concentrated. The three largest pension fund administrators in Chile handle 70 per cent of the insured. And to reduce advertising costs, public regulators are limiting the number of transfers among companies that any individual can make. A fourth unfulfilled promise of privatization in Chile has to do with expansion of coverage. It was assumed that the existence of private accounts would increase incentives for people to take part in the pension sc heme, but in fact this has not happened. Coverage and compliance rates have remained virtually constant. A fifth major claim was that the conversion of the public pension system into privately held and administered accounts would strengthen capital markets, savings and investment. But a number of studies have recently concluded that, at best, this effect has been marginal. And finally, the dimension of gender equity within a fully privatized pension scheme is being subjected to increasing scrutiny. Women typically earn less money and work fewer years than men. Therefore, since pension benefits in private systems are strictly determined by the overall amount of money contributed to them, women are likely to receive considerably lower benefits. Public pension systems, in contrast, have the possibility of introducing credits for childcare that reduce this disadvantage. Sweden is an example of countries that have embarked on this course. In the latter part of the paper, Huber and Stephens widen their comparative framework to include recent pension reforms in advanced industrial countries. There, where economic crisis was not as severe and where pressure from international financial institutions was not significant, much broader options for reform were available. In fact, although long-established systems were under stress, no developed country opted for complete privatization. Complex measures were taken to strengthen the funding base of national pension systems, including changes in investment procedures and changes in rules for calculating pension benefits. Reforms also increased retirement age, as well as the number of years required to qualify for a full pension. But even the most thoroughgoing reforms retained a central role for public schemes in ensuring old-age benefits. In conclusion, the authors consider steps that can be taken to craft pension reforms with more desirable results than those obtained to date in Latin America. They recommend measures that address the problem of an aging population by increasing the ability of each generation to pay for its own pensions-rather than relying primarily on the contributions of preceding generations of insured workers. Pension payments should be invested in a variety of financial instruments and benefits must ultimately be related to the yields obtained. Such a strategy does not require introduction of privately managed, individually held, investment funds. On the contrary, risk is lessened by relying instead on collectively managed funds, in which accounts can either be identified with individuals or-more equitably-with generations of contributors. Reformed public pension systems should also contain minimum 'citizenship pensions' that guarantee subsistence income in old age to all individuals as a matter of right. Such a measure, financed from general tax revenue rather than from personal contributions, is not beyond the means of medium income countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. In fact, some Nordic countries introduced citizenship pensions when their GNP per capita was lower than that of most Latin American countries today.

The crisis of authority in the U.S.S.R. (1988 - July 1991).
After a preliminary reference to the ideological options open to Mikhail Gorbachev, initiator of the break-up of Stalinism, and the mistrust which be inspires, both among some of his opponents as well as among right-wing conservatives, the author considers the recent evolution of the Soviet Union, from the monopoly of Party rule to the difficult birth of a pluralistic regime.
He first raises the question of the Party's attitude to perestroika. Article 6 of the Constitution of 1977, which aknowledges the leading role of the Party, was reluctantly annulled by Gorbachev, but annuled it was, thus leaving the way open for pluralism. Condemnation of factionalism within the body of the Party has not prevented the emergence of various "tendencies" (particularly the democratic Platform and the marxist Platform) which find official expression. Similarly, political and social groupings, independent of authority, began to proliferate : from groupings moved by a common principle, for example tne Safeguarding of the national heritage, or the defense of the environment, they rapidly became popular fronts, lending the system a de facto pluralism which would only later enjoy a de jure existence.
This spontaneous development took shape first of all in the Baltic countries, and then with increasing momentum spread to all the republics. In parallel with this, the communist Party leadership initiated a reform of the political system, which found expression in the semi-free elections of March 1989, marked by the defeat of various party and State notables. This was the beginning of a multi-party system, there having been two major opposing tendencies during the campaign for the regional elections in the spring of 1990 : the democratic Russia bloc (liberal) and the patriotic Russian bloc (conservative), surrounded by a multiplicity of organizations of the most diverse and constantly evolving tendencies. The charge levelled against them is that they have no autonomous ideas or initiative, and have only one single programme : mass rejection of the Party apparatus. Some observers are of the opinion that a deep schism will develop within the CPSU, and that this will give rise to a real multi-party system. The first stage of this development has just begun, with the movement for democratic reforms, which was launched in July 1991 by frontline reformers.
The other major problem which arises is that of the preservation or the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The authority of the Center is in question, and already six republics have decided to leave the union, proclaiming their sovereignty loud and long (the three Baltic states, Armenia, Georgia and Moldavia). But although the right of scission is officially acknowledged, its implementation is a vast battleground (see the law of 3rd April 1990). The upsurge of centrifugal forces has led the republics, one after the other,
to proclame their sovereignty (primacy of republican laws over federal laws, economic autonomy, ownership of the soil and mineral deposits, etc.) or their outright indépendance. Autonomous Republics and territories followed suit, opposing the authorities of the republics to which they belonged. Inter-ethnic conflict broke out all over.
The dispute over federal authority led to a "way over laws", setting the Centre at odd with republics resolved to insist on recognition of their rights (ownership of all the ressources found on their territory, freedom to exploit these resources, etc.). In this context, the question of finance and the budget had pride of place, together with that of material and technological supplies. The entire supply system was disorganized, with the republics refusing to carry out the orders of the State, or to deliver consumers' goods outside of their frontiers, in order to avoid a worsening of their own shortages. The Soviet government tried to combat the supply problems, at least in part, by setting up commodity markets. A series of economic programms was worked out, including V. Pavlov's anti-crisis plan (April 1991) which was adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, but it is not entirely clear how the economic responsabilities will be apportioned among the Central authorities, the republics and the lower-rank administrative bodies, and what will be the share of the state and private sectors. Also, it is not known how he proposes to overcome the present crisis, and how long this will take.
Another major source of discord is the army and the police. The republics demand the right to raise armed forces, and to assume the responsability for maintaning order within their territory. Certain of them, who have been the victims of attacks by the special forces of the Ministry of Interior, the OMON, have organized militias and defense groups, wich are virtually republican armies in embryo.
In the end, there was an overriding necessity for redefining the Union, and the first version of the new Union Treaty was adopted by referendum on the 17th March 1991. A slightly modified version of it was published on the 19th June, but neither the one nor the other gives a very clear idea of the respective areas of competence and the common areas of competence of the Centre and the constituent republics of the Union (and still less of the fate in store for secessionist republics). On the other hand, one can be sure that the Treaty will be the source of innumerable controversies and disputes, especially on the particularly explosive issue of the budget, taxation and the distribution of ressources. In the final part, the author ventures some thoughts on the future. He sets perestroika in the continuing context of the history of the Russian empire, recalling that the demands made (individual freedoms and democracy, self-determination and decolonization) were already those of the protagonists of the Russian democratic revolution of February-March 1917, which was "taken over" by the Bolshevik coup d'Etat. Now that the empire has fallen victim to its contradictions and weaknesses, and finally disintegrated, what will take its place ? The cure prescribed by the Union Treaty seems ill-adapted to the task, and several outcomes are possible : a resolute commitment to the way of democracy and decolonization, a return to an authoritarian régime but one establishing a market economy, the option of passivity while waiting for a solution "which will come of itself, or a return to thorough-going, tough dictatorship accompanied by a blood bath. If Gorbachev does not once more take his courage in both hands, and proceeds to decolonize the empire, however slow and piecemeal the process, others will do it for him. And in that case, we may fear the worst.