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Gerade in den letzten Wochen haben Frauen im politischen Leben Polens Präsenz gezeigt, als Tausende von ihnen auf die Straßen gegangen sind. Langsam steigen in den letzten Jahren die Zahlen der Frauen im Parlament und in politischen Führungsfunktionen. Es geht aber längst nicht nur um Zahlen. Von einer gleichberechtigten Teilhabe sind Frauen in der polnischen Politik noch weit entfernt. Frauen sind in Führungsfunktionen deutlich unterrepräsentiert, aber ein Wandel hat begonnenEinerseits sind Frauen in einigen Positionen deutlich unterrepräsentiert, wie die polnische Präsidentschaftswahl 2020 kürzlich zeigte. Unter insgesamt 11 Kandidaten war eine Frau vertreten, die letztlich auch durch einen Mann ersetzt wurde. Nach dem neusten Umbau der polnischen Regierung im Herbst 2020 sitzt im ganzen Kabinett nur eine Frau. Auch im polnischen Außenministerium befindet sich schon seit Monaten keine Frau mehr auf der Führungsebene. Andererseits gab es in den dreißig Jahren nach der Wende 1989 drei Premierministerinnen, drei Sejm-Marschallinnen, eine Außenministerin, eine Chefin der Nationalbank und eine EU-Kommissarin. Das Verfassungstribunal wird von einer Frau geleitet. Auch einige polnische Städte, darunter auch die Großstädte Danzig, Łódź oder Warschau, wurden oder werden von Stadtpräsidentinnen regiert. Frauen prägen also durchaus die polnische Politik, obwohl die gläserne Decke in Polen gut sichtbar ist. Deutschland und Polen im VergleichWie in Deutschland wurde das Wahlrecht für Frauen auch in Polen 1918 eingeführt. Im Gegensatz zu Deutschland gibt es jedoch eine gesetzliche Regelung zu Quoten. Die Einführung von Geschlechterquoten auf den Wahllisten in 2011 war ein wichtiger Schritt in Richtung der Erhöhung der Präsenz und der Rolle von Frauen in der polnischen Politik. Seither müssen auf jeder Wahlliste des Europäischen Parlaments, des Sejms und von regionalen Parlamenten beide Geschlechter mit einer Quote von 35% vertreten sein. Diese Reform war nicht unumstritten und bis heute sind auch unter Frauen die Meinungen gespalten, ob dies rechtlich geregelt sein sollte. Aber auch Frauen, die ohne rechtliche Regelungen viel erreicht haben, geben zu, dass es ohne solche Regelwerke für Frauen noch schwieriger gewesen wäre an Einfluss zu gewinnen.Diese Regelung zeigt nämlich Wirkung. Bei der letzten Wahl des Sejm 2019 stellten Frauen 42,1% der Gesamtzahl der Kandidaten auf den Wahllisten dar, was etwas schlechter als vier Jahre (42,4%) und acht Jahre (43,5%) zuvor war. Dennoch sind diese Prozentsätze deutlich höher als in den Jahren 2005 und 2007, als die Quote noch nicht in Kraft getreten war. Damals lag der Frauenanteil bei etwa 23-24%. Auch bei den Ergebnissen der gewählten weiblichen Abgeordneten ist ein stetiges – wenn auch langsames – Wachstum zu beobachten. Das Ergebnis für 2019 (28,7%) ist eineinhalb Prozentpunkte höher als bei den vorherigen Wahlen (27,2%) und fast fünf Prozentpunkte höher als 2011 (23,9%). Vor Inkrafttreten des Quotengesetzes war der Anteil der Frauen im Parlament sogar noch niedriger (20,4%).Die Einführung der Quotenregelung hat polnischen Frauen auch auf der lokalen Ebene dazu verholfen, in die Parlamente zu kommen. Die Daten für die Wahlen der Woiwodschaftslandtage (Sejmiki) in den Jahren 2010, 2014 und 2018 zeigen eine Erhöhung des Frauenanteils auf den Wahllisten. Im Jahr 2010 stellten Frauen knapp 30 % aller für die Sejmiki Kandidierenden dar. Im Jahre 2014 waren das 44,5 % und 2018 45,8 %. Bedeutet dies, dass das Glas bereits halb voll ist? Nicht unbedingt. Man braucht keine besonderen mathematischen Fähigkeiten, um festzustellen, dass es noch lange dauern wird, bis Frauen in der polnischen Politik so zahlreich repräsentiert sind wie Männer. Sollte der Trend der vergangenen Jahrzehnten anhalten, würde sich der Anteil der im Sejm oder in den lokalen Parlamenten gewählten Frauen erst in 50-70 Jahren dem der Männer angleichen. Quoten und Funktionen versus EinflussIn den Debatten um die Frauenquoten ist nicht selten zu hören, dass nicht nur der Anteil der Frauen, sondern auch die Positionen, die sie innehaben, eine Rolle spielen. Auch hier sollte man aufpassen, da der erste Blick täuschen mag, wie die aktuelle Situation in Polen deutlich zeigt. Der Sejm wird derzeit von einer Sejm-Marschallin geführt. Sie ist seit 1989 bereits die dritte Frau, die diese Funktion besetzt. Im Sejm-Präsidium sitzen aktuell, mit ihr eingeschlossen, vier Frauen und zwei Männer. Zum Vergleich: Im Bundestag sind momentan drei Frauen und drei Männer vertreten. Ähnlich ist der Frauenanteil auch in den beiden Parlamenten der Europa- und Finanzausschüsse. In Polen sind es 22% und 24%, während es in Deutschland 23,1% und 22% sind. Die entscheidende Frage bleibt aber, inwieweit diese Frauen einen starken Einfluss auf die Politik haben. Trotz der hohen Ämter ist die Lage in Polen diesbezüglich nicht mehr so rosig. Stehen im Parlament wichtige Entscheidungen an, springt meistens ein Mann ein. Die Frauen der regierenden nationalkonservativen Recht und Gerechtigkeit (PiS) Partei geben eher die Worte des Parteivorsitzenden Jarosław Kaczyński wieder, anstatt sich selbst zu Wort zu melden. Keine der Frauen, die in der PiS vorübergehend Karriere gemacht haben, verfügt wirklich über Macht. Weder die Sejm-Marschallin, Elżbieta Witek, noch die Präsidentin des Verfassungstribunals, Julia Przyłębska, oder die ehemalige Regierungschefin, Beata Szydło – keine wird als Autorität wahrgenommen. Szydło, wie auch einige andere ehemalige PiS-Abgeordnete, aber auch die ehemalige PO-Premierministerin, Ewa Kopacz, sitzen heute im Europaparlament und sind nur selten und leise in Polen zu hören. Letztlich mag es aber auch dem persönlichen Charakter der genannten Personen, der Politik der Parteiführung oder der Einstellung zu Frauen in der Gesellschaft geschuldet sein, wie viel Bedeutung ihnen in ihren jeweiligen Positionen zukommt. Auch einige der von Jarosław Kaczyński geförderten Männer üben sehr wenig Einfluss aus, obwohl sie wichtige Posten innehaben.Bezüglich der heutigen polnischen Regierungspartei lässt sich jedoch sagen, dass sie die Frauenquoten und die Frauen selbst nicht ernst nimmt, was sich dementsprechend deutlich auf deren Rolle auswirkt. Das zeigt auch der Anteil der Frauen in der aktuellen polnischen Regierung. Während sich im aktuellen deutschen Bundeskabinett unter 16 Mitgliedern sieben Frauen befinden, findet man in Polen unter insgesamt 22 Personen (Premier, stv. Premierminister und Minister) im Kabinett nur eine Frau. Vom Frauenanteil war in der öffentlichen Debatte bei der Regierungsgründung und dem späteren Umbau in Polen keine Rede, wohingegen in Deutschland thematisiert wurde, wie viele Frauen Angela Merkel an der Regierung beteiligt. Außenpolitik bleibt MännersacheWie in Deutschland gibt es auch in Polen immer noch bestimmte Bereiche, in denen wirklich wenige Frauen an wichtigen Stellen vertreten sind. Einer davon ist die Außenpolitik. Viel schlechter als in der Bundesrepublik sieht in Polen die Frauenverteilung im Außenausschuss des Parlaments aus – dort sitzt keine Frau im Präsidium und generell beträgt der Anteil der Frauen gerade mal 16,7% (in Deutschland 26,7%). Wenn es um die außenpolitischen Debatten geht, sind jedoch in beiden Ländern keine Frauen öffentlich wahrnehmbar. Theoretisch ist die Anzahl der Frauen in beiden Außenministerien hoch; dennoch ist die Zahl der polnischen Diplomatinnen auf den höchsten Posten sehr gering. Auf der Führungsebene des Ministeriums befindet sich derzeit keine Frau; Frauen sind vor allem in leitenden Positionen im Bereich der Verwaltung vertreten. In der Regierung der Bürgerplattform (2007 bis 2015) waren wiederum in den wichtigsten Abteilungen sehr viele Frauen in Führungspositionen zu finden, so auch in den Abteilungen für Wirtschaft und Sicherheit, die oft als Männersache gelten. Damals wurden die polnischen Verhältnisse im Vergleich zu den deutschen viel positiver beurteilt.Deutliche Unterschiede sind in Polen auch im Bereich der Außenpolitik zwischen Think Tanks und Hochschulen sichtbar. In den Think Tanks sind das Bewusstsein für Gleichberechtigung und die Anstrengungen, Frauen nicht zu diskriminieren, relativ hoch und es werden Lösungen entwickelt, um familiäre und berufliche Verpflichtungen miteinander zu vereinbaren. An den Hochschulen treten hingegen nach wie vor deutliche Formen der Diskriminierung auf und über Maßnahmen für die Gleichstellung von Frauen wird selten nachgedacht. Jedoch hat sich auch hier die Lage in den letzten Jahren verbessert. Immer noch zu geringe SichtbarkeitDer immer noch zu geringe Frauenanteil in Behörden und Vertretungen sowie die geringe Bedeutung, der sich Frauen in bestimmten Funktionen erfreuen, führen dazu, dass auch ihre Repräsentanz in den politischen Debatten viel zu niedrig ausfällt. Im breit gefächerten polnischen öffentlichen Raum dominieren Männer immer noch deutlich. Das zeigen vor allem auch die wenigen weiblichen Vertreter bei Diskussionsveranstaltungen, wichtigen Treffen oder als Kommentatorinnen in den Medien. Der Grund dafür ist, dass sich der Großteil der Frauen auf den unteren und mittleren Entscheidungsebenen bewegen, wo die Arbeitsintensität am höchsten, der reale Einfluss jedoch eher gering ist. Am Ende wird ein Mann eingeladen, weil die Frau "nur" seine Stellvertreterin ist, oder, wie oben schon erwähnt, nicht als entscheidungsfähig wahrgenommen wird. Dies hat sich unter der PiS-Regierung leider weiter verschlechtert.Genauso wichtig wie die Repräsentanz und der Frauenanteil ist es, dass diejenigen Frauen, die es in einflussreiche Positionen geschafft haben oder schaffen wollen, sich hierfür nicht mehr als Männer bemühen müssen. Auch das ist leider noch oft in beiden Ländern der Fall. Hoffnung macht, dass sich in jüngeren Generationen positive Tendenzen entwickeln: Einerseits treten junge Frauen viel selbstbewusster auf, andererseits unterstützen ihre Partner, Vorgesetzten, Mitarbeiter und Kollegen sie dabei. Zusätzlich engagieren sich zunehmend mehr männliche Partner im Haushalt, was den Weg zu mehr Verantwortung in Politik und Gesellschaft für Frauen ebnet. Der Text erschien in Dezember 2020 in der Zeitschrift "Civis"www.civis-mit-sonde.de
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NDI's Chris Fomunyoh is once again joined by Ambassador Johnnie Carson as they discuss the steps that can be taken to strengthen democracy. They continue their conversation with their thoughts on the key challenges and opportunities facing Africa this year. Find us on: SoundCloud | Apple Podcasts | Spotify | RSS | Google Play Johnnie Carson: When female voices are not heard, the conversation is crippled, the policy is crippled, the institutions are crippled and the results are crippled. Chris Fomunyoh: I'm Chris Fomunyoh, senior associate and regional director for Central and West Africa at the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, NDI. Welcome to this edition of DemWorks.
Again we're joined by Ambassador Johnnie Carson, a proud member of the board of directors of The National Democratic Institute, NDI with a 37 year career in the U.S. Foreign Service focus on Africa. In our previous episode, you spoke about the risk of back sliding. So for this episode, we will focus on the steps that can be taken to strengthen democracy in Africa.
I'd like us to pivot a little bit to the Sahel because in Tanzania we see the back sliding that's coming from political actors themselves, but there's something happening in the Sahel, which is a region in which we see a lot of political commitment to democratic governance, whether it's from the leaders and activists in Niger Republic, in Burkina Faso and in Mali, but at the same time these countries are coming under tremendous pressure from violent extremists who are coming across the desert and destabilizing what would be an emerging democracy and what concerns do you have and how do you think organizations like NDI, like USIP and others that have the self-power expertise, so to speak can contribute to the efforts to counter violent extremism like Sahel and also the whole of Africa?
JC: Chris you're absolutely right and we should all be concerned about outside forces that can come in and destabilize a country, its politics, its economy and its society and across the Sahel we in fact see this happening. The challenges to stability, to democracy to holding free and transparent and creditable elections and having democratic systems that work, are not only challenged by sometimes authoritarian leaders seeking to maintain power and control, we also can see this emerging as a result of exogenous forces coming in from outside, and here we see non-state actors undermining stability across the Sahel, which is creating tension for democracies and tensions for states.
I think one of the things that is absolutely critical in addressing the problems with the Sahel is for government to reconnect with their citizens, to put in place the kinds of services that citizens are looking for and are demanding and expecting. They need to be responsive to the needs that they, citizens believe are not there and they have to have these connections in order to build up resilience, to build up strength against the ideologies and to the negative forces that are brought in by extremist groups.
It is extremists groups across the Sahel are taking advantage of the absence of good services and good connectivity between government and citizens and one of the things that must accompany the security response is in fact a development and government response. Security alone cannot end the problems in the Sahel. It's an important ingredient but the most important ingredient is government going in and establishing responsible connections, providing services, education, healthcare, sanitation, water cattle feeding stations and services that citizens require and are being deprived of.
So one of the things that must be hand in hand and be out front is not the military response and the security response but the governance response, the social service response and if that is absent, the security response will be deficient and will not work.
CF: In fact, I'm so thankful you say that, because I know that you and other members of our board, Secretary Albright, in particular the chair of our board, you've been emphasizing reinforcing this message about democracy and development component as part of the toolkit in conquering violent extremism and in fact, that's the approach that NDI is taking to its work in the Sahel because we currently have ongoing programs in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, and our focus, the main focus of that piece of work is on people, processes and the politics and trying to create platforms where governments can reconnect with citizens at a grassroots level.
So in a number of cases we've set up platforms where civil society with legislatures and members of the executive branch, including representatives of the security services get together regularly to figure out what the challenges are in various communities and how to foster inter-communal dialogue and better relationships between the security services and the populations that they seek to serve, because you may remember there was a UN study that said that in many of the cases where violent extremism persist, that 70% of the people who join extremist organizations, are reacting to poor performance by security services and you have paid a lot of attention to Nigerian and the whole Boko Haram phenomenon.
I don't know how this would fit into our conversation with regards to the Sahel as well.
JC: I think it also very pertinent for Nigeria, and I too have seen studies of some very distinguished organizations, Mercy Corps and others that talk about why people are recruited and indeed, the authoritarian sometimes brutal nature of security forces towards communities that they should be protecting drives individuals away from the government and into the hands of Boko Haram.
Even the origin of the current violence in Northern Nigeria has its origins in the brutal extrajudicial killing of Boko Haram's first leader in 2009. His apprehension, his questioning, his interrogation, torture and mistreatment were all recorded on someone's cellphone and became widely seen throughout the country and throughout the north. Two years later, after that event in 2009 we saw and upsurge in 2011 and the activities of Boko Haram and indeed people continued to say that the brutal nature in which the security forces sought to root out Boko Haram, in fact generated more recruits for Boko Haram than it did for support for the government's efforts.
It is absolutely critical, it's absolutely critical that security forces recognize that they have a responsibility to protect the civil liberties and the human rights of the citizens of the state that they are protecting and that the way they treat the individuals in areas that they go into, may have an impact on their ability to ultimately win the conflict, but one thinks of Nigeria and particularly of the North East and there again weak institutions of corruption of lack of social services are all playing a major part in why the conflict in that region continues.
In the north east of Nigeria particularly and the three most affected states, Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. Those three states have the lowest social indicators of any of Nigeria's 36 states, less access to education, to healthcare, to water resources and to jobs and access and this all plays out as well. Governments needs to be responsive to their citizens and while a security response is important, governance and providing social services and the needs to citizens to build resilience is critical as well.
CF: This seems like a good place to take a short break. For well over 35 years NDI has been honored to work side by side with courageous and committed pro-democracy activists and leaders around the world to help contribute to develop the institutions practices and skills necessary for democracy's success.
I realize it's many countries to cover but in the few minutes that are left, I just see if you have any parting words for four countries that we haven't really focused that much on and those are Ethiopia, Kenya, The Democratic Republic of Congo and we'll exit with Cameroon. What are your thoughts?
JC: My thoughts on Ethiopia. It is absolutely essential that those of us who support a democracy and democratic progress lend all of our efforts to those of the Ethiopian government to ensure that the democratic experiment that is underway is successful. Prime Minister Abiy won the Nobel Prize for bringing about peace with Eritrea but the more important thing is that we, outside step up our effort to help him ensure that his legislative elections, this year, are successful and that we do what we can to strengthen his country's democratic progress.
He has appointed and outstanding leader, Birtukan, former opposition leader, spent many years in jail as his country's election commissioner. We need on the outside to provide the kind of technical and financial and advocacy support that she might need to put in place the architecture for running the country's elections. It will in fact be the first real serious elections in that country since the collapse of the Derg in the early 1990s. So it's important that we help do this.
Ethiopia is Africa's second most populous country behind Nigeria and it's important that we help democracy there. It's also a key and strategic state in the region bordering a number of other countries that will look to the success of what happens here. So we need to support.
Kenya, will have elections next year. It is important that there be a continuation in the improvement of the country's electoral agencies. The shadow of the flawed and failed and controversial and violent elections of 2007 and 2008 continue to be a shadow. The controversies associated with the last elections and court decisions there continue to hang over. It is important to continue to support civil society, support the electoral commission and work with the Kenyan government to ensure an outcome.
It appears very clearly that President Kenyatta wants to leave a positive legacy of progress, economically, politically and electorally. This will be a challenge but we should support the process moving forward. The features are still there.
CF: In fact, I should say before end up with the last two countries that for listeners, Ethiopia has got a parliamentary system of government. That's why the parliamentary elections are extremely important, the national elections for Ethiopia and also with regards to Kenya, as you say, President Uhuru Kenyatta would like to leave a good legacy. He's coming to the end of his second term and NDI working with partners on the continent has been very strong on the issue constitutionalism, respect for rule of law. In fact, we had a continent wide conference in Niamey, Niger Republic last October on the whole question of presidential term limits and we'll be having a second conference in Botswana in June to discuss term limits with former African heads of states and various other partners on the continent.
Just to say that, as leaders relinquish power when their terms come to an end, they help consolidate and strengthen democratic practices and institutions. So, with the two remaining countries-
JC: I applaud President Kenyatta for saying very early on that he would adhere to the constitution, he would serve two terms and step down. This is an important message for the most important country in East Africa, especially looking at the neighboring states, particularly Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda where leaders there have found ways to extend themselves in office. He recognizes the importance of transition at the top and allowing the citizens of the country to select new leadership on a constitutional basis rather than trying to alter the constitution to eliminate term limits, age limits and perpetuate themselves in power.
So I hope others in the region are in fact looking at Kenya's model. One jumps across to West Africa and looks at President Paul Biya who's been in power for three decades, plus shows no desire whatsoever to leave office. Here is a man who has lost touch with his citizens and the communities of his country and because he has lost touch with his citizens, because there have been structural deficiencies and weaknesses and the institutions that he is responsible for, we now see a country that is suffering from three or four major political crisis, crisis with the English speaking portion of this country in the south west, the emergence of Boko Haram and radicalism across the border from Nigeria in the north west and problems of herders and farmers driven by drought and climate conditions.
President Biya has lost touch with the needs of his citizens and his government has not been responsive to anyone but himself and a small political elite. I think it is important for the international community to point out the failures and the flaws of his governance, the corruption that underpins it and to support those internally who are pushing for a constitution and political policies that fundamentally change the nature and structure of society, political architecture in society.
CF: You're so right, because that's one country that it's got tremendous potential but that it's not pulling its weight at all and because of its strategic location, invariably weakens other countries in the central Africa sub region, as well as in West Africa too and it's now taking full advantage of what could be real opportunities to improve the wellbeing of its citizens.
We'll be right back after this quick message.
And let's end with the country right in the heart of the continent, The Democratic Republic of Congo. I was in Kinshasa in October and met with political leaders and opinion leaders across the board, civil society, religious leaders who are very powerful in the Congo, very influential and I came away, I should say, a little more optimistic than I was going in. I was quite apprehensive given what has transpired in the 2018 presidential elections but after talking to the Congolese, I got a sense that a genuine attachment to reform.
Everybody wants some reforms of the political process or the electoral process and the key question is whether they are going to be able to set aside their personal agendas and actually get together to help this country, which has got tremendous resources and tremendous potential get back on its feet. I was very impressed by the fact that most of the leaders in Congo are pretty young. I know that you and I have talked about Congo for many, many times and when you were still in the administration you had to deal with some of their crisis.
I don't know what you take is on the present leadership and the present challenges but also the opportunities that present themselves in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
JC: Let me say that The Democratic Republic of the Congo has more unrealized potential than any other large state in Africa and that potential has continued to be in held in check and not realized because of the poor nature of the politics that have occurred there since the 1960s.
The 2018 elections were deeply flawed and irregular and not representative, I think, of the vote of the people. The one thing that one can say about the process that it did lead to President Kabila stepping down and a new younger president, Tshisekedi coming into power. There was immediately after the election a strong feeling that Tshisekedi was going to be instrument of Kabila going forward in that his leadership and his authority and his ability to do things would be substantially constrained. Tshisekedi has shown some degree of independence.
It is again important to recognize that there is little we can do to rerun that election or to reverse it but there is something that all of us can do going forward, and that to put pressure on President Tshisekedi to ensure that the electoral commission is strengthened, it has more independence, more technical capacity and more of an ability to deliver a more responsible, fair and transparent election going forward.
It is also important that he continue the fight against corruption, that he begin to put in place the kind of economic reforms that are going to unleash the potential of the Congo and to provide the people, The Democratic Republic of the Congo an opportunity to realize so many of the opportunities that they have been denied in the past. He has shown more independence than I thought but it is important that he not stop, that he continue to move forward, that he open up political space and continue to open it up for civil society, for the opposition, for the media, that he not constrain but unleash the country's potential and that he continue to show both in reality and fact his independence away from Kabila and those who were around him in the past.
He will be judged on the next four years very keenly, but it's important that the institutions of democracy to the extent that we can help civil society strengthen them, that they be nurtured and pushed forward. Elections and democracy...Democracy doesn't depend essentially, solely on elections. It is institutions that must be strengthened and we can help the DRC and civil society move those forward.
Again, working effectively with religions groups, Catholic Church, a very powerful instrument, working with women's groups, with working youth groups across the DRC and working with an emerging entrepreneurial class of young Congolese as well. We have to nurture and strengthen and push them forward. These next elections will be able to tell us whether there's been progress. President Tshisekedi needs to continue to move forward.
CF: Thank you very much Ambassador Johnnie Carson. It's really been an honor to have you do this tutor for us on the entire continent. Of course there still would always be ground to cover. As you were speaking, I thought about what late President John F Kennedy said about democracy as a never ending endeavor, and so NDI and similar organizations will continue to work side by side with our African partners to make sure that we can support them, give them the support and share experiences that they need so that we can all collectively, continue to work to strengthen and support democracy in countries like the DRC, Ethiopia, Sudan and across the entire continent.
Thank you also for being a member of our board of directors. We are extremely proud of that and extremely proud of the partnership that NDI has with USIP and hope that our two organizations would continue to work together to support the growth of democracy across Africa and to our listeners, can I just say thank you for sharing in this edition of DemWorks, to follow our next podcast. Please check us out on our website www.NDI.org.
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Summer is my favorite time of year in the Gallatin valley, perhaps because it is so fleeting (which makes it ever-so precious). I hike, bike, and run about town in the wonderful sunlight, surrounded by blue skies and hot, dry heat. Of course, this weekend, my beloved Bozeman has been choked with smoke from a wildfire out in Three Forks. One of the costs of living in Montana, and the West more generally, is the fire season which is so essential to life and renewal here. Of course, that fire season has been getting worse and longer, which makes it harder on me when I exercise outside due to my asthma, a condition I've learned to manage throughout my life.
Over the weekend, I had time to reflect on forest fires and how sound public policy might help bring them under some control. I revisited Senator Daines' recent op-ed in the Billings Gazette discussing wildfire and forest reform, which I read with interest. First, Daines hits the nail on the head concerning a critical challenge facing the US Forest Service and other federal agencies responsible for managing healthy forests: money. The US Forest Service's budget is burdened with ever-increasing fire-fighting costs, which drain its ability to spend on other important activities such as trail, campground, and facility maintenance. Daines' solution to this problem is his Wildfire Disaster Funding Act "which ensures large forest fires are treated and funded as the true natural disasters they are, similar to hurricanes or tornadoes." I hope the bill—which Daines is co-sponsoring along with Senator Tester—finds a solid reception among critical allies of both parties, particularly those senators representing East Coast states hard hit by Hurricane Sandy. (Montanans also should hope that they don't hold then-Congressman Steve Daines' very first roll calls against him, given that he voted against a bill funding Sandy relief efforts.)
But what troubled me profoundly was the blame the senator placed for the "deteriorating conditions" that are responsible for increased wildfire risk. Senator Daines notes that we are at risk due to beetle kill in our forests "being left untreated"—a risk that he says is compounded by "years of inadequate forest management practices, spurred by obstructionist litigation from fringe groups and excessive regulations."
Really? Well, I guess it's time for me to whip out some "fancy" social science and give a little lesson in the funnel of causality. This is a theory developed by Campbell et al in their path-breaking work The American Voter, published in 1960. Essentially, Campbell et al argue that while the proximate decision influencing how someone votes is a person's issue position, those issue positions are the product of a person's party identification, which itself (often?) is a function of how the person was socialized into politics by his or her parents.
In other words, there's a causal chain one needs to follow to understand the best and most powerful predictor of voting behavior, and that predictor is partisan identification—a bundle of attitudes and beliefs that is not immediately proximate to the voting decision. Issue positions don't really matter—it's the partisanship behind those positions that do.
Now let's apply the funnel of causality to Daines' argument on wildfires: According to his op-ed piece, the proximate causes for the risk we face, which are the tired trope of "government mismanagement" and "fringe environmentalists," are the real problem Montanans face and the ones that require attention and redress.
But one must ask: Why is there more beetle kill in the first place? And why has the size of wildfires been on the rise in the United States, Canada, and globally—both as the charts below indicate and a recent study demonstrated? Oh, right: Because the warmer winters associated with global warming mean fewer Pine Bark beetles are dying off, enabling them to leave behind more dead trees strewn about waiting to burn up. All of this is well-documented Andrew Nikiforuk's Empire of the Beetle. And, again, a recent study demonstrates that increasing temperatures lead to more wildfire activity globally.
Total Hectares Burned by Wildfires in Canada, 1970-2013. Source: Canadian National Forestry Database
Total Acres Burned in the US (in millions of Acres), 1960-2014. Source: CRS Report, "Federal Funding for Wildfire Control and Management," July 5, 2011 and National Interagency Fire Center.
Daines is giving far too much credit to proximate causes: lawsuits and mismanagement. The root problem is global warming. We need to address that if we really want to get a handle on our wildfire risk. And to address that we, as global citizens, need to come to grips with our role in global warming via our insatiable appetite for carbon emissions.
Unfortunately, Senator Daines voted against an amendment earlier this year during the Keystone XL debate acknowledging the human role in climate change and, when running for the House, indicated in an interview a few years ago that the "jury is still out" on the role of CO-2 emissions in our ever-warming world.
The jury is not out. Ninety-seven percent of studies unambiguously endorse the notion that rising carbon dioxide levels, the result of human activity, are an important and substantial contributor to global warming. Check out the information yourself at NASA.
How many of you, when running a business or a household, place your bets on the 3 percent versus the 97 percent? If Senator Daines did this during his business career, I assure you, his career would have been much shorter and far less successful than it was. If I said it is only a "theory" that how people vote is a product largely of their partisanship, I'd be drummed out of the profession with good cause. The problem is that it is very hard for people to accept information that conflicts with their priors. Humans don't like cognitive dissonance, so instead, we reject information when it doesn't fit our beliefs. Worse, we search for justifications to confirm why that information is wrong and why what we believe is right. It is hard to overcome cognitive dissonance, but we--and those whom we elect to serve us--must.
The senator is a bright, articulate public servant. He is a graduate of Montana State, and has a degree in engineering. One would think that he would, as a man of science, make public policy on science and not advanced smoke-and-mirrors arguments about a very real threat our forests face from wildfire. How we fund fire fighting absolutely must change: Daines is right on that. But if we are really going to make our forests safer today and for future generations, we need to stop blaming red herrings and, instead, face the facts staring us straight in the face with regards to climate change.
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It has been a very exciting year for social protection! In 2019, my weekly social protection links newsletter reviewed 1042 materials in 43 editions. So here is a personal selection of papers articulated around 10 major themes. Enjoy!
1. Economic and other long-term effects
Daidone et al have a great article summarizing and explaining the economic effects of cash transfers in 7 African countries. Egger et al add another precious data point on the multiplier effects of cash transfers (I counted 12 such points for the moment): in Kenya, every $ injected generates $2.6 in the local economy.
Blattman et al show that after 5 years, a one-off cash grants in Ethiopia has fading effects. Similarly, in Malawi Baird et al estimate that the impact on reduced fertility of an unconditional cash transfers on adolescent girls rapidly vanished.
In Mexico, after 20 years of operations cash transfers ex-beneficiaries showed higher ownership of durable assets (Aguilar et al); 49.2% of them experienced upward mobility (Yaschine et al); they grew 2.8-4.1cm taller and have 5.3-5.7 more years of schooling than their parents (Gutierrez et al), with enrollment in secondary school increasing by 5-10 percentage points over grades 7-12 (Behrman et al). A 10-country review by Millan et al found that the evidence is strong on school completion, more mixed on learning, and limited on employment. Another paper by Millan et al estimate that 13 years after its inception, transfers in Honduras increased secondary education completion by 50%, but also rose the chance of migration by 3-7 percentage points.
2. Health, nutrition and education
Klein et al show that cash transfer participants in Buenos Aires showed higher success rates against tuberculosis (TB); yet Rudgard et al estimate that making transfers "TB-sensitive" would require an additional budget between $165M and $298M per country. Choko et al showed that in Malawi cash plus HIV self-test kits increased HIV anti-retroviral therapy compared to other solutions. Palermo et al find that in Ghana, combining cash and health measures increased enrolment in health insurance in the treatment group from an average of 37.4% to 46.6%.
In Ecuador, Moncayo et al show that a 1% increase in the coverage of cash transfers decreases mortality from malnutrition by about 3%. In Nigeria, Okeke and Abubakar estimate that cash reduced mortality of children in utero by at least 20%. Celhay et al found that cash increased the survival rates of birth cohorts exposed to the program by up to 14.7%. and Dow et al find that in the US, a 10% increase in the Earned Income Tax Credit or in the minimum wage reduces suicides between 3.6 and 5.5%.
In Ghana, Gelli et al found that the national school meals program improved stunting among children of 5-8 years (effect size: 0.12 standard deviations). Neufeld et al on the history of nutrition evidence on cash transfers in Mexico. And a paper by Evans and Yuan shows that girl-targeted versus general interventions in education seem to deliver similar gains, including featuring cash transfers both at the top and bottom among the most effective interventions.
3. Gender
Peterman et al summarize the impacts of safety nets on gender in Africa: safety nets perform well in reducing physical violence as well as improving psychological well-being, dietary diversity and savings. But changes in labor force participation are minimal. In terms of toolkits, FAO produced great guidelines on gender-sensitive cash transfers and public works.
A review of evidence on social assistance and intimate partner violence (IPV) by Hidrobo and Roy shows reductions in physical violence between 25-41% in Bangladesh, Ecuador, and Mali. Another brief by Heise summarizes results from 22 studies across 13 countries.
4. Crime
Tuttle shows that banning convicted drug felons from SNAP food stamps in the United States makes them more likely to return to jail. Sviatschi estimates that in Peru, cash transfers reduced drug production. And in Brazil, Machado et al find that Bolsa reduced homicide rate and hospitalizations due to violence by 8-25%.
5. Crises
Barca and Beazley estimate that it takes between 2 weeks to 14 months to scale up social protection in response to natural disasters. Bruck et al show that a new generation of 7 high-quality evaluations sheds light on social protection in fragile and displacement settings. Cherrier et al produced an excellent compendium on humanitarian-social protection linkages, while Seyfert et examine the trade-offs of integrating refugees into national safety nets.
6. Universality and targeting
A new book by Gentilini et al offers a framework to navigate the analytics, evidence and practices on universal basic income (UBI), while Banerjee et al discuss how UBI may address barriers like lack of credit, insurance or psychological factors among low-income people. Jolliffe et al show that SNAP, the American "floor for the poorest", has been sinking over the past 30 years.
ILO and UNICEF have an overview note on "universal" child grants present in 21 countries, while Kidd and Athias offer a critique of proxy means testing. In Indonesia, Tohari et al estimates that the poverty-based unified database of beneficiaries improved the chance of participating in 3 core programs by 117%, while Bah et al estimate that if all households were included in such database undercoverage would be reduced by one-third. Bonus: Ndiaye et al trace the evolution of the national social registry in Senegal.
7. Insurance and labor markets
Packard et al examines how social protection could be adapted to the changing nature of work, while Jorgensen and Siegel unveil social risk management 2.0. Guven shows that in Africa only 10.6% of Africa's working-age population contributes to pension schemes. The ILO has a fascinating "living document" laying out a number of options disaggregated by occupation.
A review of minimum wages in high-income countries by Dube finds "… muted effect of minimum wages on employment, while significantly increasing the earnings of low paid workers". However, a new compilation of evidence on minimum wage in low and middle-income countries by Neumark and Corella finds that "… when minimum wages are binding and enforced, and when they apply to vulnerable workers, the disemployment effects are most apparent".
8. Tech and financial inclusion
Gelb and Mukherjee take stock of lessons from India's biometric ID (Aadhaar) in providing inclusive services; Masino and Nino-Zarazua show that transitioning to electronic cash payments in Mexico increased households' access to formal financial services. In South Africa, however, Torkelson documents abuses in using cash transfers as loan collateral by a financial company delivering cash itself.
9. Political economy
Hickey et al have an amazing open-access book on the political economy of cash transfers in Africa. Mosec and Mo found that in Pakistan those receiving BISP cash transfers increased support for their political leaders and institutions, while in typhoon-hit Fiji Rios et al show that people receiving cash transfers are up to 20% more likely to be very satisfied with the government than non-recipients. In Brazil and Turkey, Zucco et al show that conditional transfers are only marginally more popular than similar unconditional transfers. Ciminelli et al find that reforms generating large short-term adverse distributional effects are associated with electoral costs for politicians. In Mexico, Cantu documents that cash-vouchers to be used in local supermarkets were provided in exchange for electoral support.
10. Cash plus and cash versus….
In Bihar, Khemani et al asked whether people prefer cash or other services: only 13% chose cash instead of spending on public health and nutrition; in contrast, if cash came in lieu of improving roads, preference for cash rose to 35% (see counter views). In Mozambique, De Walque and Valente compare the effects of a conditional cash transfer program with the sole provision of information to parents on school attendance: information provision is as large as 75% of the effect of the CCT.
Two papers – one on Ghana by Banerjee et al and another on Uganda by Sedlmayr et al – points to the power of combining cash transfers with assets and complementary measures (as opposed to individual components). Also, Carneiro et al evaluate an integrated cash program for 3,600 mothers in Northern Nigeria: after 2-4 years, the program reduced stunting by 8%. Bonus: Bedoya et al show that a package of transfers and assets in Afghanistan increased consumption by 30% and poverty fell from 82 to 62%.
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In my role as political analyst for MTN, I sat down on August 14 with Republican House candidate Ryan Zinke and asked him about releasing his full military records. In case you missed the interview, you can watch it here. I was promised during that interview, and afterwards by Zinke spokesperson Shelby DeMars, that I—along with the AP and Chuck Johnson of Lee Newspapers—would receive the complete set of records. I was also told that this would take some time.
It is now October 22, 2014, and the general election is less than two weeks away. In last night's House debate in Great Falls, John Adams of the Great Falls Tribune specifically asked state senator Zinke about a fitness report in 1999 that one other former Navy Seal suggests indicates some problems with Zinke's performance. Zinke did not provide a clear answer as to what was in that report, and suggested that Adams "was unjust, unfair, and shameless" for asking the question.
Adams' request was not shameless.Watch the exchange here.
I have, thus far, believed that the Zinke campaign would in good faith produce those records in a timely fashion. And I'm hopeful that they will still release those records. And yet, I still have not gotten what was promised. I, like John Adams, am beginning to wonder why.
But, if I may suggest, the problem is bigger than Ryan Zinke and his record as a Navy Seal. The problem hits directly at democratic discourse and accountability in an era when fewer and fewer candidates running for public office have extensive records in elected office. Yet, they ask US to credit them with those experiences as evidence they are suitable for service in higher public office. I believe Ryan Zinke, Steve Daines, John Lewis, and Amanda Curtis all should release as much of their employment records as possible to the press and the public. These experiences, they claim, will make them excellent public servants. If that's the case, then we—the public who choose them—should be able to make the judgment ourselves of those records.
I think there are three very good reasons for why we should expect transparency from our congressional candidates in this regard.
First, such transparency is not unusual for those seeking public employment of any kind. Take, for example, the information I have to generally produce when applying for academic jobs (both public and private). As a job candidate, I have produced the following for employers:
1. Transcripts (Graduate and undergraduate)
2. A copy of my diploma
3. My cv (an academic version of a resume)
4. References and letters of support from those references
5. Student evaluations of my teaching
6. A teaching statement
7. A research statement
8. Publications
Then, if I'm lucky enough to get a campus interview, I often have to give a research presentation and a teaching demonstration. All of this is to demonstrate that my academic credentials are real and that I am competent as a teacher and researcher.
And, I should say, that a request for my transcripts from Wisconsin or Indiana can be filled within 24 hours. Not more than two or three months.
In running for Congress, candidates use their records to bolster the case for why voters should vote for them and that they deserve the trust of voters. Candidates who have served in elected office often have extensive public records that voters can evaluate and pick apart—and even if they do not, the opposition is more than happy to do it for the voters.
Ryan Zinke's House campaign biography begins with the headline: Montana's Proven Leader. He highlights his accomplishments in nine paragraphs. One paragraph details his service in the Montana Senate. Five paragraphs focus on his "distinguished record" of military service. It is clear that this service as a Navy Seal is critical to how he would like voters to evaluate him.
Congressman Daines' campaign slogan is "More Jobs, Less Government" and much of his campaign pitch focuses on his experience in creating jobs—an experience he says begins with cutting government regulation and red tape. In his campaign biography of seven paragraphs, one full paragraph and the portion of another details his business experience. Only one full paragraph, by contrast, details his experience in Congress. Congressman Daines says he's a job creator. How exactly did he create jobs during his time at RightNow and how many of those jobs were created in Montana, in the United States, and in other countries?
Democratic candidates John Lewis and Amanda Curtis are not off the hook here. John Lewis spent his professional career working as a staffer for Senator Baucus, and on his campaign webpage, he notes that "working for Senator Max Baucus and with Montana veterans, John spearheaded legislation giving businesses incentives to hire veterans. What began as John's idea to better serve veterans is now the law of the land." We, as voters, should have access to the memos staffer Lewis wrote which demonstrate how central he was to this veterans legislation. Lewis should also ask that Senator Baucus release his personnel file so we can see the evaluations he received as a part of the Senator's staff in Washington and here in Montana. And Amanda Curtis, who touts her experience as a teacher, should demonstrate to us whether she excelled as a teacher or not.
The main point of all of this is not that Ryan Zinke was a bad Navy Seal, that Steve Daines didn't create jobs as part of an important hi-tech company, that John Lewis wasn't a competent Senate staffer, and Amanda Curtis wasn't a great teacher. The point is the voters deserve to have the ability to evaluate those claims for themselves absent a narrative constructed by the campaign, just as my fellow political scientists have the right to examine my academic record to help them decide—without my own spin—that I am the right person or not for their institution. We should be able to determine how distinguished a military career is, what makes job creator successful, and the whether the influence a Senate staffer has on legislative outcomes is substantial.
A second reason why these records should be made available is the nature of who is running for Congress. In the past, the common path for folks running for higher office was to spend considerable time working their way up through a series of public offices, building a public record that voters could evaluate. As our elected officials are increasingly coming from outside the public sphere or, if they do serve in the public eye, with much shorter tenures in office, we need to be able to assess those experiences. At least with public officials, there is a clear public record for all to see. Without a public track record, voters are left to the rhetoric of the candidates—who are clearly not unbiased—to make sense of those private employment experiences. At the very least, they should give us as much access to private records that we can get from those in public employ.
Finally, in an era of political polarization, it is even more important that voters have access to unbiased sources of information to help them make informed political judgments outside the spin room. Instead of blindly accepting what candidates or their opponents tell you, it is even more important to have metrics with which voters can independently judge the records, temperament, and fitness of their candidates for public office. And, even more important, an independent and free press must have access to these records to do just that.
Transparency helps us make better decisions and to have more trust in the democratic process. One of the most important New Deal reforms, in my judgment, was the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission which required publicly traded companies to release particular information in a timely and regular fashion about the company's operations and budgets. This information allows investors far more confidence when they participate while at the same time providing a somewhat level playing field for investors. This trust has allowed the creation of mutual funds and a retirement system funded largely by investments in the stock market. Shouldn't we demand the same kind of accountability and openness of those who wish to serve in public office? Shouldn't we demand more of and from them as investors in the democratic marketplace?
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John Dewey on the Horror of Making his Poetry Public
This April's Fools interview is a preview for 'The Return of the Theorists: Dialogues with Great Thinkers in International Relations' (ed. Ned Lebow, Peer Schouten & Hidemi Suganami), now available at Palgrave.
After various rounds of experimentation, two youthful IR scholars (the editor-in chief of this venture and Christian Bueger) bend space-time and access an alternate reality with the ambition to conduct an interview for Theory Talks with John Dewey. Dewey (1859-1952) was an American thinker often associated with a school of thought that has become known as American pragmatism. He is today largely known for his contributions to education studies, philosophy of science, and the theory of democracy. In this Talk, the young scholars sound out Dewey on what thinking tools his original worldview would provide for IR—after resolving a small embarrassment.
TT Dear Mr. Dewey. Thank you so much for your willingness to participate in this Talk. Theory Talks is an open-access journal that contributes to International Relations debates by publishing interviews with cutting-edge theorists. It is not often that Theory Talks is able to overcome space-time limitations and conduct a Talk with a departed theorist.
I am sorry—I think I have to interrupt you there…
TT Well, all right?
Yes, yes, the fact of the matter is that I am not a theorist and refuse to be associated with that label! To purify theory out of experience as some distinct realm, sirs, is to contribute to a fallacy that I have dedicated my life to combat! I am afraid that this venture of yours, of involving me in this Theory Talks, is stillborn.
TT Dear Professor Dewey—with all due respect, we are running ahead of matters here a little. The reason why we invited you is exactly for you to expound your ideas—and reservations—regarding theory, practice, and international relations. Would you be willing to bracket your concern for a minute? We promise to get back to it.
Well my dear sirs—it is that you insist on a dialogue—that restless, participative and dramatic form of inquiry that leads to so much more insight than books—and that you have travelled from far by means that utterly fascinate me, so I will give you the benefit of the doubt.
TT Thank you. And let us from the outset emphasize that by interviewing you for Theory Talks, we don't necessarily want to reduce your contribution to thought to the practice of theorizing. Isn't it also correct you have written poetry?
Now I am baffled a second time! I have never publicly attempted my hand at the noble art of the poetic!
TT It has to be said, Mr. Dewey, that the problem of what is and isn't public has perhaps shifted a bit since your passing away. That's something we'd like to discuss, too, but the fact of the matter is that what you have consistently consigned to the trashcan of your office at Columbia University has been just as meticulously recovered by 'a janitor with a long view'.
Oh heavens! You tell me I have been uncovered as a versifier? What of my terrible scribbling has been uncovered you say?
TT Well, perhaps you recognize the one that starts like:
I hardly think I heard you call
Since betwixt us was the wall
Of sounds within, buzzings i' the ear
Roarings i' the vein so closely near…
… 'That I was captured in illusion/Of outward things said clear…' I well remember—a piece particularly deserving of oblivion. I wrote that in the privacy of lonely office hours, thinking the world would have the mercy not to allow a soul to lay its eyes on it!
TT We are sorry to say that besides this one, a total of 101 poems has been recovered, and published in print—and you know, given some advances in technology, circulation of text is highly accelerated, meaning that one could very well say your poetry is part of the public domain.
So there I am, well half a decade after my death, subject to the indirect effects of advances in technology interacting with the associations I myself carelessly established between roses, summer days, and all too promiscuous waste bins! Sirs, in the little time we have conversed, I see the afterlife hasn't brought me any good. Hades takes on a bleaker shade…
TT Well, in reality, the future has been good to you: you are firmly canonised as one an authentic American intellectual, and stand firmly on a pedestal in the galleries occupied by the notables of modern international social thought. So why don't we explore a little bit why that is, within the specific domain of political theory? Theory Talks actually poses the same first three questions to every interviewee, followed by a number of questions specific to your thought. The first question we always pose is: What, according to you, is the biggest challenge or central debate in International Relations and what is your position vis-à-vis that challenge/debate?
I think that while it must have been noted by other interviewees that in fact this question is two separate questions—one about real-world challenges and another about theoretical debates—I would be the last to do so, and I am happy you mix concerns of theory and practice. I have always fought against establishing such a fictional separation between seemingly distinct domains of thought and practice. It is a dangerous fiction on top of it. The same goes for International Relations—while I have not dedicated myself to the study of the international as a discrete field of action, I do think that this domain does not escape some of the general observations I have made regarding society and its politics.
I hold that "modern society is many societies more or less loosely connected" by all kinds of associations. As I explain in The Public and its Problems, a fundamental challenge of modern times is that the largely technically mediated associations that constitute societies have outstretched the social mechanisms that we had historically developed on the human scale of the village to mitigate their indirect effects on others. During my life, I witnessed the proliferation of railway, telegraph, radio, steam-driven shipping, and car and weapon industries—thoroughly extending the web of association and affectedness within and across borders. This means action constantly reaches further. People close by and in far-off places are suddenly confronted with situations that they have to relate to but which are out of their control. This automatically makes them part of interested publics, with a stake in the way these mechanisations work. Now this perhaps seems abstract but consider: the spread of a new technology—I see you both looking on some small device with a black mirrored screen nervously every 5 minutes—automatically involves users as a 'stakeholder'. Your actions are mediated by them. You become affected by their design and configuration—over which you have little control. In that regard, you are part of a concerned public, but you have no way to influence the politics constitutive of these technologies.
I would say the largest challenge is to amplify participation and to institutionalize these fleeting publics. The proliferation of technologies and institutions as conduits for international associations has rendered publics around the globe more inchoate, while seemingly making it easier than ever before to influence—for good or ill—large groups through the manipulation of these global infrastructures of the public. We sowed infrastructures, we reap fragilities and more diffusely affected publics: each new technological expansion of the possibility to form associations leads to concomitant insecurities.
TT How did you arrive where you currently are in your thinking?
I have had the sheer luck or fortune to be engaged in the occupation of thinking; and while I am quite regular at my meals, I think that I may say that I would rather work, and perhaps even more, play, with ideas and with thinking than eat. I was born in the wake of the Civil War, and in times of a profound acceleration of technology as a vehicle of social, economic, and political development. Perhaps, as in your own times, upheaval and change was the status quo, stability a rare exception. My studies at Johns Hopkins with people such as Peirce had tickled an intellectual curiosity as of yet unsatisfied. I subsequently went to the University of Chicago for a decade in which my commitment to pragmatist philosophy consolidated. Afterwards at Columbia, and at the New School which I founded with people such as Charles A. Beard and Thorsten Veblen, this approach translated into a number of books. In these I applied my pragmatist convictions to such disparate issues as education, art, faith, logic and indeed politics, the topic of your question. For me, these are all interdependent aspects of society. This interdependence and inseparability of the social fabric means that skewed economic or political interests will reverberate throughout. But I am an optimist in that I also believe in the fundamental possibility and promise of science and democracy to curb radical change and reroute it into desirable directions for those affected. Good things are also woven through the social and we should amplify those to lessen the effects of negative associations.
TT What would a student require to become a specialist in International Relations or to see the world in a global way?
A question dear to my heart. You might know that throughout my entire life I have striven for transforming our understanding and practice of education. Human progress is dependent on education, and as I have learned during my travels to Russia, reform is not to be had by revolution but by gradual education. Education is training in reflective thinking. The quality of democracy depends on education.
Towards the end of my life I witnessed the creation of the United Nations. This was a clear signal to me that "the relations between nations are taking on the properties that constitute a public, and hence call for some measure of political organization". Having this forum implied that we saw the end of the complete denial of political responsibility of how the policies in one national unit affect another as we find in the doctrine of sovereignty. That the end of this doctrine is within reach means that we require global education which will ensure the rise of informed global publics which can develop the tools required to respond to global challenges.
In a more substantive fashion, I would insist that students hold on to the essential impossibility to separate out experience as it unfolds over time. The divisions and preferences that have come to dominate academic knowledge in its 20th century 'maturing' are for me a loss of rooting of knowledge in experience.
TT We're sorry, but isn't the task of social sciences to offer universal or at least objective analytical categories to make sense of the muddle of real-world experience? What you seem to be proposing is the opposite!
I align with Weber in lamenting the acceleration of the differentiation of understanding in society. This has made it difficult for your generations to address social, political and economic challenges head on while avoiding getting lost in one of its details or facets. Isn't the economic and the political, constantly encroaching on everyday life? In the end, this perhaps explains my insistence on democracy and schooling as the pivots of good society: democracy to reconstruct and defend publics, and schooling to defend individuals against (mis)understanding the world in ways that cannot be reduced to their own lived experience. If students could only hold on to this holistic perspective and eschew isolating subject matters from their social contexts.
TT Throughout your 70 years of active scholarship you have written over a thousand articles and books. One commentator of your work suggested that your body of writing is an "elaborate spider's web, the junctions and lineaments of which its engineer knows well and in and on which he is able to move about with great facility. But for the outsider who seeks to traverse or map that territory there is the constant danger of getting stuck." Many find your work difficult to navigate—what advice would you give the reader?
Sirs why would anyone want to engage in a quest of mapping all of my writings? You have to understand that thought always proceeds in relations. A web, perhaps, yes. A spider's web certainly not. A spider that spins a web out of himself, produces a web that is orderly and elaborate, but it is only a trap. That is the goal of pure reasoning, not mine. The scientific method of inquiry is rather comparable to the operations of the bee who collects material within and from the world, but attacks and modifies the collected stuff in order to make it yield its hidden treasure. "Drop the conception that knowledge is knowledge only when it is a disclosure and definition of the properties of fixed and antecedent reality; interpret the aim and test of knowing by what happens in the actual procedures of scientific inquiry". The occasion of thinking and writing is the experience of problems and the need to clarify and resolve them. Everything depends on the problem, the situations and the tools available. Inquiry does not rely on a priori elements or fixed rules. I always attempted to start my work by understanding in which problematic situations I aimed at intervening. Philosophy and academic, but also public life, in my time was heading in wrong directions that called upon me to initiate inquiry to resolve issues—in media res, as it were. When I wrote Logic, I tried to rebut dogmatic understandings. Now it appears that I am on the verge of becoming a dogma myself. In a sense, the most tragic scenario would be if people develop a "Deweyan" perspective or theory. Now I am curious, what problem brought you actually to converse with me?
TT Well, we are here today because we have been asked to contribute to an effort to collect the views of a number of different theorists, who, like you, live in different space-time. Now that we are here, could we ask you to tell us how you use the term 'inquiry'? It is one of your core concepts and in our conversation you already frequently referred to it. It is often difficult to understand what you mean by this term and how it provides direction and purpose for science…
It's a simple one, provided you have not been indoctrinated by logical positivists. You, me, all of us, frequently engage in inquiry. There is little distinction between solving problems of everyday life and the reasoning of the scientist or philosopher. Most often habit and routine will give you satisfaction. Yet when these fail or give you unpleasant experience, then reasoning begins. Without inquiry, sirs, most likely you wouldn't have been able to speak to me today! You will have to explain later how you bended time and space and which technology allowed you to travel through a black hole. But Albert was right, time travel is possible! Could we converse today without Einstein's fabulous inquiry that led him to the realization of space-time? Until the promulgation of Einstein's restricted theory of relativity, mass, time and motion were regarded as intrinsic properties of ultimate fixed and independent substances. Einstein questioned this on the basis of experimentation and an investigation of the problem of simultaneity, that is, that from different reference frames there can never be agreement on the simultaneity of events.
Reflection implies that something is believed in (or disbelieved in), not on its own direct account, but through something else which stands as witness, evidence, proof, voucher, warrant; that is, as ground of belief. At one time, rain is actually felt or directly experienced without any intermediary fact; at another time, we infer that it has rained from the looks of the grass and trees, or that it is going to rain because of the condition of the air or the state of the barometer. The fact that inquiry intervenes in ever-shifting contexts demands us to restrain from eternal truths or absolutistic logic. Someone believing in a truth such as "individualism", has his program determined for him in advance. It is then not a matter of finding out the particular thing which needs to be done and the best way, and the circumstances, of doing it. He knows in advance the sort of thing which must be done, just as in ancient physical philosophy the thinker knew in advance what must happen, so that all he had to do was to supply a logical framework of definitions and classifications.
When I say that thinking and beliefs should be experimental, not absolutistic, I have in mind a certain logic of method. Such a logic firstly implies that the concepts, general principles, theories and dialectical developments which are indispensable to any systematic knowledge are shaped and tested as tools of inquiry. Secondly, policies and proposals for social action have to be treated as working hypotheses. They have to be subject to constant and well-equipped observations of the consequences they entail when acted upon and subject to flexible revision. The social sciences are primarily an apparatus for conducting such investigations.
TT Doesn't such a form of reasoning mean we'll just muddle through without ever reaching certainty?
Absolutely correct! Arriving at one point is the starting point of another. Life flowers and should be understood as such; experimental reasoning is never complete. I can imagine the surprise you must feel at sudden unforeseen events in international political relationships when you hold on to fixed frames of how these relationships do and ought to look. That we will never reach certainty does not imply to give up the quest of certainty, however. We have to continuously improve on our tools of scientific inquiry…
TT Sorry to interrupt you here. Now it sounds as if you have a sort of methods fetish. Do you imply that everything can be solved by the right method and all that we have to do is to refine our methods? That's something that our colleagues running statistics and thinking that the problems of international can be solved by algorithms argue as well.
It might be that mathematical reasoning has well advanced since my departure, and that the importance granted to the economy and economic thinking as the sole conditioning factor of political organisation has only increased, but you haven't fully grasped what I mean by 'tools'. Tell your stubbornly calculating colleagues that inquiry is embedded in a situation, hence there cannot be a single method which would fix all kinds of problems. Second, while I admire the skill of mathematicians, what I mean by tools goes well beyond that. A tool can be a concept, a term, a theory, a proposal, a course of action, anything that might matter to settle a particular situation. A tool is however not a solution per se. It is a proposal. It must be tested against the problematic material. It matters only in so far as it is part of a practical activity aimed at resolving a problematic situation.
TT You emphasize that language is instrumental and reject the idea of a private language. You also spent quite some energy to demolish the "picture theory" of language. These arguments form the basis of what we call today "constructivism", yet they are mainly subscribed to the Philosophical Investigations of the later Ludwig Wittgenstein.
Earhh, I am aware of this fellow. He is an analytical philosopher, so develops his argument from a different background. I started to work on the social and cultural aspects of language use from around 1916. I don't know whether Wittgenstein actually read my work when he set out to write Philosophical Investigations, but you are quite right, there are obvious parallels. I think my own term of "conjoint activity" expresses pretty much the same, perhaps less eloquently, what Wittgenstein termed language games. I am pleased to hear, however, that the instrumental view on language, that objects get their meanings within a language in and by conjoint community of functional use, has become firmly established in academia. I'd have reservations about the term, 'constructivism'. It might be useful since it reminds us of all the construction work that the organization of politics and society entails. Indeed I have frequently stressed that instrumentalist theory implies construction. If constructivism doesn't mean post-mortem studies of how something has been constructed, but is directed towards production of better futures, I might be fine with the term. But perhaps I would prefer 'productivism'.
TT That is a plausible term, but we are afraid, the history of science has settled on constructivism. And you are right, the tendencies you warn us of are significantly present in our discipline.
Sirs, if you permit. I have to attend to other obligations. I wish you safe travels back. Make sure you pick up something from the gift shop before you leave.
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"Wenn über das Grundsätzliche keine Einigkeit besteht, ist es sinnlos, miteinander Pläne zu schmieden." – Konfuzius (551-479 v.Chr.).Der grundsätzliche universelle Geltungsanspruch der Menschenrechte besagt, dass die Menschenrechte jedem Menschen auf der Welt zustehen. Die Allgemeine Erklärung der Menschenrechte aus dem Jahr 1948 drückt das folgendermaßen aus: "Jeder hat Anspruch auf alle in dieser Erklärung verkündeten Rechte und Freiheiten, ohne irgendeinen Unterschied, etwa nach Rasse, Hautfarbe, Geschlecht, Sprache, Religion, politischer oder sonstiger Anschauung, nationaler oder sozialer Herkunft, Vermögen, Geburt oder sonstigem Stand […]" (UN-Vollversammlung 1948, Artikel 2). Jedoch ist dieser universelle Geltungsanspruch der Menschenrechte in der Realität häufig noch ein Ideal. Mit der Deklaration von Bangkok, die einige südostasiatische Staaten Anfang der 1990er Jahre unterzeichneten, wurde er sogar explizit in Frage gestellt. Was ist die Sichtweise dieser südostasiatischen Staaten auf die Universalität der Menschenrechte und wie begründen sie diese? Wie könnten Perspektiven für einen interkulturellen Menschenrechtsdialog aussehen? In diesem Beitrag werden die Menschenrechte durch eine Definition und einen Abschnitt zur Geschichte kurz vorgestellt. Anschließend wird die Debatte um Universalität und (Kultur-)Relativismus erläutert, welche überleitet zur "asiatischen Perspektive" auf die Menschenrechte und zu den "asiatischen Werten". Abschließend werden die Kritik und Perspektiven für einen interkulturellen Dialog aufgegriffen.Menschenrechte – eine Definition
Zerstörung, Elend, menschliches Leid und der Völkermord an den europäischen Juden führten in "dramatischer Weise die Notwendigkeit eines wirksamen Schutzes grundlegender Menschenrechte durch verbindliche internationale Normen und kollektive Mechanismen" vor Augen (Gareis/Varwick 2014, S. 179).
Die Idee, dass jedem Menschen, "unabhängig seines Geschlechts, Alters, seiner Religion oder seiner ethnischen, nationalen, regionalen oder sozialen Herkunft, angeborene und unveräußerliche Rechte zu eigen sind, die sich aus seinem Menschsein ableiten", verfestigte sich und führte am 10. Dezember 1948 zur Allgemeinen Erklärung der Menschenrechte (Gareis/Varwick 2014, S. 179).
Erstmals wurde in einem internationalen Dokument festgehalten, dass jedem Menschen wegen "grundlegender Aspekte der menschlichen Person" grundlegende Rechte zugesprochen werden. Diese Rechte sind unveräußerlich und vorstaatlich, was bedeutet, dass der Staat sie nicht vergeben kann, denn jeder Mensch hat sie aufgrund der "biologischen Zugehörigkeit zur menschlichen Gattung" inne (Human Rights 2018). Dem Staat obliegt es, diese Rechte zu schützen.
Menschenrechte besitzen demnach vier Merkmale: Sie sind universell (alle Menschen sind Träger dieser Rechte), egalitär (eine ungleiche Verteilung dieser Rechte ist ausgeschlossen), individuell (der Träger der Menschenrechte ist ein individueller Mensch, keine Gruppe) und kategorial (wer der menschlichen Gattung angehört, besitzt sie automatisch) (vgl. Lohmann 2010, S. 36).
Die Erklärung der Menschenrechte aus dem Jahr 1948 ist keine rechtlich bindende Resolution. Doch auch wenn sie rechtlich nicht bindend ist, hat sie "moralische Wichtigkeit bekommen" (Human Rights 2012). Sie wird dem Gewohnheitsrecht zugeordnet, was bedeutet, dass sie sowohl allgemein anerkannt als auch angewendet und deswegen als verbindlich angesehen wird (vgl.: Human Rights 2012). Sie ist das "weltweit am meisten verbreitete und am meisten übersetzte internationale Dokument" (Gareis/Varwick 2014, S. 179) und dient als Grundlage für zahlreiche Abkommen (vgl. Maier 1997, S. 39).
Juristisch können die Menschenrechte wie folgt definiert werden: "Internationale Menschenrechte sind die durch das internationale Recht garantierten Rechtsansprüche von Personen gegen den Staat oder staatsähnliche Gebilde, die dem Schutz grundlegender Aspekte der menschlichen Person und ihrer Würde in Friedenszeiten und im Krieg dienen" (Human Rights 2012).
Seit 1948 haben sich die Menschenrechte weiterentwickelt, und es hat sich etabliert, von den Menschenrechten in drei Generationen zu sprechen. Zur ersten Generation gehören "die klassischen bürgerlichen und politischen Freiheits- und Beteiligungsrechte" wie das Recht auf Leben, Freiheit und Sicherheit oder das Verbot von Folter (Krennerich 2009). Die zweite Generation der Menschenrechte umfasst wirtschaftliche, soziale und kulturelle Menschenrechte, so beispielsweise das Recht auf Bildung, Teilhabe, aber auch auf Freizeit und Erholung. Die dritte Generation der Menschenrechte "bezeichnen allgemeine, noch kaum in Vertragswerken konkretisierte Rechte wie etwa das Recht auf Entwicklung, Frieden oder saubere Umwelt" (Krennerich 2009). Alle drei Generationen "sollten gleichberechtigt nebeneinander bestehen" (Barthel, zitiert nach Hamm 1999, S. 23).
Der Gedanke der angeborenen Rechte, die ein Mensch qua Menschsein besitzt, ist jedoch älter als die Erklärung der Menschenrechte aus dem Jahr 1948 und die Vereinten Nationen selbst.
Eine kurze Geschichte der Menschenrechte
Der Ursprung der Menschenrechte geht auf das antike Griechenland zurück. Der "revolutionäre Gedanke der Stoiker, der beschreibt, dass alle Menschen gleich sind", wurde durch die im 18. Jahrhundert entstandene Naturrechtslehre weiter gefestigt (vgl.: Müller 2017, 03:06-03:20). Die "überlieferten konkreten Freiheiten der Ständegesellschaft wurden dort in eine allgemeine Freiheit des Menschen umgedacht" (Maier 1997, S. 11). Wegweisend war, dass diese Rechte nun allen Menschen zugesprochen wurden und diese Rechte Ansprüche an den Staat stellten (vgl. Maier, 1997 S. 11f). Denn "[er sollte] nicht tun dürfen, was ihm beliebt, [und] in substantielle Bezirke individueller Freiheit nicht […] eingreifen dürfen" (Maier 1997, S. 12). Als vorstaatliche Rechte kann der Staat diese nur akzeptieren, nicht aber verleihen.
Die Idee der unveräußerlichen Menschenrechte kulminierte schließlich in der Unabhängigkeitserklärung der 13 britischen Kolonien 1776 in Nordamerika (zentrales Dokument: Virginia Bill of Rights) und fand schließlich 1789 in der Französischen Revolution (zentrales Dokument: Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen) in Europa ihren Durchbruch. Diese Dokumente legten den Grundstein für die modernen Menschenrechte, die nun als Grundrechte in zahlreichen Verfassungen verankert sind. Schließlich, im Jahr 1966, wurden die ersten völkerrechtlich bindenden Menschenrechtsabkommen durch die Vereinten Nationen verabschiedet (vgl.: Wagner 2016).
Besonders eindrücklich zeigt die Geschichte der Menschenrechte, dass ihre Idee auf "konkrete Unrechtserfahrungen der Menschen des Okzidents zurückgehen" (Tetzlaff 1998, S. 60). Darauf, nämlich dass die Menschenrechte 'im Westen' ihren Ursprung haben und individualistisch geprägt seien, bezieht sich im Wesentlichen die Kritik an ihnen. Diese Kritik zieht auch in Zweifel, ob die Menschenrechte universell sind. (Kultur-)Relativismus vs. Universalismus
Verfechter des Universalismus verstehen die Menschenrechte als unveräußerliche, angeborene Rechte eines jeden Menschen. "Niemand kann, mit Bezug auf welche Eigenschaft auch immer, von der Trägerschaft ausgeschlossen werden" (Lohmann 2010, S. 37). Ausgeschlossen ist hierbei auch die "ungleiche Verteilung" der Rechte (vgl. Lohmann 2010, S. 37). So muss der Staat seinen Pflichten nachkommen und für die Einhaltung, Wahrung und Durchsetzung der Menschenrechte sorgen.
Jedoch werden die Menschenrechte, wie sie 1948 verabschiedet wurden, in ihrem universellen Gültigkeitsanspruch von vielen Ländern und Kulturen auf der Welt nicht akzeptiert. Der (Kultur-) Relativismus in seiner extremen Form sieht die Menschenrechte als nicht vollständig übertragbar und "nur relativ zu einem bestimmten Kultursystem 'begründbar'" (Lohmann 2009). Manche Staaten gehen sogar so weit und verstehen die Menschenrechte als ein westliches Produkt, das "dem Osten" aufoktroyiert wurde. Auch seien die Menschenrechte nicht, wie der universalistische Anspruch behauptet, unabhängig von Zeit, Raum und kulturellem Hintergrund gültig. Sie seien aus der europäisch-nordamerikanischen Aufklärung entstanden, abendländisch geprägt und somit nicht in dieser Form in anderen Kulturkreisen anwendbar. Zudem sei ihre "weltweite Propagierung Ausdruck einer Mentalität der Einmischung, welche die Tradition des Kolonialismus mit anderen Mitteln fortsetze" (Hilpert 2019, S. 230). Tatsächlich sei "das Menschenrechtsverständnis in erster Linie abhängig von dem Menschenbild in einer spezifischen Kultur […], wonach es keinen Standard gibt, der unabhängig von bestimmten sozialen Lebensformen wäre" (Pohl 2002, S. 7).
Von (Kultur-)Relativisten konkret kritisiert werden häufig die "individuelle Selbstbestimmung, die körperliche Unversehrtheit, das Vorrangverhältnis zwischen Individuum zur Gemeinschaft, die Gleichheit von Männern und Frauen, die religiöse Toleranz und die Einschätzung demokratischer Mitbestimmung" (Lohmann 2010, S. 41).
Zum anderen wird bemängelt, dass bei der Verabschiedung der Allgemeinen Erklärung der Menschenrechte im Jahr 1948 die westlichen Länder dominierten, während die meisten Länder des Globalen Südens noch unter kolonialer Herrschaft standen. Viele Staaten werfen dem Westen sogar "moralischen Chauvinismus" (Pollis/Schwab 2006, S. 68), "Ideologismus" und eine "quasi-religiöse" Auslegung der Menschenrechte vor (Pohl 2002, S. 7).
Genau an diese Dichotomie, Universalismus und (Kultur-)Relativismus, knüpfte die 1993 vorgelegte Deklaration von Bangkok an, welche von vielen (süd-)ostasiatischen Ländern unterzeichnet wurde. Bevor die Wiener Menschenrechtskonferenz im Jahr 1993 begann, zweifelten diese Länder die Universalität der Menschenrechte an und legten eine "asiatische Perspektive" auf die Menschenrechte und sogenannte "asiatische Werte" vor.
Die asiatische Perspektive auf die (Universalität der) Menschenrechte und 'asiatische Werte'
Die ,asiatische Sicht' auf die Menschenrechte und die 'asiatischen Werte' werden im Grunde kulturrelativistisch begründet. Im folgenden Abschnitt werden die 'asiatischen Werte' zeitgeschichtlich eingeordnet und näher erläutert.
Die zeitgeschichtliche Einordnung der 'asiatischen Werte'
Die Kontroverse, dass sich die Menschenrechte in (Südost-)Asien anders entwickelt hätten, spitzte sich Anfang der 1990er Jahre zu und erlangte mit der Verabschiedung der Deklaration von Bangkok weltumspannende Beachtung. Die Gründe für den Ausbruch dieser Debatte sind vielfältig. Zum einen genoss 'der Westen', vor allem die Europäische Union und die Vereinigten Staaten, zu dieser Zeit beispielloses politisches und ökonomisches Selbstbewusstsein. Der Ost-West-Konflikt war beendet, die Demokratie und der Kapitalismus schienen 'die' Erfolgsmodelle zu sein, die "das Ende der Geschichte" einläuteten (Fukuyama 1992). Die Globalisierung schritt unaufhaltsam voran, während der Kommunismus in vielen osteuropäischen Ländern in sich zusammenbrach. Zudem gewann die Idee des politischen und wirtschaftlichen Liberalismus mehr und mehr an Bedeutung.
In dieser Zeit gingen die Vereinigten Staaten und viele Mitgliedsstaaten der EU auf die Forderung vieler Menschenrechtsorganisationen ein, die Menschenrechte und die Demokratie in anderen Ländern zu verbreiten. Die Regierung unter Präsident Bill Clinton ging sogar so weit und erklärte sowohl die Verbreitung der Menschenrechte als auch der Demokratie zu einer der drei Säulen der US-amerikanischen Außenpolitik (vgl.: Barr 2000, S. 313). Allerdings missbilligte insbesondere China den menschenrechtlichen Druck vieler westlicher Staaten, der durch das Massaker von Tiananmen im Jahr 1989 und Chinas Tibet-Politik stetig zunahm.
Hinzu kam, dass viele ostasiatische Staaten, allen voran China, Malaysia, Japan, Hongkong, Taiwan, Singapur und Südkorea, als 'ostasiatische Wirtschaftswunder' bezeichnet wurden (vgl.: Ernst 2009). Diese wirtschaftliche Prosperität ließ ein "neues Selbstbewusstsein und eine neue politische Elite entstehen, die vom 'Westen' das Recht auf einen eigenen entwicklungspolitischen Weg einforderte und die Vormachtstellung der alten Industriestaaten Europas und Nordamerikas herausforderte" (Ernst 2009). Darüber hinaus sahen sie in der Rolle des starken Staates eine wichtige "Erklärungsvariable" für den wirtschaftlichen Erfolg (Heinz 1995, S. 11).
Die Bestimmtheit, mit der die Europäische Union und die Vereinigten Staaten um die Durchsetzung der Menschenrechte in Asien rangen, wurde von (ost-)asiatischen Ländern als Versuch verstanden, ,Asien' ,dem Westen' unterwürfig zu halten. Zudem wurde die Kritik als "Einmischung, irrelevant und kulturfremd abgewehrt" (Heinz 1995, S. 12).Schließlich, im Vorfeld der Wiener Menschenrechtskonferenz im Jahr 1993, "bestritten [unter anderem] die Regierungen Indonesiens, Singapurs und Chinas die Universalität der Menschenrechte" (Heinz 1995, S. 16). Stattdessen müssten die jeweiligen wirtschaftlichen, sozialen und politischen Bedingungen betrachtet werden, weil sie nur anhand derer verwirklicht werden könnten (vgl.: Heinz 1995, S. 15f). Deshalb wurden sogenannte 'asiatische Werte' vorgestellt. Was sind 'asiatische Werte'?
'Asiatische Werte' beschreiben eine (kultur-)relative Sicht auf die Menschenrechte, die in den frühen 1990er Jahren von asiatischen Politiker*innen und Wissenschaftler*innen vorgestellt und von 34 Staaten verabschiedet wurden. Sie umfassen im Groben die Bereiche Politik, Wirtschaft und Kultur (vgl.: Tai 2005, S. 34). Federführend bei der Debatte waren Lee Kuan Yew, der damalige Premierminister von Singapur, und Mahathir bin Mohamad, der damalige Premierminister von Malaysia. Sie, die 'asiatischen Werte', sollen eine Anpassung zum aus asiatischer Sicht "westlichen Modell der Menschenrechte" darstellen (Henders 2017). Die regionale Bezeichnung 'Asien/asiatisch' bezieht sich in diesem Zusammenhang eher auf (Süd-) Ostasien beziehungsweise pazifisch-Asien als auf den Nahen oder Mittleren Osten. Das bedeutet auch, dass sich die 'asiatischen Werte' hauptsächlich auf die "konfuzianische Kultur" stützen und weniger vom Islam oder dem Hinduismus geprägt sind (Ernst 2009).
Allerdings lehnen die ostasiatischen Länder die Menschenrechte nicht grundsätzlich ab. Schließlich haben einige dieser Länder, darunter China, die Allgemeine Erklärung der Menschenrechte 1948 verabschiedet und bekräftigten 1993 in Wien nochmals ihren Einsatz für Prinzipien, die in der Erklärung enthalten sind (vgl.: Tay 1996, S. 751). Sie plädierten mit der Deklaration von Bangkok stattdessen für nationale und regionale Unterschiede in der Schwerpunktsetzung und auch in der praktischen Umsetzung der Menschenrechte (vgl.: Tay 1996 S. 751f).
Befürworter der 'asiatischen Werte' bestanden zudem darauf, dass sie nicht nur durch den wirtschaftlichen Erfolg, den die ostasiatischen Staaten in den Jahrzehnten vor der Wiener Menschenrechtskonvention 1993 erlebt hatten, legitimiert würden, sondern auch maßgeblich für diesen Erfolg verantwortlich seien. Darüber hinaus müsse die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung bei ökonomisch aufstrebenden Ländern über allem stehen; bürgerliche und politische Rechte sollten den ökonomischen und sozialen Rechten deswegen untergeordnet sein (vgl.: Henders 2017).
Bisher wurde keine offizielle "umfassende, verbindliche Liste" vorgestellt (Heinz 1995, S. 25), aber häufig genannte 'asiatische Werte', die bei der Wiener Menschenrechtskonvention 1993 vorgelegt wurden, waren: "Disziplin, harte Arbeit, eine starke Führungskraft" (Tai 2005, S. 34ff), "Sparsamkeit, akademischer Erfolg, die Balance zwischen individuellen und gemeinschaftlichen Bedürfnissen, Respekt vor Autorität" (Henders 2017) und ein starker, stabiler Staat (Barr 2000, S. 310). Darüber hinaus wird "nationales Teamwork", die Erhaltung einer "moralisch sauberen Umwelt" (das Magazin 'Playboy' wird in Singapur beispielsweise nicht verkauft) und keine absolute Pressefreiheit für zentral erachtet (Heinz 1995, S. 26).
Die asiatische Perspektive auf die Universalität der Menschenrechte
Im Diskurs um die ,asiatische Perspektive' haben sich mehrere häufig genannte Argumente herausgebildet. Einige davon sollen näher beschrieben werden, nämlich die Behauptungen, dass Rechte kulturspezifisch seien, die Gemeinschaft in Asien über dem Individuum stehe, dass Rechte ausschließlich den jeweiligen Staaten oblägen und dass soziale und ökonomische Rechte über zivilen und politischen Rechten ständen.
Rechte sind kulturspezifisch
Die Idee der Menschenrechte entstand bereits in der Antike auf dem europäischen Kontinent und entwickelte sich schließlich unter bestimmten sozialen, ökonomischen, kulturellen und politischen Bedingungen ebendort und in Nordamerika (vgl.: Li 1996, S. 19). Die Umstände, die die Umsetzung der Menschenrechte voranbrachten, könnten aber nicht auf diese Art auf Südostasien übertragen werden. So beschreibt China in seinem 1991 veröffentlichten Weißbuch, dass sich aufgrund des eigenen historischen Hintergrunds, des Sozialsystems und der jeweiligen ökonomischen Entwicklung die Länder in ihrem Verständnis und ihrer Auslegung der Menschenrechte unterscheiden würden (vgl.: Weißbuch 1991, Vorwort). Das ist eine Haltung, welche auch 1993 auf der Menschenrechtskonferenz in Wien nochmals bekräftigt wurde (vgl.: Li 1996, S.19).
Die Gemeinschaft steht über dem Individuum
Die südostasiatischen Länder insistierten, dass die Bedeutung der Gemeinschaft in asiatischen Ländern nicht mit dem Primat des Individuums vereinbar sei, worauf die Vorstellung der Menschenrechte beruht (Li 1996, S. 19). Zudem stünden Pflichten über Rechten (vgl.: Nghia 2009, S. 21). Dies seien auch die entscheidenden Faktoren, die 'Asien' fundamental vom 'Westen' unterschieden. Die Menschenrechte seien von Natur aus individualistisch geprägt, was nach (süd-)ostasiatischer Auffassung eine Bedrohung für den (süd-)ostasiatischen sozial-gemeinschaftlichen Gesellschaftsmechanismus darstellen könnte. Als Begründung für diese Behauptung führten die (süd-)ostasiatischen Staaten den Zusammenbruch vieler Familien, die Drogenabhängigkeit und die hohe Zahl an Obdachlosen im 'Westen' an (vgl.: Li 1996, S. 20).
Soziale und ökonomische Rechte stehen über zivilen und politischen Rechten
Zentral bei der ,asiatischen Auslegung' der Menschenrechte waren die Priorisierung der Gemeinschaft gegenüber der Individuen und die Suche nach dem Konsens im Gegensatz zum Konflikt. Dominanz und Autorität würden nicht limitiert oder gar als suspekt betrachtet, sondern gälten im Gegenteil als vertrauens- und förderungswürdig (vgl.: Tay 1996, S. 753ff). Die asiatische Auslegung, so wurde argumentiert, lege den Fokus auf ökonomische und soziale Rechte, die durch ein starkes wirtschaftliches Wachstum und Wohlstand legitimiert würden, worauf Asiat*innen Wert legten und was ihnen wichtig sei. So proklamiert das Weißbuch der chinesischen Regierung aus dem Jahr 1991, dass "sich sattessen und warm kleiden die fundamentalen Bedürfnisse der chinesischen Bevölkerung seien, die lange unter Hunger und Kälte leiden mussten" (Weißbuch 1991, Kapitel I). Wohlstand könne nur effizient erreicht werden, wenn die Regierenden autorisiert seien, die politischen Rechte ihrer Bürger*innen zu limitieren, um wirtschaftlichen Wohlstand zu garantieren (Li 1996, S. 20). Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung müsse deswegen bei ökonomisch aufstrebenden Ländern über allem stehen; zivile und politische Rechte sollten den ökonomischen und sozialen Rechten untergeordnet sein (vgl.: Henders, 2017). Implizit schwingt bei dieser Behauptung mit, dass erst alle basalen Bedürfnisse und eine stabile politische Ordnung sichergestellt werden müssten, um politische und bürgerliche Rechte zu implementieren (vgl.: Li 1996, S. 20f). Befürworter der Idee der asiatischen Perspektive erachten es somit für wichtig, den Staat als Oberhoheit zu sehen (vgl.: Henders 2017).
Rechte sind die Angelegenheit der jeweiligen Staaten
Das Recht eines Staates zur Selbstbestimmung schließe den Zuständigkeitsbereich der Menschenrechte mit ein. So seien Menschenrechte innenpolitische Angelegenheiten, in die sich andere Staaten oder Organisationen nicht einzumischen hätten (vgl.: Li 1996, S. 20). "Die Bestrebung des Westens, auch bei Entwicklungsländern einen universellen Geltungsanspruch der Menschenrechte durchzusetzen, sei versteckter kultureller Imperialismus und ein Versuch, die Entwicklung [wirtschaftlich aufstrebender Länder] zu behindern" (Li 1996, S. 20).
Kritik an der asiatischen Perspektive Generell wurde bemängelt, dass nicht einfach über 'asiatische' Werte geredet werden könne, weil es die einzelnen asiatischen Länder simplifiziere, stereotypisiere und sie um ihre Vielfalt bringe (vgl.: Henders 2017). Des Weiteren seien die genannten Werte nicht alleinig in Asien zu finden, sondern hätten auch in anderen Teilen der Welt Gültigkeit (vgl.: Tai 2005, S. 35). Tatsächlich, so wurde argumentiert, gebe es keine ,asiatischen Werte', denn der Begriff sei mit "seiner Allgemeinheit und Undifferenziertheit ein Konstrukt, das ganz bestimmten Zielen dienen soll" (Schreiner 1996, S. 57). Außerdem seien nur mächtige Politiker*innen leitender Teil der Debatte gewesen; die Argumente seien weder in die Gesellschaft getragen noch philosophisch (fort-)geführt worden. Die einzelnen 'asiatischen' Argumente gegen die Universalität der Menschenrechte wurden jedoch auch einzeln kritisiert. Einige Kritiker*innen stellten die Ansicht der Kulturspezifizität in Frage. Das Argument impliziere, dass soziale Normen, die in anderen Ländern und Kulturkreisen ihren Ursprung hatten, in der asiatischen Kultur keine Anwendung finden sollten oder könnten. Kapitalistische Märkte und die Konsumkultur, welche ebenfalls außerhalb der asiatischen Länder entstanden sind, konnten jedoch sehr wohl von asiatischen Kulturen aufgenommen werden (vgl.: Li 1996, S. 20). Die schwerfällige Akzeptanz und Umsetzung der Universalität der Menschenrechte könne somit nicht ausschließlich auf ihre kulturelle Herkunft zurückgeführt werden.
Die zweite Behauptung, dass Asiat*innen die Gemeinschaft über das Individuum stellten, würde als kulturelles Argument missbraucht werden, um aufzuzeigen, dass unveräußerliche Rechte eines Einzelnen sich nicht mit der Idee von asiatischen Gesellschaften verstünden. Kritiker*innen der ,asiatischen Perspektive' sahen hier die Gefahr der generellen Verdammung der Rechte des Einzelnen. Dabei würden individuelle Freiheiten den asiatischen Gemeinschaftswerten nicht generell oppositionell gegenüberstehen. Vielmehr seien grundlegende Rechte, wie eine Versammlungs- und Meinungsfreiheit sowie Toleranz, wichtig für eine Gemeinschaft (vgl.: Li 1996, S. 21).
Beim dritten Argument, welches die südostasiatischen Länder vorlegten, kritisierten viele Verfechter*innen der Universalität der Menschenrechte, dass die nationale ökonomische Entwicklung nicht gleichzusetzen sei mit der ökonomischen Absicherung (sozio-)ökonomisch benachteiligter Gruppen einer Gesellschaft. Nationales ökonomisches Wachstum garantiere schließlich nicht automatisch Rechte für ökonomisch benachteiligte Mitglieder einer Gesellschaft. Stattdessen würden sich politisch-zivile und sozial-ökonomische Rechte bedingen und nur effektiv wirken, wenn alle vier Ebenen garantiert werden könnten (vgl.: Li 1996, S. 22).
Abschließend wurde kritisiert, dass die vorgebrachten Argumente, insbesondere die Forderung der Nichteinmischung in innerstaatliche Angelegenheiten, als Vorwand für einen illiberalen und autoritären Regierungsstil verwendet werden würden. Zudem sollten diese Argumente die Schwäche des wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungsmodells der asiatischen Länder verschleiern (vgl.: Henders 2017). Das sind beides Kritikpunkte, die während der asiatischen Wirtschaftskrise 1997/1998 weitgehend bestätigt wurden und zur Verabschiedung der asiatischen Erklärung der Menschenrechte im Jahr 1998 führten.
Was ist mit 'asiatischen Werten' passiert?
Der Dialog über die in der Deklaration von Bangkok vorgestellten 'asiatischen Werte' begleitete staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure sowie Wissenschaftler*innen bis in die 1990er Jahre hinein. Als im Jahr 1997 eine Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise Asien ereilte, wurde es jedoch nicht nur still um die 'asiatischen Werte', sie wurden nun sogar "als Ursache der Krise gedeutet" (Ernst 2009). Insbesondere die staatliche Intervention und die starken Familienwerte wurden als Verursacher genannt (vgl.: Ernst 2009). Um den wirtschaftlichen Anschluss an den industriellen 'Westen' nicht zu verlieren, waren Menschenrechtsorganisationen in Südostasien bemüht, den Menschenrechtsschutz bottom-up durchzusetzen. Die Asiatische Menschenrechtscharta, die die 'asiatischen Werte' ablehnt, wurde 1998 von Menschenrechtsorganisationen in Kwangju, Südkorea, verabschiedet. Sie ist auch ein Versuch, asiatische Regierungen bei Menschenrechtsverstößen zukünftig in die Verantwortung nehmen zu können.
Seit dem Ausbruch der asiatischen Wirtschaftskrise ist die Debatte um 'asiatische Werte' nahezu versiegt. Gleichwohl werden interkulturelle Dialoge über die Menschenrechte weiter geführt. Zwischen Kulturrelativismus und Universalismus – Perspektiven für einen Dialog
Eine globale Durchsetzung der Menschenrechte bleibt nach wie vor ein Ideal, ebenso wie deren uneingeschränkte Einhaltung. Die ostasiatischen Länder sind nur ein Beispiel von vielen, denn Kritik an der Universalität der Menschenrechte kommt auch aus anderen Ländern und von anderen Religionen. Dabei hat die Forderung nach weltweiter Umsetzung der Menschenrechte nicht an Dringlichkeit verloren. Wie kann aber ein Dialog über die Menschenrechte oder gar ein Konsens vorangebracht werden?
Bei dieser Problematik ist es wichtig zu bedenken, dass die Menschenrechte kein starres System sind, sondern auch nach ihrer Verabschiedung im Jahr 1948 weiterentwickelt wurden. Zudem hat die Idee der Menschenrechte zwar primär in der Zeit der europäisch-amerikanischen Aufklärung ihre Wurzeln, konnte ihre volle Durchsetzungskraft jedoch erst in der Moderne entfalten (vgl.: Bielefeldt 1999, S. 59f). Insbesondere im Hinblick auf das Argument der Nichtumsetzbarkeit der Menschenrechte in kulturell anders geprägten Regionen "wäre es verfehlt, den Begriff der 'Aufklärung' auf eine bestimmte Epoche der europäischen Geschichte zu verkürzen" (Bielefeldt 1999, S. 60). Schließlich muss es auch für andere Kulturen möglich sein, "humane Anliegen der eigenen Tradition in moderner Gestalt in den Menschenrechten wiederzuerkennen" (Bielefeldt 1999, S. 61).
Aufgrund dessen sprechen sich viele Wissenschaftler*innen für eine Adaption der Menschenrechte aus. Die US-amerikanische Politikwissenschaftlerin Alison Dundes Renteln, beispielsweise, "möchte am Begriff universaler Menschenrechte durchaus festhalten, ihn zugleich aber auf interkultureller Basis inhaltlich neu bestimmen […], indem sie nach einem weltweit gemeinsamen Nenner in den Wertorientierungen unterschiedlicher Kulturen sucht" (Bielefeldt 1999, S. 45f). Der kanadische Philosoph Charles Taylor spricht sich für einen "ungezwungenen Konsens" aus, der anderen kulturellen Normen Verständnis entgegenbringt (Taylor 1999, S. 124). Der Dialog über die Menschenrechte zwischen Asien und 'dem Westen' solle sich global ausweiten und eine Auseinandersetzung über eine Übereinstimmung an Normen, die menschliches Verhalten und politisches Handeln leiten sollten, starten. Dieser Grundkonsens auf der Basis der Menschenrechte soll bindend sein, darf sich aber in seiner Begründung unterscheiden (vgl.: Carnegie Council 1996). Der deutsche Philosoph Georg Lohmann vertritt wiederum die Position, dass der "Universalismus" nicht zwingend eine "Einheitskultur darstellt oder in einer solchen resultiert" (Lohmann 2009). Für ihn sind Universalismus und Relativismus auch keine Gegensätze; er sieht im Partikularismus das Gegenteil zum Universalismus. Deshalb ist er der Ansicht, dass ein "verwirklichter und rechtlich wie politisch konkretisierter universeller Menschenrechtsschutz die Möglichkeiten einer kulturellen Vielfalt der Menschen erweitern wird" (Lohmann 2009). Kulturelle Vielfalt ist hier aber nicht mit Willkür gleichzusetzen. Unterscheiden muss man zwischen "Besonderheiten, die mit dem Universalismus der Menschenrechte kompatibel sind und solchen, die ihm widersprechen" (Lohmann 2009). "Strikter" soll der Universalismus bei negativen Pflichten agieren, so zum Beispiel beim Verbot von Folter (Lohmann 2009). Bei positiven Pflichten, wie beispielsweise bei Leistungsrechten, kann der Universalismus lockerer angewendet werden und mehrere, kulturell unterschiedliche Auslegungen zulassen (vgl.: Lohmann 2009). Ein interkultureller Dialog und die Suche nach einem Konsens bedeuten jedoch nicht, dass "die Menschenrechte [völlig neu überdacht und] bereits bestehende international vereinbarte Standards und Konventionen […] abgetan werden sollen. Das wäre gefährlich" (Utrecht 1995, S. 11). Für eine strikte Durchsetzung ideal, so konkludiert Lohmann, "wäre ein gut etabliertes Rechtssystem, in dem die Menschenrechte individuell eingeklagt und mit Hilfe staatlicher Gewalten auch durchgesetzt werden können" (Lohmann 2013, S. 19). Fazit
Viele (süd-)ostasiatische Länder brachten im Jahr 1993 mit der Deklaration von Bangkok kulturrelativistische Argumente hervor, mit denen sie ihre Sichtweise auf die Universalität der Menschenrechte aufzeigten und rechtfertigten. Eine zentrale Begründung war hier, dass das "individualistische Rechtsverständnis" der Menschenrechte nicht mit dem asiatischen Gemeinschaftsverständnis vereinbar sei (Tetzlaff 2002, S. 5). Ebenso waren die Kulturspezifität von Rechten und das Primat des wirtschaftlichen Wohlstands Teil der Begründung. Auseinandersetzungen darüber fanden bis weit in die 1990er Jahre hinein viel Gehör und Gegenrede. Erst mit der asiatischen Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise 1997/1998 wurde es still um die 'asiatischen Werte'. Was von der Debatte allerdings bleibt, ist die Diskussion über den Universalismus und den (Kultur-) Relativismus, für die der Menschenrechtsrat (MRR) der Vereinten Nationen in Genf eine Plattform bietet.
Bei allen Vorschlägen und Denkanstößen, die eine kulturelle Sensibilität und Variabilität ermöglichen sollen, ist der interkulturelle Dialog zentral. Fraglich bleibt jedoch, wie gut sich eine Diskussion über Normen auf der Basis der Menschenrechte und deren anschließende Durchsetzung in autoritär geführten Staaten durchsetzen lässt (vgl.: Carnegie Council 1996). Denn schließlich sagte schon Konfuzius (551 v. Chr. bis 479 v. Chr.), dass es sinnlos sei, miteinander Pläne zu schmieden, wenn über das Grundsätzliche keine Einigkeit bestehe.
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As much as COVID-19 is a health and economic crisis, at its core, it is also a governance crisis.
NDI President Derek Mitchell and new Director of Democratic Governance Kristen Sample delve into ways governments and the international community have risen (or not) to meet the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic.
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Derek Mitchell: As we all continue to shelter in place and respond to the colossal health and economic crisis that is COVID-19, we must not forget that at its core, pandemics are as much a result of governance failure as any failure of healthcare or health system. Since working to support democratic processes, institutions and governance around the world is what NDI does for a living, we thought it useful to delve into the role governance has played in the COVID-19 pandemic with NDI's experience in more than 50 countries around the world serving as a guide. Welcome to DemWorks. My name is Derek Mitchell, president of the National Democratic Institute. To discuss all this with me in this podcast, I'm joined by NDI's new director of democratic governance, Kristen Sample. Kristen Sample: Thank you so much Derek. DM: Kristen just joined us on March 1. She brings more than 20 years of democratic governance experience with her to NBI having advised and evaluated programs at UN Women, UN Democracy Fund, the Open Society Foundation, Global Partners, Governance and International IDEA. Kristen is an expert on countering corruption, legislative strengthening in the nexus of gender and politics and she has led projects focused on the impact of democratic reform on economic development and citizen security. At a moment when the global crisis in governance is at the center of international conversation, at least before the pandemic push pause, we are thrilled to have Kristen aboard to look at that issue with fresh creativity here at NBI. So welcome Kristen to your very first DemWorks podcast. KS: I'm really pleased to have the opportunity to speak with you today on such important issues. DM: So we'll speak about the crisis of governance but also the pandemic factor as well. But I do want to start with this global governance crisis that has sort of preceded this. This is a broader overhang. We've seen all over the world popular demonstrations over the past year and more and everywhere from Moscow to Managua, to Hong Kong, to Khartoum, to Algeria, to Istanbul, to Paris. You can go on and on. And what it represents is a frustration with the quality of governance. Democracy somehow is not delivering for people. And I want to hear your thoughts on that. It's a moment of turmoil certainly. People will look at this and say, "Well, democracy is failing," but it's more than democracy that this is happening. It's a general quality of governance question that I think actually provides an opportunity. So let me just ask your thoughts on that first off, Kristen. KS: Yeah. Thanks so much for that question, Derek. I think that NDI, since we have officers or programs spanning every region of the world basically in more than 50 countries, we're in a very good position to be able to take the pulse of what's happening in the different countries. In fact, we have been conducting surveys every two weeks of our country programs to get a sense of what's happening on the ground and we've received some very interesting signals that I'm really happy to be able to share with you today. On the one side, we are saying that in many countries governments are responding very seriously, in very concerted ways to the health crisis. I mean in more than two thirds of the countries. The governments in the countries where we work are closing nonessential businesses in over 60%, they are communicating in ways, having very intensive communication campaigns that really are reaching all citizens. But when it comes to the democracy side, when it comes to implementing that response and pursuing a response that's consistent with democratic principles and norms and values and institutions, we are seeing some troubling developments at the same time. For instance, the number of governments by our account, over 40% of the governments in the countries where we work are declaring emergency powers and it's clear that this is an extraordinary situation that requires extraordinary measures, but in many cases these emergency powers are inconsistent with democratic principles. They are not linked to the crisis. There is no provision for legislative oversight or in many cases, these have no sunset class, so there's no time limit and these are simply open-ended. And link to that and linked in many cases to these emergency powers, emergency decrees, we're seeing an uptick also in threats to fundamental freedoms. For instance, nearly half of our countries are reporting that there are measures in place where governments are repressing non-state media who are critical of the government's response to the pandemic and that in some cases, again, almost 50% of our countries, there are measures in place where governments are limiting space for civil society to engage in political actions. Another factor that I'd like to highlight too is while we're all distracted by the pandemic and while people are at home and perhaps with less access to information and less direct contact with government, there are also signals that many governments are using this as an opportunity to diminish anti-corruption controls. So that means that in some cases economic response packages or healthcare delivery is taking place with less transparency and less openness, which as you can imagine is a risk in terms of making sure that those resources are actually getting where they need to be. And all of this, all of the stresses, the frustration and these concerns of course also have impacts when it comes to citizen trust, interpersonal trust citizen trust of the government and also we're seeing greater potential for civic unrest and a deteriorating security environment. So all together, I hate to start with such a pessimistic view, but I think it is important again, through the networks that we have, the relationships that we have with political and civic actors on the ground, to convey the seriousness of the situation and to make sure that we're always communicating that well, this response requires really drastic measures. These measures need to be consonant of course, with the principles of democratic governance. DM: Right. It fits into this broader competition of narratives that occurred even before the pandemic began, where China or Russia saying, "Look, authoritarian governments are more efficient in providing services. We do this stuff better. Democracy is messy." And they're able, as you say, to take advantage of this moment when people are looking for strong central control to make that case and to both do that rhetorically but also through provision of services. And then it's not just those major countries. You'll have folks whether it's Hungary or Poland or you just go around the world, they're postponing elections. They are shutting down civil society, they're settling scores with adversaries. They're constraining public debate, saying that those things are luxuries during a time of crisis and that gives them an opportunity then as you said, for not just power grabs, but resource grabs and money grabs and they say, "Look, these are extraordinary times. They require extraordinary measures." And the concern is that these extraordinary measures will be permanent, that they'll say you need us to be surveilling people. So this is a challenge for certainly those who do democracy work and for folks inside these countries. But I think the broader question of security, we'll talk about that maybe a little bit later, but it's interesting what we're seeing on the ground as you say. You do a lot of work in the legislative sphere, you have a lot of background on that. How legislatures are particularly important. Civil society is too, but just focusing on legislature's role as a check and balance against executive overreach, can you talk about from the NDI experience or your other observation, how legislatures are being challenged, how they're dealing with this moment, how they're adapting to deal with the COVID-19 moment. KS: Yeah, absolutely. So I'm so glad you brought this point up. The first challenge that I'd highlight is this risk that the legislative branch is getting sidelined. In a crisis like this, the executive branch is generally front and center. Their role is clearly understood by citizens. Head of state might be the one out there doing daily press briefings or a health minister communicating medical reports. And there's this sense of emergency that as I sort of alluding to before, it seems to empower the executive branch. And unfortunately that seems to be, in many cases, at the expense of the legislative power. And additionally, another challenge and another reason that legislatures are perhaps getting crowded out or sidelined is simply that, the coronavirus, by it's dynamic, it's not socially compatible. And since parliaments are these multi-member bodies that have more diffuse operations, more diffuse leadership and that involve hundreds of different people, it's simply just a challenge to assemble a large group of people together, bring them together and keep them front and center in this crisis. So if that first challenge is making sure that people just keep in mind that legislatures matter and the legislatures are able to exert their rights and their authority, I'd say that the second challenge of course is just how do parliaments, legislatures operate in a virtual world. Politicians are by nature, they like to shake hands, they like to get out on the street, they need to be in touch with their constituents. And there are so many challenge involved in this current world that we have where we should all be social distancing. So looking across the world where we work, their parliaments are adopting different measures. Some of them are using social distancing restrictions like reducing the number of MPs in sessions. Others are moving to remote voting, remote deliberations. And then others are not meeting at all, which of course is quite terrible. And in those cases where legislatures have been dissolved or have been suspended for long periods of time. We are working too, as you were saying, as NDI closely with parliaments in a number of countries to try to do those adaptations to the rules of procedures so that they're able to continue meeting in session and continue deliberating and continuing exercising oversight. For instance, we have connected parliamentarians in Colombia with parliamentarians in Ecuador. We have virtual sessions to learn from Ecuador's experience in adopting a regulation for the implementation of virtual session and teleworking. So we are trying to connect parliamentarians across countries to understand how some parliaments have been moving forward in terms of remote procedures and how that's going for them. And two more challenges. One I'd highlight is that oversight role that we've been talking about. And from the same survey that we conducted with our country programs, we found that in 59% of the countries, checks and balances have been weakened, have deteriorated under the pandemic. And this is happening at such an unfortunate time when there's so many policy measures that need to be approved and put in place. If we just take the issue of debt policy for instance, I saw a statistic from the Westminster Foundation that more than 80 countries have already requested emergency aid from the IMF. I mean these countries are struggling of course to meet different types of fiscal obligations and they are desperate for cash in order to ramp up health services and put in place economic measures. And so these governments are taking on debt obligations, debt burns that are going to have far reaching impacts and long lasting impacts that should really be approved by the legislative branch and include monitoring and reporting. And that's not always the case in most of these instances. DM: So you just say it's a very dangerous time and folks are adapting procedurally, but there are really implications to this longterm, including for security. And I think we'll get to that after the break. For more than 35 years, NDI has been honored to work with courageous and committed pro-democracy activists and leaders around the world to help countries develop the institutions, practices and skills necessary for democracy's success. KS: Welcome back. Derek, I've heard you speak to the issue of authoritarian systems and how they're operating in this crisis and that the authoritarian nature in itself makes health crises more likely. And you've also said in some of your speeches and some of the conversations we've had that it's not a coincidence that the pandemic started in China and I'd really like to hear from your expertise, your deep background on China specifically. Can you explain to listeners why that is? Why there is that connection? DM: Well, as I said at the top, this is not just a health crisis, it's a governance crisis. It's a factor of governance both in the prevention of the pandemic and the response to it. We talked so far mostly about the response, how we're responding to the pandemic, but the core of the pandemic is a failure of governance. The difference between a local health crisis that is contained and a pandemic lies in the ability of a political system to respond to that early challenge quickly and effectively. And that requires both government and civic action. And if you're going to deal with this crisis early, it requires both. To do that, you have to act swiftly. You have to have widespread testing and contact tracing. You need critical support from citizens. In order to do all that and to ensure that that happens, you have to have basic civic trust. Closed societies routinely fail that test of having that civic trust and that rapid action for some very practical reasons. When a government suppresses a free flow of information, when it fails to empower independent civic institutions, when it's too insecure to convey bad news candidly, doesn't feel that it has a political legitimacy, therefore, it's insecure to convey bad news. When its data can't be trusted because it's opaque, when its officials are afraid to speak truth to power or communicate inconvenient truths to their superiors or act decisively, absent waiting for some strict orders from the very center and they can't move quickly, the result can be deadly. It turns what is a local health issue into a pandemic so it crosses borders. It becomes not just a problem for one country but for all others. So democratic governance is very, very practical and once again in this regard, transparent, accountable, inclusive, responsive, open governments is essential to crisis response but it's also essential to prevent the crisis from emerging to begin with. And it is a matter of national security. This highlights frankly what many of us have known all along, that this is not just nice but has very practical national security effects. And as we just talked earlier, the irony is that just as the world needs more open democratic societies to prevent future crises and deal with the current one, there are opportunistic politicians who are closing political and civic space. That I think is a very practical reason why that closed societies cause these pandemics. KS: I think that all of those points that you've been raising in terms of the threats and the vulnerabilities are so important for us to keep front and center. At the same time, here in NDI, as you know, is we're very keen to make sure that there are also opportunities to elevate the many examples around the world where governments are acting democratically and effectively in response to the crisis and they're framing and working with citizens in ways that are absolutely consistent with democratic values and principles. And so I do want to showcase some of those. I think it's received a lot of press around the world how New Zealand, for instance has reacted, and I read this week that New Zealand is perhaps one of the very first countries to have been able to successfully eliminate COVID. They have no new COVID cases. And it's a case that really stands out for the way that the prime minister has been able to deliver information in a very clear, compassionate, inclusive way, a way that's very grounded in science of course, and transparent. And at the same time where the legislature has had an important role developing a parliamentary select committee that's providing scrutiny of the government's response. The government has also been very affirmative there I think, in terms of issues of freedom of information and media freedom and has said that they would not slow down, for instance, their commitment to responding to requests for information during the crisis. So there's certainly the case of New Zealand, which is so interesting and it's shown such early success, but there are other places around the world too where specific measures taken by the government I think have been so positive and far reaching. Uruguay comes to mind for instance. We see so many cases where authoritarian leaders are using this crisis to be able to settle scores as you were saying, or to act in a very partisan fashion. But in Uruguay, the president convened all of the former presidential candidates to give a joint press conference to send a powerful message of unity and to show that across the party divide, they were working together to develop responses. Taiwan also really stands out for its cross party coordination, the transparent communications they've had, the very creative efforts that the government has put in place there, I think they've called it humor, not rumor. A campaign to share facts in real time to counter disinformation, to manage fear. So there aren't many cases out there as I was saying, of governments that are responding effectively and in ways that are building that citizen trust that you were mentioning. DM: Yes. And then a further one, another democracy that's a leading democracy, probably the first out of the gate is South Korea. They did exactly what was necessary. People are looking at that example, a democratic example. They didn't sacrifice rights at all. They obviously had very strong controls at times of the society, but it took very swift action. They did widespread testing, contact tracing and they worked with civil society and is shown over and over that civil society is probably one of the most important factors. It's not simply a government driven thing that makes a response success. Civil society serves as a very efficient force multiplier for government. We saw that in Katrina, hurricane Katrina. We see it's proved over and over that it really is effective in getting the word out and messaging. Ensuring is like in Taiwan through their civic tech community, they're sort of hackers. They're young citizens, who themselves in a voluntary fashion, formed a community. They were viewed as allies and partners not alienated from the government. And that partnership has been a success in Taiwan, has been a success in South Korea and is essential for a success. And that means that governments need to be open, need to be transparent, they need to see society as partners. So this is absolutely critical. KS: Yeah. And I just want to add on the South Korea example. I'm so glad you brought that up because South Korea held elections during the pandemic on April 15, they had national assembly lessons and they were actually able to organize those elections in a way that was seen as very transparent, that was very consistent with electoral integrity and they had higher levels of turnout than in previous elections, which is pretty amazing. And there's so many countries around the world that are facing elections in 2020. I think the way that South Korea was able to do it with a very intensive communication campaign as you were speaking again to their transparency of communication, they had expanded early voting measures in place. They had home voting, they had very comprehensive safeguards for people to be able to vote in person. So even organizing an election in a time that seems so difficult and so challenging, I think that as you were saying, democracies like South Korea are showing that there is a way forward. DM: Right. And I think we can learn some lessons from that as well. There are groups, including NDI has been at the center of this, of putting together documents that say here are the election integrity guidelines for this moment, that democracy should not be sacrificed at the alter of crisis response, that elections need to move forward if they can be done in the right way and if they need to be postponed, it's postponed within a certain timeframe and only during a period of high crisis. So there are principles here where democracy can continue to move forward. It makes the society stronger, it builds that civic trust that's important for crisis response. But we need to... You can walk and chew gum at the same time at this moment. So I'm glad we were able to talk about some of these democratic examples. KS: Absolutely. And I will be right back after this quick message. You can hear more from other democracy heroes by listening to our DemWorks podcast available on iTunes and SoundCloud. DM: Welcome back with Kristen Sample. Of course you're new to NDI, but you know NDI very well and it's a fundamental principle everywhere that nations will only succeed when societies are fully inclusive, where they don't leave anybody behind. They enable all to contribute equally. That means women, that means young people, that means traditionally marginalized groups, LGBT communities, et cetera. It's just plain logic that if you leave anybody behind, that you're not going to get the most out of your citizen when you're going to hold your country back, and yet we are witnessing negative impacts toward these populations during this COVID-19 moment. Kristen, can you speak to this, explain what's going on here and why it matters? KS: Sure, absolutely. I mean obviously this crisis isn't occurring in a vacuum. It's occurring in a context where across the world, across all countries, there are already this array of existing intersecting inequalities where some people were coming into this crisis already in a disadvantaged place. And then the pandemic itself has differentiated impacts that affect women and other marginalized groups disproportionately. I'll just give a few examples. I mean lockdown for women who are living in relationships of power imbalance and of abuse perhaps, lockdown for them means locked in, with an abusive partner. And for instance our survey of country offices that I was referring to previously, in 66% of our countries, there seems to be an increase in sexual and gender based violence since the pandemic. In 15% of those countries, it's a significant increase. Of course these women might be locked in in vulnerable situations and then at the same time have less access to government resources, government support. So that's one example. Others, people with disabilities for instance, who have always struggled to access health services, transportation in an equitable fashion, you can imagine that that lack of access and the differentiated impact of the pandemic on them is life threatening in some cases. There are digital divide concerns, people in rural areas or women, other marginalized groups who may have less access to information, to resources. There are real concerns also and cases around the world where this pandemic is being exploited by anti migrant hate groups for instance, who try to link movement and migration to the origin of the virus. Or in some cases, for instance in Africa and some of the countries where we work, media outlets are perpetuating stereotypes against people with albinism for instance, and placing the blame for the virus on them. So there are so many challenges around making sure that people have access to resources, people are safe and that we are able to convey and support a message of social cohesion and solidarity instead of the divisions that we're seeing pop up around the world. I think that in our case, for instance in Indiana, what we're trying to do is reinforce the need for inclusive decision-making, making sure for instance, that women are involved in decision making and other marginalized groups are involved in decision making and representation and in these deliberation bodies, making sure that the policymaking is taking into account these vulnerabilities and these different differentiated needs. And also the government messaging is inclusive, getting to everybody and it's supporting the social cohesion messaging and solidarity messages. DM: And again, this is critical for the crisis response, pandemic response. I mean COVID-19 doesn't discriminate. Whoever has it, whoever is vulnerable or subject will get it and it will spread to the society writ large. So if you're not inclusive, if you're excluding folks, if politicians then see that there is an opportunity here as some politicians will to divide and conquer, to play on fear. Or spoilers from the outside may see that there are opportunities if they're divided societies, to create tensions that then require or enable them to negotiate the deal that you want to make or promote corruption within the society. There are all kinds of ways this makes societies less stable, less secure, and affects the development and certainly the response to crises. So this is not just a nice thing, it's not just a human rights thing. This is fundamentally important to national security, international security and to everything that we're seeking to achieve through democracy. KS: Absolutely. And I think along the things I'd really like to hear from you too, Derek, in terms of how you see along the lines of this being an international crisis that includes the whole world, that joins us all although we are in very different places. How you see role NDI's role in supporting that cross border cooperation and solidarity and having the international community come together? DM: Given that authoritarians are claiming their model is unique for this moment, we have to be out there making our case. But in terms of our specific adaptations that we are doing, we are working in places like Ethiopia to ensure that the public opinion surveys are necessary invents of their postponed elections or continue forward, but can be done virtually. That we can adapt legislative rules of procedure in places that need it to allow for remote voting and continue the legislative process to ensure that election integrity is maintained. As I mentioned earlier, there are certain principles and established accepted international principles for when and how to postpone elections, how to hold them during moments of crisis. And we put together crisis response kits that can be used. It's called the practical toolkit for politicians during a pandemic that can help political parties figure out how to do crisis management or help the government put together crisis communication. So a lot of things that can be done internally and done across different countries that ensure the solidarity is still there, the momentum for democracy is still there. The expectation that democratic norms are sustained in this moment so that the headlines are not simply roll back authoritarian opportunism, that massive surveillance, all the things that people may succumb to because of fear during crisis, that there is an alternative voice and it says it doesn't have to be like that. Or if it does have to be like that now, it doesn't have to continue to be like that indefinitely and that there are some standards by which these things are being imposed. So that international norm setting at this moment, it's probably more important than ever to do and we are trying to do at national level. We're trying to do it across different countries to ensure that there is not a vacuum to which the authoritarian voice moves and has free open season for its own values. It goes across, I think, a lot of different countries. And Kristen, I'd be interested in your thoughts from your perspective of governance, how that's working. KS: I think that there's a real role for the international community to play. And I wanted to highlight that too in what you're saying because these challenges are so vast that clearly we have to work together on people to people exchanges and supporting lesson sharing. And so I do think that there's an absolute role for the international community playing in terms of getting out the messages of that democracy is not a luxury, it's not something that could be put into a coma or put on hold while we're all sheltering, that it's something that has to be reaffirmed on a daily basis. And so I do think that countries also have to, in addition to standing firm, standing on their own ground on democratic principles, they also have to be willing to promote and expand those democratic principles across borders, especially to counter those liberal influences that you were referring to earlier, that in some cases are, really transmitted and increased through disinformation campaigns or phony PR campaigns that need to be called out of course by all actors. DM: Thanks again, Kristen for joining me in conversation about how democracies can best meet the challenges of COVID and how NDI with its global partners are meeting the moment. KS: Thank you, Derek. DM: I'd also like to say thank you to our listeners. To learn more about NDI or to listen to other DemWorks podcasts, please visit our website at www.ndi.org. Thanks very much.
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Loet Leydesdorff on the Triple Helix: How Synergies in University-Industry-Government Relations can Shape Innovation Systems
This is the sixth and last in a series of Talks dedicated to the technopolitics of International Relations, linked to the forthcoming double volume 'The Global Politics of Science and Technology' edited by Maximilian Mayer, Mariana Carpes, and Ruth Knoblich
The relationship between technological innovation processes and the nation state remains a challenge for the discipline of International Relations. Non-linear and multi-directional characteristics of knowledge production, and the diffusive nature of knowledge itself, limit the general ability of governments to influence and steer innovation processes. Loet Leydesdorff advances the framework of the "Triple Helix" that disaggregates national innovation systems into evolving university-industry-government eco-systems. In this Talk, amongst others, he shows that these eco-systems can be expected to generate niches with synergy at all scales, and emphasizes that, though politics are always involved, synergies develop unintentionally.
Print version of this Talk (pdf)
What is the most relevant aspect of the dynamics of innovation for the discipline of International Relations?
The main challenge is to endogenize the notions of technological progress and technological development into theorizing about political economies and nation states. The endogenization of technological innovation and technological development was first placed on the research agenda of economics by evolutionary economists like Nelson and Winter in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In this context, the question was how to endogenize the dynamics of knowledge, organized knowledge, science and technology into economic theorizing. However, one can equally well formulate the problem of how to reflect on the global (sub)dynamics of organized knowledge production in political theory and International Relations.
From a longer-term perspective, one can consider that the nation states – the national or political economies in Europe – were shaped in the 19th century, somewhat later for Germany (after 1871), but for most countries it was during the first half of the 19th century. This was after the French and American Revolutions and in relation to industrialization. These nation states were able to develop an institutional framework for organizing the market as a wealth-generating mechanism, while the institutional framework permitted them to retain wealth, to regulate market forces, and also to steer them to a certain extent. However, the market is not only a local dynamics; it is also a global phenomenon.
Nowadays, another global dynamics is involved: science and technology add a dynamics different from that of the market. The market is an equilibrium-seeking mechanism at each moment of time. The evolutionary dynamics of science and technology nowadays adds a non-equilibrium-seeking dynamics over time on top of that, and this puts the nation state in a very different position. Combining an equilibrium-seeking dynamics at each moment of time with a non-equilibrium seeking one over time results in a complex adaptive dynamics, or an eco-dynamics, or however you want to call it – these are different words for approximately the same thing.
For the nation state, the question arises of how it relates to the global market dynamics on the one side, and the global dynamics of knowledge and innovation on the other. Thus, the nation state has to combine two tasks. I illustrated this model of three subdynamics with a figure in my 2006 book entitled The Knowledge-Based Economy: Modeled, measured, simulated (see image). The figure shows that first-order interactions generate a knowledge-based economy as a next-order or global regime on top of the localized trajectories of nation states and innovative firms. These complex dynamics have first to be specified and then to be analyzed empirically.
For example, the knowledge-based dynamics change the relation between government and the economy; and they consequently change the position of the state in relation to wealth-retaining mechanisms. How can the nation state be organized in such a way as to retain wealth from knowledge locally, while knowledge (like capital) tends to travel beyond boundaries? One can envisage the complex system dynamics as a kind of cloud – a cloud that touches the ground at certain places, as Harald Bathelt, for example, formulated.
How can national governments shape conditions for the cloud to touch and to remain on the ground? The Triple Helix of University-Industry-Government Relations can be considered as an eco-system of bi- and tri-lateral relations. The three institutions and their interrelations can be expected to form a system carrying the three functions of (i) novelty production, (ii) wealth generation, and (iii) normative control. One tends to think of university-industry-government relations first as neo-corporatist arrangements between these institutional partners. However, I am interested in the ecosystem shaped through the tri- and bilateral relationships.
This ecosystem can be shaped at different levels. It can be a regional ecosystem or a national ecosystem, for instance. One can ask whether there is a surplus of synergy between the three (sub-)dynamics of university-industry-government relations and where that synergy can generate wealth, knowledge, and control; in which places, and along trajectories for which periods of time – that is, the same synergy as meant by "a cloud touching the ground".
For example, when studying Piedmont as a region in Northern Italy, it is questionable whether the synergy in university-industry-government relations is optimal at this regional level or should better be examined from a larger perspective that includes Lombardy. On the one hand, the administrative borders of nations and regions result from the construction of political economies in the 19th century; but on the other hand, the niches of synergy that can be expected in a knowledge-based economy are bordered also; for example, in terms of metropolitan regions (e.g., Milan–Turin–Genoa).
Since political dynamics are always involved, this has implications for International Relations as a field of study. But the dynamic analysis is different from comparative statics (that is, measurement at different moments of time). The knowledge dynamics can travel and be "footloose" to use the words of Raymond Vernon, although it leaves footprints behind. Grasping "wealth from knowledge" (locally or regionally) requires taking a systems perspective. However, the system is not "given"; the system remains under reconstruction and can thus be articulated only as a theoretically informed hypothesis.
In the social sciences, one can use the concept of a hypothesized system heuristically. For example, when analyzing the knowledge-based economy in Germany, one can ask whether more synergy can be explained when looking at the level of the whole country (e.g., in terms of the East-West or North-South divide) or at the level of Germany's Federal States? What is the surplus of the nation or at the European level? How can one provide political decision-making with the required variety to operate as a control mechanism on the complex dynamics of these eco-systems?
A complex system can be expected to generate niches with synergy at all scales, but as unintended consequences. To what extent and for which time span can these effects be anticipated and then perhaps be facilitated? At this point, Luhmann's theory comes in because he has this notion of different codifications of communication, which then, at a next-order level, begin to self-organize when symbolically generalized.
Codes are constructed bottom-up, but what is constructed bottom-up may thereafter begin to control top-down. Thus, one should articulate reflexively the selection mechanisms that are constructed from the bottom-up variation by specifying the why as an hypothesis. What are the selection mechanisms? Observable relations (such as university-industry relations) are not neutral, but mean different things for the economy and for the state; and this meaning of the observable relations can be evaluated in terms of the codes of communication.
Against Niklas Luhmann's model, I would argue that codes of communication can be translated into one another since interhuman communications are not operationally closed, as in the biological model of autopoiesis. One also needs a social-scientific perspective on the fluidities ("overflows") and translations among functions, as emphasized, for example, by French scholars such as Michel Callon and Bruno Latour. In evolutionary economics, one distinguishes between market and non-market selection environments, but not among selection environments that are differently codified. Here, Luhmann's theory offers us a heuristic: The complex system of communications tends to differentiate in terms of the symbolic generalizations of codes of communication because this differentiation is functional in allowing the system to process more complexity and thus to be more innovative. The more orthogonal the codes, the more options for translations among them. The synergy indicator measures these options as redundancy. The selection environments, however, have to be specified historically because these redundancies—other possibilities—are not given but rather constructed over long periods of time.
How did you arrive where you currently work on?
I became interested in the relations between science, technology, and society as an undergraduate (in biochemistry) which coincided with the time of the student movement of the late 1960s. We began to study Jürgen Habermas in the framework of the "critical university," and I decided to continue with a second degree in philosophy. After the discussions between Luhmann and Habermas (1971), I recognized the advantages of Luhmann's more empirically oriented systems approach and I pursued my Ph.D. in the sociology of organization and labour.
In the meantime, we got the opportunity to organize an interfaculty department for Science and Technology Dynamics at the University of Amsterdam after a competition for a large government grant. In the context of this department, I became interested in methodology: how can one compare across case studies and make inferences? Actually, my 1995 book The Challenge of Scientometrics had a kind of Triple-Helix model on the cover: How do cognitions, texts, and authors exhibit different dynamics that influence one another?
For example, when an author publishes a paper in a scholarly journal, this may add to his reputation as an author, but the knowledge claimed in the text enters a process of validation which can be much more global and anonymous. These processes are mediated since they are based on communication. Thus, one can add to the context of discovery (of authors) and the context of justification (of knowledge contents) a context of mediation (in texts). The status of a journal, for example, matters for the communication of the knowledge content in the article. The contexts operate as selection environments upon one another.
In evolutionary economics, one is used to distinguishing between market and non-market selection environments, but not among more selection environments that are differently codified. At this point, Luhmann's theory offers a new perspective: The complex system of communications tends to differentiate in terms of the symbolic generalization of codes of communication because this differentiation among the codes of communication allows the system to process more complexity and to be more innovative in terms of possible translations. The different selection environments for communications, however, are not given but constructed historically over long periods of time. The modern (standardized) format of the citation, for example, was constructed at the end of the 19th century, but it took until the 1950s before the idea of a citation index was formulated (by Eugene Garfield). The use of citations in evaluative bibliometrics is even more recent.
In evolutionary economics, one distinguishes furthermore between (technological) trajectories and regimes. Trajectories can result from "mutual shaping" between two selection environments, for example, markets and technologies. Nations and firms follow trajectories in a landscape. Regimes are global and require the specification of three (or more) selection environments. When three (or more) dynamics interact, symmetry can be broken and one can expect feed-forward and feedback loops. Such a system can begin to flourish auto-catalytically when the configuration is optimal.
From such considerations, that is, a confluence of the neo-institutional program of Henry Etzkowitz and my neo-evolutionary view, our Triple Helix model emerged in 1994: how do institutions and functions interrelate and change one another or, in other words, provide options for innovation? Under what conditions can university-industry-government relations lead to wealth generation and organized knowledge production? The starting point was a workshop about Evolutionary Economics and Chaos Theory: New directions for technology studies held in Amsterdam in 1993. Henry suggested thereafter that we could collaborate further on university-industry relations. I answered that I needed at least three (sub)dynamics from the perspective of my research program, and then we agreed about "A Triple Helix of University-Industry-Government Relations". Years later, however, we took our two lines of research apart again, and in 2002 I began developing a Triple-Helix indicator of synergy in a series of studies of national systems of innovation.
What would you give as advice to students who would like to get into the field of innovation and global politics?
In general, I would advise them to be both a specialist and broader than that. Innovation involves crossing established borders. Learn at least two languages. If your background is political science, then take a minor in science & technology studies or in economics. One needs both the specialist profile and the potential to reach out to other audiences by being aware of the need to make translations between different frameworks. Learn to be reflexive about the status of what one can say in one or the other framework.
For example, I learned to avoid the formulation of grandiose statements such as "modern economies are knowledge-based economies," and to say instead: "modern economies can increasingly be considered as knowledge-based economies." The latter formulation provides room for asking "to what extent," and thus one can ask for further information, indicators, and results of the measurement.
In the sociology of science, specialisms and paradigms are sometimes considered as belief systems. It seems to me that by considering scholarly discourses as systems of rationalized expectations one can make the distinction between normative and cognitive learning. Normative learning (that is, in belief systems) is slower than cognitive learning (in terms of theorized expectations) because the cognitive mode provides us with more room for experimentation: One can afford to make mistakes, since one's communication and knowledge claims remain under discussion, and not one's status as a communicator. The cognitive mode has advantages; it can be considered as the surplus that is further developed during higher education. Normative learning is slower; it dominates in the political sphere.
What does the "Triple Helix" reveal about the fragmentation of "national innovation systems"?
In 2003, colleagues from the Department of Economics and Management Studies at the Erasmus University in Rotterdam offered me firm data from the Netherlands containing these three dimensions: the economic, the geographical, and the technological dimensions in data of more than a million Dutch firms. I presented the results at the Schumpeter Society in Turin in 2004, and asked whether someone in the audience had similar data for other countries. I expected Swedish or Israeli colleagues to have this type of statistics, but someone from Germany stepped in, Michael Fritsch, and so we did the analysis for Germany. These studies were first published in Research Policy. Thereafter, we did studies on Hungary, Norway, Sweden, and recently also China and Russia.
Several conclusions arise from these studies. Using entropy statistics, the data can be decomposed along the three different dimensions. One can decompose national systems geographically into regions, but one can also decompose them in terms of the technologies involved (e.g., high-tech versus medium-tech). We were mainly relying on national data. And of course, there are limitations to the data collections. Actually, we now have international data, but this is commercial data and therefore more difficult to use reliably than governmental statistics.
For the Netherlands, we obtained the picture that would more or less be expected: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Eindhoven are the most knowledge-intensive and knowledge-based regions. This is not surprising, although there was one surprise: We know that in terms of knowledge bases, Amsterdam is connected to Utrecht and then the geography goes a bit to the east in the direction of Wageningen. What we did not know was that the niche also spreads to the north in the direction of Zwolle. The highways to Amsterdam Airport (Schiphol) are probably the most important.
In the case of Germany, when we first analyzed the data at the level of the "Laender" (Federal States), we could see the East-West divide still prevailing, but when we repeated the analysis at the lower level of the "Regierungsbezirke" we no longer found the East-West divide as dominant (using 2004 data). So, the environment of Dresden for example was more synergetic in Triple-Helix terms than that of Saarbruecken. And this was nice to see considering my idea that the knowledge-based economy increasingly prevails since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the Soviet Union. The discussion about two different models for organizing the political economy—communism or liberal democracy—had become obsolete after 1990.
After studying Germany, I worked with Balázs Lengyel on Hungarian data. Originally, we could not find any regularity in the Hungarian data, but then the idea arose to analyze the Hungarian data as three different innovation systems: one around Budapest, which is a metropolitan innovation system; one in the west of the country, which has been incorporated into Western Europe; and one in the east of the country, which has remained the old innovation system that is state-led and dependent on subsidies. For the western part, one could say that Hungary has been "europeanized" by Austria and Germany; it has become part of a European system.
When Hungary came into the position to create a national innovation system, free from Russia and the Comecon, it was too late, as Europeanization had already stepped in and national boundaries were no longer as dominant. Accordingly, and this was a very nice result, assessing this synergy indicator on Hungary as a nation, we did not find additional synergy at the national (that is, above-regional) level. While we clearly found synergy at the national level for the Netherlands and also found it in Germany, but at the level of the Federal States, we could not find synergy at a national level for Hungary. Hungary has probably developed too late to develop a nationally controlled system of innovations.
A similar phenomenon appeared when we studied Norway: my Norwegian colleague (Øivind Strand) did most of our analysis there. To our surprise, the knowledge-based economy was not generated where the universities are located (Oslo and Trondheim), but on the West Coast, where the off-shore, marine and maritime industries are most dominant. FDI (foreign direct investment) in the marine and maritime industries leads to knowledge-based synergy in the regions on the West Shore of Norway. Norway is still a national system, but the Norwegian universities like Trondheim or Oslo are not so much involved in entrepreneurial networks. These are traditional universities, which tend to keep their hands off the economy.
Actually, when we had discussions about these two cases, Norway and Hungary, which both show that internationalization had become a major factor, either in the form of Europeanization in the Hungarian case, or in the form of foreign-driven investments (off-shore industry and oil companies) in the Norwegian case, I became uncertain and asked myself whether we did not believe too much in our indicators? Therefore, I proposed to Øivind to study Sweden, given the availability of well-organized data of this national system.
We expected to find synergy concentrated in the three regional systems of Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmö/Lund. Indeed, 48.5 percent of the Swedish synergy is created in these three regions. This is more than one would expect on the basis of the literature. Some colleagues were upset, because they had already started trying to work on new developments of the Triple Helix, for example, in Linköping. But the Swedish economy is organized and centralized in this geographical dimension. Perhaps that is why one talks so much about "regionalization" in policy documents. Sweden is very much a national innovation system, with additional synergy between the regions.
Can governments alter historical trajectories of national, regional or local innovation systems?
Let me mention the empirical results for China in order to illustrate the implications of empirical conclusions for policy options. We had no Chinese data set, but we obtained access to the database Orbis of the Bureau van Dijk (an international company, which is Wall Street oriented, assembling data about companies) that contains industry indicators such as names, addresses, NACE-codes, types of technology, the sizes of each enterprise, etc. However, this data can be very incomplete. Using this incomplete data for China, we said that we were just going to show how one could do the analysis if one had full data. We guess that the National Bureau of Statistics of China has complete data. I did the analysis with Ping Zhou, Professor at Zhejiang University.
We analyzed China first at the provincial level, and as expected, the East Coast emerged as much more knowledge intense than the rest of the country. After that, we also looked at the next-lower level of the 339 prefectures of China. From this analysis, four of them popped up as far more synergetic than the others. These four municipalities were: Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing.
These four municipalities became clearly visible as an order of magnitude more synergetic than other regions. The special characteristic about them is that –as against the others – these four municipalities are administered by the central government. Actually, it came out of my data and I did not understand it; but my Chinese colleague said that this result was very nice and specified this relationship.
The Chinese case thus illustrates that government control can make a difference. It shows – and that is not surprising, as China runs on a different model – that the government is able to organize the four municipalities in such a way as to increase synergy. Of course, I do not know what is happening on the ground. We know that the Chinese system is more complex than these three dimensions suggest. I guess the government agencies may wish to consider the option of extending the success of this development model, to Guangdong for example or to other parts of China. Isn't it worrisome that all the other and less controlled districts have not been as successful in generating synergy?
Referring more generally to innovation policies, I would advise as a heuristics that political discourse is able to signal a problem, but policy questions do not enable us to analyze the issues. Regional development, for example, is an issue in Sweden because the system is very centralized, more than in Norway, for example. But there is nothing in our data that supports the claim that the Swedish government is successful in decentralizing the knowledge-based economy beyond the three metropolitan regions. We may be able to reach conclusions like these serving as policy advice. One develops policies on the basis of intuitive assumptions which a researcher is sometimes able to test.
As noted, one can expect a complex system continuously to produce unintended consequences, and thus it needs monitoring. The dynamics of the system are different from the sum of the sub-dynamics because of the interaction effects and feedback loops. Metaphors such as a Triple Helix, Mode-2, or the Risk Society can be stimulating for the discourse, but these metaphors tend to develop their own dynamics of proliferating discourses.
The Triple Helix, for example, can first be considered as a call for collaboration in networks of institutions. However, in an ecosystem of bi-lateral and tri-lateral relations, one has a trade-off between local integration (collaboration) and global differentiation (competition). The markets and the sciences develop at the global level, above the level of specific relations. A principal agent such as government may be locked into a suboptimum. Institutional reform that frees the other two dynamics (markets and sciences) requires translation of political legitimation into other codes of communication. Translations among codes of communication provide the innovation engine.
Is there a connection between infrastructures and the success of innovation processes?
One of the conclusions, which pervades throughout all advanced economies, is that knowledge intensive services (KIS) are not synergetic locally because they can be disconnected – uncoupled – from the location. For example, if one offers a knowledge-intensive service in Munich and receives a phone call from Hamburg, the next step is to take a plane to Hamburg, or to catch a train inside Germany perhaps. Thus, it does not matter whether one is located in Munich or Hamburg as knowledge-intensive services uncouple from the local economy. The main point is proximity to an airport or train station.
This is also the case for high-tech knowledge-based manufacturing. But it is different for medium-tech manufacturing, because in this case the dynamics are more embedded in the other parts of the economy. If one looks at Russia, the knowledge-intensive services operate differently from the Western European model, where the phenomenon of uncoupling takes place. In Russia, KIS contribute to coupling, as knowledge-intensive services are related to state apparatuses.
In the Russian case, the knowledge-based economy is heavily concentrated in Moscow and St. Petersburg. So, if one aims –as the Russian government proclaims – to create not "wealth from knowledge" but "knowledge from wealth" – that is, oil revenues –it might be wise to uncouple the knowledge-intensive services from the state apparatuses. Of course, this is not easy to do in the Russian model because traditionally, the center (Moscow) has never done this. Uncoupling knowledge-intensive services, however, might give them a degree of freedom to move around, from Tomsk to Minsk or vice versa, steered by economic forces more than they currently are (via institutions in Moscow).
Final question. What does path-dependency mean in the context of innovation dynamics?
In The Challenge of Scientometrics. The development, measurement, and self-organization of scientific communications (1995), I used Shannon-type information theory to study scientometric problems, as this methodology combines both static and dynamic analyses. Connected to this theory I developed a measurement method for path-dependency and critical transitions.
In the case of a radio transmission, for example, you have a sender and a receiver, and in between you may have an auxiliary station. For instance, the sender is in New York and the receiver is in Bonn and the auxiliary station is in Iceland. The signal emerges in New York and travels to Bonn, but it may be possible to improve the reception by assuming the signal is from Iceland instead of listening to New York. When Iceland provides a better signal, it is possible to forget the history of the signal before it arrived in Island. It no longer matters whether Iceland obtained the signal originally from New York or Boston. One takes the signal from Iceland and the pre-history of the signal does not matter anymore for a receiver.
Such a configuration provides a path-dependency (on Iceland) in information-theoretical terms, measurable in terms of bits of information. In a certain sense you get negative bits of information, since the shortest path in the normal triangle would be from New York to Bonn, and in this case the shortest path is from New York via Iceland to Bonn. I called this at the time a critical transition. In a scientific text for instance, a new terminology can come up and if it overwrites the old terminology to the extent that one does not have to listen to the old terminology anymore, one has a critical transition that frees one from the path-dependencies at a previous moment of time.
Thus, my example is about radical and knowledge-based changes. As long as one has to listen to the past, one does not make a critical transition. The knowledge-based approach is always about creative destruction and about moving ahead, incorporating possible new options in the future. The hypothesized future states become more important than the past. The challenge, in my opinion, is to make the notion of options operational and to bring these ideas into measurement. The Triple-Helix indicator measures the number of possible options as additional redundancy. This measurement has the additional advantage that one becomes sensitive to uncertainty in the prediction.
Loet Leydesdorff is Professor Emeritus at the Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR) of the University of Amsterdam. He is Honorary Professor of the Science and Technology Policy Research Unit (SPRU) of the University of Sussex, Visiting Professor at the School of Management, Birkbeck, University of London, Visiting Professor of the Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (ISTIC) in Beijing, and Guest Professor at Zhejiang University in Hangzhou. He has published extensively in systems theory, social network analysis, scientometrics, and the sociology of innovation (see at http://www.leydesdorff.net/list.htm). With Henry Etzkowitz, he initiated a series of workshops, conferences, and special issues about the Triple Helix of University-Industry-Government Relations. He received the Derek de Solla Price Award for Scientometrics and Informetrics in 2003 and held "The City of Lausanne" Honor Chair at the School of Economics, Université de Lausanne, in 2005. In 2007, he was Vice-President of the 8th International Conference on Computing Anticipatory Systems (CASYS'07, Liège). In 2014, he was listed as a highly-cited author by Thomson Reuters.
Literature and Related links:
Science & Technology Dynamics, University of Amsterdam / Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR)
Leydesdorff, L. (2006). The Knowledge-Based Economy: Modeled, Measured, Simulated. Universal Publishers, Boca Raton, FL.
Leydesdorff, L. (2001). A Sociological Theory of Communication: The Self-Organization of the Knowledge-Based Society. Universal Publishers, Boca Raton, FL.
Leydesdorff, L. (1995). The Challenge of Scientometrics . The development, measurement, and self-organization of scientific communications. Leiden, DSWO Press, Leiden University.
http://www.leydesdorff.net/
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