Suchergebnisse

In the aftermath of the 5th Regional Conference on Cadastre and Spatial Data Infrastructure (Banja Luka and Laktaši, Bosnia and Herzegovina, June 6–8, 2012), the Republic Authority for Geodetic and Property Affairs of the Republic of Srpska and the Federal Administration for Geodetic and Real Property Affairs published the 5th Regional Study on Cadastre and Spatial Data Infrastructure. The study was produced in the frame of the Project INSPIRATION – Spatial Data Infrastructure in the Western Balkans, which is being realized for the benefit and with cooperation of representatives of eight geodetic administrations in the region (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Serbia) by consortium led by German company GFA of Hamburg, in cooperation with GDi GISDATA of Zagreb, experts from the Austrian Environmental Agency and German company con terra GmbH and financed from the European Union IPA funding programme for 2010. ; Nakon 5. regionalne konferencije o katastru i infrastrukturi prostornih podataka (Banja Luka i Laktaši, Bosna i Hercegovina, 6–8. lipnja 2012.) Republička uprava za geodetske i imovinsko pravne poslove Republike Srpske i Federalna uprava za geodetske i imovinsko pravne poslove Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine izdale su 5. regionalnu studiju o katastru i infrastrukturi prostornih podataka. Studija je izrađena u okviru projekta INSPIRATION – the SDI in the Western Balkans, kojeg za potrebe i uz suradnju predstavnika osam geodetskih uprava u regiji (Albanija, Bosna i Hercegovina, Crna Gora, Hrvatska, Kosovo, Makedonija, Srbija), realizira konzorcij na čelu s njemačkom tvrtkom GFA iz Hamburga u suradnji s tvrtkom GDi GISDATA iz Zagreba, stručnjacima austrijske Agencije za okoliš i njemačke tvrtke con terra GmbH, a financira se iz sredstava programa IPA Europske unije za 2010. godinu.

Predmet istraživanja rada je utjecaj jedinica lokalne i regionalne samouprave Varaždinske županije na formiranje populacijske politike. Analizom statističkih podataka prikazana su osnovna demografska obilježja županije. Opisana je problematika demografske politike u Hrvatskoj od osamostaljenja do danas i identificirane su ovlasti koje imaju općine, upravni gradovi i županije za provedbu mjera populacijske politike. Intenzitet i efikasnost postojećih demografskih mjera lokalne i regionalne samouprave Varaždinske županije analizirane su uz pomoć proračunskih dokumenata i službenih odgovora dobivenih putem zahtjeva za pristupom informacijama. Poseban osvrt napravljen je na strategije razvoja lokalne samouprave i njihova odnosa prema demografiji u budućnosti. Zaključno su predložene mjere demografskog oporavka Varaždinske županije koje mogu provesti upravni gradovi i općine. Rezultati istraživanja pokazuju kako su mjere koje provodi lokalna uprava nesustavne, neučinkovite (izostaje porast nataliteta), bez definiranih ciljeva i vremenskih rokova te da populacijsku politiku mora provoditi država. ; The thesis topic and subject of research is influence of the local and regional self-government units in Varaždin County on the development of population policy. The analysis of statistical data shows the basic demographic characteristics of the County. Demographic policy issues in Croatia are described since independence, and the authority of municipalities, towns and counties for implementation of population policy measures has been identified. The intensity and efficiency of existing demographic measures of local and regional self-government units of Varaždin County were analyzed using budget documents and official responses received through requests for access to information. A special review was made on local self-government development strategies and their attitude towards demography in the future. In conclusion are proposed measures of demographic recovery of Varaždin County, which can be implemented by towns and ...

U političkome trenutku kada se Europska unija percipira kao specifična politička organizacija kompleksnoga multirazinskog sustava vlasti koji prevladava nacionalne i manjinske probleme, pojavile su se tendencije unutarnjega identitetskog i političkog komešanja kod pojedinih država članica. Španjolska predstavlja izuzetan primjer recentne političke nestabilnosti proizvedene uslijed najava referendumskih izjašnjavanja građana Katalonije o potencijalnoj neovisnosti. Ekonomska kriza koja je pogodila Španjolsku zasigurno je katalizator spomenutih tendencija, ali nipošto jedini ili odlučujući faktor u političkome zahtjevu za neovisnošću ili barem povećanom autonomijom unutar Španjolske. Potonja ima dugu povijest sukobljavanja centralističkih i regionalno-federalističkih tradicija, a njezina identitetska kompleksnost nipošto ne odgovara centralističkomu sustavu vlasti i političke teritorijalizacije. Stoga su izazovnost tematike španjolskoga regionalnog modela, njegova problematika i zahtjevi za revidiranjem suviše važna tematika koja zahtijeva pažljivo proučavanje mnoštva aspekata koje ovaj model podrazumijeva. Ovaj rad nema namjeru sveobuhvatne analize španjolskoga regionalnog ustrojstva, već kratak presjek najznačajnijih elemenata koji su reaktualizirani u novijim događajima te njihovo smještanje u odgovarajuće teorijske modele radi lakšega razumijevanja i interpretacije. ; In today's political situation when the European Union is percevied as a specific political organization with a complex multilevel system of authority which overcomes national and minority problems, certain identity and political restlesness started to emerge in some member states. Spain is an excellent example of recent political instability created due to the announcement of the citizens referendum on potential self-determination in Catalonia. Economic crisis which has affected Spain is definitely a catalyst of the mentioned tendencies, but by no means the only and decisive factor in the political claims for independence or at least greater autonomy within Spain. The latter has a long history of conflict between centralist and regional-federal traditions, and the complexity of its identity in no way corresponds to the centralized system of government and political territorialization. Therefore, the challenging themes of Spanish regional model, its problems and requirements for its revisionism are extremely important issues which require careful study from multiple aspects that such model implies. This paper is not a comprehensive analysis of Spanish regional organization, but a brief overview of its most significant elements reaffirmed in the most recent events as well as their positioning within appropriate theorethical models for easier understanding and interpretation.

U radu se istražuju ustroj i djelovanje Izvršnog vijeća Sabora NRH, republičkog izvršnog tijela vlasti, u razdoblju od njegova osnivanja Ustavnim zakonom NRH 1953. godine do donošenja novog Ustava SRH 1963. godine. U navedenom razdoblju rad Izvršnog vijeća prati se kroz tri mandatna razdoblja: prvo 6.2.-18.12.1953, drugo 18.12.1953.-10.4.1958. te treće mandatno razdoblje 10.4.1958.-27.6.1963. godine. Istraživanje se prvenstveno temelji na analizi arhivskoga gradiva fondova Izvršno vijeće Sabora SRH 1953-1990. i Sabor SRH 1945-1982. u Hrvatskom državnom arhivu te zakona, podzakonskih propisa i drugih akata objavljenih u službenim listovima (Narodne novine, Službeni list FNRJ). U prvom dijelu rada analiziraju se odredbe o postupku izbora Izvršnog vijeća te donosi pregled i popisi izabranih članova po mandatnim razdobljima. U nastavku rada naglasak je na definiranju poslova iz stručne nadležnosti, te pregledu organizacije i rekonstrukciji unutarnjeg ustroja Izvršnog vijeća (upravljanje Izvršnim vijećem, stručna tijela: odbori i komisije, administracija Izvršnog vijeća). U posljednjem poglavlju analiziraju se osnovna obilježja i rezultati rada Izvršnog vijeća u promatranom razdoblju, s posebnim osvrtom na rad u sjednicama, pripremanje prijedloga zakona, te donošenje podzakonskih propisa i drugih akata iz njegove nadležnosti. ; The article presents Executive Council of Parliament of the People's Republic of Croatia (1953-1963), as one of the central governing institutions, with special interest i n its organization, functions and activity. The first chapter gives an overview of the provisions about constitution and procedure of members' election. It was constituted by 15 to 30 members, elected from members of the Republican Chamber of the Parliament of the People's Republic of Croatia. Three mandate periods were established within which the activity of the Executive Council should be monitored: The first mandate from 6th February till 18th December 1953, the second mandate from 18th December 1953 till 10th April 1958 and the third mandate from 10th April 1958 till 27th June 1963. The same chapter brings the list of all members organized according to mandates. The second chapter gives an overview of the functions defined in regulations. According to the provisions of Constitutional Law from 1953, it is defined which functions has the Executive Council taken over from the authority of the abrogated Government of the People's Republic of Croatia and Presidium of the Parliament of the People's Republic of Croatia. Further analysis points that in period from 1953 to 1956 Executive Council was acting as executive-administrative body and from 1956 to 1963 primarily as executive-political body. In 1956, due to the reorganisation of the public administration, the majority of administrative functions until then under the jurisdiction of the Executive Council were transferred to the authority of the Republic's governing bodies. According to that, Executive Council acts primarily as executive-political body, under which authority is enforcement of general politics and measures, as well as adoption of acts and putting precise tasks to governing bodies for their accomplishment. The next chapter gives an analysis of its organization, divided in three parts: guidance of Executive Council, working bodies (boards and commissions) and administrative and professional service. The last chapter gives an analysis of the activity of Executive Council. It is concluded that the most of the activity concerns the discussion of questions, preparation of laws and adoption of acts related to economy and finances, organization of central Republic's institutions, republican and regional (local) governing bodies, as well as education, science and culture. Less activity concerned the discussion of questions, preparation of laws and adoption of acts related to other administrative fields, first of all, system of justice and home affairs, health care system and social policy, as well as labour relations.

The author claims that Haberle's theory of the constitution is a science of culture, opposed to formalism, decisionism, positivism, & statism. It is based on the continuity & the relationship among culture-building, law, & state. The subjects of the constitution-formative authority are mutually culturally linked citizens who decide on the objectively given subject-matter & procedures. The theory of the constitution as a science of culture is based on the assumption that serious conflicts among the open societies of Western Europe are highly unlikely. This represents a significant departure from the positivist theory of the state grounded in the conflict of interests & opinions as well as the strong regulatory role of the state. The author challenges Haberle's disregard for the crisis potential of modern societies & proposes that these two opposed theories should complement each other. The author goes on to describe Haberle's research method, which includes an analysis of both the cultural context & the normative/constitutional solutions. He applies this research method to the constitutional laws of Germany, Switzerland, & Austria, & also when comparing large & small states, or developed & underdeveloped ones. Haberle espoused Taylor's definition of culture: culture & civilization are equated so that the systems of culture are on the one hand products of activity, & on the other the conditioning element of future activity. According to Haberle, the culture of a community starts from the traditional, innovative & pluralist aspects that are the orientation points for constitutional science as a science of culture. Regarding tradition, culture is mediation of things past. The innovative aspect is based on the idea that culture is a further development of things past. Since culture is not uniform, its pluralist aspect should not be forgotten. Thus the citizens of a democratic constitutional state make up the cultural/anthropological premise, while the state is only one aspect of the constituted res publica. The constitutional state today goes beyond the scope of the national state since the regional European constitutional state has been evolving together with the outlines of "the world community of constitutional states.". 9 References. Adapted from the source document.

Autor priređuje i analizira neobjavljenu listinu, izdanu 1386. godine u Dvigradu, kojom je sklopljen savez između dvigradske komune, nominalno pod jurisdikcijom akvilejskih patrijarha, i Hugona VIII. Devinskog, kapetana susjedne Istarske grofovije, upravne regije pod vrhovnom vlašću kuće Habsburg. Ističući razne nedaće koje su pogodile Akvilejski patrijarhat i Markgrofoviju Istru tijekom zadnjih desetljeća 14. stoljeća, imenovanje je Hugona VIII. kao novoga advokata (tj. zaštitnika, lat. advocatus) Dvigrada interpretirano u svjetlu jurisdikcijskoga pluraliteta, poroznih granica istarskoga srednjovjekovlja i, najvažnije, recipročne naravi odnosa između gospodara i podanika. Autor zaključuje da je novoutemeljeni savez bio prvenstveno motiviran nemoći tadašnjih istarskih markgrofova da svojim podanicima pruže primjerenu vojnu zaštitu, pogotovo u kontekstu tradicionalnih graničnih sporova između podanika akvilejske Crkve s jedne i Istarske grofovije s druge strane. Štoviše, kako je Akvilejski patrijarhat potonuo u građanski rat, koji je suprotstavio promletački tabor na čelu s Udinama protiv propadovanskoga, koji su vodili de iure patrijarh Filip d'Alençon i Čedad, Hugon VIII. Devinski postao je jedan od najmoćnijih regionalnih vlastodržaca. Istovremeno, tadašnji istarski markgrof, Dujam od Castella, otvoreno je podržavao promletački front te mu je stoga zakoniti patrijarh d'Alençon osporavao legitimitet ureda; Hugon VIII., s druge strane, ostao je službeno neutralan u ovom sukobu, ali je prešutno podržavao propadovanski savez, postajući de facto neprijatelj istarskoga markgrofa Dujma, de iure gospodara Dvigrada. Upravo je u tom kontekstu neprijateljstva, krize i neizvjesnosti građanskoga rata dvigradska komuna, na čije su teritorije najvjerojatnije pljačkaški upadali podanici Pazinske knežije uz podršku samoga Hugona VIII., odlučila sklopiti savez sa svojim moćnim susjedom, preferirajući imenovati tadašnjega kapetana Pazina kao svojega službenog zaštitnika i plaćati mu godišnji danak (tj. reket), nego ostati vjerna nemoćnoj akvilejskoj Crkvi. ; The author edits and analyzes an inedited charter, issued in Dvigrad in 1386, by which an alliance was forged between the Commune of Dvigrad, nominally under the jurisdiction of Aquileian patriarchs, and Hugo VIII of Duino, the captain of the neighboring County of Istria, a jurisdictional region under the supreme authority of House Habsburg. Highlighting various calamities that plagued the Patriarchate of Aquileia and the Margraviate of Istria during the final decades of the 14th century, the appointment of Hugo VIII as the new guard (Lat. advocatus) of Dvigrad is interpreted in the light of jurisdictional plurality, porous boundaries of Istrian Middle Ages, and, most importantly, the reciprocal nature of the lord-subject relationship. The author concludes that the newly forged alliance was primarily motivated by the inability of the incumbent Istrian margraves to offer adequate military protection to their subjects, especially in the context of traditional border disputes between the subjects of the Church of Aquileia and the subjects of the County of Istria. Moreover, as the Church of Aquileia plunged into civil war which pitted the pro-Venetian faction led by Udine against the pro-Paduan faction led by the de iure patriarch, Philip d'Alençon and Cividale, Hugo VIII of Duino emerged as one of the most powerful regional potentates. At the same time, the incumbent margrave of Istria, Domnius of Castello, openly supported the pro-Venetian front and as such the legitimacy of his office was disputed by the lawful patriarch Alençon; Hugo VIII, on the other hand, remained officially neutral in the conflict, but he tacitly supported the pro-Paduan alliance, becoming a de facto enemy of Margrave Domnius, the de iure lord of Dvigrad. It was in this context of enmity, crisis, and the uncertainty of civil war that the Commune of Dvigrad, most probably pillaged by the neighboring subjects of the County of Pazin backed by Hugo VIII, decided to forge an alliance with their more powerful neighbor, preferring to constitute the incumbent captain of Pazin as their official guard and to pay him a new annual tax (i.e. a protection racket) than to remain faithful to the powerless Church of Aquileia. ; L'autore dispone e analizza un documento inedito, rilasciato nel 1386 a Duecastelli, con il quale fu stabilita l'alleanza tra il comune di Duecastelli, nominalmente sotto la giurisdizione dei Patriarchi di Aquileia, e Ugo VIII di Duino, capitano del vicino Marchesato d'Istria, regione amministrativa sotto l'autorità suprema della casa d'Asburgo. Sottolineando vari disagi che colpirono il patriarcato di Aquileia e il Margraviato d'Istria negli ultimi decenni del XIV secolo, la nomina di Ugo VIII a nuovo avvocato (ovvero protettore, lat. advocatus) di Duecastelli fu interpretata alla luce della pluralità delle giurisdizioni, dei confini porosi del medioevo istriano e, la più importante reciprocità del rapporto tra autorità e sudditi. L'autore conclude che la nuova alleanza stabilita fu motivata soprattutto dall'incapacità dei margravi istriani di allora nell'offrire una protezione militare adeguata ai propri sudditi, soprattutto nel contesto delle tradizionali controversie frontaliere tra i sudditi della Chiesa d'Aquileia da una parte e il Marchesato d'Istria dall'altra parte. Inoltre, dato che il patriarcato di Aquileia sprofondò nella guerra civile che vide opporsi la parte pro veneziana, con a capo Udine, contro quella pro padovana guidata de iure dal patriarca Filippo d'Alençon e Cividale del Friuli, Ugo VIII di Duino diventò uno dei più potenti sovrani regionali. Contemporaneamente, il margravio istriano di allora, Doimo di Castello, sosteneva apertamente il fronte pro veneziano e per quel motivo, il patriarca legittimo d'Alençon, contestava la legittimità dell'ufficio; Ugo VIII, dall'altra parte rimase ufficialmente neutrale in quel conflitto, però sostenne tacitamente l'alleanza pro padovana, diventando de facto nemico del margravio istriano Doimo, de iure padrone di Duecastelli. Proprio in quel contesto di ostilità, crisi e incertezza della guerra civile il comune di Duecastelli, su cui territorio presumibilmente le invasioni dei rapinatori erano effettuate dai sudditi della Contea di Pisino con il sostegno di Ugo VIII stesso, decise di stipulare l'alleanza con il proprio vicino potente, preferendo nominare il capitano di Pisino di allora a proprio protettore ufficiale e a pagargli il tributo annuale (ovvero il racket) che rimanere fedele all'impotente Chiesa di Aquileia.

RIJEČ UREDNIŠTVA Nova promjena u vezi s plaćanjima naknade za općekorisne funkcije šuma, tretirane kao parafiskalni namet, potiče nas da opetovano progovorimo o tom problemu. Na Poduzetničkom portalu čitamo: Premda se službeno zovu "neporezna davanja" u javnosti se već uvriježio termin "parafiskalni nameti", a popisan je 161 parafiskalni namet, koji kažu naciji oduzima oko 2,5 % BDP-a. Detaljnije pak pojašnjenje prema definiciji Ministarstva financija kaže: "parafiskalni nameti su sva propisana obvezna neporezna davanja koja plaćaju poduzeća središnjim tijelima državne uprave, jedinicama lokalne i područne (regionalne) samouprave ili drugim tijelima s javnim ovlastima, ako pri tome: platitelj ne dobiva za uzvrat neku uslugu, dobro ili pravo .". Ako je tome tako zbog čega se onda naknada za općekorisne funkcije šuma tretira kao parafiskalni namet? Naime, u ovome slučaju nesporno je da platitelj dobiva za uzvrat uslugu, dobro ili pravo. To bi trebalo biti svima jasno ako samo pogledaju Zakon o šumama, gdje su navedene općekorisne funkcije šuma kako slijedi: 1. zaštita tla, prometnica i drugih objekata od erozije, bujica i poplava; 2. utjecaj na vodni režim i kvalitetu voda; 3. utjecaj na plodnost tla i poljodjelsku proizvodnju; 4. utjecaj na klimu i ublažavanje posljedica klimatskih promjena; 5. zaštita i unapređenje čovjekova okoliša; 6. stvaranje kisika, ponor ugljika i pročišćavanje atmosfere; 7. rekreativna, turistička i zdravstvena funkcija; 8. stvaranje povoljnih uvjeta za divljač i ostalu faunu te 9. povećan utjecaj zaštitnih šuma i šuma posebne namjene na bioraznolikost. U pojedinim funkcijama imaju korist samo neki, a u nekima svi. Naknada za općekorisne funkcije šuma prvotno je iznosila 0,07 % od ukupnoga godišnjeg prihoda, 2010. godine pada na 0,0525 %, a potom 2012. godine na 0,0265 % da bi 2018. godine bili oslobođeni plaćanja oni koji ostvaruju ukupni prihod manji od 3 milijuna kn godišnje. Sada se oslobađaju plaćanja oni s ukupnim godišnjim prihodom manjim od 7,5 milijuna kn, a postotak pada na 0,024. Da bi nam bilo jasnije, izračunajmo koliko je to novaca godišnje – na 3 milijuna kn to je bilo 795,00 kn/god., a na 7,5 milijuna kn to je 1.800,00 kn/god. (velik novac !?). Sagledavajući kronologiju smanjenja naknade za općekorisne funkcije šume i histeriju koja vlada oko parafiskalnih nameta, ne bi nas iznenadilo da obnašatelji vlasti nakon parlamentarnih izbora potpuno ukinu ovaj po nama potreban ekološki progresivni porez. Nažalost, ne bi bilo prvi puta da se radi populizma povlače potezi koji nisu dobri ni za državu ni za društvo. Od glavnih gospodarskih djelatnosti: 1. proizvodnje drvnih šumskih proizvoda, 2. proizvodnje šumskog reprodukcijskog materijala i 3. proizvodnje nedrvnih šumskih proizvoda, očekuje se i dobit koja se uplaćuje u državni proračun. Sve to unatoč netržišnom poslovanju u prometu tim proizvodima i nužnim potrebama pravodobnog i sveobuhvatnog rada na uzgojnim i zaštitarskim radovima u šumskom ekosustavu koji se često "preskače", kako bi dobit bila čim veća. Više puta ukazivali smo da u šumarstvu nema dobiti, ako vratimo šumi ono što smo joj uzeli, a da bi ona bila u optimumu, ili slikovito rečeno "vječna". O svakoj od devet navedenih općekorisnih funkcija često smo govorili, potkrijepivši naše riječi istraživačkim rezultatima. Brojke su impresivne i najbolje se pamte. Govoreći, zbog manjka prostora u rubrici, primjerice samo o njenoj hidrološkoj funkciji, rečeno je kako niti jedan vegetacijski oblik ne utječe tako djelotvorno na vodu kao šuma - ona uravnotežuje raspored vode u prostoru, ravnomjerno opskrbljuje vodotoke i ublažava pojavu visokih vodnih valova, utječe na čistoću vode i broj izvorišta. Procjeđivanjem vode kroz živo i rahlo šumsko tlo, ona u podzemne tokove ulazi pitka. Ako uzmemo u obračun prosječnu godišnju količinu oborina u Hrvatskoj od 1200 mm i površinu šuma od samo 2 milijuna ha (ona je veća) računa se da iz šume istječe oko 13 milijardi tona pitke vode. Tko dobiva tu uslugu – svi uključivši i platitelja! Ovako bi mogli i o ostalim općekorisnim funkcijama. E sada, neki kažu pisano je već o svemu tome i rečeno na mnogim šumarskim skupovima, ali mi šumari govorimo sami sebi – a mi pitamo kolegice i kolege: servirani su vam podaci u ovoj rubrici i drugim tekstovima – zašto to ne širite među poznanike, a oni politički angažirani šumarski stručnjaci među kolege političare na lokalnoj, regionalnoj pa i državnoj razini? Pitamo se, da li je pristojno reći da ste se "zavukli u mišju rupu"? Vi odgovorite! Uredništvo ; EDITORIAL A new change referring to the payment of non-market forest function fees, regarded as a parafiscal tax, urges us to again discuss this problem. We read on the Entrepreneurial Portal: Although officially called "non-tax benefits", the term "parafiscal levies" has already become commonplace in the public, and 161 parafiscal levies have been listed, which is believed to take away about 2.5 % of the GDP from the nation. A more detailed explanation according to the definition of the Ministry of Finance states: "parafiscal levies are all prescribed mandatory non-tax benefits paid by companies to central state administrative bodies, local and regional self-government units or other bodies with public authority, if the payer does not receive a service, goods or right in return .". If so, then why is the non-market forest function fee treated as a parafiscal levy? In this case it is indisputable that the payer receives a service, goods or right in return. It should be clear to everyone who reads the Forest Act and where the non-market forest functions are listed as follows: 1. protection of soil, roads and other facilities from erosion, torrents and floods; 2. impact on water regime and water quality; 3. impact on soil fertility and agricultural production; 4. impact on climate and mitigation of climate change; 5. protection and improvement of the human environment; 6. oxygen generation, carbon sink and atmospheric purification; 7. recreation, tourist and health function; 8. creation of favourable conditions for wildlife and other fauna, and 9: increased impact of protective forests and special purpose forests on biodiversity. Some of the functions provide benefits only for some individuals, while other functions provide benefits for all. The non-market forest function fee initially amounted to 0.07 % of the total annual income, in 2010 it dropped to 0,0525 %, and then in 2012 to 0.0265 %, whereas in 2018 all those who generated total income less than 3 million kuna annually were exempt from payment. Now all these with a total annual income of less than 7.5 million kuna are exempt from payment, and the percentage has dropped to 0.024. To make it clearer, let us calculate how much money it is per year - at 3 million kuna it was 795.00 kuna/year, and at 7.5 million kuna it was 1,800.00 kuna / year (what an amount!). In view of the chronology of the reduction of the non-market forest function fee and the hysteria surrounding parafiscal levies, it would not at all surprise us if, after the parliamentary elections, the government completely abolishes this, in our view, necessary and environmentally progressive tax. Regrettably, it would not be the first time that populism takes steps that are not good either for the state or for the society. The main economic activities, including 1. production of wood forest products, 2. production of forest reproductive material and 3. production of non-wood forest products, are expected to generate income which is paid into the state budget. All this despite non-market business moves in the trade of these products and the necessary need for timely and comprehensive work on silvicultural and protection operations in the forest ecosystem, which are often "skipped" in order to maximize profit. We have repeatedly pointed out that there is no profit in forestry if we return to the forest what we have taken from it so as to leave it in the optimal state, or figuratively speaking, so as to make it "eternal". We have often discussed every one of the nine non-market functions listed above, corroborating our words with research results. The numbers are impressive and are easy to remember. Due to limited space in the column, let us only take the hydrological function; no vegetation form affects water as effectively as a forest - it balances the distribution of water in space, evenly supplies watercourses and mitigates high water waves, and affects water purity and the number of water springs. Water filtered through live and friable forest soil reaches ground courses as potable water. If we take into account the average annual rainfall in Croatia of 1200 mm and the forest area of only 2 million ha (it is larger), it is calculated that about 13 billion tons of drinking water flows from the forest. Who receives this service? Everyone, including the payer! We could continue in the same way with other non-market forest functions. Some would say, these issues have been treated at a number of forestry conferences, but we foresters speak for ourselves - and we ask our colleagues: you have been served information in this column and in other articles - why do not you spread it among your acquaintances, and why those politically active forestry experts do not raise these issues among their fellow politicians at the local, regional and even state level? We wonder, is it polite to say that you have "crawled into a mouse hole"? You answer it! Editorial Board

Baski, manjinski narod sa svojim zasebnim jezikom i kulturom, stoljećima je podijeljen između Španjolske i Francuske. U Francuskoj Baski nemaju status manjine ni institucionalnu autonomiju. U Španjolskoj, međutim, nakon teškog razdoblja Francove diktature i preustrojstva Španjolske 1978. na kvazifederalnom načelu, španjolski Baski dobivaju priznanje nacionalne posebnosti te znatnu institucionalnu autonomiju kroz tzv. Autonomnu zajednicu (AZ) Baskiju. Unatoč zadovoljavanju većine aspiracija Baska u Španjolskoj, u španjolskoj Baskiji i dalje je prisutan secesionizam, dok taj fenomen u francuskom dijelu Baskije gotovo da i ne postoji. Cilj disertacije bio je, binarnom studijom i dizajnom najsličnijih slučajeva, koristeći se kvalitativno-kvantitativnom metodom, istražiti je li autonomija, umjesto zadovoljavanja španjolskih Baska statusom u okviru Španjolske, pridonijela jačanju njihova nacionalizma i secesionizma. Ovi fenomeni obrađeni su kroz tri prizme: izgradnju subdržavnih institucija, izgradnju subdržavnih identiteta i izgradnju lokalnih elita. Uočeno je da je autonomija u španjolskoj Baskiji pridonijela izgradnji protodržave, od demokratski izabranog Parlamenta, preko izvršne vlasti, do djelomično izgrađenog sigurnosnog aparata. Iako usporen rascjepima u baskijskom društvu uslijed demografske heterogenosti, na djelu je proces izgradnje subdržavne baskijske nacije. Autonomija je omogućila i izgradnju lokalnih elita, dolazak baskijskih nacionalista na vlast, kao i stranačko nadmetanje u baskijskom nacionalizmu. Sve to omogućilo je i da AZ Baskija krene izrazito "baskijskim" smjerom. Ona je potencijalno samo korak do pune neovisnosti, kojoj nedostaje još "prozor mogućnosti", koji se dogodio npr. raspadom bivših komunističkih federacija. U francuskoj Baskiji ne postoji teritorijalna, odnosno institucionalna autonomija. Ne dajući im "prozor mogućnosti" za razvoj i jačanje, građanska i unitarna država u Francuskoj odigrale su značajnu ulogu u ublažavanju baskijskog nacionalizma i secesionizma. Slučajevi španjolske i francuske Baskije pokazali su kako (ne)postojanje autonomije znatno utječe na periferni nacionalizam i secesionizam, kao i na potencijal za secesiju. ; In the last couple of years, the rise of secessionism in several democratic, Western European countries - from the United Kingdom (Scotland) and Belgium (Flanders) to Spain (Catalonia and the Basque Country) has been noted. All of them have something in common. In addition to having a heterogeneous ethnic structure, that is, the existence of distinct historical ethnic communities, all of these states have also, in the last couple of decades, gone through dramatic administrative and structural changes. From unitary states they had once been, they have transformed in a way which resulted in the introduction of either a certain degree of devolution or even in federalization. Consequently, historical ethnic communities have achieved a certain degree of autonomy, ranging from a partial and asymmetric decentralization ("devolution") as in the case of Scotland, to an extensive autonomy of the so-called autonomous communities of Spain. The intention of the central state and the legislator has been, inter alia, to safeguard the state unity and strengthen the state by accommodating the grievances of ethnic communities and their elites. The final outcome, however, has often been adverse to initial intentions. In the newly formed administrative units, "proto-states" of the ethnic minorities, there has been a rise in nationalism and secessionism. The purpose of this dissertation is to tackle this phenomenon and explore the causal relationship of autonomy and nationalism/secessionism. That is, the idea whether the autonomy itself strengthened nationalism and secessionism in the autonomous territories, thus acting as "subversive institutions" towards the central State, has been examined. In order to test the hypothesis and the arguments of the theory of subversive institutions, a dual comparison of two cases, Spanish and French Basque Country, and the most similar systems design have been used. The most similar systems design holds that the two cases share many common features and differ in only one. For instance, French and Spanish Basque Country are situated in the same region, share common language and ethnic origins; they are both parts of wider nation-states, face situation of diglossia etc. A differing feature, in this case, autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country – Autonomous Community of the Basque Country –Euskadi, is held responsible for the different outcome (stronger peripheral nationalism and secessionism). The choice of these two cases has been prompted by the fact that they may be considered the most similar cases in extremis, given that it is the same people on the two sides of the state border.The Basques, minority group with their own language and culture, for centuries have been divided among Spain and France. In France of today the Basques enjoy neither status of a national minority nor an institutional autonomy. In Spain, however, after a difficult period of Franco's dictatorship and the country's restructuring in 1978 on a quasi-federal principle, the Spanish Basques got acknowledgement of their national uniqueness (through a status of a nationality), and the Basque Country gained a significant institutional autonomy through so-called Autonomous Community of the Basque Country. In spite of the accommodation of most of the Spanish Basques' grievances, both on a tangible level (economic, political and cultural) and on a symbolic level (national and state symbols), the Spanish Basque Country still faces secessionism, while that phenomenon is hardly visible in its French counterpart. The dissertation explores whether the autonomy, instead of accommodating the Spanish Basques in the framework of the Spanish State, has contributed to the growth of their nationalism and secessionism. Conversely, the dissertation explores also whether the French civic state has contributed to attenuation of the peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. In France there are no "autonomic" institutions, but as a result of political and societal changes in France and external pressure from the South, i.e. from the Spanish Basque Country (spill over effect or Galton's problem), a "new governance" with specially designed institutions has been developed to partially accommodate the Basque grievances. Deprived of any substantial competences, executive or financial, they are a pale shadow of their Spanish counterparts. However, precisely for that, they serve as a good example to make comparative research in order to show the immense difference the autonomy per se can make. The research relies on the Valerie Bunce' s theory of "subversive institutions", which she tested on the cases of the former communist federations Soviet Union (USSR), Czechoslovakia (CSFR) and Yugoslavia (SFRY). Valerie Bunce (1999), explaining the collapse of former communist federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY, put forward a thesis that their design created preconditions for creating states within state. Consequently, the structure itself brought about the collapse of the communist bloc, and within it, of the federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY. Therefore, Bunce holds that the federalism created nations at the republican level or, if they had already been "defined", the federalism strengthened them. In other words, federal structure where the autonomous/federal units enjoyed relatively wide autonomy, in the long term acted centrifugally and finally led to the collapse of states (federations). With the advent of Gorbatchev and perestroika, consequent abandoning of the Brezhnev doctrine, and array of events that brought upon the collapse of communism and of federations, federal units – new "nations-in-the-making", took advantage of the situation ("window of opportunity") and proclaimed their independence.Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) after the 1978 Constitution, possess almost the entire state administration. One of the 17 autonomous communities, Autonomous Community of the Basque Country - Euskadi has a clearly defined territory, a democratically elected Parliament (officially called the Basque Parliament), a Government, officially called the Basque Government, ministries (called departamentos, departments, headed by consejeros, counselors), a Prime Minister, Lehendakari, with some prerogatives of a President, including state honours and palace. His office includes a mini Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Acción Exterior – External Action), with its delegations abroad. Thus, the Basque Government can project its image abroad. The autonomous administration has some 60 000 employees, to which one has to add the 30 000 employees of the provincial and communal administration, and disposes of a 10.6 billion € budget. At the same time, the central state administration in the Basque Country counts only 15 000 employees. Euskadi disposes of its own police forces Ertzaintza. As mentioned before, several authors argue that with such a developed administrative apparatus, a "segment-state", in our case the Spanish Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi, has been in power for most of the post-1978 Constitution period. Its institutions are consequently able to act as centrifugal ("subversive") institutions, transmitting nationalist messages through media, education system, and regional institutions. But their nationalist message is not of Spanish, but of peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. Given the specific, unfavourable linguistic situation of diglossia, and the importance of language for national (and Basque) identity, the Basque Governments took it as a mission to restore to the Basque language a status of a full-fledged official and education language, in a sense of Gellner's "language of high culture" (1998). (Re)Introducing the Basque language, not only in schools and universities, but literary everywhere, rebasquisating Euskadi, a Basque identity has been (re)enforced. Nowadays almost all institutions under the competence of local, autonomous institutions in the Spanish Basque Country are obliged to adopt Action plans or Five-year plans on the language normalization, that is, reinforced use of the Basque language. The Basque Government, in that way projects certain ideology and builds up and strengthens the Basque national identity. A new, Basque nation is being built.The statistics speak for themselves. Before the autonomy, that is, before 1978/1980, education language was 100% Spanish. Nowadays, only a tiny 0.5% of students study exclusively in Spanish (so called Model X), and 15.3% in Model A, with education in Spanish, and Basque language as one of the subjects. 18.9% study in bilingual schools (Model B) and the high 65.3% study in Basque schools (Model D), with Spanish language as one of the subjects. The presence of the Basque language is enforced in other areas as well. For instance, in public administration the targeted percentage of Basque speakers should be 48.46% and it should increase with the rise of knowledge of the Basque language in general population. Moreover, the presence of the Basque language is checked regularly in yearly evaluation reports. In the Parliament, in 2005-2009 legislature, 56% of deputies spoke Basque, while in 2013 the percentage rose to 68,5%. At the University of the Basque Country, in Academic year 1995/1996, 27.2% of the students studied in Basque, while in 2013/2014 the percentage rose to 64.3%. The number of bilingual professors (Basque and Spanish) rose from 35.1% in 2006 to 47.8% in 2013. Similar processes can be followed everywhere.As far as identity is concerned, the 35% of the interviewees in the opinion polls conducted by the University of the Basque Country declare themselves as "only Basques", 21% as "more Basque than Spanish", 35% "equally Basque and Spanish", 3% "more Spanish" and 3% "only Spanish". As it can be noted, Basque identity prevails, with a significant percentage of dual identity. Spanish identity (more or exclusively Spanish) is quite low. Opinion polls also testify of the presence of a strong local (Basque) patriotism, and at the same time, mistrust in Spanish State institutions. For example, 62% of the interviewees show trust in the Basque Government, 61% in the Basque Parliament and Basque police Ertzaintza, while only 39% in the King, 15% in the Spanish Cortes and 11% in the Spanish Government. Trust in the Basque Prime Minister is 56%, while in the Spanish Prime Minister it is only 7%. Regarding the attitude towards secessionism, 35% of interviewees support the present autonomous status, 29% favour federation (which understands a more autonomy), 7% favour more centralization and 25% favour secession. Although the latter percentage alone seems low as to provide proof of secessionism in stricto senso, the sum of the all percentages, except for 7% for centralization, should be taken into consideration if secessionism were to be regarded in a wider sense (as peripheral nationalism; autonomism and secessionism; Horowitz, 1985). From the data above, the conclusion can be drawn that the process of Basque nation-building maybe has not finished yet, but is well under way and that there is a "Basque direction" of the Euskadi. As for the Basque language in the French Basque Country, though it is increasingly present in its schools, public institutions and society, it still does not enjoy an official status. The improvement of linguistic situation is only partially due to the incitement on the part of the authorities. There is an immense difference from Spain. The French state after 1980-s allowed more freedom and space for "regional languages" to be taught, but did not impose it, force it by "dictate", as has been in the case of Euskadi. The main credit for the improvement of status of the Basque language is due to the efforts of the civil society, associations and citizens themselves. The results, comparing the Spanish and the French Basque Country, vary accordingly. Only 36,6% of school children attend some Basque language classes, while in Spanish Basque Country it is 99,5%. There is the Public Office of the Basque Language (OPLB), that helps and promotes teaching Basque language in the French Basque Country, but it has no authority to impose the Basque language in education as the Viceconsejería de Política Lingüística of the Gobierno Vasco and the Gobierno Vasco in the Spanish Basque Country. Only 11% of the interviewees feel "only Basques", 5% "more Basques", 24% "equally Basques and French", 16% "more French and 36% "only French". In the French Basque Country, the French identity and the French language in both education and society prevail. There is no "Basque direction" or Basque nation-building process. The third argument of the theory of subversive institutions is about elites' building. In Euskadi, there is the local (Basque) Parliament, where the Basque nationalists have dominated since the first elections after the establishment of autonomy (1980), with an average of 60% of votes/seats, except for the period 2009-2012 (due to a ban of the Basque radicals before the elections). In the current legislature, 2012-2016, the nationalists (moderate PNV-EAJ and radical EH Bildu) have 48 out of 75 seats. That means that they have been able to impose a "Basque direction", e.g. policies of rebasquization (termed language normalization), or vote the Ibarretxe Plan. There are also numerous examples of party competition in nationalism and local patriotism, e.g. the issue of Basque language use, flag, coat of arms or anthem. In the French Basque Country, due to non-existence of a local Parliament or self-rule, there are no such phenomena. There have been since decades Basque nationalist parties, and they score up to 10% of the votes. Nowadays, there is also a Basque nationalist party, AB (Abertzaleen Batasuna), which is relatively successful at the lower, communal level, having around 100 councillors. However, the non-existence of a Basque administrative unit,département, and centralist French electoral and administrative system, result in a situation where only two Basque nationalist councillors managed to enter the General Council of the Département Pyrénées-Atlantiques, of which French Basque Country is a part. And there they are only two of the 54 councillors. Therefore, even if at the lower, communal level, Basques nationalists can enter the local communes and be part of ruling coalitions, or form associations of local councillors and mayors, they cannot impose a more "Basque direction" of the whole French Basque Country, like their Spanish Basque counterparts. The autonomy, embodied in the Euskadi's Basque parliament, enabled Basque nationalists in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country – Euskadi) to come to power at the local level and to direct the (Spanish) Basque Country towards a "Basque direction". In addition, it helped also to build up their own elites – party elites and leaders, Government and Parliament dignitaries, above all the Prime Minister- Lehendakari, local public company managers, University, Academy, institutes' directors etc. If a potential future new country needs the infrastructure (i.e. state administration, the framework), it also needs identity/ideology and leaders (the contents and experts). And here they are! Not only are they in place, but they are in power! Finally, having their own Basque University will help to reproduce new Basque elites. In contrast, the French Basque Country does not possess almost any of the above. Indeed, the difference produced by autonomy is immense. A special attention has been given to the Ibarretxe Plan which represents at the same time a peak of the autonomy, but also shows its limits. Juan Jose Ibarretxe, Euskadi's Prime Minister (Lehendakari) from 1999 to 2009, put forward in 2003 his Proposal for Reform of the Political Statute of Community of Euskadi, popularly known as Ibarretxe Plan. It was actually a proposal for a confederation between the Basque Country and Spain. The relations between them would be based on a "free association"(Art.1). Without going into details of the Proposal, suffice it to say that, had it been enacted, even without a completely independent Basque Country, it would mean the end of Spain as we know it today. The Plan was approved by the Basque Government in 2003, and a year later, by the Basque Parliament, although with a narrow majority of 39 out of 75 votes. However, in order to be enacted, the Proposal should have passed in the Spanish Parliament. It was not surprising that the Spanish Parliament had rejected any discussion about it. Today a Spanish "carte blanche" for an independent Basque Country seems completely unimaginable. Nevertheless, remembering the "velvet divorce" of Czech and Slovak Republics and bearing in mind as well the development of situation in Catalonia, one cannot exclude, under different circumstances and leadership in Madrid and Euskadi, a possibility of a "new Ibarretxe Plan" leading to a "velvet divorce" and eventually to an independent Basque Country. To conclude, the autonomy enabled institutions (Parliament/Argument 1), nurtured Basque identity (Argument 2), enabled Basque nationalists to come to power, created a space for Basque elites and leaders and created space or even incentives for party competition in Basque nationalism (Argument 3). The thing the autonomy has not produced, and that lacks for secessionists, is a "window of opportunity" (Bunce, 1999). But if the "window" opens, as in the case of e.g. Czechoslovak "velvet divorce", an opportunity for a potential sovereign Basque state could be created. The comparative analysis has showed more sharply the differences between the two cases resulting from the existence of the autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi) and its absence in the French Basque Country. While in Euskadi the nationalists have since 1980 scored around 60% of the votes in the Basque Parliament and dominated local politics for most of the time, in the French Pays Basque they never score more than 10% and have always been quite irrelevant at the regional local level (except for the lower local level of municipalities). The Basque identity prevailed in Euskadi and French in the Pays Basque. The Basque nationalists have been able to impose a "Basque direction" and an intensive "basquization" within the language normalization policy in Euskadi, which has not been the case in Pays Basque. Finally, a serious sovereignist/secessionist attemps – Ibarretxe Plan occurred, materialized, and was voted in the Basque Parliament of Euskadi, while in the Pays Basque anything of a kind is beyond imagination. There is no French Basque Government to conceive such a plan, no French Basque Parliament as a forum where such a Plan could be voted and no prevalence of Basque nationalists to vote such a plan…All of these phenomena are direct or indirect results of the autonomy or were allowed and fostered by the autonomic institutions in the Spanish Basque Country. Conversely, they are missing in the French Basque Country due to lack of autonomy. The two cases confirmed the hypothesis that the autonomy in ethno-federal arrangements fosters peripheral nationalism and secessionism and a potential for secession, while civic State attenuates them. Interestingly enough, even the consultative institutions of the French "new governance", initially quite powerless, managed to acquire some of the features of the "subversive institutions". They have become increasingly "Basque" and have taken a "Basque direction". However, the civic, centralised and unitary State prevented these institutions stripped of a real power from taking a lead in the Basque nationalism, to gain any significant power, or to direct the French Basque Country in any "Basque direction". The civic State in France indeed acted in attenuating peripheral, Basque nationalism by not providing it a "window of opportunity" to grow.