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In this article, we argue that countries with strong regional self-rule offer more incentives and opportunities to form networks of local collusion leading to higher corruption levels. In contrast, shared rule allows for more oversight on the national level which reduces political corruption. Using a recent dataset on regional authority, we test our hypotheses on a sample of up to thirty-six countries between 1984 and 2006 and find robust empirical support for the predicted contrasting effects of regional authority: Self-rule enhances and shared rule limits political corruption. Adapted from the source document.

The individual in international law — Nationality — Naturalization — Conditions of eligibility for — Effect on eligibility of prior conviction for high treason committed against applicant's national State during Second World War — Naturalization likely to be detrimental to standing of naturalizing State abroad — Relevance of attitude of foreign public opinion — The law of Austria

Full-text in Open Access: Sample chapter 1 ; This is the first of five ambitious volumes theorizing the structure of governance above and below the central state. This book sets out a measure of regional authority for 81 countries in North America, Europe, Latin America, Asia, and the Pacific from 1950 to 2010. Subnational authority is exercised by individual regions, and this measure is the first that takes individual regions as the unit of analysis. On the premise that transparency is a fundamental virtue in measurement, the authors chart a new path in laying out their theoretical, conceptual, and scoring decisions before the reader. The book also provides summaries of regional governance in 81 countries for scholars and students alike. ; -- Part I. Measurement -- 1. Transparency in Measurement 3 -- 2. Crossvalidating the Regional Authority Index 36 -- 3. How We Apply the Coding Scheme 58 -- Part II. Country Profiles -- North America 113 -- Central America and the Caribbean 145 -- South America 193 -- Asia Pacific 283 -- Northern and Western Europe 344 -- Central and Eastern Europe and Russia 418 -- Southern Europe 450 -- Appendix 514 -- References 563 -- Index 669

This article sets out a coding scheme for eight dimensions of regional authority across 42 developed countries for the period 1950-2006. The article explicates coding rules, discusses ambiguities of interpretation, and explains how particular regions are coded. Adapted from the source document.

Most of the empirical analysis explores the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth within an institutional void. This paper investigates the connection between fiscal decentralization and economic growth in different institutional settings in 21 OECD countries over the period 1970–2010. We find that the pro-growth effects of fiscal decentralization depend critically on the authority of sub-national governments: tax decentralization leads to higher (lower) rates of economic growth when coupled with high (low) administrative and political decentralization. Tax decentralization is more conducive for growth if sub-national taxes accrue mostly from autonomous revenues such as property taxes. Overall, this provides evidence of institutional complementarities at work among decentralization dimensions leading to relevant insights for policy implications.