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Theme As well as its impact on development, international aid can be a vehicle of regional and global influence and a tool of multilateral governance. Summary This paper synthesises the analysis and conclusions of three case studies focusing on international development cooperation as a lever for exerting regional and global influence. The studies explore Germany […]
La entrada Development aid, influence and governance: a road map se publicó primero en Elcano Royal Institute.

Guest blogger and Visiting Fellow in the Department of Media and Communication at LSE, Dr Grace Yuehan Wang writes about ASEAN's AI Governance guide as it diverges from EU rules, emphasising innovation and cultural sensitivity and discusses the challenges in balancing regional nuances with global AI governance standards. _______________________________________________   ASEAN’s Approach to AI Governance– … Continued

On November 30, the Brussels Court of Appeal rendered a landmark decision in the climate case brought by "Klimaatzaak" ("climate case" in Dutch) against Belgian public authorities (the federal and the three regional governments). In this decision, the court found the federal authority and the Brussels and Flemish regions' climate action to be in violation of Articles 2 and 8 of the ECHR and of their duty of care, and imposed a minimal GHG reduction target to be reached by Belgian authorities for the future. In their blogpost, Alice Briegleb and Antoine De Spiegeleir provide a clear overview of the case, exploring its previous stages and insisting on the continuing failures of the Belgian climate governance and its complex federal structure. We focus on our part on how the decision makes it clear that the climate justice movement is now confronted with the tension between the legally required and the ethically desirable parameters of climate effort distribution.

The 2011-12 Lecture Series of the Center for Globalization and Governance at the University of Hamburg will focus on Global Constitutionalism: Thinking about Justice, Legitimacy and Democracy in Global Terms

Time and Place:
02.11.2011 – 25.01.2012 WEDNESDAY, 6 – 8 pm
University of Hamburg, Lecture Room K, Edmund-Siemers-Allee 1

Participants: Robert Howse & Ruti G. Teitel, New York University; Richard Bellamy, University College London; Cecelia Lynch, University of California at Irvine; Christoph Möllers, Humboldt Universität Berlin; Neil Walker, University of Edinburgh; Richard Ned Lebow, Darthmouth College

Abstract: The 21st century has brought about a change from merely globalised to constitutionalised international relations. The shift comes with a paradox: While international organisations have undergone processes of constitutionalisation compliance with international law is highly contested. At the same time, most international actors including both states and none-states would be in broad agreement that legitimacy and legality matter in international relations. The paradox has been addressed by lawyers and political scientists from a range of theoretical angles who raised questions about the relationship between different legal orders and the role of international organisations. Specifically, recent studies of global constitutionalism have discussed ways in which the United Nations (UN) can be incorporated into a constitutional order and developed methods to assess the constitutionalisation of international organisations such as the World Trade Union (WTO, the European Union (EU), Mercosur and other. These academic debates are global. They reflect the pressing problem of legitimate governance for politicians and courts as contested UN Security Council decisions inside and outside European and other regional courts demonstrate (compare the debate about the Kadi case and its implications for law and politics). However, despite the wide-ranging interest and the political pressure to fix global problems with the intervening assistance of international institutions, there is little agreement on how to proceed (compare the UN Security Council decision on Libya). The observed change that is brought to the fore by global constitutionalism represents a particular challenge to international relations theory since it involves a distinct constitutional quality in an area not commonly addressed by constitutional theory.

COORDINATION: Professor Antje Wiener, Chair in Political Science and Global Governance, University of Hamburg

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For over a year, Sudan has been engulfed in one of the world's most violent civil conflicts. The war has ravaged the country and now risks spreading beyond its borders, engulfing the wider region in a destabilizing, protracted conflict.Like most international players, the United States initially responded slowly to the war in Sudan, but President Biden appears to be taking the situation more seriously, having recently appointed former Virginia congressman Tom Perriello as U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan. Perriello — who previously served as Special Envoy to the Great Lakes region during the Obama administration — will lead talks between warring factions and concerned regional parties with the goal of reaching a lasting peace agreement and paving a path for the creation of a civilian government.Since his appointment, Perriello has been pushing to restart the on-again, off-again peace talks that have been based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. In an interview with Responsible Statecraft, he expressed hope that the formal peace talks would restart sometime this month. "We are eager to start them tomorrow," Perriello said. Delaying them further, he warned, risks making Sudan "look more like a failed state that could become a 10- to 20-year crisis like we've seen in Somalia, but in a country much larger and in a very strategic location."The risks of this conflict spreading arms and refugees throughout East Africa and the broader Gulf has attracted regional powers' attention to both sides of the conflict. The UAE has reportedly provided military support to the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), while Egypt and Iran have reportedly supported the government's de facto military, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), including by providing drones. Alex de Waal, an expert on Sudan and East Africa and the Executive Director of the World Peace Foundation, told RS that the growing complexity of the conflict means that the African Union (AU) or other regional bodies like Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) can't solve it alone. Rather, according to de Waal, ending the conflict requires a widespread diplomatic effort involving all major actors across Africa, the Gulf, and important international bodies, like the U.N.Perriello shares this perspective, saying he and his team have "been working particularly with some of the neighboring countries and other key African leaders to help communicate to the world and to other key regional actors that this is headed to a truly disastrous situation of a more factionalized, ethnicized war that is more likely to bring in neighboring countries that have overlapping populations." "For those who focus just on the regional stability concerns," he added, "this has now crossed over into being a very serious strategic crisis."Perriello says African countries are sounding the alarm to other regional actors and beyond: "don't light this fire, don't pour fuel on this fire, this is something that could burn us all. We have got to rein this thing in before it becomes something that goes past the point of no return."Perriello also said any lasting peace deal "shouldn't be a … way for former corrupt officials or extremist elements to backdoor their way into power." "I don't think some sort of power-sharing arrangement between the two sides is in anyone's interest," he added.Ultimately, however, the United States may lack sufficient leverage to determine the makeup of a post-war Sudanese government largely due to the involvement of extra-regional actors, such as Saudi Arabia — where the formal peace talks will be held — as well as the UAE, Egypt, and Iran, all of which have provided military support, therefore implicating them in the war's outcome. As a result, Washington should expect these states to advocate strongly for their own interests during the peace process. This means that Washington may have to live with a compromise that satisfies at least some of the demands of key domestic and foreign actors.Perriello admitted that although regional and global actors are increasingly inclined to end the war, "the two fighting sides are negotiating primarily through guns" and lack strong political will to end the conflict. Indeed, the war has created one of the world's worst humanitarian disasters in years. More than 8 million people have been displaced and human rights groups have documented widespread human rights violations committed by both sides. Among these include forced enlistments, the burning of homes and other property, sexual violence, and the indiscriminate killing of civilians.With over 1.8 million Sudanese now refugees in neighboring states, the security situation is closely interlinked with the dire humanitarian crisis. De Waal says that the humanitarian system is "collapsing." In the past, he said, Sudanese refugees could expect to receive a "modicum of peace and security" in neighboring states. That's no longer the case, as those countries are now dealing with their own intense security and governance challenges, and are struggling to provide the resources needed to support the dramatic influx of recent migrants.Perriello expressed frustration that "there has just not been enough aid, enough food and medicine sent" to Sudan and the surrounding region. In response, many Sudanese have worked at a local level to increase access to humanitarian aid and deliver money through the creation and proliferation of digital cash apps to help transfer critical funds to support the purchasing power of those struggling to afford food and other necessities. The humanitarian sector is also struggling from a lack of funding. "Even in areas like Chad that have been quite welcoming of humanitarian organizations, [refugees] are not getting more than one meal a day," Perriello lamented.The need for humanitarian support seems to now resonate across the West. Just a couple weeks ago, major European governments met in Paris to discuss increasing the financial support for humanitarian aid in Sudan. They jointly announced that they had raised $2.1 billion to support the humanitarian response. Before Paris, the U.S. had provided more humanitarian aid than any other country, having provided $115 million in 2024 so far.Perriello spoke repeatedly of the importance of uplifting the voices of the Sudanese people, saying that "we think the most important thing is for the negotiation to be as centered on the Sudanese people as possible." Although this sentiment has value, the claim that the United States speaks for and represents the interests of the Sudanese people is not always a view shared by those in Africa.Tying the threads of this conflict together will prove to be a difficult task for Perriello and his colleagues. Yet, the United States deserves credit for engaging diplomatically with regional and domestic players in an attempt to end the war before it grows to an even greater scale.

The selection committee for the Australian International Political Economy Network (AIPEN) Richard Higgott Journal Article Prize is pleased to announce the shortlist for the 2023 prize, as voted on by AIPEN members.
The prize will be awarded to the best article published in 2022 (online early or in print) in international political economy (IPE) by an Australia-based scholar.
The prize defines IPE in a pluralist sense to include the political economy of security, geography, literature, sociology, anthropology, post-coloniality, gender, finance, trade, regional studies, development and economic theory, in ways that can span concerns for in/security, poverty, inequality, sustainability, exploitation, deprivation and discrimination.
The overall prize winner will be decided from the shortlist by the selection committee, which this year consists of Maria Tanyag (ANU), Elizabeth Thurbon (UNSW), Kanishka Jayasuriya (Murdoch) and Tom Chodor (Monash). The winner will be announced by December 2023.
The 2023 shortlist for The Australian International Political Economy Network (AIPEN) Richard Higgott Journal Article Prize is as follows:
Sirma Altun, Christian Caiconte, Madelaine Moore, Adam David Morton, Matthew Ryan, Riki Scanlan, and Austin Hayden Smidt, "The life-nerve of the dialectic: György Lukács and the metabolism of space and nature," Review of International Political Economy, 30:2 (2023): 584-607 [Published online: 7 April 2022].
Ainsley Elbra, John Mikler & Hannah Murphy-Gregory, "The Big Four and corporate tax governance: From global dis-harmony to national regulatory incrementalism," Global Policy 14:1 (2023): 72– 83 [First published: 10 October 2022].
Elliot Dolan-Evans, "Making war safe for capitalism: The World Bank and its evolving interventions in conflict," Security Dialogue 53:6 (2022): 531–549.
Jessica Whyte, "Economic Coercion and Financial War," Journal of Australian Political Economy, 90 (2022): 5-25.
The post Shortlist For The 2023 Australian International Political Economy Network (AIPEN) Richard Higgott Journal Article Prize appeared first on Progress in Political Economy (PPE).

The long-term impact of Israel's Gaza war on the Middle East's geopolitical order and security architecture will require far more time to fully realize. But one of the more pressing questions it raises is what impact, if any, will it have on the still-young Iranian-Saudi détente?There are two major narratives about the effects of Israel's military campaign on Tehran-Riyadh relations. One is that Hamas's brutal Operation al-Aqsa Flood and the conduct of other Iran-backed actors in the region, such as Lebanon's Hezbollah and Iraqi Shi'a militias, are heightening Saudi Arabia's concerns about Tehran's behavior and ambitions in the Middle East.
The other is that pan-Islamic solidarity now brings the Islamic Republic and the kingdom closer as both governments call for an immediate ceasefire, condemn the unprecedented destruction inflicted by Israel's military campaign on Gaza's population and infrastructure, and profess their determination to preserve peace and stability in the Persian Gulf.Ultimately, there is truth to both narratives, which are not mutually exclusive. Although Iran and Saudi Arabia share some concerns about the Gaza crisis, Riyadh also worries about Tehran's ability to exploit this conflict in ways that could potentially harm the kingdom and its Arab neighbors.Aziz Alghashian, a fellow with the Sectarianism, Proxies & De-sectarianisation project at Lancaster University, believes that Israel's war on Gaza will not necessarily have much impact on Iranian-Saudi relations. But he thinks it will put the kingdom into a "state of mitigation" in the face of Iran's opportunism. While Saudi Arabia's leadership views both Iran and Israel as contributing to the region's turmoil, Alghashian said that Riyadh fully understands the extent to which Tehran will attempt to capitalize on Israel's devastating response to October 7."Saudi does have its concerns over Iran's opportunism and does believe that Iran is not contributing towards the stability in the region. And that is the Saudis' biggest security concern," he told RS. "At the same time, Saudi understands that the Israeli occupation and its indiscriminate bombing campaign in Gaza are part and parcel of this regional instability. While Saudi may have concerns and even grievances with Iran's opportunism, I do not see the Saudi-Iranian tension spilling outside the confines of diplomacy and negotiations."It is important to recognize that, although both Iran and Saudi Arabia want a ceasefire implemented in Gaza, they are pursuing objectives for the "day after" period that diverge, particularly regarding post-war governance in the long-besieged enclave.
One of the major reasons why both countries aim for a ceasefire has to do with both Iran and Saudi Arabia's economic situations. As their population continues to struggle under sanctions, officials in Tehran worry about how the Gaza war's potential spillover into more parts of the Middle East could harm Iran's economy. Saudi Arabia has its own concerns about what the crisis in Palestine could mean for Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS)'s Vision 2030, especially given the extent to which its western Red Sea region, where many of the kingdom's economic diversification projects, such as the futuristic NEOM and various tourism destinations are situated, is affected by the war's spread and internationalization.As two major Muslim-majority countries that seek to play leading roles in the wider Islamic world, Iran and Saudi Arabia's share a revulsion at the devastation and death caused by Israel's bombing and ground campaign.
On October 11, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and MbS had their first phone conversation since the signing of the renormalization agreement seven months earlier in Beijing. According to Mohammad Jamshidi, the Iranian presidential political affairs aide, the two leaders addressed "the need to end war crimes against Palestine," Islamic unity, and Washington's support for Israel's actions in Gaza.
Furthermore, Raisi's attendance at the joint Arab League-Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) emergency summit on Gaza, held in Riyadh on November 11, marked the first time an Iranian president has visited the kingdom since Mahmoud Ahmadinejad represented his country at an OIC summit in Medina in August 2012."Raisi's visit to Saudi Arabia was crucial for Iran, aligning with its strategic focus on Palestine and the pursuit of regional and Islamic leadership," according to Talal Mohammad, who teaches at the University of Oxford and is the author of Iranian-Saudi Rivalry Since 1979: In the Words of Kings and Clerics (1922). "The Gaza conflict provided an opportunity for Iran to make the first move diplomatically. It allowed Tehran to overcome the 'who visits first' dilemma.""The visit was framed as an attempt for Islamic unity and solidarity with the Palestinian cause," said Mohammad in an interview.
"It also allowed Iran to stand out among delegates [by] proposing a ten-point plan, although its suggestions weren't included in the final summit statement. Iran used the platform to advocate arming Palestinians against Israel and labelled Israel's military as a 'terrorist organization.' In the current tense climate, Iran seems cautious not to upset Riyadh and is maintaining the Chinese-brokered détente by moderating its discourse and gestures toward Saudi Arabia," Mohammed added.Since October 7, Saudi Arabia has been central to the Islamic Republic's diplomatic agenda, according to Hamidreza Azizi, a visiting fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin. "During this period, Iran's Foreign Minister consistently engaged with his Arab counterparts, including the Saudi Foreign Minister," he told RS, in pursuit of two main goals.
The first, he said, is to solidify the Iranian-Saudi détente, and the second, to persuade Riyadh to abandon any consideration of bringing the kingdom into the Abraham Accords. "Tehran has also sought to use this opportunity to assert itself as a significant and proactive regional actor capable of influencing regional dynamics in collaboration with other nations," said Azizi.In reality, however, there is a limit to how much success Iran has achieved on this front, underscored by the extent to which Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's calls on leaders of Muslim-majority countries to go all-in on a boycott of Israel have fallen on deaf ears. Also, certain reports, if true, suggest that Saudi Arabia is merely delaying, but not abandoning, plans for normalizing diplomatic ties with Tel Aviv as Israel's war on Gaza rages on.As Azizi told RS, Iran's efforts to establish a pan-Islamic regional order based on Iranian-Arab solidarity that isolates Israel have not produced the results desired by Tehran. Nonetheless, there is no denying that the carnage in Gaza has led to increased engagement between Iranian and Saudi diplomats, as well as high-level meetings that have brought together senior officials of both countries.
Over time, this higher level of diplomacy between Tehran and Riyadh could help lead the two countries toward better understanding of the other.

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Solar panels on the roof of Centre Gabriela Mistral in Santiago, Chile, part of the Ministry of Energy's Public Solar Roofs Program.






















How can we leverage new technologies, such as blockchain, to unleash the power of climate markets?

What are Climate Markets?
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement intends to provide a basis for countries to voluntarily cooperate with each other to deliver on their NDCs and raise ambition. Effectively, this Article signals the use of carbon markets globally, allowing for decentralized bilateral cooperation approaches, including through internationally transferred mitigation outcomes.

The size of the prize of these next-generation carbon markets? According to a recent study, they could halve the cost of implementing NDCs, saving $250 billion per year by 2030, unleashing the power of markets to tackle climate change.

Current and future markets, however, pose challenges: different countries and operate under different technological systems, different governance rules. Information about mitigation outcomes (MOs) is currently collected in a variety of repositories, including spreadsheets, databases reflecting pipeline activities, and registries at the country, regional, or institutional level. The differences in these processes and systems constrain market integration making for complicated transactions.

The Kyoto Protocol utilized an International Transaction Log, operated by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), to facilitate communication between registries. This meant the UNFCCC undertook centralized functions, including a clearance process for transactions. [Article 6 will be front and center in the negotiations at the upcoming COP25 in Madrid.] Negotiators are still determining whether a centralized infrastructure should continue, the functions it could perform, and to which market mechanisms or transactions it would apply.

The World Bank's Approach to Next-Generation Climate Markets
The World Bank's Carbon Markets and Innovation team (CMI) is developing a Climate Warehouse ecosystem to demonstrate the viability of a decentralized information technology approach to connect climate markets systems. In this ecosystem, a meta-registry system connects to country, regional, and institutional databases and registries to surface publicly-available information on MOs and record status changes to provide information on how MOs are used. The objective of the Warehouse is to enhance transparency and trust among market participants and enable the tracking of MOs across different systems.

According to our recent research, blockchain, artificial intelligence, the internet of things, and other disruptive technologies hold significant promise in terms of addressing the needs of next-generation climate markets. CMI is, therefore, partnering with the World Bank's Information Technology Services Technology and Innovation Lab to explore how these new technologies can be used to develop the Climate Warehouse system.

Among its advantages, blockchain is a decentralized, distributed digital ledger that records information across multiple computers so that any involved record cannot be altered retroactively without the alteration of all subsequent blocks, boosting transparency. Blockchain also has the capabilities to simplify data sharing among diverse registries and ensures that MOs can be traceable from their origin to their eventual retirement. The decentralized and immutable nature of the system provides resilience against attacks and can boost confidence that information has not been tampered with. Furthermore, the peer-to-peer arrangement could give participating entities the flexibility to interact with their own blockchain node and manage their access rights based on their own requirements and institutional frameworks.

However, blockchain may not be a suitable repository for storing large amounts of information about climate actions. For instance, the measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV) processes needed to verify project and MO information currently rely on extensive use of audit reports, detailed project information, and imagery. Blockchains, however, were built to store transactional data linked together that grows as more transactions are added. As the chain grows, so too does its demand for storage and computing power to process transactions. This can affect the cost of running the system on a public blockchain.

Also, blockchain cannot assure the quality of data: it is only as good as the quality of data entered into the system. Some of this can be alleviated through processes and governance practices put in place that dictate the format of information and its flow into the meta-registry. And if duplications occur, at the very least, blockchain provides a record of the occurrence, and corrections can be fully traceable among participating parties.What's next?
The Bank is undertaking a simulation of the Climate Warehouse concept involving partner institutions that are implementing or planning to implement databases or registry solutions. Because the Climate Warehouse is a new concept, there is much to gain through co-existence with current systems and parallel processes. Along with the Bank, partners are connecting their systems to the Climate Warehouse simulation to surface publicly-available information from their systems. The team is planning for upcoming engagements to share lessons learned and support policy-makers.

Continuing negotiations on Article 6 means that piloting efforts are more important than ever. The Bank is well-placed to demonstrate innovative solutions to address key challenges and build client capacities through collaborative pilots. Moving forward, the Bank hopes to continue to facilitate regular exchange with Governments, non-governmental standards-setting organizations, the private sector, and other expert groups to explore opportunities to leverage emerging technologies for post-2020 climate markets.

Learn more about World Bank's Blockchain, and Climate Markets visit our Program Page.










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Chandni Dinakaran
Knowledge and Learning Analyst
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Susan Carevic
Susan Carevic, IT Officer, Business Management II
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Stephanie Rogers
Senior Financial Specialist
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Sandhya Srinivasan
Senior Climate Change Specialist, World Bank
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Rachel Mok
Climate Change Specialist, Climate Change Group
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James Close


November 29, 2019

Great to see this important work progressing. Many congratulations to the team.

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Raufu Alaka, chief in the fishing village of Orimedu (Lagos State). © Photo: Arne Hoel, World Bank






















Digital technologies offer new avenues for economic growth in Africa by accelerating job creation, supporting access to public services and increasing productivity and innovation. However, major challenges remain. The lack of connectivity in remote and rural regions and the low use of digital technologies in connected areas is further disadvantaging the poor, women, and small businesses. Increased cyber risks and lack of data protection have brought new risks and vulnerabilities to businesses, governments, and people.

Government policies and regulations are key to enable greater use of digital services while mitigating risks. But how to intervene in a timely manner in a changing technological environment? Agile enabling regulations are needed to quickly respond to market developments, facilitating entry of new competitors for the benefit of consumers. In Kenya, collaboration between the competition authority, the central bank and the telecom regulator allowed digital financial service providers to access telecom services to offer mobile money services along mobile network operators. Consumers benefitted with greater availability of options for mobile payments. Later, the collaboration also facilitated interoperability between mobile money providers and banks, allowing consumers to seamlessly transfer funds between providers, top up saving accounts or use digital credit.

Such new approach is required to support the development of agile and collaborative regulations. A shift from planning and controlling to piloting and implementing policies in a multi-stakeholder setting for rapid feedback and iteration is necessary. Feedback loops allow policies to be evaluated against the backdrop of the broader ecosystem to determine if they are still meeting citizens' values and needs and considering the impact on the industry and private participation. To implement this approach, a change of mindset is first needed. This approach is particularly appropriate for dealing with digital transformation, which by its nature is changing and evolving, and would otherwise be hampered by rigid policies and regulations.

Some African countries are already implementing agile regulation principles to address various issues. Ghana and South Africa responded swiftly to COVID pandemic demand for higher bandwidth by quickly adjusting current regulations and made it easy for companies to offer higher bandwidth to citizens. Kenya and Zimbabwe were quick to remove roadblocks and supported the roll-out of applications that allowed citizens to quickly access mobile money transfers and other financial apps. The African Union has consulted perspectives from businesses, civil society and academia to develop policy frameworks on data and on digital identities. This inclusive multi-stakeholder approach resulted in workable frameworks that encourage innovation through data sharing and cross-border data flows for African eCommerce while protecting rights of individuals. These African Union frameworks on data and on digital identities are important cornerstones to build an African Digital Single Market – the vision of the Smart Africa Alliance that is endorsed by all members of the African Union.

The African Union's Agenda 2063 envisions a people-driven development for Africa, relying on the potential of African people, especially its women and youth. That's why digital skills are prioritized in the African Union Digital Transformation Strategy 2020-2030, where the goal is to "build inclusive digital skills and human capacity across the digital sciences […] and technology policy & regulation". African leaders recognize the pivotal role of policies and regulations in shaping societal and business practices and - if done correctly – how policies can support and encourage digital transformation.

German Development Cooperation and the Digital Development Partnership of the World Bank, in partnership with Smart Africa, have started piloting this agile approach under the Agile Regulation for Digital Transformation program (AReg4DT), a program linked to the Smart Africa Digital Academy, the digital skills vehicle for Smart Africa, and atingi - an online learning platform developed by GIZ, the implementing organization of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Development and Cooperation. The pilot is equipping policymakers and regulators in Africa with the knowledge and tools to regulate digital markets in Africa to support digital transformation. The results so far have been promising with a combination of online and face-to-face training events to allow for learning and knowledge exchange within and for Africa. This partnership is testing the development of capacity building activities in an agile and iterative way and tailoring the content to the local context, as well as gaining a practical understanding about implementation challenges and the training ecosystem in Africa. Prof. Dr. Yeboah-Boateng from Ghana's National Communications Authority also appreciated the chance for peer-to-peer exchange during the event in Abidjan. In particular, he noted the "value of better harmonization of policies and regulations across Africa that would benefit the continent as a whole."








Regulators across the world are developing and testing new policies and regulatory tools, while also adapting existing ones for new purposes, particularly in face of the COVID pandemic. In many cases, the same technologies that challenge traditional regulation also offer many opportunities to reinvent rule making, oversight, inspections, and enforcement.

The AReg4DT program supports the implementation of the Digital Economy for Africa (DE4A) initiative and aims at facilitating regional integration through a common understanding of challenges, opportunities and solutions that can be implemented at the national and regional level, thereby ushering Africa, into the dawn of the single digital market.









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Boutheina Guermazi
Director for Regional Integration for Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, World Bank
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Birgit Pickel
Director-General for Africa in the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)
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Director General and Chief Executive Officer, Smart Africa
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Armed conflict and violence seldom erupt overnight, even when their visible effects seem to take many off-guard. More likely, they stem from deep-rooted, entrenched fault lines that may not always be obvious or visible because they go back decades—if not longer. Effectively mitigating the eruption or recurrence of conflict requires identifying, analyzing, and tackling the root causes of fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV)—not just what happens but why it happens.

Structural factors of FCV are systemic characteristics that underpin a country's economic, political, institutional, security, and societal evolution. They range from historical legacies and narratives to norms and values and include geography, subnational disparities, demographic trends, and many more. They may be simmering beneath the surface, deemed latent, as if no longer relevant or even self-evident, to the extent that one may not assess their full ramifications in the current context.

In the Lake Chad region, where armed conflict has been fueled by deep-rooted fragility and grievances, some groups, such as the "montagnards" from the Mandara Mountains and the Buduma, have been historically disenfranchised and still face regular barriers to representation in decision-making processes and development dividends. Geography is another important structural factor. As shown in the Lake Chad regional RRA with the exception of the capital N'Djamena, the Lake Chad region is remotely located which has fostered a sentiment of political isolation coupled with economic marginalization.

Past instances of armed conflict generate historical legacies, even when a generation or more has elapsed since violent events. Trauma, often inter-generational and collective, heals through acknowledging wrongdoings and reparative justice. In addition to direct survivors and families of victims, their descendants and the community at large can connect with the memory of violent events and how remnants of discrimination and stigmatization may still be perceived, long after these historical occurrences. Historical legacies shape a memory and group identity. It further contributes to a narrative where an individual's access to opportunities may be interpreted through the lens of whether they belong to the group of former perpetrators or survivors.

While underlying, persistent patterns of exclusion and a sense of injustice feed into strong local feelings, collective narratives, and psyche about significant elements of a society, structural factors of FCV do not necessarily determine the trajectory of a region, country, or locality. They are instead constitutive to the history and fabric of a context and, as such, shape a core part of its specificity. Think of rhizome more than direct causality.

There are many examples of this. For instance, territorial imbalances greatly contribute to inequalities and grievances. Analysts point out a crisis of pastoralism at the heart of nomadic herders' grievances in the Sahel, as well as zero-sum tendencies that prevent wider inclusion. Regional inequalities, between coastal and landlocked Saharan and Sahelian provinces, have various ramifications, such as on economic diversification, identity formation, and center-periphery relations.

Another example is the way in which governance systems inherited from colonial times have contributed to perpetuating contested and/or exclusionary patterns in settings affected by FCV. Guiding questions that may be helpful to unpack these connections include: To what extent did a colonial administration influence central or federal trajectories and power-sharing? Did independence occur as a result of a peaceful negotiation or from violent guerrilla warfare which institutionalized top-down, one-party "winner take all" mindsets? Did major milestones include and benefit all or only a few?

The recently completed Guinea Risk and Resilience Assessment (RRA) outlined the country's experimentation with different forms of governance, such as socialism. The country's exposure to various models has deeply influenced Guineans' yearning for equality and their low acceptance of economic stratification, which can still be perceived today.

How can we adjust our lens not just to the last unconstitutional change of government but to review core features that have defined a country's entire post-independence period? We cannot address the root causes of FCV unless we understand why events happen. This not only helps to mitigate their impact more effectively but also to prevent their recurrence in the future. Capturing structural factors of FCV entails augmenting a standard stakeholder mapping or conflict analysis with a recognition of these complex, intertwined connections, and the role of people's perceptions in fueling deep-rooted grievances. In line with the World Bank Group Strategy for Fragility, Conflict, and Violence, it requires attention to the following:

Mobilizing various disciplines to understand a society, its constitutive forces, and pressure points. Armed conflict and violence rarely arise simply because of economic failures and asymmetries. Rather, they stem out of power dynamics as well as actual and perceived exclusion factors. To measure them, one should understand that the structure of the economy, the country's history, geography, culture, and social divisions, set entrenched patterns and require thinking outside the realm of traditional disciplines.
Valuing people's perceptions as much as objective measures of wellbeing and development. As the 2018 Pathways for Peace report demonstrated, inequalities and perceptions of exclusions between groups matter just as much, and often more, than inequalities between rich and poor. Perception and subjectivity play a critical role in shaping people's sentiments and appraisal of inequalities and exclusion. As such, it is often not only about what happened, but how it was perceived, interpreted, digested, and narrated by the people who experienced it. Therefore, one key challenge for practitioners is often one of data. Simply put, do we have the right data to dig deeper and wider
Accepting the compounding and dynamic aspects of conflict and risks. Structural factors of FCV are mostly static but they are not relegated to the past. The extent to which these simmering attributes interact with the present makes them "living" and ever-present in the backdrop of fragile and conflict-affected situations.
This web of connections between past and present, structural, and more acute experiences of state formation and contestations, illustrates that societies are not frozen in time—they live, breathe, and evolve. They also remember. In addition to spatial, social, cultural, and economic features, structural factors of FCV influence path dependency—a historically-influenced course from which sets a rigid route—and behavioral patterns that unfold and repeat through time. They resist change and sometimes build up over time, like the sediment of a riverbed. If we don't integrate them into a risk-informed approach and engagement, we, as development practitioners, miss critical depth and breadth, two essential parameters to effectively diagnose and tackle the root causes of FCV.









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Farah Abdessamad
Consultant, Fragility, Conflict, and Violence Group
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Catherine Defontaine
Senior Operations Officer - Fragility, Conflict, and Violence Group
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Dave


October 04, 2023

Very insightful article.






Catherine


October 27, 2023

Thank you!

After a prolonged period of speculation, conjecture, and anticipation, the contours of a Blue-White coalition poised to challenge the incumbent Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan's 2024 presidential election began to crystallize late last month.
In a joint press conference following private negotiations, Eric Chu, the chairman of the Kuomintang (KMT), and Ko Wen-je, the 2024 presidential candidate and chairman of the Taiwan People's Party (TPP) unveiled a united front committing to championing the "third wave of democratic reform" in Taiwan, a clear repudiation of the entrenched winner-takes-all "democratic dictatorship" political culture. Encouragingly for coalition supporters, the KMT and TPP have also confirmed their commitment to collaborate in the legislative elections, with a shared objective of breaking the DPP's legislative majority since 2016.
This alliance signifies a robust intent to not only overhaul Taiwan's electoral system but more importantly, also dismantle the nearly decade-long dominance of the DPP over Taiwan's politics.
The journey toward forming the Blue-White Coalition has been tumultuous, marked by clear ideological and political disparities between the KMT and the TPP. Although the glue of a strong shared discontent with the governance of DPP has been holding the KMT and TPP together in the prolonged negotiation of joining forces, the delicate dance of ambition and pragmatism underscores the different realities faced by both parties.
The storied over-a-century-old KMT desires to retake the presidency, reverse its decline of a decade, and channel its deep-rooted legacy to rekindle its past preeminence. Meanwhile, the four-year-young TPP is striving to expand its influence and establish itself as a revolutionary "third force" that enthralls the younger electorate with pledges to disrupt the entrenched KMT-DPP dominance, thereby necessitating some level of strategic neutrality from close cooperation with KMT.
For the young TPP, being able to gain the current popularity is already a remarkable victory; for the KMT, anything short of securing the presidential palace next January would be a failure. As a result, despite both Eric Chu and the KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih have been lobbying for Ko to accept a vice-presidential slot beside Hou, forming a joint president ticket that is led by KMT, with polling continuing to place Ko and Hou neck and neck, Ko is loath to settle for second. For a star politician that is trending upward like Ko, assuming the vice presidency might be valued less than holding on to the "third force" value, which might eventually promise a better chance to win the presidency in future elections.
The situation has led observers to continue casting doubts on the likelihood of a Hou-Ko joint ticket, despite the recent breakthrough of negotiations.
Terry Gou, founder of the world's largest contract electronics maker Foxconn, has been pursuing his campaign despite being marginalized a bit by the recent progress of the Blue-White coalition. Gou's recent submission of over a million petition signatures — triple the threshold of 289,667 signatures for an independent presidential candidacy — signals some positive momentum that Gou possessed.
However, faced with a storm of scrutiny consisting of Foxconn's politically charged tax probe by Beijing — a move seen as China's strategic ploy to express disapproval of Gou's campaign — and the bribery allegations tied to his petitioning process, Terry Gou's resolve to stay in this presidential race is being tested. This situation adds layers of complexity yet flexibility to the potential Blue-White coalition. The difficulty for the KMT and TPP to align in the presidential ticket could pivot the political chessboard toward alternative alliances, such as a Terry Gou endorsement of Ko or Hou after a possible withdrawal from the race. While such scenarios could certainly present a challenge to the DPP candidate Lai Ching-te's presidential bid, the polls suggest they would not be as formidable as a united KMT-TPP ticket with Hou-Ko or Ko-Hou, which according to polls, would achieve an easy victory.
If unable to negotiate a joint ticket before the imminent November 24 candidate registration deadline, KMT, TPP, and Terry Gou would likely not be able to thwart Lai's presidential bid, as he continues to outpace each contender.
In light of these unfolding developments in Taiwan, it becomes imperative for Washington to fully grasp the ramifications of a potential Taiwanese Blue-White coalition government on the delicate dynamics of the Washington-Beijing-Taipei triangle. A thorough analysis and strategic foresight are required to determine the most appropriate U.S. policy approach in the event of a coalition government materializing in 2024.
Given the intricate situations in Ukraine and Israel demanding Washington's attention, the prospect of a Blue-White coalition government in Taiwan could provide a welcome respite to Washington, as both parties have demonstrated a clear willingness to jointly improve cross-strait dialogues after the election.
Interestingly, Bonnie Glaser and Joel Wuthnow, eminent U.S. experts on cross-strait relations and China's military affairs, have recently argued that Xi Jinping is not prepared to attack Taiwan due to the political and economic hardships that Xi is facing. Taking cues from their expert analyses, a transition to a Blue-White government in Taiwan in 2024 could indeed also provide a breather for Xi, as it would mitigate the need for Xi to grapple with the challenging decision of military engagement, especially in light of the potential for his adopting a more confrontational stance toward Beijing by Lai Ching-te, a self-claimed "political worker of Taiwan Independence."
Amid the current global turmoil, the emergence of a Blue-White coalition in Taiwan could present a unique opportunity for both Washington and Beijing to steer clear of conflict in the Taiwan Strait at least for the next four years.
However, the most prominent challenge for a possible Blue-White coalition government to regional security lies precisely in the transition period that it would require. The lack of a historical precedent in Taiwan raises questions about the stability of such coalition governance. Besides, if the KMT and TPP cannot even align smoothly in the election period, how can they cooperate well in a coalition government?
In the delicate transition phase, the nascent coalition would need to navigate internal tensions and differing policy priorities, potentially leading to a period of weakened governance. This fragility could inadvertently create openings for Beijing to amplify its influence and infiltration into Taiwanese society, and may well leverage its close ties with the KMT or Ko Wen-je to exploit any discernible fractures that might emerge within the coalition.
In light of these unfolding events, it becomes imperative for Washington to deepen its engagement and understanding of both Ko Wen-je and Hou Yu-ih to come to a more reliable judgment on the prospective mutual trust and ideological alignment of a potential Blue-White coalition. The recent visit by Laura Rosenberger, Chairwoman of the American Institute in Taiwan, to Taiwan, where she engaged with leading candidates Lai, Ko, and Hou, underscores this necessity. It is reasonable to believe that the potential of a Blue-White coalition would be a topic of discussion in her confidential conversations with Ko and Hou.
Sustaining and intensifying such diplomatic interactions is crucial, as it will reinforce its preparedness for the challenges brought by a Blue-White coalition government. In terms of the ongoing electoral campaign, prudence dictates that Washington should continue to adopt a stance of measured restraint and uphold a balanced posture. This is essential as both potential outcomes — a continuation of the DPP government or the advent of a KMT-TPP coalition — present their distinct sets of pros and cons from the vantage point of U.S. interests in the region.

October 3, 2023 marks the 30th anniversary of the Battle of Mogadishu, when American forces engaged in a pitched battle with a Somali militia in a densely populated residential neighborhood in Mogadishu, Somalia. This battle has become popularly known as "Black Hawk Down" in reference to the several UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters shot down during the battle, leading to the deaths of 18 U.S. soldiers and at least 300 Somali casualties, including militia and civilians. Much has been written about how this event, and the wider U.S. military intervention in Somalia, was a watershed moment heralding a new "world order" led by the U.S. in the aftermath of the Cold War. However, one of the most consequential impacts of U.S. interventions in Somalia has been the hindrance of local socio-political processes that might have, with time, provided an exit from the condition of permanent conflict. In so doing, these interventions have contributed to the continuation of conflict and historical paralysis in Somalia. The Battle of Mogadishu was the culmination of a U.S.-led UN intervention in Somalia which went through several iterations that progressively became more militarized. It began in April 1992 with United Nations Operations in Somalia I (UNOSOM I), which was mandated to monitor a ceasefire agreement between the warring parties in Mogadishu following the fall of the Somali state in early 1991. The ceasefire, however, never took hold, gravely hampering the delivery of humanitarian aid in the midst of an appalling famine. The harrowing images of starving children broadcasted across the globe partly informed the U.S. decision to offer to organize and lead a multinational force, United Task Force (UNITAF). The UN accepted the offer and UNITAF forces arrived in Somalia in December 1992 with the objective and mandate to provide security and facilitate humanitarian relief efforts. UNITAF was succeeded by UNOSOM II in March 1995 with a force of about 30,000 from 27 countries. The U.S. contributed a little over 1,000 personnel to this force, but exercised significant control over the operations. UNOSOM II not only took over the mandate of UNITAF in terms of securing and facilitating aid delivery, but was further tasked with nation-building, including forcible disarmament. This led to a confrontation between UNOSOM II and one of the militias, Somali National Alliance (SNA) led by General Mohamed Farah Aidid. U.S. forces led this confrontation carrying out raids against SNA militia and Aidid. After a series of increasingly violent reprisal attacks, U.S. forces raided a hotel in Mogadishu October 3, 1993 to capture high ranking SNA personnel. The disastrous result of the raid ultimately led the Clinton administration to change course and withdraw U.S. forces from Somalia in the spring of 1994. The U.N. followed suit and was out of Somalia by early 1995. There has been widespread criticism of various aspects of the U.S./UN intervention: the militarization of the intervention with the inevitably high civilian casualties, the racist violence and abuse of Somali civilians, the caricature and reduction of the crisis to images of starving children and drug-crazed militias, the UN's insistence that its failure to act quickly to avert the famine was entirely due to security concerns and not bureaucratic inertia, and the claim that 80% of food supplies meant for famine victims were being looted. Despite the criticism of the intervention, many also felt that the withdrawal of U.S. forces and the termination of UNOSOM II would lead to a resumption of violence and upsurge in the suffering of the population. The fact that this did not happen is a testament to the dynamics of the conflict and social processes that worked to overcome the conflict. Subsequent to the U.S. and UN withdrawal in early 1995, Somalia not only did not return to a cycle of violence, but experienced relative stability in what one commentator referred to as "governance without government." This period lasting about a decade, 1995-2004/05, was characterized by the formation of various self-governance arrangements based on locality and kinship relations as well as the emergence of conflict adjudication/arbitration centers in urban settings like Mogadishu.The best examples of the autonomous and semi-autonomous local administrations that emerged are Somaliland and Puntland in the north and northeast of the country. While no similarly successful administration emerged in the central and southern regions of the country, large-scale conflicts dissipated there as well as conflicts became localized. With the localization of conflicts, it became easier for communities to find locally-grounded solutions led by a mixture of traditional elders, business people, and civic groups. In some urban centers, meanwhile, there emerged adjudication/arbitration centers that utilized a mixture of sharia and Somali customs (heer) to resolve disputes. The most well-known and successful of these are the sharia courts of Mogadishu. These courts emerged within a year of the disintegration of the central government in 1991 as an expression of neighborhood residents' desire to address the disorder and anarchy. Given the centrality of sharia to the very idea of justice and law in Somali society, the centers began to be referred to as sharia courts. The sharia courts of Mogadishu brought a certain level of security to some neighborhoods in Mogadishu throughout the 90s and early 2000s despite the opposition of warlords and militias. The return of large-scale violence to Somalia coincided with the next U.S. intervention. The sharia courts of Mogadishu attracted the attention of American officials in Nairobi starting in the early 2000s because of a suspicion that individuals associated with some of the sharia courts might be harboring suspects in the 1998 U.S. East African embassy bombings. To help find and capture these suspects, the CIA started funneling money to warlords in Mogadishu. This strategy backfired as the sharia courts, with the massive support of Mogadishu residents, defeated the warlords. Whether perpetrators of the bombings were in Mogadishu or not, it was short-sighted to enlist the support of the warlords and target the sharia courts, as the State Department's political officer for Somalia pointed out at the time, because the courts were not a homogenous entity. They were an assortment of independent adjudication centers reflecting the entire spectrum of Islamist views in Somalia. Moreover, the warlords had a terrible reputation and were disliked by the people. When the warlords failed, the U.S. then supported an Ethiopian invasion of Mogadishu in mid-2006 that eventually disbanded the sharia courts. This invasion also backfired because it conferred legitimacy to the most radical elements within the sharia courts, thus, setting the stage for the rise of al-Shabaab and transformation of Somalia into a frontline state in the global war on terror. These American interventions in Somalia can be critiqued from many angles, but what is often overlooked and more damaging in the long run is the impact they had on local historical processes that might have led to Somalia overcoming its protracted conflict. Every time the U.S. intervenes directly or indirectly, through local or regional proxies, it reshuffles the decks, putting an end to organic political and social processes, thus contributing to the perpetuation of the Somali conflict that is now over three decades old. This is not to suggest that local processes of adaptation and governance will necessarily lead to a centralized government or a liberal democracy. But the presumption that this is the only way for Somalia to exit from conflict is part of the problem.

The Houthis are creating a global shipping crisis as they draw support and tribute from other Muslim countries and peoples for standing up for Palestinians in Gaza. But how far will it go before the West punches back in defense of "world trade" and regional security?On December 18, the Department of Defense announced the formation of Operation Prosperity Guardian. The ten-nation force aims to ensure maritime security in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandeb, which is a shipping chokepoint between the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Since October 7, the Houthis have launched more than a hundred armed drone and missile attacks — including several aimed at US warships on Saturday — claiming that they are targeting any and all vessels with links to Israel.These threats have caused global shipping companies to divert away from the Red Sea. Many are now sailing around the Cape of Good Hope, which can add over a week to sailing times and as much as 20% to shipping costs. The diversions are also impacting Egypt's fragile economy. Tolls from the Suez Canal are a significant source of hard currency for the Egyptian government. Additionally, the Israeli port of Eilat has seen its revenues decline by 80%. While the global costs of the Houthis' attacks on shipping are steadily increasing, the attacks are paying hefty political and even strategic dividends for the Houthis, who appear to be winning on the public relations front both in and outside Yemen. In Yemen, support for the Houthis, even among some enemies, has increased. In many other Muslim nations, the Houthis are viewed as being "the only Muslim group standing against Israeli aggression." The high profile attacks, including the hijacking of the Galaxy Leader, have stoked national pride among many Yemenis. The Houthis' sophisticated strategic communications operations draw all of these attacks to the attention of domestic and international audiences. According to Yemeni sources who spoke to this author, this has supercharged recruitment for the Houthis and has also led to an influx of donations to the war effort from Yemeni businesses and individual citizens. The attacks are also a demonstration of the Houthis' geographical reach and of their emergence as a regional power.The only negative consequence of the anti-Israel campaign, at least so far, has been a reduction of the number of ships docking in the Houthi-controlled ports of Hodeidah and Salif. Yemen imports well over 90% of its food and a majority of the imports arrive via Hodeidah. Duties and taxes arising from the port are an important source of revenue for the Houthis. Reduced dockings at Hodeidah and rising maritime insurance costs will begin to bite, too.However, it is the Yemeni people who will pay the heaviest price. The Houthis enjoy multiple revenue streams which include everything from a range of efficiently collected taxes, the seizure of businesses and properties, to interests in illicit activities that range from human and arms trafficking to the manufacture and distribution of various drugs.The Houthis are hardwired for resilience and adaptability. Nearly two decades of war have honed the Houthis' war fighting capabilities. After the effective fall of the Yemeni government in September 2014, the Houthis further enhanced these capabilities by grafting their organization into what remained of the Yemeni military and intelligence services. Since 2014, the Houthis have systematically taken over almost every aspect of civil governance, security, education, and the economy in northwest Yemen.While the Houthis were and remain one of the finest guerrilla fighting forces in the region, if not the world, their success on and off the battlefield in Yemen has been aided by the ineptitude and disunity of their enemies. Yemen's Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) and the cobbled together Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) have consistently failed to unify the dozens of militias that operate in those areas outside Houthi control. Additionally, the IRG has failed to reign in endemic corruption. A considerable portion of the Houthis' arms and materiel comes from what Saudi Arabia and the UAE provide to their proxies in Yemen. Many of these Saudi and Emirati supported militias sell weaponry into Yemen's thriving arms market where the Houthis or their agents buy the weapons. This is not to argue that there isn't corruption within the Houthi organization. There is. However, the corruption is managed and largely limited to senior members of the organization. The Houthis exercise tight command and control over their arsenals, weapons assembly facilities, government ministries, and a burgeoning economic empire in Yemen. Northwest Yemen has never had a more efficient or brutal government than the current Houthi-led regime.Since October 7, the U.S. and its allies have focused on defensive measures aimed at intercepting the Houthis missiles and drones. The costs of these measures are steadily increasing. The U.S. and its allies cannot easily continue to expend large numbers of scarce multimillion-dollar missiles to take out drones that can cost as little as a thousand dollars. The Houthis have factories, many of which are located in hard-to-target dense urban areas, which can manufacture — supplies permitting—dozens to hundreds of low-end drones per week. More sophisticated drones are produced at a slower pace, but the Houthis can still assemble several hundred of these over the course of a few months. While the Houthis have and continue to receive assistance and materiel from Iran, almost all the Houthis' drones and missiles are assembled in Yemen. The Houthis are also increasingly focused on modifying and adapting Iranian designs for missiles and drones to suite their own particular requirements.To date, the Houthis have only used a fraction of the armed drones and missiles that they currently possess. Nor have the Houthis made use of their more sophisticated longer-range drones and missiles. The Houthis also possess large numbers of naval mines, including hard to detect influence mines.The U.S.-led collation of ships that is now assembled in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, combined with the on-shore assets in neighboring countries, possesses enough firepower to degrade the Houthis' military capabilities, at least over the short term. However, such a campaign will need to be sustained for what could be months and will come at a tremendous cost for all involved. The Houthis are masters of asymmetric warfare—as clearly evidenced by their Red Sea campaign—and will respond to U.S.-led strikes by attacking energy infrastructure in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Houthis will also deploy more sophisticated missiles and armed drones. While U.S. and coalition warships will likely be able to defend themselves against these weapons, commercial shipping, especially tankers, will be increasingly vulnerable. The Houthis have already effectively closed the Bab al-Mandeb to many global shipping companies. Higher-intensity conflict in and around the Bab al-Mandeb could mean that Red Sea shipping traffic is diminished—or even stopped altogether—for months. The Houthis have largely achieved their objectives: impose costs on Israel and its allies, demonstrate their regional reach, and bolster domestic support. The U.S. and its allies have no good options when it comes to dealing with the Houthis. Apart from acting to constrain Israel's unrelenting offensive in Gaza, the only way of avoiding entering an escalatory loop is for the U.S. to continue to support Saudi and Omani led efforts aimed at reining in the Houthi's threats and attacks. Yet, at the same time, the Houthis only respect force. The current U.S. response is viewed as toothless by the Houthis, and many other nations and non-state groups will view the response or lack thereof in the same way. The conflict in the Red Sea is a harbinger of what the future holds as the diffusion of low-cost but increasingly capable weapons systems continues. The U.S. and its allies are inevitably going to face more and more situations in which there are no good options as the asymmetry between high and low-cost weapons systems increases.

On September 28, CEGA hosted its annual Evidence to Action (E2A) conference, this year titled "Realigning Tech for Social Impact." It brought together researchers, policymakers, practitioners, funders, community members, and students to take stock of the benefits and harms technological interventions have had over the last two decades, with an emphasis on the experience of communities in low- and middle-income countries. Sean Luna McAdams, program manager for the Data Science for Development portfolio, shares key takeaways from the event.Carson Christiano (left), Executive Director of CEGA, and Mohamed Abdel-Kader (right), Chief Innovation Officer and Executive Director for the Innovation, Technology, and Research (ITR) Hub at USAID | Matt KrupoffNew technology benefits from a simple and powerful narrative: it can help solve complex problems, often by doing more with less. The printing press accelerated our ability to share information over long distances. Social media has made it nearly costless to communicate with anyone, anywhere in the world. But new technologies can have unintended effects. The cotton gin turbocharged an economic model that relied on enslaved African labor and ill-gotten land, with terrible consequences. More than one account at E2A emphasized this nuance of the effects of technological interventions.Over the course of the day, participants surfaced a set of complementary best practices when designing, testing, and integrating tech into existing policy, governance, and social welfare systems. The first speaks to the limits of expertise: a technically excellent product is necessary but not sufficient for social impact. Additionally, the ultimate goal of scaling a solution is often underspecified. Scaled by whom, for which communities, and at what scale (national, regional, global)? Making these answers explicit can improve estimates of the trade-offs to scaling and ensure the technological solution is the right fit for its intended problem.Beyond Technical ExcellenceAt E2A, the best examples of technology improving lives and achieving large-scale adoption in low- and middle-income countries relied on interdisciplinary teams, incorporated community input, and planned for maintenance and capacity building to ensure sustainability. Interventions developed with these elements can cultivate community trust, clarify their value proposition for potential users, and dynamically adapt and improve their product. Dan Fletcher, Professor of Bioengineering and Faculty Director at the Blum Center at UC Berkeley, reflected that the initial prototype of Cellscope failed during field testing despite its technical excellence because it was developed only by engineers. Subsequent iterations involved experts from the social sciences, improving the product and leading to greater success.Cellscope is a mobile phone-based microscopy tool that helps health workers identify a variety of pathogens to more quickly diagnose and treat those affected and test the potability of water. | Cellscope teamHowever challenging, collaboration across disciplines is essential for successful interventions. Mohamed Abdel-Kader, Chief Innovation Officer and Executive Director for the Innovation, Technology, and Research (ITR) Hub at USAID, reminded us of the value of proactively including people "whose lived experience can provide different perspectives." For USAID, this means ensuring that 25 percent of its funding is dispersed to local organizations. Daanish Masood, Advisor on AI Alignment at the UN's Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, echoed this call by highlighting the importance of "epistemological pluralism" to more effectively engage community members who often perceive and value their world using different frameworks. By bringing together multidisciplinary teams, innovators can develop technologies that will better meet the social reality in which they will be deployed.Not only does diversity make technology more effective, it also helps to minimize potential harm. For example, Josh Blumenstock shared how his team gathered input from rural communities in Togo to inform the development of a social transfer targeting software his team co-created with the Ministry of Digital Economy and Transformation. Zoe Kahn, a PhD student on Blumenstock's team in Togo, conducted ethnographic research to better understand how members of rural communities would interact, understand, and appraise the digital social transfer system they were building.Finally, technically excellent solutions must build the social consensus and requisite buy-in across different contexts to tailor and maintain these tools iteratively. This requires planning for the long-term, building in plans for deprecation, and creating institutions — whether private companies, volunteer-based organizations, or capacity-building initiatives — to maintain and update these innovations to make them sustainable over the long-run.What Does Success Look Like?We should not assume that we have the same vision of a successful technological innovation in the social impact space. We often tout "scaling" as the final life stage of tech; for many, it serves as the ultimate goal and proxy of success. Yet, Brigitte Hoyer Gosselink, Director of Product Impact at Google.org, distinguished two paths to integrating technological interventions: a tailored, individualized solution in close partnership with a decision maker and centralized, replicable systems that can be deployed across time and space reliably.Our Technology Adoption for the Public Good panel delved into the public sector's challenges and opportunities in helping to scale proven solutions. | Matt KrupoffShould a technological intervention in global development be global in scope? We need a better sense of the trade-offs in scaling up from local to global to answer this question empirically. Some systems may be better suited to function at national or regional scales. Collaborators should plan to measure performance reliably across scale to tailor solutions accordingly.As Jane Munga, Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, reminded us: even if we develop good tech solutions for citizens who have a mobile phone and access to the internet now, there is a sizable portion of the world's most underserved who would be excluded due to lack of access. We need to expand the size of the pie, improve the quality of its ingredients, and increase the diversity of the culinary team that bakes it. Digital technology has a role to play in achieving more equitable social and economic development world-wide. How transformative that development will be depends on us.Technology Is Not a Panacea, but It Can Help Solve Specific Problems was originally published in CEGA on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.