Suchergebnisse

As part of our joint review of the UK Constitution with the Institute for Government, Justin Fisher navigates the challenges of effectively regulating political finance in light of technological change, internationalism and the significant emergence of non-party actors.
The post The regulation of political finance – choppier waters ahead? appeared first on Bennett Institute for Public Policy.

In recent decades self-regulation of politicians and political parties has become less acceptable and public control over the design of such rules and their evolutionary mechanisms gains paramount importance. In line with this statement my cumulative dissertation presents four papers on transparency regulation of political finance and conflict of interest. It not only conceptually defines and embeds these types of regulation into the overall anti-corruption regulatory framework but also provides interested readers with a theoretical framework on why countries change these sensitive rules and hereby often go for various designs. This thesis develops further already classical theoretical approaches of neo-institutionalism used to study party finance reforms by discussing the importance of international factors and existing regulatory traditions. To test the theoretical propositions, I construct original data sets inter alia from the evaluation and compliance reports provided by the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) as well as from personally conducted in-depth interviews. Although political finance regimes, at least in Europe, in general tend to converge, we lack empirical evidence that countries adopt similar transparency regulation on political finance and conflict of interest. A detailed discussion of findings concludes that domestic political competition to a large extent determines the launch of reforms, apart from scandals. Also, international organisations, like GRECO, contribute to the reforms´ initiation by drawing public attention to political corruption upon examining loopholes in existing practices, and to some extent empowering civil society in combating corruption. Political parties which favour transparency reforms and control the veto points as well as successful regulatory experience in similar contexts significantly affect the positive outcome of reforms. Overall, the outcome of transparency reforms is a product of domestic competition between political parties, costs of domestic implementation of these reforms as well as reputational benefits and loses for the country in the international arena. Thereby, democratic dissent seems to be the central mechanism for diminishing corruption and establishment of an effective anti-corruption regulatory framework. Suggestions for future research round up each of the chapters.

Political finance regulation is often praised in terms of its ability to introduce equality among political parties, to create more transparent political parties and to lower the influence of affluent donors on the political decision-making process. Little examination exists, however, of the effectiveness of this type of regulation. This article aims to fill this gap by addressing whether and to what extent different types of public funding regulation have improved the legitimacy of political parties by improving their image in terms of corruption. Towards this end, and focusing on both European and Latin American democracies, this article investigates whether a relationship indeed exists between the perceived corruption of political parties and the regulation of political finance. It finds such a relationship does exist, although not in the direction commonly stipulated by the advocates of party finance regulation. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright, the International Political Science Association.]

Political finance regulation is often praised in terms of its ability to introduce equality among political parties, to create more transparent political parties and to lower the influence of affluent donors on the political decision-making process. Little examination exists, however, of the effectiveness of this type of regulation. This article aims to fill this gap by addressing whether and to what extent different types of public funding regulation have improved the legitimacy of political parties by improving their image in terms of corruption. Towards this end, and focusing on both European and Latin American democracies, this article investigates whether a relationship indeed exists between the perceived corruption of political parties and the regulation of political finance. It finds such a relationship does exist, although not in the direction commonly stipulated by the advocates of party finance regulation.

In recent years the regulation of political finance in Australia has moved from systems of laissez‐faire to systems of enhanced regulation, which aim to curb the scale and influence of donations. This article examines political finance regulation in New South Wales — the jurisdiction that has seen the most significant transformation of its regulatory setup — to assess whether and how the new regulations have affected donations to political parties in the state. We find, based on analysis of the pattern of donations before and after the reforms, that the regulations have made the financing system fairer and thus improved the quality of democracy in the state.

Europe does matter for political parties because of the impact of its rules, directives and norms into the domestic sphere. Drawing on new evidence, this paper sheds light on largely hidden aspects of the Europeanization of political parties and argues that the legal framework regulating party funding has been directly affected by this process. Political parties in EU candidate countries and the member states of the Council of Europe have become the target of stricter regulations in order to combat political corruption. The way in which external agencies have influenced the regulations on the funding of political parties is analysed. The article illustrates how political parties gain in importance in the context of the EU accession process and associated anti-corruption reforms. The influence of Europeanization on party funding regulations has been particularly important in the cases of Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania, as well as Turkey and the Balkan countries that have declared their intention of joining the EU.

This report reviews and analyses party financing regulation in 13 African countries, drawing on an in depth scrutiny of party legislation and personal interviews1 with representatives of nine different political parties2 in more than half of those countries (i.e. Angola, Malawi, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Uganda). It examines the complex dynamics between money and party politics, looking in particular at (1) how public funds are allocated, (2) how campaigns are financed, (3) the different options (and obstacles) parties face when trying to finance their ordinary activities, (4) the type and scope of financial disclosure and oversight, and (5) the extent to which financial violations are sanctioned. Overall, and despite variation in national contexts and national regulations, we find that (1) in most countries party financing regulations are shine by their absence, and (2) party competition is largely unequal. In this context, it is possible to conclude that while incumbents not only receive often the lion's share of public and private funding, but also have unsupervised access to state resources; opposition parties face the highest hurdles to be able to perform key functions such as mobilization of voter support and electoral campaigning. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

The relationship between money and politics and the regulation of the money role in politics have long become one of the most important and persistent questions of democratic government. Various countries in the world, including Lithuania, are trying to find the best political finance mechanisms to reduce political corruption related to political finance, and to ensure the transparency by engaging in public debate, and changing the legal regulation of political finance. This article analyzes political party finance, regulatory changes and its consequences in Lithuania, with particular emphasis on sources of funding restrictions, limitations reasons, arguments and possible consequences. The main aim of the article is to find out whether the permanent change of financing of political parties and regulatory prohibitions actually help or can help to ensure the transparency of political finance in Lithuania. First, the article provides an overview of the political finance systems. Second, the analysis of political party funding regulations in Lithuania, identifying the key stages of the regulatory changes and trends, is provided. Third, the article analyzes possible consequences of the current political party funding mechanism.

The relationship between money and politics and the regulation of the money role in politics have long become one of the most important and persistent questions of democratic government. Various countries in the world, including Lithuania, are trying to find the best political finance mechanisms to reduce political corruption related to political finance, and to ensure the transparency by engaging in public debate, and changing the legal regulation of political finance. This article analyzes political party finance, regulatory changes and its consequences in Lithuania, with particular emphasis on sources of funding restrictions, limitations reasons, arguments and possible consequences. The main aim of the article is to find out whether the permanent change of financing of political parties and regulatory prohibitions actually help or can help to ensure the transparency of political finance in Lithuania. First, the article provides an overview of the political finance systems. Second, the analysis of political party funding regulations in Lithuania, identifying the key stages of the regulatory changes and trends, is provided. Third, the article analyzes possible consequences of the current political party funding mechanism.

The relationship between money and politics and the regulation of the money role in politics have long become one of the most important and persistent questions of democratic government. Various countries in the world, including Lithuania, are trying to find the best political finance mechanisms to reduce political corruption related to political finance, and to ensure the transparency by engaging in public debate, and changing the legal regulation of political finance. This article analyzes political party finance, regulatory changes and its consequences in Lithuania, with particular emphasis on sources of funding restrictions, limitations reasons, arguments and possible consequences. The main aim of the article is to find out whether the permanent change of financing of political parties and regulatory prohibitions actually help or can help to ensure the transparency of political finance in Lithuania. First, the article provides an overview of the political finance systems. Second, the analysis of political party funding regulations in Lithuania, identifying the key stages of the regulatory changes and trends, is provided. Third, the article analyzes possible consequences of the current political party funding mechanism.