Straipsnio tikslas - irodyti, kad demokratijai kaip politinei santvarkai nereikia religijos, kaip ja papildancio veiksnio. Irodymas grindziamas lyginamaja Alexis'o de Tocqueville'io ir Johno Rawlso paziuru analize. Tocqueville'io nuomone, demokratijai reikia religijos, kaip ja papildan-ciu morales normu saltinio. Rawlsas demokratija suvokia kaip savaran-kiska politinio gyvenimo forma, nepriklausancia nuo religiniu isitikinimu. Tocqueville'io ir Rawlso paziuru lyginamoji analize leidzia paaiskinti itampa tarp demokratijos ir religijos. Net ir siekdamas kuo didesnio nesaliskumo, demokratinis rezimas yra saliskas tam tikroms filosofinems prielaidoms, ku-riu negali pripazinti tikintieji The aim of the study was an analysis of two the conceptions of relationships between democracy and religion. One of these conceptions was created by Alexis de Tocqueville. He thought that democracy needs religion as an element that enriches it and helps in removing some negative tendencies inherent in this form of government. He understood that democracy was coalesced with the philosophies that were alien to religion, however, he demanded an alliance of democracy and religion. The other object of philosophical analysis is John Rawls. The theories of this author show an important change in the relationship of religion and democracy, which stems from the fact that he equates religion with philosophy. The Political Liberalism of Rawls helps us understand why democracy as a form of government has no need of religion. Adapted from the source document.
The article is based on an idea that there are four different modes of understanding reality -- practice, science, art and mysticism. Political liberalism demands separation of public and private beliefs. However, mystical understanding of reality is not a system of propositions and beliefs. This is why one can speak of a conflict between liberalism and mystical understanding of reality. Political liberalism imposes a certain understanding of reality on believers. Liberals propose to remove religious convictions from public life and not to treat them as a basis of politics. They forget that mystics have the biggest trouble namely with convictions. To turn the reality of God into words for them is always the hardest task. Mystics find God before words, concepts and discourses. Liberals reduce religion to convictions and demand from mystics to comprehend that, which in their opinion is not comprehensible. There is a tension between liberalism and people who have mystical experiences. Liberals narrow down religious experience to convictions. However, mystical experience is a much broader subject. Behind it stands an understanding of world that has its own standards of reality. Adapted from the source document.
Muslims have known & used the term 'da'wa' throughout the history of Islam. The concept, or rather concepts, of da'wa has been elaborated upon since the early centuries of Islam. Muslims have applied the term to various specific activities of theirs. The broadly known explanation in Europe & North America for da'wa is that it constitutes activities, which in the Christian context fall under the term 'missions' or 'missionary activities.' Recently, however, there has been much discussion whether da'wa at all can be rendered as 'missionary activity,' for it is argued by some Muslims as well as non-Muslim scholars that da'wa distinctly differs from what in the Christian tradition 'missions' have encompassed. From the available historical evidence, it appears that after Muhammad's death Muslims did not immediately embark upon da'wa activities -- during & after the rapid conquests of the Byzantinian & Persian lands, they little if at all ventured to preach to local non-Muslims about the virtues of Islam. Da'wa in the sense of inviting non-Muslims to embrace Islam was not yet on conquering Muslims' agenda. The first waves of conversions to Islam from among the indigenous populations of the conquered lands took place with virtually no Muslim missionary activities in the background. But the concept of da'wa was not lost even on the early Muslims. They were very much aware of it & indeed capitalized on its exploitation. Yet, this first was done on the intra-community level, among the Muslims themselves. The term da'wa came into wider usage almost a hundred years after Muhammad's death, in the wake of the 'Abbasid propaganda against the then ruling Ummayad clan in the 720's. However, the 'Abbasid da'wa ceased as soon as the 'Abbasids were in power -- the fact that attests to its political nature. Da'wa as a truly missionary activity, albeit still within the Muslim Umma, appeared in the form of the Isma'ili da'wa of the 9th through 13th centuries. Isma'ilis, in many ways, can be seen as the pioneers of the organized Muslim missionary activities: their highly institutionalized & sophisticated da'wa structure has hardly been repeated until today. Moreover, for the Isma'ilis, da'wa was a state priority. The Isma'ili da'wa encompassed extra- & intra-ummaic forms & blended both theology & politics. The focal point of this article is the inter-relatedness of da'wa & politics on both theoretical & practical levels. On the one hand, the Quran nowhere directly implies da'wa to be a political activity. On the other hand, Muslims made it a part of their political theory (through relating da'wa to jihad) & life (using the concept of da'wa in their political agendas). Taken in general, the intertwining of da'wa & politics, then, has been a feature throughout the Muslim history, though practical implications of this have been different in different ages. [Abstract shortened by ProQuest.]. Adapted from the source document.
With the so-called war on terror launched by the USA in 2001, a new era started in one of the fields of the propaganda war -- the Internet. Ability to disseminate information to as wide as possible audience due to globality of the Internet has become a powerful mean of influence. Many Muslim politically engaged religiously motivated groups, who perceive themselves to be in the state of such war, create their own elaborate web-sites. "KavkazCenter" is just one of them. "KavkazCenter" declares itself to be a product of the Chechen Independent International Islamic Internet Agency, which was set up in 1999 in Grozny by the Chechen National Center for Strategic Research & Political Technologies. However, its content is somewhat problematic, as the site appears to have been solely a propaganda tool for the Chechen Jihadist group Riyadhu as-Salihin, led by the late Shamil Basayev, who often boasted about his organized bloody attacks, frequently against civilians. Lithuania first noticed the site in early 2003, when it started being serviced by a Lithuanian firm "Microlink Data," which at the time hosted the site on its server. Back then the Lithuanian State Security Department (SSD) declared the site to be free from terrorist propaganda & insisted it did not pose any threat to Lithuania, though it was known that the site had been earlier closed down in the USA & the UK. However, half a year later the very same SSD confiscated the server of the firm "Elneta," which at that time hosted the site, thus shutting down its operations from Lithuania. This launched a long marathon of legal deliberations going all the way up to the Constitutional Court. The case divided the Lithuanian public into two parts -- those, who considered the "KavkazCenter" to be an information agency of independence-seeking Chechen freedom fighters & those, who considered the site to contain terrorist propaganda. The "defenders" group was championed by some MPs, Soviet-era dissidents, while the "accusers" group was led by the SSD. The unfolding of the case revealed that both sides were ill-prepared to meet the challenge the site "KavkazCenter" had caused. One can argue that even state institutions were taken by surprise by it. This first of all applies to the SSD, who showed itself at its worst -- its lack of professionalism was astonishing. At the same time, gaps in legislation & by extension in the work of courts were exposed. Most journalists, who took to bashing of the SSD for presumed persecution of media on the freedom of expression grounds, displayed ignorance & lack of deeper insight into the case. The general public was left puzzled. Moreover, Russia's involvement, though often referred to in the media, has never been fully revealed. The epopee of the "KavkazCenter" in Lithuania sucked both the Lithuanian government & the general society into the whirlpool of the global information wars. And though the experience shows that most of the actors were ill-prepared or not prepared at all, the very experience is very useful -- it allowed for identifying of the weaknesses in political, legal & social life of the country. Learning from its mistakes, the society can progress & improve. It is plausible to hope that in the event of another "kavkazcentr," the Lithuanian government & non-state actors will be better informed & equipped to tackle the issue. Adapted from the source document.
The main thesis of this article is that civic & political activity of older generations of Lithuanian population is based on "sense of duty" and traditional moral values (importance of family, patriotism, religion) while younger generation is characterized by secular-rational values (priority is given to measures of personal benefit, efficiency). It is argued in the article that this intergenerational difference in value orientations is more important than life cycle effect explaining differences of political & civic engagement between young & older people in Lithuanian society. Adapted from the source document.
