In 1942, proletarian writer, Takeda Rintarō, was sent from Japan to the Dutch East-Indies (Indonesia) as part of the Sendenbu (propaganda squad), where he led the literature section in the Keimin Bunka Shidōshō (cultural center) in Jakarta. Jawa sarasa documents Takeda Rintaro's activities and cultural experiences in Java, Indonesia, after he returned to Japan in 1944. Most Japanese literature and cultural writings about Nanyō or Nanpō ("South Islands" - South Asia and the Pacific, including Indonesia) from this era reference the concept of Imperialism in Asia. In the pre-war period, stereotypes such as dojin (local primitive) and tōmin (islander) defined South Island people as being lesser than or "other" than the Japanese people. Japanese literary depictions of tropical Eden's and exotic "uncivilized people" reflect similar perceptions and writings by Western authors towards Asia in the 19th century. This paper explores Takeda Rintarō's perspectives of "otherness" in prewar discourses about Indonesia. Through the influence of "The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" propaganda concept, the ideology of "sameness" was becoming a hegemonic cultural idea in Takeda's writings about Indonesia. Conversely, however, Takeda's depiction of the double-occupation of Java, with the political rule of Holland and economic domination of daily life by Chinese immigrants, implied criticism of Japan's administrative policies regarding economic exploitation in Java. Takeda's criticisms of Japanese policy are bedded in his emotion for the nature, culture and people of Indonesia.
Hans Schippers assesses the position of the Islamic AK Party led by Prime Minister Erdogan in the light of the relationship between religion and the state in Turkey. Although the AK Party won the general elections in 2002, Erdogan has the Damocletian sword of a military coup hanging above his head ever since. The military consider themselves to be the guardians of Kemal Atatürk's legacy of Turkey as a secular state. In the past decades they intervened four times in politics, the most recent one the 1998 'post modern' coup to oust the Islamic Prime Minister Erbakan, whose approach to Iran, critical opinions on the EU and NATO and favourisation of religious education had gone too far in the eyes of the military. Erdogan cleverly avoided the mistakes of his predecessor. He declared the AKP to be a conservative, pro-EU and pro-NATO party that would seek adherence to the mostly christian-democratic European Peoples Party. His government would be liberal and respect people with different opinions on religion. Erdogan did well in regional elections of 2004. However, he met with growing criticism in the following two years. The organisational structure of the AKP is undemocratic and the number of women active in the party is far too limited, his critics remarked. The party is accused of conducting a campaign of 'creeping islamisation' of Turkish society. The military closely monitor every decision of the government near two-thirds majority in parliament and he could They have the support of the secular president have a party member elected. This would increase Sezer who has amended or rejected a large number the chances of military intervention. Erdogan will of Erdogans proposals. A crucial moment for the probably opt for a compromise candidate. However, AKP-government will be the election by parliament until the arliamentary elections of November, the of a new president, coming May. Erdogan has a political.
Traduction japonaise, original anglais disponible en ligne sur HAL-SHS. Remerciements à Matoba Hiroshi pour sa traduction. ; International audience ; This paper responds to two different contexts. The first one was the coming UK referendum and, whatever the result, the challenge for the EU to reinvent itself or dissolve if it continues failing European populations. The second context was a deep questioning in Japan, but also in South Korea, about the future of East Asia and of ASEAN: is a convergence possible beyond economic interactions? How to breach cultural divides? How to overcome the search for hegemony, deep historical hatred, in order to reach and establish a common ground? The paper analyzes the presupposition of the European construction from the beginning: a union can be negotiated and instituted by the construction of a joint or common economic sphere. This construction has always denied or even repressed the fact that the autonomization of the economic sphere is complex historical process different for each nation in Europe or in the rest of the world. So the economic sphere has different relations to politics, society, knowledge production and education, even religion, in each nation. The same can be said of the conception and practice of public opinion, the structure and role of the state, etc. A union based on the presupposition of a common economic sphere becomes unsustainable in time of crisis. No solution can be hoped from the minds of politicians and bureaucrats: they don't act at the level where solutions can be found. "Culture", like "market", does not touch the problems at stake. The only real solution is to produce and share knowledge on the differentiation in each case of politics, civil society, the economy, research and education, even religion in order to map the differences and the family ressemblance between the different national trajectories. This joint knowledge is the only common ground of a coherent and creative union in Europe. It is also true in other parts of the world where ...
Traduction japonaise, original anglais disponible en ligne sur HAL-SHS. Remerciements à Matoba Hiroshi pour sa traduction. ; International audience ; This paper responds to two different contexts. The first one was the coming UK referendum and, whatever the result, the challenge for the EU to reinvent itself or dissolve if it continues failing European populations. The second context was a deep questioning in Japan, but also in South Korea, about the future of East Asia and of ASEAN: is a convergence possible beyond economic interactions? How to breach cultural divides? How to overcome the search for hegemony, deep historical hatred, in order to reach and establish a common ground? The paper analyzes the presupposition of the European construction from the beginning: a union can be negotiated and instituted by the construction of a joint or common economic sphere. This construction has always denied or even repressed the fact that the autonomization of the economic sphere is complex historical process different for each nation in Europe or in the rest of the world. So the economic sphere has different relations to politics, society, knowledge production and education, even religion, in each nation. The same can be said of the conception and practice of public opinion, the structure and role of the state, etc. A union based on the presupposition of a common economic sphere becomes unsustainable in time of crisis. No solution can be hoped from the minds of politicians and bureaucrats: they don't act at the level where solutions can be found. "Culture", like "market", does not touch the problems at stake. The only real solution is to produce and share knowledge on the differentiation in each case of politics, civil society, the economy, research and education, even religion in order to map the differences and the family ressemblance between the different national trajectories. This joint knowledge is the only common ground of a coherent and creative union in Europe. It is also true in other parts of the world where ...
Traduction japonaise, original anglais disponible en ligne sur HAL-SHS. Remerciements à Matoba Hiroshi pour sa traduction. ; International audience ; This paper responds to two different contexts. The first one was the coming UK referendum and, whatever the result, the challenge for the EU to reinvent itself or dissolve if it continues failing European populations. The second context was a deep questioning in Japan, but also in South Korea, about the future of East Asia and of ASEAN: is a convergence possible beyond economic interactions? How to breach cultural divides? How to overcome the search for hegemony, deep historical hatred, in order to reach and establish a common ground? The paper analyzes the presupposition of the European construction from the beginning: a union can be negotiated and instituted by the construction of a joint or common economic sphere. This construction has always denied or even repressed the fact that the autonomization of the economic sphere is complex historical process different for each nation in Europe or in the rest of the world. So the economic sphere has different relations to politics, society, knowledge production and education, even religion, in each nation. The same can be said of the conception and practice of public opinion, the structure and role of the state, etc. A union based on the presupposition of a common economic sphere becomes unsustainable in time of crisis. No solution can be hoped from the minds of politicians and bureaucrats: they don't act at the level where solutions can be found. "Culture", like "market", does not touch the problems at stake. The only real solution is to produce and share knowledge on the differentiation in each case of politics, civil society, the economy, research and education, even religion in order to map the differences and the family ressemblance between the different national trajectories. This joint knowledge is the only common ground of a coherent and creative union in Europe. It is also true in other parts of the world where ...
This book deals with community-building as it manifested itself in early modern 's-Hertogenbosch. Citizenship and autonomous collective organisations were phenomena that were present in all West-European cities. Mostly men organised themselves in among others civic militias, craft-guilds and the reformed congregation: corporations that may be considered the most important institutions of the middling sort. The members of the corporate institutions rendered their services to a great extent to the master-corporation, their domicile. On the basis of the situation in 's-Hertogenbosch the following questions will be answered: 1. how was civil society formed in Dutch cities in the seventeenth and eighteenth century; 2. in what way did the corporate institutions contribute to the local community-building; 3. how did these social connections develop in time. Craft-guilds, civic militias and the church created a bond between the people. By their regulations members of these corporations took up a juridically clearly defined position towards the inhabitants who did not belong, and especially towards foreigners. In the corporations individual freedom was not sought as its highest goal, but the welfare of the collective. The corporations offered their members dignity, social acceptance, participation, sociability and protection in times of distress, and they bore responsibility for the organization of the city. In this book there is definitely a place for conflict as well. A harmonious and prosperous society is in the view of communautarists like Robert Putnam's almost the natural outcome from citizens cooperating in unions. Conflict forms an essential part of the interaction between people. In spite of the conflicts corporations did not collapse. Corporations underlined the importance of the social bond for the individual as well as the community. The main obstacle was religion. The policy of the town council was directed towards a fair and just treatment of the different confessions within the framework of the Capitulation Treaty of 1629 and the "laws of The Hague". The town council was the guardian of the common interest and it corrected the corporations that were inclined to serve their own ends. Skipping the details Robert Putnam draws attention to the corporations in North-Italian city-states that caused civil communities to bloom. Putnam relates this to the present American society. He just like Amitai Etzioni, another important community-thinker, recognizes the importance of social connections in which members cooperate, have discussions and in doing so keep democracy alive. Communautarists pay attention to the transmitting of norms and values. Corporations in early modern times also were emphatically engaged in this. What applied to Putnam's city-states in the late Middle Ages also applies to the corporations in early modern 's-Hertogenbosch. Members of the corporations created a lively culture of discussion, a necessary condition for a community on its way to democracy. (Jonathan Israel states that 'the democratic republic [started] in the Republiek') In order to deliberate with one another it is important that the partners in deliberation trust one another. Cooperating within social connections and delegating responsibilities is only possible, as Fukuyama points out, if there is trust. Both within the guilds and the militias this trust could grow because quite soon after the Reduction of 1629 the catholic and reformed members started to work on the ecumenicity of everyday life. Schilling and Blickle both ascertain, ignoring details, that changes into a democratic direction in early modern times were initiated bottom-up in small connections. The discussion that Tönnies started on Gesellschaft und Gemeinschaft is still very much alive especially when we take into account the 'golden rules' of Etzioni. He draws attention to the smaller connections - intermediary institutions - that a democratic communitarian society, a 'community of communities' needs if it is to stay alive.
