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The logic of civil religion consists of minimizing community in order to maximize pluralism. Every modern society needs pluralism on the one hand, and securing of its foundations on the other. Still, civil religion may raise suspicion with regard to use of religion for political purposes. And instrumentalization is contradictory to the character of religion, although the latter always has political consequences as well. Civil religion serves politics with the aim of educating citizens. Perhaps, however, it can also be perceived as preparation of totalitarian beliefs and liturgies, such as are known to us from the first half of the 20th century. Civil religion can go hand in hand with excessive nationalism, proselytism, and Satanization of enemies. Such undesirable consequences of civil religion are discussed in this article on the basis of examples from the time of the French Revolution. The Revolution was largely marked by civil religion, the former even legitimized the latter. Four examples from the history of the French Revolution are analyzed: human rights as civil religion; cult of reason and of the supreme being; worship of the Revolution's "martyr" Jean-Paul Marat, and, finally, Satanization of enemies. Following his expose, the author confronts these questions: Is the confusing element of civil religion the fact that it wants to utilize religion per se for political purposes? What is it that protects civil religion from degenerating into nationalism and proselytism? Or else civil religion can be both: the basis of a tolerant pluralist democracy as well as the preparatory stage of totalitarianism? Adapted from the source document.

The author looks into the relation between politics, state and religion from the political-science perspective, as part of an analysis and evaluation of tasks, achievements and failures of polity, policy or politics from the standpoint of normative-constructive philosophy of equity. At present the central task of policy is to stimulate and strengthen the Western political culture based on the fundamental distinction between "reasonable" and "unreasonable" pluralism. "Reasonable" pluralism rests on the assumption that the state is a just power, the sovereignty of which can be recognized in distinguishing the "public" and the "private", the just and the good, and, in connection therewith, it is almost self-understandable that such a liberal guaranteed private sphere must be the primary arena of religious practice and religious freedoms. The crucial trait of the relation between state and religion is manifest in the fact that only the legal state and the liberal constitution are competent to state what the freedom of individuals consists of within the framework of norms of what is just. The author defines "religion" in the comprehensive sense as central to the processes of forming cultural identity, and he deems that cultural policy (which, in principle, has to do with relations between state and religion), as policy of equitable integration of multi-culturally shaped political unities, must be oriented toward stimulation of those attitudes and values which make possible the reasonable pluralism defined according to Rawls. Since the political encompasses also the possibility to make enemies, the author advocates the cultural policy of "weakening the feelings of enmity" (N. Elias). In this way, a systematic concept of policy would be created, one which would reflect and preserve the conditions of reasonable pluralism. On the policy level and, in particular, on the politics level, cultural policy is a very demanding project. Perhaps it is precisely Switzerland, with its special prospects of civil democracy, that offers promising cultural-policy opportunities for activity, which are as yet still insufficiently researched. Adapted from the source document.

The paper reports partial findings of a research project into Croatian ethnonationalism (Croatian: narodnjastvo) as a religion (in the sense of a human invention of the sacred). The practical problems are as follows: ethnonationalism as a religion, which implies inter alia that an ethnic community (Croatian: narod) has the potential and/or capability to develop into, and ought to become, the substratum of a (nation-)state; consequences of ethnonationalism, which include the unattainability of ethnic democracy, ethnic economy and ethnic maturity; conditions of Croatian ethnonationalism, primarily the Catholic Church as a condition in 1961-71, and also before and after the period, especially since 1990. Theoretical problems, i.e. inadequacies in scholarly knowledge of the practical problems, include the following: firstly, Croatian Constitutional Court jurisprudence on ethnic and religious communities; secondly, systematic history of law and state in Croatia and Yugoslavia 1945-90; thirdly, transformation of both communism and catholicism into ethnonationalism; fourthly and fifthly, social structure and representation/agency. To attain the general goal of the research project, which is the use of reason in public affairs, the research is carried out within the theoretical and methodological framework of an integral theory of law and state which includes a modified Lasswell and McDougal's policy analysis expanded by historical institutionalism and critical theory. The subject-matter are the following features of Catholicism as an institutionalized religion, especially in Croatia 1961-71: (1) law, i.e. (1.1) sources of law; (1.2) internal law (organs, members, means); (1.3) external law (relations with the state and non-Catholics); (2) the Church and economy; (3) the Church and nation; (4) Catholicism on theory and practice. The hypotheses (which are ideal-types and as such cannot be either verified or falsified conclusively) are that ethnonationalism in Croatia is a consequence of, inter alia, the following beliefs maintained by the Catholic Church in Croatia in the 1960s and to a significant degree later on: 1. the only acceptable relationship between the Church and the state is the partnership of two legally equal public orders over the same subjects within which the Church has the exclusive power to regulate matrimonial and other family relations, and the power to control education in public schools; 2. peasant family is the basic organic human community; 3. the subjects to the ecclesiastical -- originally feudal -- power tied in fact to land make the ethnic community (Croatian: narod), which is united with the clergy into the Christian community (Croatian: krscanski narod); 4. since fundamental truths are accessible by theology only, and practice is an application of theory, practical knowledge, especially on the appropriate relationship between the Church and the state, is valid only if in accord with Church teaching. The evidence presented in the paper supports to a significant degree the hypotheses. The research findings contribute to the solution of all the theoretical problems, providing major contributions to the second and the third: the most probable reason why the Catholic Church in Croatia was rather silent in the Yugoslav and Croatian Spring 1961-71 and quite vocal since the 1990 is the Croatian Church's allegiance in matters of Church and state more to the First than to the Second Vatican council (which abandoned the Church's "divine" right to be co-sovereign with the state, exposing the "right" as a human invention of the sacred); the Church's ethnonationalism, which facilitates the political partnership of the Church and the state and ensures the dominant position of the clergy within the Church, has coincided with the interest of Yugoslav communists to retain their might and power by a metamorphosis, with the Church's assistance honoured by a concordat, into Croatian ethnonationalists, who, as newly born capitalists, have appropriated the greater part of the former socialist property and continue appropriating the greater part of present public goods. Adapted from the source document.

The article deals with the separation of church and state as the key historical turning point in the creation of one of the fundamental determining factors of contemporary states and political systems. The author gives an account of the contributions of the American and European political traditions, and presents a very comprehensive historical context in which Christianity introduced a new model of relations between church and state. The Western tradition of church-state interrelations is essentially characterized by the problem of separation, and by various legal-political arrangements founded on the principle of separation of church and state. Consequently, the article aims to put forward some of the relevant ideas which contributed to the creation of the church separation principle, as well as some of the basic elements of the relations between church and state in contemporary political systems. Adapted from the source document.

How is law as both a set of standards of conduct and a way of reasoning related to politics, economy and culture? The approach to the problem taken in the paper is practical and instrumental rather than theoretical for its own sake. The aim is to appraise the subject-matter with a view of facilitating its change towards the basic values of the inquiry. Since the values are postulated by a stipulative definition of law, which implies relations of law to politics, economy and even culture, it may appear that the approach unduly trivializes rather than solves the problem. The approach may nonetheless be valid, if the stipulated definition of law is sufficiently integral, that is, inclusive. To that end the paper attempts to integrate into the stipulated definition of law three major philosophical traditions, which are still building blocks of -- and hence the keys to -- contemporary doctrines and cultures. In the classical (ontological) key (which is analysed in the first part of the paper) law is conceived of as a constituting and correcting aspect of the whole consisting of politics, economy, law and religion qua centerpiece of culture. In the modem (epistemological) key (analysed in the second part of the paper) ideas of law range from the conceptions that law is the constituent of modem social systems and hence an indispensable means of identifying modem social phenomena to the theories that law, as well as politics, economy and culture, is a phenomenon reducible to its natural causes. In the contemporary (linguistic) key (also in the second part) law, which is the constituent even of religion, can be understood only from within of the culture -- including politics and economy -- into which it is woven. The three traditions differ most markedly in their views of the contact between reason and action. In contrast to the classical tradition, which recognizes that reason can be action-guiding, reason and action are in the epistemological key separated by a logical gap, whereas in the linguistic key they are hardly distinguishable. The triple solution of the problem of inquiry increases both heuristic and practical potentials of the stipulated definition of law. By integrating diverse philosophical traditions, the definition is serviceable to the integrity of a pluralistic legal order, that is, to achieving the postulated basic values within the limits of the law. However, the approach taken in the paper, while more inclusive than more partisan approaches, is still merely an approach which is in the final analysis also partisan. Moreover, when seen from a culture that has not been integrated by the definition, the approach may be parochial or even inimical. Adapted from the source document.

How is law as both a set of standards of conduct and a way of reasoning related to politics, economy and culture? The approach to the problem taken in the paper is practical and instrumental rather than theoretical for its own sake. The aim is to appraise the subject-matter with a view of facilitating its change towards the basic values of the inquiry. Since the values are postulated by a stipulative definition of law, which implies relations of law to politics, economy and even culture, it may appear that the approach unduly trivializes rather than solves the problem. The approach may nonetheless be valid, if the stipulated definition of law is sufficiently integral, that is, inclusive. To that end the paper attempts to integrate into the stipulated definition of law three major philosophical traditions, which are still building blocs of -- and hence the keys to -- contemporary doctrines and cultures. In the classical (ontological) key (which is analysed in the first part of the paper) law is conceived of as a constituting and correcting aspect of the whole consisting of politics, economy, law and religion qua centerpiece of culture. In the modern (epistemological) key (analysed in the second part of the paper) ideas of law range from the conceptions that law is the constituent of modern social systems and hence an indispensable means of identifying modern social phenomena to the theories that law, as well as politics, economy and culture, is a phenomenon reducible to its natural causes. In the contemporary (linguistic) key (also in the second part), law, which is the constituent even of religion, can be understood only from within of the culture -- including politics and economy -- into which it is woven. The three traditions differ most markedly in their views of the contact between reason and action. In contrast to the classical tradition, which recognizes that reason can be action guiding, reason and action are in the epistemological key separated by a logical gap, whereas in the linguistic key they are hardly distinguishable. The triple solution of the problem of inquiry increases both heuristic and practical potentials of the stipulated definition of law. By integrating diverse philosophical traditions, the definition is serviceable to the integrity of a pluralistic legal order, that is, to achieving the postulated basic values within limits of the law. However, the approach taken in the paper, while more inclusive than more partisan approaches, is still merely an approach, which is in the final analysis also partisan. Moreover, when seen from a culture that has not been integrated by the definition, the approach may be parochial or even inimical. Adapted from the source document.

Članak problematizira demokratski karakter Države Izrael i uspoređuje ga sa stvarnim stanjem stvari. Proturječnost određenja Izraela kao "židovske i demokratske" države već je u samom začetku stvaranja prouzročila određene karakteristike koje su teško usporedive sa zapadnim liberalnim demokracijama. Izrael se takvim pokušava prikazati usprkos očiglednom nepovoljnom položaju arapske manjine koja danas čini približno 20 posto stanovništva. Taj se položaj izraelskih Arapa odražava ne samo na status manjine u Izraelu već i na geopolitičku situaciju na prostoru Izraela i Zapadne Obale. Status Palestinaca može se iščitati iz svakodnevne političke prakse, ali i iz temeljnih dokumenata i zakonodavstva Države Izrael. Segregacija stanovništva prema vjerskom određenju čini nevidljivi zid unutar samog izraelskog društva. ; The article deals with the declared democratic character of the State of Israel and compares it with the real state of affairs. The contradiction present in the definition of Israel as "Jewish and democratic" has from its very beginning created certain characteristics of the State that are hardly comparable with western liberal democracy. Israel is striving to present itself as such despite the obvious adverse position of the Arab minority, comprising around 20 per cent of the population. This position of the Israeli Arabs reflects itself not only on the status of the minority, but also on the entire geopolitical situation in Israel and the West Bank as well. The status of the Palestinians in Israel can be deducted from the everyday political practice as well as from the fundamental documents and legislation of the State of Israel. The segregation of population according to religion makes for an invisible wall within the Israeli society.

Rad iznosi djelomične nalaze istraživanja hrvatskog narodnjaštva, tj. etnonacionalizma kao religije (u smislu ljudskog izmišljanja svetog).* Praktični su problemi sljedeći: narodnjaštvo kao religija, koja među ostalim uključuje to da narod ima mogućnost i/ili sposobnost da se razvije u nositelja države i da treba to i da postane; posljedice narodnjaštva, a to su nedostižnost narodne demokracije, narodne privrede i narodnog sazrijevanja; vjere u narod, i to prvenstveno Katoličke crkve u Hrvatskoj kao uvjeta od 1961. do 1971. te prije i nakon toga, naročito nakon 1990. Teorijski su problemi, tj. neodgovarajuće znanstveno znanje o praktičnima, sljedeći: prvo, odluke Ustavnog suda Republike Hrvatske o etničkim i vjerskim zajednicama; drugo, sustavna historija prava i države Hrvatske i Jugoslavije 1945.-1990.; treće, preobrazba komunizma i katolicizma u narodnjaštvo; četvrto i peto, društvena struktura i predstavljanje/zastupanje. Da bi se postigla opća svrha istraživačkog projekta, a to je upotreba razuma u javnim poslovima, istraživanje je provedeno u teorijsko-metodologijskom okviru integralne teorije prava i države koji uključuje prilagođenu Lasswellovu i McDougalovu političku analizu proširenu historijskim institucionalizmom i kritičkom teorijom prava. Glavna je hipoteza da je vjera u narod kao nositelja države izražena i ustanovljena odredbama Ustava RH da je RH nastala samoodređenjem naroda i/ili da je nacionalna država jednog ili više naroda; da je narod suveren; da pravo na državljanstvo RH imaju pripadnici određenog ili određenih naroda; da pripadnici određenog ili određenih naroda imaju posebna politička prava itd. Dopunska je hipoteza da je puku RH ili, pravno određenije, da je stanovnicima RH s biračkim pravom u RH smanjena vlast, a time i moć u odlučivanju o članstvu RH u transnacionalnim organizacijama, naime NATO-u i EU, te su oni sami svedeni na pravno neprepoznatljiv sastojak time što se u RH ne zna tko čini bilo puk bilo ustav. ; The paper reports partial findings of a research project into Croatian ethnonationalism (Croatian: narodnjaštvo) as a religion (in the sense of a human invention of the sacred). The practical problems are as follows: ethnonationalism as a religion, which implies inter alia that an ethnic community (Croatian: narod) has the potential and/or capacity to develop into, and ought to become, a substratum of the (nation-)state; consequences of ethnonationalism, which include the unattainability of ethnic democracy, ethnic economy and ethnic maturity; conditions of Croatian ethnonationalism, primarily the Catholic Church as a condition in 1961-1971, and also before and after the period, especially since 1990. The theoretical problems, i.e. inadequacies in scholarly knowledge of the practical problems, include inter alia Croatian Constitutional law, esp. jurisprudence of the Croatian Constitutional Court, on powers of ethnicities and disabilities of the people. To attain the general goal of the research project, which is the use of reason in public affairs, the research is carried out within the theoretical and methodological Framework of an integral theory of law and state which includes a modified Lasswell and McDougal's policy analysis expanded by historical institutionalism and critical theory. The paper attempts to demonstrate that there is strong evidence to support the following two chiefly descriptive hypotheses, which are ideal types and as such cannot be supported by conclusive evidence. The main hypothesis is that the faith in a narod as a substratum of the state is expressed and established by the provisions of the Croatian Constitution stating that the Republic of Croatia was created by the self-determination of a narod and/or is a nation-state of a narod, or of two or several narodi; a narod is sovereign; adherents of a narod have the right to Croatian nationality; adherents of a narod have special political rights, etc. The auxiliary hypothesis is that the people (Croatian: puk) or, juridically more precise, inhabitants of the Republic of Croatia with the right to vote have lost a part of their power to decide on the membership of the Republic of Croatia in transnational organisations, namely, NATO and EU, and have been reduced to a legally unrecognizable entity by virtue of the fact that in the Republic of Croatia it is not known what makes either its people or its constitution.

U ovom se radu promišlja i analizira odnos individualnog i socijalnog/grupnog identiteta na primjeru suvremene Bosne i Hercegovine. Ukazuje se na tjeskobu i nelagodu pojedinaca i grupa koji grade svoj grupni identitet na obilježjima i vrijednostima druge kulture kojoj zapravo ne pripadaju. Na taj način, pojedinac se fzički nalazi u svojoj zemlji/državi, a pod utjecajem politike i obrazovne politike, duhovno živi u nekom drugom okruženju. Takvi pojedinci najčešće postaju apatridi2, a da toga nisu svjesni, niti oni niti kreatori takve obrazovne politike. Oni se obrazovanjem udaljavaju od vlastite zajednice i kulture u kojoj žive i deklariraju pripadnicima neke druge kulture s kojom ih veže najčešće samo jedan od zajedničkih nazivnika, npr. religija. Na drugoj strani, pojedinci u BiH koji sebe svrstavaju u kategoriju ostali, ne grade svoj identitet isključivo na vjerskoj i nacionalnoj osnovi, oni ne teže biti što različitiji niti ekskluzivniji od ostalih svojih sunarodnjaka, oni svoje odnose s drugima utemeljuju na sličnostima i oni ne poimaju svoj identitet utemeljen isključivo na pripadnosti jednom od konstitutivnih naroda, iako im je to na neki način Ustavom zadano. Grupaciju ostali čine deklarirani patrioti BiH, čvrsto utemeljeni na svojoj zemlji, u svojoj domovini i nastoje graditi i oblikovati kompleksni bosansko-hercegovački socijalni identitet. Ova inverzija u kojoj se iz Ustavom defniranih konstitutivnih naroda zbog krize identiteta regrutiraju apatridi, i gdje ostali, iako im Ustav uskraćuje mnoga prava, postaju istinski patrioti, je jedinstven primjer koji, postoji samo u BiH i koji je uz sve druge okolnosti snažno potaknut obrazovnim sustavom. ; Tis paper considers and analyzes the relationship between individual and social / group identity on the example of modern Bosnia and Herzegovina. It points to the anxiety and discomfort of individuals and groups that build on its identity on the characteristics and values of other cultures which does not belong. In this way, the individual is physically located in your country / state, and under the influence of policy and education policy, the spiritual lives in another okruženju.Takvi individuals usually become stateless, without being aware of it, neither they nor the creators of such educational policies. Tey are educated away from their own communities and cultures in which they live, and declare themselves members of another culture that binds them most ofen only one common denominator, for example, Religions. On the other hand, individuals in BiH who himself into the category of others, do not build your identity solely on religious and national basis, they do not tend to be as diverse or more exclusive than the rest of their countrymen, they do their relationships with others founded on the similarities and they do not perceive their identity is based solely on the origin of these peoples, although it is in some way the Constitution default. Other group consists of BiH patriots declared, frmly established on their land, in their home country and seek to build and shape the complex Bosnian-Herzegovinian social identity. Te inversion in which the Constitution defned the constituent peoples due to identity crisis recruited stateless, and where else, if their constitution denied many rights, they become true patriots, is a unique example of that, there is only in BiH and that is with all the other circumstances strongly driven by educational system. ; Dieses Papier ist der Auffassung, und analysiert die Beziehung zwischen individuellen und sozialen / Gruppenidentität auf dem Beispiel der modernen Bosnien und Herzegowina. Es weist auf die Angst und Beschwerden von Einzelpersonen und Gruppen, die auf ihrer Identität auf die Eigenschafen und Werte anderer Kulturen, die nicht gehört zu bauen. Auf diese Weise wird die individuelle körperlich in Ihrem Land / Staat befndet, und unter dem Einfluss von Politik und Bildungspolitik, die spirituellen Leben in einem anderen okruženju.Takvi Individuen in der Regel werden Staatenlose, ohne es zu wissen, weder sie noch die Schöpfer solcher Bildungspolitik. Sie sind weg von ihren eigenen Gemeinschafen und Kulturen, in denen sie leben, erzogen und erklären sich Angehörige einer anderen Kultur, die sie bindet meist nur einen gemeinsamen Nenner, zum Beispiel. Die Religionen. Auf der anderen Seite, Menschen in Bosnien und Herzegowina, der sich in die Kategorie der anderen, nicht Ihre Identität zu bauen ausschließlich auf religiöse und nationale Basis, sie nicht dazu neigen, so vielfältig und exklusiver als der Rest ihrer Landsleute zu sein, haben sie ihre Beziehungen mit anderen auf die Ähnlichkeiten gegründet und sie nicht wahrnehmen ihre Identität beruht ausschließlich auf den Ursprung dieser Völker basiert, auch wenn es in irgendeiner Weise die Verfassung Standard. Andere Gruppe besteht aus BiH Patrioten erklärt, auf ihrem Land fest etabliert, in ihrem Heimatland und zu versuchen, zu bauen und gestalten die komplexen bosnisch-herzegowinischen soziale Identität. Die Umkehrung, in der die Verfassung defniert die Volksgruppen aufgrund von Identitätskrise rekrutiert Staatenlose, und wo sonst, wenn ihre Verfassung verweigert viele Rechte, wahre Patrioten werden sie, ist ein einzigartiges Beispiel dafür gibt es nur in Bosnien und Herzegowina, und das ist mit all den anderen Umständen stark vom Bildungs angetrieben Systems.

Christian Zionism is a political and religious phenomenon which has shaped the current Middle East to a very significant degree. Prompted by their religious beliefs, Christians played an important role in facilitating Jewish return to Zion, and in subsequent establishment, justification and defense of the State of Israel. Faith as motive behind Christian support of Israel became a more discussed topic during the recent years. That phenomenon was, however, usually superficially explored, particularly in Europe, where it was often perceived as a new and bizarre American excess, prompted by some other, non-religious and obscure interests. By inquiry in its history, this article demonstrates that such a view of Christian Zionism is largely incorrect. Christian Zionism can be traced all the way back to early 19th-century European and American Christian Evangelical movements. It grew out of a certain view of ecclesiology and literal interpretation of the Bible. The article suggests some explanations for reasons why it took so long for Christian Zionism to become recognized as a political and religious phenomenon, and argues that Christian Zionism by mid-20th century underwent a profound transformation. From an eschatological, proselytizing evangelistic movement it became more focused on ideology and geopolitical circumstances. The movement is still based on Christian religion, but support to the Jewish state is not focused on end-time prophecies any more. Among the main themes of the movement's current phase are recognition of Jewish and Christian common roots and civilizational proximity, fulfillment of Old Testament promises to Jews, resistance to global jihad, and Christian remorse for the horrors of the Holocaust. In conclusion, Christian Zionism is probably an unprecedented interfaith phenomenon, which is, in spite of being complex, multifaceted, and multilayered, genuinely and primarily religious. Adapted from the source document.

The first part of the text presents the republican position of young Hegel. This position is developed primarily through a divergence from Christianity, which is, in Hegel's judgment, the spiritual pillar of political despotism and the main cause of German spiritual, social and political backwardness. According to Hegel, the main reason for the fatal influence of Christianity is its private character, the fact that it teaches man to despise this earthly life, tells him that he is unable to achieve moral perfection through his own efforts and turns him into an object of a transcendental power. In opposition to Christianity, Hegel puts forward the Greek popular religions, i.e. the antique republican orders as the only orders adequate to man's freedom, pointing them out also as models for his own time. The second part of the text shows how Hegel's giving up on his youthful republican-democratic ideals and his adherence to hereditary monarchy is a consequence of the appearance of the liberal moment in his political philosophy. Through acceptance of subjectivity as the supreme principle of the new age, Hegel realizes that a return to the substantial ethical unity of the Greek polis is impossible. At the same time, he sees in the constitutional monarchy of the hereditary type the only order adequate to modern conditions. Namely it preserves the autonomy of non-political spheres in the state, while simultaneously -- in the monarch who is not dependent on the will of those subject to his power -- the state unity is guaranteed as opposed to civil society as a space of interest plurality and socio-economic differences. Finally, the author strives to demonstrate how, in spite of Hegel's obvious opting for hereditary monarchy and rejection of the republic, his mature political philosophy also encompasses a republican dimension. This has to do with a contradiction between the republican form and the monarchic contents of the political state. Namely the latter is not (only) a machinery of power which serves as a counterbalance to civil society, but is defined as the sphere of true political community. It is however not shaped through the activity of individuals; their political subjectivity is embodied in the hereditary monarch. This contradiction, i.e. the republican essence of the political state, leads to the conclusion that political emancipation can be conceived as a natural and necessary consequence of civil emancipation also in the conceptual field of The Philosophy of Right. Adapted from the source document.